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“No state on the planet Earth has gone through as many so-called ‘revolutions in 
warfare’ and ‘transformations’ as the United States. No state has expended the 
resources comparable to the US in the search for the panacea for war.”1 
Looking at the United States’ military history, especially since the two World Wars, it seems 
that the Air Force and Army have tried (as did the other services) ever since to find an 
overarching concept of how to fight and win the perfect war from a military perspective. 
Technology and its application in the forms of fires, maneuverability, intelligence or 
communications tools were most often center stage in discussions on war and warfare. For 
example, when General William E. DePuy took over the United States Army’s newly 
established Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)2 in 1973, he wanted to adjust the 
Army and its doctrine to a big conventional3 land war, which the Army’s leaders intended to 
emphasize after the United States’ Vietnam experience. To gain this effect, the Field Manual 
(FM) 100-5 Operations4, the Army’s main doctrine document, would then be rewritten. But 
not only had the Vietnam War, also the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 influenced the new 
doctrine. At that time ”modern” land war was imagined to be fast, intensive, brutal and 
deadlier than ever. Tanks and mechanized infantry from both sides would meet each other 
in gigantic battles, supported by artillery and air forces. But mass, precision, reaction times, 
range and firepower of modern weapon systems had already grown much since World War 
Two and the Korean War. According to analysis done by TRADOC, the Warsaw Pact forces’ 
weapons were numerous and excellent, as was their doctrine; this would allow the Pact to 
go against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses with mass and speed. In 
DePuy’s eyes, NATO defense lines in Europe would not stand against a Soviet attack, and 
                                                            
1
 Lewis, Adrian R.: The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Second Edition, New York, 2012, p. 377. 
2
 The purpose of TRADOC is to oversee training of United States Army forces and the development of 
operational doctrine. 
3
 In common understanding, conventional forces or war or tactics means that each opposing side is well-
defined and fighting using weapons that primarily target the other side’s military. Chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons are therefore understood to be unconventional weapons, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
as unconventionally fighting. 
4
 Field Manual 100-5, later on 3-0, is one of the Army’s two basic documents apart from Field Manual 1, The 
Army, and it is on top of the structure of regulations and Manuals. In terms of their shape and form, Manuals 
are handbooks containing detailed information for procedures important to soldiers serving in the field. They 




nuclear weapons on the tactical level would be considered too late. As a result large areas of 
Western Europe would be harmed. 
The basic idea of the new concept, Active Defense, was to drill on modern weapons, which 
would help the United States’ Armed Forces to stand against a Warsaw Pact onslaught 
despite numerical inferiority and to throw back enemy forces thanks to technological 
superiority. The Big Five were part of this range of weapons, comprising the main battle tank 
M1 Abrams, the medium transport helicopter UH-60 Blackhawk, the attack helicopter AH-64 
Apache, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) M2/3 Bradley, and the ground-based Surface-to-
Air Missile (SAM) system Patriot. The description Big Five was nonofficial and developed over 
time.5 But critique swiftly arose stating that DePuy’s doctrine was suited primarily to a 
conventional war in Europe and not necessarily to other out-of-area conflicts, as well as 
being too much focused on the first battle of a looming war. Sample application of the new 
doctrine in exercises in Europe unveiled Active Defense‘s perceived faults: a battle that was 
difficult to coordinate because of many necessary lateral movements, predictable tactics, 
and piecemeal destruction by follow-on forces. There was a need for a new doctrine in 
which the fight at the front line was simultaneously and coordinately fought against follow-
on enemy forces. 
General Don A. Starry6, who took over TRADOC in 1977, had seen possible problems with 
Active Defense in different exercises in Europe as commander of United States V Corps. 
Under his guidance FM 100-5 was rewritten again. In contrast to the earlier version, soldiers 
were not solely the operators of their machines; factors such as training, morale and 
adaptability were added to the Manual. AirLand Battle, as this edition of the Manual was 
also called, in principle differed not decisively from Active Defense; the difference could 
mainly be found in the principle of “synchronization”, on which AirLand Battle rested. The 
concept of Deep Battle/Deep Attack7 should help the United States Army to destroy follow-
on Warsaw Pact forces in collaboration with the Air Force; the whole battle should be 
coordinated on the newly introduced operational (or Corps) level. 
AirLand Battle was developed further during the 1980s, resulting in the concept AirLand 
Battle Future (ALB-F). After experiences in the Second Gulf War in 1991, the Revolution in 
                                                            
5
 Mahnken, Technology, p. 130. 
6
 Starry had been commander, Armor Center and School before; after his tenure at TRADOC, he became 
commander, Readiness Command, which prepared overseas deployments of United States Army forces. 
7
 According to US-comprehension: ”effect” primarily through fire into the „depth” of the battlefield. Cf. 




Military Affairs (RMA), which was coined by military reformers, favored the Air Force 
increasingly. This resulted also in considerations for a future doctrine. An RMA includes 
changes of technological, organizational as well as doctrinal scope. Soviet military officers 
such as Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov thought already in the 1970s that computers, satellites, 
long-range weapons or missiles would alter the character of war.8 In the United States Army 
concepts such as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)9 or termini, like Dominant Maneuver and 
Mass Effects as well, became quite established. However, these new technologies entered 
the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 only in a limited way; the Cold War concepts still dominated. 
The Air Force was different as it propagated its own concepts more aggressively after 1991 – 
before, the Air Force’s mainstay had been nuclear warfare and support to the ground forces. 
Midway through the 1990s, Colonel John A. Warden III with his description of the Enemy as 
a System laid the cornerstone for a new concept called Parallel Warfare. Warden started 
from the premise that the United States could attack several strategically important points 
or targets of an enemy from the air and collapse his system. Warden drew up a plan for an 
air campaign against Iraq that would have applied his ideas, but it was not implemented.10 In 
his essay about the Effects-Based Operations (EBO)11 written in 2001, Lieutenant General 
David A. Deptula developed Warden’s main idea further and postulated that the massive 
commitment of ground troops was no longer necessary thanks to the new technologies. 
                                                            
8
 Cf. Kievit, James / Metz, Steven: Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy, United 
States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995. The herein specifically addressed RMA was 
linked by United States analysts to the increasing digitalization and interconnection on the battlefield beginning 
with the Second Gulf War in 1991. Cf. Kievit, James / Metz, Steven: Strategy and the Revolution in Military 
Affairs: From Theory to Policy, United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995. 
Additional literature can be found in: Knox, MacGregor / Murray, Williamson: The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge, 2001; Toffler, Alvin / Toffler, Heidi: War and Anti-War – Survival at the 
Dawn of the 21st Century, London, 1994; Bunker, Robert J.: Generations, Waves, and Epochs – Modes of 
Warfare and the RMA, in: Airpower Journal, Spring 1996; Van Creveld, Martin: Technology and War -  From 
2000 B.C. to the Present, London, 1989 and Krepinevich, Andrew F.: Cavalry to Computer – The Pattern of 
Military Revolutions, In: The National Interest, Fall 1994. 
9
 The terminus NCW was coined by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. NCW means the exploitation of the 
information age technologies to reach an advantageous position in the battle against the enemy. Cgf. 
Cebrowski, Arthur K. / Garstka, John J.: Network-centric warfare: Its origin and future, in: Proceedings, January 
1998. 
10
 Cf. Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E.: The General’s War: the inside story of the conflict in the Gulf, 
Boston, 1995. 
11
 In the United States Air Force after the Second Gulf War the idea matured that enemy infrastructure or 
troops could be affected by „effects” rather than destruction. The term EBO was coined by Lieutenant General 
David A. Deptula, who recently was Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance of 





Deptula had been one of the leading planners in the air campaign in 1991 as a member of 
the Black Hole group which led strategic warfare in the Gulf. 
Also, in response to the 2001  attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11th 
(9/11) and the ensuing “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq came across a phase of 
Transformation.12 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to transform the United 
States Armed Forces into a learning organization, relying much more on technology. Quicker, 
smaller networked forces should be able to fight and beat every type of enemy. However, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were to be fought against an adaptable enemy who did not 
want to fight on equal terms against the western forces. In 1992, Andrew Krepinevich had 
already written about the so-called streetfighter state in his assessment about the occurring 
Military-technical Revolution.13 But C (COIN) was far different from what Krepinevich had in 
mind a decade earlier.14 
In 2010, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were both winding down, the same Krepinevich 
propagated, now as the head of a think tank based in Washington, the so-called AirSea 
Battle (ASB), a concept to fight a near-peer enemy (an enemy with a conventional army who 
could challenge the United States militarily) such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or 
Iran mainly in the air and on the surface and sub-surface of the sea. The concept’s name 
would suggest a similar way of joint cooperation (e.g. team warfare, the application of 
combined arms warfare on a larger, national scale/level) between Air Force and Navy as 
AirLand Battle did for Air Force and Army. The concept focused especially on enemy Anti-
access and Area denial weapons (A2/AD).15 More or less quickly, as will be described in-
depth, the Air Force and Navy jumped on the bandwagon to promote their new brainchild, 
especially in times of financial austerity. The Budget Control Act from 2011 led to automatic 
spending cuts throughout the United States government in 2013, including the Armed Forces 
                                                            
12
 While armed forces do transform themselves all the time, owing to different political ideas or in wars, surely, 
the United States government under President George W. Bush wanted not only to implement reforms in the 
United States Armed Forces in the early 2000s, Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld wanted the Forces to 
be continuously adapt and transform, cf. Davis, Paul K.: Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and 
What Lies ahead?, in: Stephen J. Cimbala: The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy, and War, 
Chapter 2, May 2010. 
13
 Krepinevich, Andrew F., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, Washington (1992) 
2002, p. 47. 
14
 COIN, a type of warfare already present before it was propagated again during the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, means fighting in an organized fashion against groups or persons who do want to change the 
present government or institutions in one or more countries, cf. Headquarters, Department of the Army: Field 
Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Washington, DC, May 2014, p. 1-2. 
15




(sequestration cuts). The United States Army seemed, at the time of writing, still to be in 
search of how to argue for its own share of AirSea Battle. 
Having described in short over 30 years of the development of the image of war and 
therefore, doctrine, in the United States Air Force and Army, the question now seems to be: 
How did these concepts really differ? Did ideas repeat? Or did the same terms and concepts 
return again with a different meaning? 
Question and limitation 
This thesis follows the idea of analyzing military publications (journals, studies, diploma 
projects) on one hand and military Manuals16 as well as other official and semiofficial means 
of communication (for example, remarks of general officers) on the other, to show the 
development and change in the perception of war, the enemy and warfighting in the United 
States Army and Air Force between 1980 and 2012. These two services are chosen because 
they ”continue to speak fundamentally different languages when it comes to their respective 
images of modern war,” as Lambeth points out.17 The Air Force (once an offspring of the 
Army itself) and the Army seem to be locked into a constant struggle for resources and the 
pole-position as their nation’s premier and decisive fighting force. Meanwhile, the Navy and 
Marine Corps (the United States Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy) do 
”own” a very different environment; while the Air Force did clash with the United States 
Navy regarding the employment of nuclear weapons, in the timeframe analyzed, 
competition about the land war and the air war above did occur mainly between the Air 
Force and Army. 
As shown above, after the Vietnam War, the Army dominated doctrine development as 
general officers such as DePuy and Starry promoted the ultimate land war in the 1980s. The 
Air Force did at least officially come along through excellent contact between Starry and Air 
Combat Command (ACC) head General Wilbur Creech regarding AirLand Battle, as will be 
shown below. Thanks to its quite decisive effort in Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force 
seemed to take over the lead in the debate on ”modern warfare” in the early 1990s.18 After 
                                                            
16
 For example „instructions“, „guideline“ or even „guide“ to war or warfighting. 
17
 Lambeth, Benjamin S.: The Transformation of American Air Power, Ithaca, N.Y., 2000, p. 286. 
18
 Cf. Lewis, Adrian R.: The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Second Edition, New York, 2012; Linn, Brian M.: Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way 
of War, Cambridge, 2007; and Mahnken, Thomas G.: Technology and the American Way of War since 1945, 




9/11, the ground forces again seemed to regain the upper hand, resulting in the COIN 
doctrine under General Petraeus.19 And recently, as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
comes to an end (at least, officially and in scope), the Pacific Pivot20 as well as sequestration 
cuts let loose new discussions on the roles of the different services in a possible conflict with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This proposition will lead through the thesis at hand. 
Therefore, doctrine plays an important part in the analysis presented in this thesis. While 
doctrine is generally defined as a body of teachings or instructions, principles or 
propositions, it is, in essence, the teachings of a belief system. Doctrine can be political, 
religious, or as in the present case, military. Norwegian military historian Harald Høiback 
describes doctrine as a ”recipe […] that tells us how to play in order to win […] it needs some 
assumptions about what leads to victory.”21 Doctrine therefore is the institutional idea of 
war par excellence. It is hereby understood to be the institutionalized view on war and 
warfare: 
“Army doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces operate […] doctrine establishes 
the Army’s view of the nature of operations, the fundamentals by which Army forces 
conduct operations […] Doctrine is also a statement of how the Army intends to fight. In 
this sense, doctrine often describes an idealized situation and then contrasts the ideal 
with the reality Army leaders can expect. Doctrine provides a means of conceptualizing 
campaigns and operations, as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions, 
and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult. Doctrine […] establishes a 
common frame of reference and a common cultural perspective to solving military 
problems, including useful intellectual tools.”22 
Doctrine thus represents the idealized image of war, which is to say, of ”modern war”; to 
show this is the chief aim of this thesis. In the case of the United States and its Armed 
Forces, the Manuals are the main vehicle to promote doctrine, and they are re-edited every 
few years. While the United States Armed Forces has a joint Doctrine (e.g. a doctrine for all 
services), this thesis does not explicitly want to show how the Air Force and Army did 
                                                            
19
 Headquarters, Department of the Army: Field Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency, Washington, 
DC, December 2006. 
20
 Clinton, Hillary: America’s Pacific Century, in: Foreign Policy, November 2011, p. 56-63, here p. 57. 
21
 Høiback, Harald: What is Doctrine?, in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.34:6, 2011, p. 879-900, here p. 883f. 
22
 Headquarters, Department of the Army: Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 




develop joint Doctrine, but rather, how their image of war and corresponding doctrines 
differed. 
The concepts of AirLand Battle as well as Effects-Based Operations both gained a foothold in 
official publications, and now the hybrid threat and AirSea Battle seem to follow suit. In 
addition to the main questions set out here, it is therefore necessary to analyze how strongly 
these concepts were institutionalized and to what extent they shaped the language use in 
general and terminology in particular. 
Based on the historical background, shown in the prelude and primary findings, it seems to 
be appropriate to restrict the evaluation period to the timeframe between 1980 and 2012. 
All of the concepts mentioned, AirLand Battle, Effects-Based Operations, counterinsurgency 
and now AirSea Battle, were developed during these years. 1980 is the year after the NATO 
double-track decision which was prompted by Soviet military build-up; 2012 is the year 
where the United States Army and Marine Corps together published their own paper23 to 
counter the AirSea Battle concept and justify their stake in the United States’ planning. 
Accordingly, the main research question in this thesis has two parts. On one hand, it will be 
shown how the enemy is conceptualized from which the respective warfighting concept is 
derived (wherein this can happen also in the reverse direction). For example, AirLand Battle 
was looking on the Warsaw Pact as the enemy in Europe, but the Effects-Based Operations 
had to be adaptable to every type of enemy (and shape of war). On the other hand, the 
language used in respect to the literal meaning of warfare has to be discerned. While 
AirLand Battle clearly wanted to destroy enemy tanks, infantry and provisions, the target 
catalogue for the Effects-Based Operations seemed to be wider. Herein the population is 
also part of the system which has to be influenced, as is its morale. 
State of research 
The history of most of the United States services is a broadly researched topic. Especially the 
evolution of the Army is widely examined in many different monographs. The Companion to 
American Military History24, written by Texas A&M University professor of history and 
specialist in American maritime, naval, and military history James C. Bradford, for example, is 
                                                            
23
 United States Army, Capabilities Integration Center / United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command: Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept, Ver. 1.0 March 
2012. 
24




an outstanding starting point for every subject linked to the history of the United States 
Armed Forces. His work contains articles which are useful for the historical background of 
the analysis at hand, as they tell much about other related literature in the covered field. At 
this point John R. Ballard25, Elizabeth Lutes Hillman26, John W. Huston27 and Ronald L. 
Spiller28 deserve to be mentioned especially. 
Apart from Bradford’s standard monograph regarding United States military history, a wide 
range of other authors examine the evolution of warfare in the United States. Benjamin 
Buley29 notably shows for the second half of the 20th century, and the first few years of the 
21st century, the political and, indeed, cultural backgrounds for the idea of a New American 
Way of War, relying more on technology and, especially, on airpower30. From the Vietnam 
Syndrome via the Powell Doctrine to 9/11, Buley shows how politicians and military men laid 
down rules for United States interventions all over earth and therefore promoted the New 
American Way of War. 
The monograph Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare31 written 
by Robert M. Citino, historian at the University of North Texas, examines especially the 
development of mechanized warfare. Citino also works with the military concepts Active 
Defense and AirLand Battle, as well as its application in Operation Desert Storm. He identifies 
the Vietnam War as origin of a spiritual and intellectual rebirth for the United States Army.32 
Citino, too, analyzes Desert Storm thoroughly and poses the thesis that more an Air-land 
then AirLand Battle was conducted in the Gulf, as the Iraqi Armed Forces were bombarded 
from the air for weeks before a ground offensive was conducted against them with minimal 
resistance encountered. 
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Similar to Buley, University of Kansas professor Adrian R. Lewis also examines the United 
States Armed Forces’ specific means of handling war.33 Especially his chapters on the 
rebuilding and reorientation of the Army under President Ronald Reagan show how a 
concentration on the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact in Europe, as well as how a specific 
doctrine and appropriate technological means for victory over this seemingly overwhelming 
enemy, was constructed. Lewis is very critical towards the lessons drawn from the Operation 
Desert Storm; he questions the military’s (and especially the Air Force’s) belief in the 
capabilities which the so-called RMA promises. In his view, NCW and EBO are only useful in 
wars against states but less so against nations of will or irregular34 fighters. 
British-American strategic thinker Colin S. Gray’s monograph about the future of war35 
shows how war and warfare in fact change very little. Gray, professor of International 
Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading and director of the Washington-
based think tank Centre for Strategic Studies gives much insight, especially into the United 
States’ Way of War(fare) in relation to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Texas A&M University professor Brian M. Linn36 also specifically exposes the United States 
Armed Forces’ concepts and image of war. Linn describes thoroughly how military thinkers 
shaped the imagination of war much more than did real war experiences. Linn designs a 
model in which he describes three stereotypes of officers, managers, guardians and heroes, 
who imagine war in very distinct ways and portray it accordingly. The guardians show a very 
scientific approach and interpret war as sort of an engineering project in which the correct 
usage of principles can result in the desired outcome. In contrast, the managers are driven 
by “efficiency”, whereas the heroes see war as a human enterprise. 
Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Strategy at 
the United States Naval War College, also examines the United States Armed Forces’ way of 
dealing with war in his monograph.37 Mahnken focuses on technology and shows how 
conceptual ideas drove the development of modern weapons systems especially for the 
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European battlefield in combat against the Warsaw Pact. In a less critical but more 
technically adept and detailed knowledge, Mahnken advances up to the Balkan 
interventions. Mahnken has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning 
from 2006 to 2009. 
Robert R. Tomes, Adjunct Professor of Security Policy Studies at the George Washington 
University, writes about topics like innovation and revolution, as well as transformation.38 
Beginning with the end of the Vietnam War he shows the United States Armed Forces’ 
efforts to enlarge its technological and doctrinal advantage in relation to the Warsaw Pact. 
Tomes refers to the efforts that intended to network sensors and effectors (e.g. 
reconnaissance/surveillance systems and weapons systems) as early as in the 1970s. Tomes 
also states that wrong lessons were learned from Operation Desert Storm; in his eyes 
possible future enemies had acknowledged the impossibility to beat the United States 
Armed Forces in a conventional conflict, acting unconventionally e.g. not copying the United 
States’ technological Way of War. Tomes looks at the RMA as a construct of the computer 
evolution during the 1970s and 1980s and determines an according use of language. 
As an introduction to the principles and terms regarding land warfare beginning in the 20th 
century, Christopher Tuck’s Land Warfare39 is very well suited. Tuck is a lecturer in the 
British Defence Studies Department. Before he had been a lecturer at the Department of 
Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst. 
All mentioned authors or monographs work with the so-called American Way of War in one 
way or another; they describe leading thinkers or their concepts and the differing views on 
war and warfare. But none of them explicitly examines the structures of imagination in the 
United States Armed Forces and how this is shown in discourses which can be found in 
Manuals or military-related publications. An example of an author who does, in fact, analyze 
and describe military thought might be Azar Gat’s A history of military thought – from the 
Enlightenment to the Cold War. 40 But while Gat describes first and foremost how strategists 
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such as B.H. Liddell Hart influenced the Western perception of war including operational 
issues, the thesis at hand will focus on how the United States Air Force and Army themselves 
built and maintained their respective image of war as whole thinking institutions – a process, 
which is best described as a discourse, which lays the foundations for the things which could 
or could not be thought and told during a specific timeframe. 
Theoretical approach and method 
Different historians in the German-speaking world used different ways and methods to work 
with military publications and military thinking. Ralf Raths, in his 2009 thesis Vom 
Massensturm zur Stosstrupptaktik. Die deutsche Landkriegstaktik im Spiegel von 
Dienstvorschriften und Publizistik 1906 bis 1918, similarly investigates a theoretical 
development, analyzing the discussion on normative tactical doctrine. Thereby he interprets 
military publications as a ”Forum“ which is used to solve (doctrinal) problems. Raths uses 
Manuals and guidelines to analyze the development of tactics in theory, but he intentionally 
leaves out the implementation of these guidelines. Thus, he writes military history mainly 
from the perspective of the hierarchical center or from the officer’s view, respectively. At 
the same time, Raths adopts a non-personal approach, intentionally taking a specifically 
military stance, analyzing the development of thought processes, figures and motives of 
different authors without highlighting certain stakeholders. Apart from analyzing the 
guidelines and Manuals as a theoretical base, he focuses on the discourse in military 
publications. Raths sees thoughts, meanings and ideas being presented, exchanged, 
criticized, further developed, accepted and denied in these publications.41 However, in his 
study, Raths neither shows a theoretical base, as such, nor a method. Still, his approach 
more or less makes sense in working with military concepts. However, the present study 
shall not work with guidelines on the tactical level beneath scientific military publications, 
which affected tactics. Rather it shall work with the image or imagination of war especially, 
which also includes some amount of cultural background. Hence, publications which concern 
the doctrine of a specific service are better suited to analysis. 
At this point, another study has to be referred to as its theoretical-methodical approach was 
an inspiration for the study at hand. To analyze texts, the historian’s discourse analysis 
seems to fit best. Niklaus Meier analyzes in his dissertation Warum Krieg? – Die Sinndeutung 
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des Krieges in der deutschen Militärelite 1871 – 1945 the interpretation of the sense of war. 
He argues that through “producing“ knowledge about war, discourses construct the reality 
of war: “Indem ein bestimmtes Wissen über den Krieg bzw. über die Wirklichkeit des Krieges 
hergestellt wird, entsteht eine (diskursiv) konstruierte Wirklichkeit des Krieges.“42 Meier uses 
discourse analysis as an instrument to make out manners of speaking and perceptions of 
war: 
Kriegsdiskurse erzeugen und etablieren bestimmte Vorstellungen und ‚Wahrheiten‘ über 
Krieg, sie legen gewisse Sichtweisen fest und geben vor, auf welche Art und Weise über 
Krieg gedacht und geredet wird. Hierbei besitzen Kriegsdiskurse eine sinnstiftende, 
legitimierende und wirkmächtige Funktion. […] Es soll untersucht und beschrieben 
werden, welche Themen und Elemente in den Kriegsdiskursen erschienen, welche 
Kategorien, Klassifikationen und Hierarchien auftraten und welche Rede-, Deutungs-, 
Legitimations- und Argumentationsformen dominierend waren.43 
Meier wants to show how elements of discourse such as categories, classifications or 
hierarchies brought certain forms of speaking, interpretation, legitimacy or arguments. 
According to the French philosopher, historian of ideas, social theorist, philologist and 
literary critic Michel Foucault, discourses are certain practices that form the things they 
speak about.44 Hereto a set of laws has to be found in a text corpus, which discerns 
”possible“ statements from others.45 Yet until now, no consensus has been found, neither in 
cultural nor in social sciences, as to what exactly discourse is about. There exist several 
different definitions. The Austrian historian Franz Eder defines discourses as practices which 
organize and regulate statements for a certain topic and decide what can be said and 
thought by a social group in a designated timeframe.46 According to Philipp Sarasin, Swiss 
historian and Foucault connoisseur, discourse analysis is a conceptual stance with 
appropriate methodical assumptions. The place of origin of discourse analysis is to be found 
with Foucault, says Sarasin: he (Foucault) wants to confront an ”old structure” with a new 
one, to mark historical transitions or fractures (”historische Übergänge oder vielmehr 
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Brüche“).47Discourse analysis thus shows system structures by viewing texts not as sources 
but rather as ”dead“ material. In an almost anatomical way, system structures, which are 
contingent and therefore historically and culturally specific, are discerned. As opposed to 
language analysis, it focuses on a historical question: ”how is that one particular statement 
appeared rather than another?“48 Further, one has to search for patterns of statements and 
similarities (”geregelte Formationen von Aussagen“). Terms, categories, or key arguments 
serve as elements of the specific structure which allows an author, at a designated point in 
time, to formulate a certain statement and opened what could be said by him (“dem Autor 
zum Zeitpunkt X die Formulierung dieser bestimmten Aussage ermöglicht und ihm dort 
insgesamt den Raum des Sagbaren eröffnet hat.“) Discourse analysis does not examine 
single texts written by single authors but rather series of texts from different authors.49 
Foucault proposes to build-up a coherent corpora of documents, establish a principle of 
choice, define the level of analysis and of the relevant elements, and, lastly, to specify  a 
method of analysis in order to characterize a discourse.50 According to the German historian 
Achim Landwehr, the researcher in a historical discourse analysis can ask for statements as 
well as their point in time and point of origin. Statements organize themselves according to a 
topic and repeat consistently (but not necessarily in an identical form!). In Landwehr’s eyes, 
the regularity of statements determine the discourse term, and the discourses produce 
reality (”Diskurse bringen Wirklichkeit hervor“).51 The historical discourse analysis, according 
to him, tries to enable access to a history of trueness, of reality, and knowledge (”einer 
Geschichte der Wahrheit, der Wirklichkeit und des Wissens“). The truth which was not 
formulated – the generally accepted truth (”die allgemein akzeptierte Wirklichkeit“) – should  
be the main focus because it is all about the search for the perception of the reality 
(“Wahrnehmungen der Wirklichkeit“), the change of social perceptions of reality (“Wandel 
sozialer Realitätsauffassungen“) and the research on issues which were acknowledged as 
given at a certain point in time.52 To attain this objective, Landwehr suggests a series of 
investigative steps for a historical discourse analysis. First  one must find the subject, 
wherein the focus lies on sources with motives in recurring images (”in Bildern, die immer 
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wiederkehren“).Next, in the formation of a corpus, one must focus on the repetition and 
equality of things that are said or written always in the same way (“Wiederholung und 
Gleichförmigkeit von immer wieder ähnlich Gesagtem oder Geschriebenem“).Landwehr 
concedes that constraints should be imposed on the investigation area with respect to labor 
efficiency. In the end, the target is a corpus consisting of different texts for example. The 
choice of research material also cannot be made in an objective way; it is liable to 
background knowledge, hypotheses, and presuppositions which, of course, have to be 
unveiled. The next in this series of steps is the context analysis. Here Landwehr proposes the 
investigation for interactions between text and context. Institutions or occasion ought not to 
be the starting point, but rather one ought to question phenomena in texts and their 
meanings. The whole context – societal, political and institutional parameters – must not be 
left out. In a further step, statements have to be analyzed, because these are the 
constitutive elements of the discourses; however, they are not simply certain sentences or 
particular words. Their function, rather than their superficial shape, is determining. Several 
macro analyses need to be conducted to find the decisive statements which characterize the 
discourse and at the same time determine the macrostructure. Landwehr proposes, as part 
of the macro analysis, features such as rhetoric, topic, length of sentence, rhetorical figures, 
word statistics and lexical groups.53 This way, possible questions to the statements of the 
discourse are pointed out: Which categorizations, causalities, hierarchies of values are 
recognizable? In what contexts do the statements appear? Or who tries using what means to 
place certain statements? With this last step the discourse analysis, as such, has finally 
arrived. The analysis of the discourse (“Analyse des Diskurses“) comes from an array of 
regularly repeated statements regarding a certain group of themes; one has to ask for 
demarcations and the establishment of a legitimate worldview in chronologic change (“nach 
den Grenzziehungen und nach der Etablierung einer legitimen Weltsicht im zeitlichen 
Wandel“). Hereby, features from the single analyses serve as links: How do the features 
change? How are they put to use? Do new ones appear or do old ones disappear? The aim is 
to get to the bottom of the categories of perception, meaning constructions, and identity 
establishments as they change historically, which means one must show the assumed 
foundations of a certain timeframe and culture and – last but not least – to find the exact 
moment when a discourse reaches such a degree of obviousness that it is no longer 
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fundamentally challenged (”an dem ein Diskurs einen solchen Grad an Selbstverständlichkeit 
erreicht, dass er nicht mehr grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt wird“).54 
German sociologist Reiner Keller criticizes Landwehr‘s approach as primarily focused on 
linguistic features. He proposes a type of discourse analysis derived from sociology of 
knowledge in order to reconstruct processes of social construction and convey of modes of 
interpretation and action on the level of institutional arrays, organizations, and social actors 
(”Prozesse der sozialen Konstruktion und Vermittlung von Deutungs- und Handlungsweisen 
auf der Ebene von institutionellen Feldern, Organisationen und sozialen Akteuren“), in other 
words, a research program to analyze the discursive deconstruction of reality.55 This is about 
an interpretive and deductive reading, an understanding of the text’s own 
understanding(“Verstehen des Verstehens“). The historian has to analyze communicative, 
social, creative processes. Manifestations of social knowledge supply a knowledge-sourced 
symbolic structure of statements and systems, in other words, the ”typical“ as interpretation 
pattern. The researcher is looking for plots or stories, for the ”golden thread.” Reiner Keller 
therefore proposes to proceed as follows: Firstly, he recommends the formation of a data 
corpus according to a heuristic set of rules. What follows is a data selection for detailed 
analysis and guided by certain criteria, either a maximum or a minimum contrast or 
similarity regarding the texts shall be achieved; documents have to be comparable. In this 
way, a discourse can be worked out through the analysis of the ”coding“ which is achieved 
through a terminological condensation of certain text passages. Text blocks are then 
selected for a sequential analysis (whereby sentences, paragraphs, chapters, or whole texts 
can be looked at) and interpretation hypotheses compiled.56 
Partially following the theoretical and methodical approaches chosen by Ralf Raths and 
Niklaus Meier, the thesis at hand shall result in a discourse analysis bound to two different 
main text corpora. (Accordingly, only texts are worked with.) As described above, the key 
terms and statements in the discourses on warfighting, or ”modern war“, and the enemy 
shall be shown and interpreted in their contexts. Discourses focusing on topics such as the 
role of Airpower versus Landpower; the role of ”firepower“ versus ”maneuver“ in the 
context of warfare; the role of technology; the type of enemy; and the shape of the 
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battlefield serve as a base on which concepts such as AirLand Battle or COIN are discussed. 
Hereby, military technical terms (termini), which stand for dominating terms in certain 
timeframes or in discussions on concepts and are written in italics, are searched for and 
their underlying ideas analyzed. Sometimes acronyms or abbreviations are used to ”label“ a 
concept (for example COIN or EBO).57 The United States Armed Forces have an inherent 
culture of using abbreviations and acronyms in their daily language. While one has to 
distance him/herself from the labelling, on the other side the termini and acronyms are 
central to the discourse analysis. Often terms and their meaning themselves constitute a 
discourse. The designation or terminus on the other hand, is the technical terminology or 
characteristic idiom used in the military. Terms dominating a discourse over a period of time 
or being discussed in different ways are highlighted by ”quotation marks“ and written in 
italics. Apart from terms as well as termini, series of statements are the most important 
feature of discourses, and their regularity has to be derived from the texts. Discourses and 
their respective terms, as well as statements and termini used in their context, are coming 
and going out again; the differences in meaning of the terms in the discourses are pointed 
out to show how the discussions evolved over time. At a certain point in time, the Airpower 
discourse gets front stage when concepts relating to (and based on) it gain support. At 
another point in time, Airpower gets diminished, when COIN again brings Landpower to get 
on a roll. Conceptual history would therefore be an alternative theoretical approach to the 
subject at hand. In general, conceptual history tries to analyze conceptual-historical stages, 
as Koselleck writes.58 Despite “our dictionary of fundamental historical concepts“ and 
despite “our continual use of the same words, the political-social language has changed.”59 
Terms, therefore, do not change, but their meaning does. However, while conceptual history 
would help to analyze the changing meanings of terms such as “firepower“ and the change in 
the meaning and extent of concepts such as Airpower, conceptual history does not give a 
method to analyze the discourses through the texts that form the foundation of this thesis. 
Therefore, in the context of this thesis, discussions of new concepts throughout the texts 
and different forms of the latter are especially important. Accordingly, the text corpora are 
intentionally restricted to the United States Air Force and Army. “Militarily“, the topic 
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analyzed is warfare using means against or in another state or nation. The exclusively 
nuclear dimension is left out as a separate level, since this would burst the framework of this 
study. Nuclear weapons show up either as means on the tactical and operational level or as 
part of the strategic attack. 
Quality of sources and selection 
The similarity of the analyzed sample texts is, regarding the Manuals, thanks to their 
consistent structure and similar intention over the years, namely promoting a ”global“ 
mindset for the whole institution or general image of war. As such, the Manuals promote a 
special set of speaking rules for one service or the other. Often, Manuals contain images or 
historical inserts and a glossary of definitions and terms. They are written to institutionalize 
the image of war in the service whose leadership writes and publishes it. 
The military publications are confined to a handful of journals which are institutionally 
bound similarly to the Manuals, but are at the same time different types of text, expressing 
the view of one or more particular authors. In all the publications used for this study, the 
articles are printed in color and are illustrated with images and/or figures. Regarding the 
United States Army, the journals Military Review and Parameters are analyzed, and in the 
case of the United States Air Force, the Air Force Magazine and the Air&Space Power 
Journal. The Military Review of the United States Army is published by the Combined Arms 
Center (CAC) which is the largest command subordinated to TRADOC. CAC is the main 
education facility for officers in the United States Army, and the Military Review is its official 
publication whereas the content of its articles is not the official stance of the United States 
Army or its Manuals. Military Review appears bimonthly. Parameters is the official 
publication of the United States Army War College (USAWC) which is the higher education 
facility of the United States Army, training staff officers and civilian cadre beside its research 
activities. The journal itself is presented as a forum for discussions on war and warfighting to 
the benefit of the Department of Defense (DoD), meaning that the articles published are 
subjected to certain rules regarding content and scientific standards. Parameters is 
published four times a year. The Air Force Magazine is the mouthpiece of the Air Force 
Association (AFA) which is an independent organization promoting the United States Air 
Force’s roles and capabilities to the public. The Magazine is published monthly and reports 




a handful of editors appear regularly as contributors together alongside active and retired 
Air Force officers and members of other services. Finally, the Air&Space Power Journal60 is 
the official publication of the United States Air Force, and it serves as a forum for discussions 
on the role of Airpower. It is published bimonthly and serves as an open forum for 
innovative thinking, especially on doctrine. The views and opinions do not carry the official 
sanction of the Air Force, though its articles are peer-reviewed. The publisher is the Air 
University (AU) which is part of the United States Air Force Air Education and Training 
Command. Finally a set of sources taken from the archives of the United States Air Force 
Historical Agency (AFHRA) as well as the United States Army Heritage and Education Center 
(AHEC) is used. These sources comprise mostly remarks or drafts of remarks for General 
Officers involved in doctrine development or the Chiefs of Staff, respectively. Studies written 
by participants at the United States Army War College or at the Strategic Studies Institute on 
the one hand and at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, on the other hand 
top off the selection of sources. 
Most of the sources used in this analysis are available to the public. The journals, for 
example, are digitally available, even partially searchable.61 A host of Manuals from Army 
and Air Force are digitally available as well. One edition of FM 100-5 had to be requested via 
Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA). AFHRA kindly sent two older editions of Air 
Force Manual (AFM) 1-162 as print copies. Besides the Manuals and journals, a range of 
diploma theses and other official documents such as, for example, assessments by the CIA’s 
National Foreign Assessment Center regarding Soviet Military Power are also online available 
in the Digital Library of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). 
The initial selection of sources was easily done regarding the Manuals. On the Army‘s side 
those comprise the FM 100-5 editions from 1976, 1982, 1986, 1993, 2001 (now dubbed FM 
3-0), 2008, 2011 (which is in fact a revision of the 2008 edition) and the ADP/ADRP 3-0 from 
2011; the 1976 edition is included because of the covered concept (Active Defense) which 
was an important step to AirLand Battle. On the Air Force’s side the AFM 1-1 from 1975, 
1979, 1984, 1992, 1997 (named AFDD from this edition on, Air Force Doctrine Document), 
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2003 and 2011 are analyzed. The editions before the analyzed timeframe are included for 
the same reason as is the case regarding the Army’s FM 100-5. 
The examined journal articles were first roughly sorted according to relevancy. Titles and 
abstracts were searched for terms and termini: Strategy, Doctrine, AirLand Battle, Effects-
Based Operations, Revolution in Military Affairs, Way of War or Soviet Threat, Operational 
Maneuver Group, Counterinsurgency, AirSea Battle, Operation Desert Storm, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Odyssey Dawn and many others. In a 
second step, a detailed analysis was conducted to determine if each article or author 
showed or promoted a certain image of war. In this examination, the personal background 
of each author is as well taken into account as it determines the “place“ of his “statement.“63 
Using this two-phase approach, concepts as well as the discourse on which the discussions of 
concepts are based, shall be extracted from the texts. The same method was applied to the 
studies analyzed. 
Structure 
The discourse analysis would allow presented results to be organized following the different 
topics which constitute the discourses. However, in this thesis it seems more logical and 
reader-friendly to describe the discussions in a chronological style and show how the 
different discourses are determined over time. Therefore, the first part of the study at hand 
will show the discussions regarding the threat posed by a quick thrust conducted by Warsaw 
Pact forces into NATO territory, its numerical superiority, the United States‘ answer in shape 
of the AirLand Battle doctrine, and the following doctrinal evolution until Operation Desert 
Storm (1980-1990). The second part focuses on discussions regarding lessons learned after 
Desert Storm and the subsequent concepts RMA, NCW and EBO (1991-2000). The third part 
tells how the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq led at least the United States Army to 
(temporarily) acknowledge forms of war other than the conventional one against another 
state or near-peer enemy and how the end of these stabilization efforts and the PRC's 
economic and military rise produced new images of an AirSea Battle in the minds of mainly 
sailors and airmen (2001-2012). Each of the three parts will be followed by a short interim 
conclusion recounting the development of the terms and termini in the different discourses, 
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showing how the ideas and, therefore, imaginations based on the discourses, are shaped in 





I. From Vietnam to the Persian Gulf (1980-1990)64 
1.1. The end of the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 
The twenty years in between the Vietnam War and the Second Gulf War in 1991 stand for 
the greatest period of reform in the history of the United States Army, according to Spiller. 
Reforms and professionalization of the Army were driven by the end of conscription and the 
Yom Kippur War in 1973 as well as refocusing on land war in Europe.65 Therefore, at the 
beginning of this first part of the thesis, this chapter is going to show how the end of the 
Vietnam War and the Yom Kippur War influenced military thinking in the United States Army 
and Air Force in the years before the analysis starts. 
After Vietnam 
The United States Army’s interpretation of the Vietnam War was that it was stabbed in the 
back,66 and it saw its troops’ tactical abilities negated through political spinelessness and 
strategic incompetence. This interpretation holds true today as part of the Army’s collective 
identity. It even led the Army as an institution to disregard lessons learned immediately after 
the war.67 After Vietnam the traditionally apolitical military elite of the Army was politicized; 
it arranged with the Total Force Concept that the United States Armed Forces would be 
voluntary in the future and therefore did not have to draw manpower from citizens who 
might not wish to serve in the Armed Forces.68 There was an allegation that Chief of Staff of 
the Army (CSA) Creighton W. Abrams connected the force structure of the National Guard 
and Reserve to the Active Army in such a way that any future conflict would require the 
mobilization of the Reserve and/or National Guard. At this time politicians and, much more, 
the military elite formulated a new ideal according to which the United States military was 
designated only for a specific kind of employment and only minimal own casualties would be 
tolerated. This employment only “with restrictions” was reinforced in the Weinberger 
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Doctrine, which would become the Powell Doctrine later on.69 Caspar Weinberger was 
Ronald Reagan‘s Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987. Colin Powell was Weinberger‘s 
military consultant temporarily and referred to this doctrine during operations in Panama in 
1989 and in the Second Gulf War in 1991 while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS). In particular, the doctrine said that military means shall only be employed if 
absolutely necessary in view of national interests. If troops would be deployed then in 
earnest, they should be so in a satisfactory number and with full moral support whereas the 
support by congress and the public had to be ascertained. The deployment of Armed Forces 
should only be done with clear political ends, and it should be at the same time the last 
resort.70 This doctrine can surely be looked at as being the legacy from the guardians who 
have a scientific approach to war as described by Linn. In this kind of scientifically correct 
and one-sided war the enemy should serve as the receiving end of overwhelming military 
power that he cannot oppose.71 Therefore, “Modern war” should be short, intensive, and 
swiftly decided. The American people should not be compromised by it.72  
With this a period of resurgence of the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz73 began in the 
discussions on strategy and doctrine as some officers postulated that the politicians should 
weigh the risks before the military took over and started the war. In opposition to 
Clausewitz, war should not be the continuation of politics; it began when politics had 
failed.74  
After Vietnam, the Army wanted to revive itself and the trust in itself. Temporarily, there 
had been rumors that the Army’s units in Europe were only there to be evacuated rapidly 
when war broke out.75 The military did not want to play “tripwire” for the attacking Warsaw 
Pact forces while politicians debated the employment of nuclear weapons.76 The Army 
actually favored a battle against the Warsaw Pact, according to Krepinevich.77 From the 
military's point of view, Vietnam was such a dramatic experience that it turned to the Soviet 
threat in Europe in a therapeutic way. Buley locates this in the circumstance that between 
                                                            
69
 Hereto among others Krepinevich, Andrew F.: The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore/London, 1986, p. 269. 
70
 Buley, The New American Way of War, p. 65; cf. also Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 310 und Linn, 
Echo of Battle, p. 198. 
71
 Linn, Echo of Battle, p. 199. 
72
 Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 309. 
73
 Clausewitz, Carl von: Vom Kriege, Berlin, 1832. 
74
 Buley, The New American Way of War, p. 66. 
75
 Skinner, Airland Battle Doctrine, p. 3. 
76
 Tomes, US Defense Strategy, p. 59. 
77




1975 and 1989 only 43 Military Review articles were written regarding the so-called Low-
Intensity Conflict (LIC).78 He insists that the lessons of the Vietnam War were not really 
pursued.79 Thereby positive lessons would definitely be, as Citino points out, drawn from this 
war; he argues in his monograph that Army and Marine Corps units fought rather well 
operatively.80 And at the same time, the Vietnam War allowed the United States to develop 
more modern weapons such as precision bombs as well as tactics and doctrine (the Wild 
Weasel in the Air Force to overcome enemy air defenses or the Airmobile concept81 in the 
Army, relying heavily on the helicopter to move troops and support them with gunships). 
While the Army fought against an enemy, denying it the possibility to put its technological 
advantages to full use, the Air Force fought, throughout the war, against a frontline Soviet 
air defense network with limited success. Prepared for nuclear war over Europe, the Air 
Force thought its units and aircraft would be adequate to fight a conventional war. But while 
some innovative technologies and tactics were developed, air combat showed deficiencies 
as well. Losses in air-to-air combat for example, were reduced by establishing new training 
and schools such as Top Gun.82 
Yom Kippur 
As mentioned above, the Arab-Israeli war from 1973 is seen as a second defining event in 
doctrine development at the end of the 1970s. In this war, all warring nations lost about half 
of their heavy weapons in the first two weeks. The war from 1973 saw the clash of armed 
forces which were equipped more or less similarly as those in Europe.83 Especially modern 
anti-aircraft weapons or Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), anti-tank weapons (ATGM, Anti-Tank 
Guided Missile) and anti-ship missiles (ASCM, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) proved to be 
effective.84 The new Soviet weapons were deemed to be very effective (the SAMs actually 
inflicting heavy losses on United States aircraft attacking North Vietnam), and therefore their 
very existence theoretically even called into question airstrikes employing tactical nuclear 
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weapons against the Warsaw Pact’s forces.85 The war from 1973 clearly influenced the 
contemporary battlefield image in the FM 100-5 from 1976: “In clashes of massed armor 
such as the world had not witnessed for 30 years, both sides sustained devastating losses, 
approaching 50 percent in less than two weeks of combat.”86 The number of 50 percent 
losses has to be especially considered as it went in the official documentation. And at the 
same time, one of the determining terms – “mass” – is already connected to the Warsaw 
Pact’s tanks. But nonetheless, Saul Bronfeld argues that “the encouragement and inspiration 
derived from the eventual success of the surprised and outnumbered Israelis had an 
important impact on American planners during the era of the Cold War.”87 With the ATGM a 
means came into play which questioned the dominating opinion that only a tank could stop 
another tank. The opposing parties lost more equipment in a short period of time as the 
United States Army altogether had in Europe.88 Tomes describes the conclusions drawn from 
the Yom Kippur War as following: The battlefield was (again) “deadlier than ever”; on the 
then “modern” battlefield, combined arms warfare was absolutely necessary to be 
successful, and training on the tactical level made all the difference.89 
1.2. The perception of the Soviet threat at the beginning of the 1980s 
The war in 1973 was therefore in the late 1970s and early 1980s, respectively, translated by 
United States planners into a scenario differing strongly from the war reality encountered in 
Vietnam. That contemporary scenario saw Soviet tanks and armored vehicles beaded for 
kilometers into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Those vehicles would then break through 
the weak NATO defenses, as the FM 100-5, 1976 edition would describe at that time: 
“The Soviet Army […] attacks on very narrow fronts in great depth, with artillery massed 
at 70 to 100 tubes per kilometer in the breakthrough sector. […] It is deeply ingrained in 
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the Soviet Army and if we should go to war in Europe, those are exactly the tactics we 
would face.”90  
FM 100-5, 1976 was designed to promote the basic concepts which formed the foundation 
of what the Army had to be prepared for: “masses” of tanks, or in this statement, artillery. 
While the FM’s authors did include other types of war, they foremost saw the battle against 
forces of the Warsaw pact in Europe as the “most demanding mission”91 the United States 
Army could be assigned. In that way, the authors especially coined the discourse, blocking 
out other scenarios on fact. The consequences which the United States Army had drawn 
from the 1973 Arab-Israeli war certainly had their impact on the perception of war, as can be 
seen in the FM 100-5 from 1976. And the doctrine writers would even exaggerate and speak 
of “challenges beyond any the US Army has ever faced.“92 However, this was certainly not 
the first occasion on which a military entity claimed to stand in front of the greatest 
challenge ever encountered. 
Fulda Gap 
If one followed the image of war promoted, then one saw in the shortest period of time the 
Warsaw Pact’s formations standing in Frankfurt, at the Rhine, or even farther westwards 
after having crossed the Fulda Gap. In Western perception, the Warsaw Pact would not give 
NATO any time to mobilize, as Soviet operational thinking favored fast, Deep Operations into 
enemy territory. The Fulda Gap, an area between the Hesse-Thuringian border and Frankfurt 
am Main, contained at that time corridors of lowlands through which tanks might have 
driven easily in a surprise attack to gain footholds across the Rhine. So the Fulda Gap was an 
obvious route for a hypothetical Warsaw Pact attack towards West Germany from Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, the concept of a major battle in or along the Fulda Gap was a 
predominant element of United States and NATO war planning during the Cold War. The 
Fulda Gap got a symbol for the battle imagined in central Europe; even a board game was 
derived from the scenario linked to the Fulda Gap.93 
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Indeed, already in the late 1920s soviet officers such as Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky94 
and Vladimir Kiriakovitch Triandafillov95 had introduced the concept of Deep Battle or Deep 
Operations into the Red Army, part of Operational Maneuver96 in English. Triandafillov in his 
1929 writing The Character of Operations of Modern Armies named tanks as mobile element 
in offensive operations, as did G.S. Isserson writing The Evolution of Operational Art 
(1932/37) and Fundamentals of the Deep Operation (1933), which was not the case in every 
nation in the interwar period. In the United States, for example, the tank was not seen as a 
decisive weapon at that time.97 The regulations Ustav from 193698 conceptualized under the 
guidance of Tukhachevsky, declared simultaneous attacks by aircraft and artillery on enemy 
positions in the “depth” (another term that would dominate the discussions) of the area and 
breakthroughs by mechanized forces as Soviet doctrine.99 The “operational level“100 included 
the Deep Battle or Deep Operation, the advancing in the enemy’s rear area unto the rear 
artillery line with simultaneous actions by artillery, mechanized infantry units, tanks, cavalry 
and air support.101 The echelonment facilitated to hold back reserves for offensive 
operations, on one side, as well as readying the necessary mass for breakthroughs and 
exploitation on the other side. This enabled, moreover, more elasticity in the defense, 
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including rear-oriented movements.102 Tactical breakthrough should facilitate the creation of 
an operational breakout which could then in a third phase be exploited. In exercises in 
1935/36 coordination, leadership and logistics of large units proved to be the weak points of 
the concept.103 
Fast forward to the late 1970s: the United States, because of this Soviet thinking, would not 
be able to intervene with nuclear weapons due to political deliberations. The retreat to 
better defensive grounds and the channeling of enemy forces to destroy them afterwards 
would mean the concession of terrain. This way a nuclear attack could only be made on 
NATO territory, and that was not politically feasible. The Air-Land Forces Application 
Directorate's (ALFA) Air-Land Battle Primer stated in 1978: 
“Increasingly, Soviet offensive doctrine has been tending to favor the unreinforced attack 
– a blitzkrieg-like penetration of many units to overwhelm the NATO defense. Such 
penetrations are possible if gaps or open flanks in the defenses can be found.”104 
This frustrating scenario was soon known as The Battle of the Fulda Gap.105 A 1981 report by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed the Soviet forces similarly: “The [Soviet] 
ground forces would carry out a massive and rapid ground offensive into NATO territory to 
defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent 
reinforcement.”106 Adjectives like massive, fast, and then later deep as well will be further 
encountered describing the attack by the Warsaw Pact, signaling the terms important to be 
able, at that time, to speak about the Soviet thrust: “depth”, “mass”, and “speed”. 
Conventional Forces 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as driving force of the 
Warsaw Pact had as well countered every new technological development of the United 
States: the atomic bomb, the intercontinental bombing aircraft, the fusion bomb, the Ship-
launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Multiple independently-targeted re-entry Vehicle 
(MIRV).107 Analysts agree that especially in the area of nuclear weapons the erstwhile 
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supremacy of the United States was gone, and western conventional weapons systems had 
become more and more expensive and complex, making acquisition en masse more 
difficult.108 The United States Armed Forces in the 1970s had lower budgets available as well, 
whereby the Army was more affected than the Air Force, which had a quasi-monopoly on 
the strategic level. Under President Nixon, the administration tried to mollify Congress and 
to foment as few anti-military sentiments as possible. Therefore, less money was invested in 
weapons procurement, but disarmament was discussed with the USSR. Meantime, the USSR 
induced SS-20 Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile (IRBMs) in Europe; this the United States 
and NATO countered with the Pershing II and Tomahawk as well as the aforementioned 
disarmament talks.109 The CIA saw a renewed significance of conventional forces because of 
a “parity” in nuclear weapons systems in its 1981 study: 
“To the extent that Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces now check those of the United 
States and Soviet gains in theater nuclear forces have offset those of NATO, the balance 
of conventional forces in Europe has become increasingly significant.”110 
Soviet theater nuclear forces were best symbolized by the SS-20 induction. Tommy L. 
Whitton, Senior research specialist at the Directorate of Estimates, Strategic Studies Division, 
United States Air Force Headquarters used the term “parity” in his article in the Air University 
Review, March/April edition 1983 in a similar fashion: 
“Another important factor affecting the employment of air power in a theater role has 
been the attainment by the Soviets of at least ‘essential parity’ in strategic nuclear 
forces.”111 
These developments resulted in United States analysts and therefore authors of military-
related pieces having the perception that a conventional conflict was more likely as the 
Warsaw Pact now could escalate in a controlled fashion. In comparing the numbers of 
conventional weapons systems in Europe, a striking quantitative Soviet superiority was 
evident as well. According to Citino, the Warsaw Pact in the mid-1980s had estimated 42,500 
Main Battle Tanks (MBT), NATO about 13,000; regarding artillery pieces and mortars the 
numbers stood at 31,500 versus 10,750; regarding Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) at 
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78,800 versus 30,000; regarding anti-tank missiles at 24,300 versus 8,100; and regarding 
tactical fighter aircraft at 7,240 versus 2,975.112 
Numbers 
These numbers and the resulting numerical inferiority, respectively, of the United States and 
its allies were then downright celebrated in the Manuals without questioning either the 
quality or readiness of this equipment. Altogether NATO faced nine armored and ten 
mechanized divisions in the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), as well as 16 armored 
and 14 mechanized divisions in the whole of Eastern Europe, and another 45 Warsaw Pact 
divisions together with 65 divisions113 in the European part of the USSR. In essence, NATO 
had to go against about 140 divisions. To cope with these forces, NATO had 16 United States 
Army Europe (USAREUR) divisions114, each with double the size of its Soviet counterpart as 
well as the units of the European allies – 93 divisions overall.115 Moreover, the USSR would 
have had the possibility to easily reinforce thanks to its railway and road network; that is 
what contemporary analysts thought at least. United States reinforcements, on the other 
side, would have had to take the longer way across the Atlantic (REFORGER, Return of Forces 
to Germany).116 But the quality of Soviet personnel and equipment in the second and third 
echelon units possibly would not have been that high on the other side. Nonetheless, CIA 
analysts wrote in a 1984 report about the Soviet threat again similarly: 
“Soviet war aims would be to defeat NATO and occupy Western Europe before it could 
be reinforced. The Soviets plan for a rapid, combined arms operation to reach the 
Atlantic in the shortest time possible. Soviet ground formations hope to achieve a rate of 
advance of up to 100 kilometers per day.”117 
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Of course the CIA has to be considered as a significant place of statement. Whereas the 
number of 100 kilometers has to be questioned from a military perspective, at the same 
time, it shows the image of the quick and complication-free attack of the Warsaw Pact 
(“speed”). Indeed, analyses regarding the war aims of the Warsaw Pact show that as far as 
into the 1980s it preferred offensive action and extinction of NATO forces on their territory 
before they could be reinforced from the continental United States.118 But there were other 
opinions as well. General Frederick J. Kroesen, Commander in Chief United States Army, 
Europe, wrote to retired Colonel Daniel Gans in a private letter in 1980: 
“To win, the Soviets must move quickly to prevent reinforcement of Europe, to choke off 
the sustaining petroleum supplies, and to cause us to divert scarce military resources to 
other vital areas. They would hope to accomplish that while waging a preemptive 
psychological warfare campaign aimed at inhibiting our use of nuclear weapons and 
attempting to separate us from our allies […] I do not view our prospects as hopeless, 
and I’m not in agreement with those who believe there will be Russians on the Rhine in 
72 hours, but I also feel that we have to look realistically at strategic probabilities in a 
general war.”119 
Similarly to Kroesen, who did not view the United States’ prospects as “hopeless”, Major 
General Alexander M. Weyand, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, equally 
criticized the negative perceptions: “Some parts of the draft manual [FM 100-5, 1982] sound 
as if we view ourselves as a militarily inferior nation.”120 And General DePuy himself wrote in 
1980: 
“Soviet armies do not move forward on some magic cruise-control set at 15 km per hour 
or some other rate derived by averaging movement over periods of days and weeks. 
Instead, battles are episodic – advances sporadic – and subject as much to the terrain 
and the quality of the defense as to the doctrine of the attacker. Just because we have 
studied Soviet doctrine exhaustively, we must not sanctify his intentions nor assign his 
tactics an aura of inevitable success. A well-situated U. S. tank or Mech company team 
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with 10 to 15 high performance tank and anti-tank weapons should be able to destroy a 
Soviet tank battalion coming straight at it 9 times out of 10 with moderate losses.”121 
The distinctive managerial style purported by DePuy, stressing numbers and probabilities, 
will be found again below in the discussion of FM 100-5 1976 and the Active Defense. 
Numbers and probabilities will get again take center stage as part of the Airpower discourse 
where “efficiency” will be claimed to be the main advantage of aerial attacks. In the 
meantime, General Glenn K. Otis wrote similarly when he was in command of TRADOC in 
1981: “A ground attack against NATO forces in Europe will be spearheaded by masses of 
armored vehicles. Frontages in Europe will demand that we concentrate on main avenues of 
approach and counter quickly.”122 Resorting partially to Active Defense language (see below), 
Otis hereby described the “mass” coming at the defending NATO forces. But General Donn 
A. Starry as well had to concede in a letter to Brigadier General Donald Morelli, United States 
Army Readiness Command, on the concept paper for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon: 
“The general thrust of the paper shows NATO defending and WP [Warsaw Pact] attacking. 
We’ve tried to get that bias out of most what we write, but it shows through too grossly here 
again.”123 Both General officers promoted their own distinctive image of United States Army 
warfare style and doctrine in order to counter the Soviet threat envisioned in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. But first, the next chapter will outline how the Warsaw Pact’s forces were 
thought to move forward on the ground. 
1.3. The emergence of the Operational Maneuver Group 
After the Second World War and in the 1950s the dominant opinion in the United States was 
that in “modern warfare” the focus lay on “firepower” and therefore especially on nuclear 
weapons. In the 1960s Soviet military intellectuals as well saw a Revolution in Military Affairs 
on the battlefield resulting from these nuclear weapons (which should not to be confused 
with the United States’ RMA). Theoreticians like Wassili Danilowitsch Sokolovski even 
postulated that conventional ground war had become unnecessary or at least secondary 
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because of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the strategic level.124 Only over the 
course of the 1960s did it become obvious that conventional ground war could absolutely 
play a role. This opinion was reinforced by the nuclear “parity” resulting from the 
circumstance that the Warsaw Pact was able to field the same nuclear triad as the United 
States (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers). In the late 1970s and 1980s, nuclear strikes were seen as 
means on the operational level in a conventional war. The deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons, as temporarily believed by NATO as well as the Warsaw Pact’s forces, could take 
place despite of the huge arsenal of strategic weapons without triggering an all-out nuclear 
exchange of “blows”.125 Moreover, with the advent of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)126 
conventional weapons could have wide-ranging “effects” (a term which would be more 
prominent in the 1990s) on the battlefield as well, serving as a substitute for tactical nuclear 
weapons and therefore diminishing the likelihood of nuclear escalation by empowering 
conventional forces.127 
Deep Operation 
Therefore, as was the opinion in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
contemporary Soviet doctrine, the Deep Operation, rested upon surprise. Thus the attack on 
the enemy throughout the whole “depth” of the area consisted of numerical superiority in 
means and “firepower” at decisive points, mobility as well as continuous operations and 
advancing through a distance of between 50 and 70 kilometers on each battle day. Quoting 
General Starry in 1978, “Key soviet concepts are mass, momentum, and continuous land 
combat”128, one can see the terms “mass” and “speed” associated again to the Soviet 
assault. Erroneously analysts in the United States until the end of the 1970s saw Warsaw 
Pact forces only attacking along one (or few) axis. Not until the exercise Zapad-81129 in which 
the Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) was deployed for the first time in earnest showed 
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western planners how Soviet forces systematically tried for gaps and weaknesses in the 
defense perimeters.130 Using airmobile troops even made vertical echelons possible apart 
from those into the “depth”. The goal of these actions had to be multiple breakthroughs 
along different movement axis’s including parallel action against targets in the Hinterland. 
At the same time the weaknesses of Soviet doctrine, propagated by United States analysts, 
had to be exploited: the rigid leadership system, which apparently tolerated little initiative 
on lower levels; the general tendency to hold precisely onto battle plans at higher command; 
and the education system, which let only few creativity take place and the more scientific 
approach to the battle.131 Furthermore, there had to be predictable echelons whose 
elements had clear missions from the beginning. In the end, western analysts attested the 
Warsaw Pact’s forces also a technological inferiority, as Skinner described.132 Therefore they 
would mainly rely on their numerical superiority as well as surprise: 
“[…] mass, momentum, and continuous combat are the operative tactics. Breakthrough 
(somewhere) is sought as the initiator of collapse in the defender's system of defense. 
[…] In the alternative, surprise is substituted for mass in the daring thrust tactic. […] 
What is important is that superiority in numbers permits him to keep a significant 
portion of his force out of the fight […] follow-on echelons gives the enemy a strong grip 
on the initiative which we must wrest from him, then retain in order to win.”133  
“Mass” and the accompanying “momentum” (“speed”) would pose exorbitant problems to 
defend against. The executing element for this Deep Battle would be the OMG having 
different armored and mechanized units in multiple in-depth echeloned formations.134 The 
OMG as a new form of a conventional threat should consist of multiple mixed formations135 
(combined arms) and itself be part of multiple echelons, as well as be echeloned itself. 
Sacrificing distribution on a broad front for a marching formation echeloned in the “depth” 
of the area should facilitate fast advances and forestall any tactical nuclear strikes by NATO 
forces.136 The OMG should comprise one or multiple Independent Maneuver Element(s) to 
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probe for gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s lines and open breaches, into which up-moving 
forces could advance at once. Starry described the phenomenon in 1981: “They [the Soviets] 
plan a regimental level attack on multiple axes, against defenses which are not set. Every one 
of those is a meeting engagement, which they then try to exploit by pouring on second 
echelons.”137 Therefore, according to critics of the concept Active Defense (which was 
conceived as an answer to Soviet doctrine and will be discussed further in the next chapter) 
and advocates of AirLand Battle Doctrine later on, it was indispensable that the enemy was 
fought against throughout the whole “depth” of the area simultaneously.138 The OMGs 
would advance on multiple axes. Most of the force would be concentrated at the front and 
well secured from enemy nuclear strikes. Simultaneously, the USSR deemphasized the 
importance of the second echelon units, as they were indeed potentially increasingly 
vulnerable to nuclear strikes.139 Pre-planned and possibly being composed of parts of the 
first echelon, the OMG could rapidly exploit breaches.140 As part of a Front141 the OMG 
should quickly advance behind the first echelon to exploit breaches in a fast fashion.142 Army 
Major Stephen T. Rippe, an airborne ranger infantry officer and Army aviator, accordingly 
wrote in a CGSC thesis in 1985 to gain the title of Master of Military Art and Science: 
“In order to breach defenses rapidly and maintain offensive momentum, Warsaw Pact 
doctrine advocates the use of massed, high speed, heavily armored forces at a time and 
place of their choosing. During offensive operations, the advanced penetration element 
and the first echelon maintain pressure on the defense in an attempt to find its 
weakness. Then second echelon forces and Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) are 
used for exploitation.”143 
“Mass” and “speed” dominated the discourse on the enemy’s warfare in the United States 
Army during these years and were mostly connoted to the image of the Soviet thrust in 
Central Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States Army even had a Soviet Studies 
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Group which, among others, concentrated on conventional ground war or a conflict confined 
to the European Theater respectively. The group concluded that the Soviet OMGs could, 
thanks to their “mass”, easily turn tactical breaches into operational success. Soviet 
defectors further described the execution of five phases: firstly, one or multiple nuclear 
strikes against defending Western troops and/or the nuclear means of NATO would have 
been conducted; second, aerial attacks and third, conventional rocket attacks would have 
followed; fourth the ground offensive, in which a tank army would appear as the decisive 
element for a breakthrough; and finally the breakthrough would be exploited by the second 
echelon. Every advance would possibly be foregone by a nuclear carpet. Overall, one Soviet 
defector calculated five to six armies with about 10‘000 tanks, acknowledging the perceived 
“mass”, without anyone seemingly really questioning the calculus.144 
Preventing the deployment of nuclear weapons 
The Soviets themselves saw NATO’s forces to be, arguably, mobile, but having few 
operational “depth” and reserves. Because of that, also, NATO could feel pushed to use 
nuclear strikes. Quick advances by the Warsaw Pact’s forces should prevent the deployment 
of PGMs or nuclear weapons by undermining NATO’s communications and leadership 
ability.145 Those responsible in the USSR took the view that, owing to the nuclear deterrent 
on both sides, a conventional war was more realistic, as Glantz argues. In the context of this 
scenario, the early destruction of enemy tactical/operational nuclear means with an 
immediately following advance on the ground would be ideal to forestall nuclear 
escalation.146 A more flexible echelon instead of the concentration of forces owing to the 
principle of “mass” should prevent enemy nuclear strikes and facilitate concentration 
through movement on the battlefield.147 The OMG was high-placed in the discussion 
regarding the threat by the Warsaw pact and therefore an important concept in the 
discourse on the enemy. In June 1983, Colonel William G. Hanne at the Strategic Studies 
Institute of the United States Army described the OMG as following: 
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“The OMG has evolved into an organization that is designed to strike rapidly and deep 
into NATO's rear, thereby capitalizing on predicted difficulties within NATO to obtain 
tactical nuclear weapons release.”148 
Hanne here describes the term OMG as a problem for NATO relating to the reserves as well. 
The OMG concept as manifestation of the terms which dominated the discourse on enemy 
warfare (“mass“, “speed“) can be found in many different journal articles during these years. 
In April 1984 another article by Lieutenant Colonel John G. Hines, Assistant to the director, 
Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Philipp A. Petersen, Analyst for the 
Department of Defense, examining the Termini Deep Operation and Deep Battle was 
published in Military Review:  
“In effect, the deep operation seeks to destroy the enemy's defenses with several deep 
finger-like penetrations that are controlled by a single powerful hand rather than with 
the driving fist of a frontal assault.”149  
This description reflects exemplarily the imagination of a Warsaw Pact advance along 
multiple axes with the OMG as a partially separately element, even as it is militarily highly 
doubtful that any single entity would have been able to control this type of operation, 
especially at the “speed“ mentioned. In Parameters in 1985, Hung P. Nguyen, PhD Candidate 
in Soviet Studies at Johns Hopkins University wrote about the OMG as the decisive element in 
the future: “The recent reorganization of two tank divisions into a corps-like structure 
indicated that this formation will comprise the Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) of the 
future.“150 Tanks were seen as main part of the OMG as described above. Jeffrey Record, 
Adjunct Professor of Military History at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, wrote in the September/October edition 
of Air University Review in 1985 about the OMG, suggesting even more decrease in reaction 
times thanks to echelonment: 
“Indeed, the Soviets have for years been increasing the combat power of their first-
echelon forces in Eastern Europe, notably the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, while the 
recent development of the so-called Operational Maneuver Group and its associated 
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doctrine suggests that they are also attempting to decrease the amount of time required 
to commit second-echelon forces.”151  
Jeffrey Record as well wrote about the “lack of any assurance that political decision makers 
will act effectively in time, or even act at all, on whatever warning is received.”152 Now one 
can see the image of a nuclear strike prevented by slow political decision processes. In the 
October edition of Military Review in 1985 Captain Stephen P. Aubin, Editor of Military 
Intelligence, and Captain Robert E. Kells Jr. from the 513th Military Intelligence Group, 
analyzed Soviet military thought, arguing quite similarly that the chance to resort to nuclear 
strikes could be denied by the employment of OMGs: 
“They are moving toward a posture by which they could overwhelm the West on the 
conventional level alone, hoping to deny the West even the chance to resort to nuclear 
weapons.”153  
The image of a quick and concentrated Soviet advance was then also displayed by Lieutenant 
Colonel Stephen T. Rippen, Commanding Officer (CO) for First Battalion, 4th Infantry, 3d 
Infantry Division, in Air University Review May/June edition 1986: 
“Second-echelon forces and operational maneuver groups (OMGs) would be used for 
exploitation. […] Their entire structure is designed for fast-tempo operations that can be 
executed to defeat NATO forces, presenting them with a fait accompli, before NATO can 
execute a nuclear option.”154 
Therefore again “speed“ can be found as describing term for the Soviet assault using 
OMGs. And former TRADOC commander and then USAREUR General Otis described 
the threat posed by the OMG in front of a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)155 
audience in 1988 as follows: 
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“The formation and training of operational maneuver groups in the Warsaw Pact have 
nothing to do with defense. Warsaw Pact regiments are made up of combined arms, 
consisting of armor, infantry, and artillery, all under a regimental commander. Soviet 
operations under this regimental structure tend toward the offensive. […] They have 
developed a new type of army corps that can deal in relatively independent operations 
and exploit breakthroughs. […] If we consider their capabilities, their modernization, and 
their almost totally self-propelled and nuclear-capable artillery, we find a force that is 
organized and equipped for offensive action.”156 
These text passages157 have in common that they try to paint a picture of a battle possibly 
lost before it was begun. The OMG seems to be the projection surface for the image of a 
massive, mechanized attack force of the Warsaw Pact, which would be able to leverage a 
traditional understanding of nuclear deterrence. The used terms are mainly “mass“ or 
“speed“. A United States Army image of war centered around numbers and “firepower” 
comes together as well; problems and frictions (in a clausewitzian sense) are left out by the 
authors of these articles which leads to the contemporary image of a “clean war“. 
“Firepower”, then, is together with “maneuver” one of the main terms on which many 
discussions are based. Different views exist on whether an enemy force in the field can be 
beaten only by using clever tactics or by technical means, e.g. “firepower”. The Soviet side 
was thought to use “firepower” more as a suppressing element of warfare, enhancing 
“maneuver”, or “mass“ and “speed“. 
If one follows the propagated assessment of the situation in Europe, there were only two 
alternatives for NATO in the contemporary situation to cope with the conventional threat 
which the Warsaw Pact seemed to present: either one stopped part of the attacking forces 
at the inner German border and lead a counterattack, whereby one had to concede part of 
the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD). However, NATO had pledged in the context of 
Forward Defense as early as in the 1950s to not concede any territory to the enemy.158 The 
alternative would have been therefore to defend at the inner German border, but this bore 
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the danger of an earlier Soviet breakthrough and an early Warsaw pact victory thanks to the 
echelons or quantitative superiority, respectively.159 Hung P. Nguyen wrote in Parameters in 
1985: 
“Exploiting the breakthrough of a section of the defense, highly independent forward 
tank formations are funneled through the gap to achieve a rapid thrust into the depth of 
the defense in coordination with deep artillery strikes and air attacks. These tank forces 
then act as a lever turning on a moving fulcrum composed of the all-arms main forces, 
which also serve as the ‘magnetic steamroller’ that holds opposing forces forward and 
crushes them.“160 
The expression of a “magnetic steamroller“ serves as visualization of the presupposed 
numerical and even doctrinal superiority of the Warsaw Pact. NATO analysts also imagined 
the latent danger of a Soviet surprise attack with some of its motorized regiments out of its 
garrisons in Eastern Europe, which would have prevented the arrival of United States 
reinforcements at the front lines.161 However, United States Army analysts saw this scenario 
to be more or less unrealistic because it contradicted the supposition that the Warsaw Pact 
would ready multiple echelons to gain an overwhelming victory. Under these circumstances 
NATO perhaps would have succeeded at gaining the upper hand after beating back a first 
wave. In the contemporary perception of NATO, a scenario which saw USSR units on exercise 
in Eastern Europe or the DDR mounting a surprise attack had a higher probability of 
occurrence, according to Citino. But Hines and Petersen formulated the scenario which was 
seen as the most probable: 
“The earliest penetrations probably would be by division and even army-size operational 
maneuver groups (OMGs) that are specifically organized and equipped for deep, large-
scale raid missions. Through early destruction or seizure of objectives deep in NATO 
territory and the rapid fragmentation of NATO's forward defense on a broad front, the 
Soviets would seek to quickly reduce the perceived utility of continued resistance.”162 
The image portrayed in this last statement did in fact develop in the early 1980s. The terms 
“mass” and “speed” had already dominated the perfected Soviet attack in the late 1970s, 
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best displayed by ALFA’s “blitzkrieg style”163 Soviet attack in 1978. Discerning the discourse 
on the enemy and its elements of “mass” and “speed” seems appropriate. The question now 
was: How should the United States Army’s style of warfare or doctrine be planned to 
counter the imagined overwhelming Warsaw Pact attack? 
1.4. Active Defense: attrition warfare in Central Europe 
This chapter will show how the newly established TRADOC did formulate new doctrine to 
cope with the aforementioned Warsaw Pact threat by employing a new doctrine with Active 
Defense. The concept will be described as well as the image of war it displayed. 
The concept 
TRADOC naturally had the purpose of finding ways to cope with the Soviet superiority by 
using newly developed technologies, new doctrine, new training and a new 
professionalism.164 General DePuy, who led TRADOC from the beginning until 1977, was 
assigned to the manager-type of United States officer by Linn. The group of officers named 
as managers evaluated warfare in Vietnam as inefficient as well as insufficiently effective and 
they saw a deficiency in the huge number of officers (in relation to soldiers in the field) who 
brought with them too much bureaucracy to the rear of the battlefield.165 In 1976 a new FM 
100-5, which described the concept of Active Defense, was written under the guidance of 
DePuy. It stipulated training and technology as means against the numerical massively 
superior armies of the Warsaw Pact. First detailing the Army’s objectives, the Manual then 
quickly described “Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield” before defining the Army’s 
doctrine (“How to Fight”) and then going into details about different subjects in-depth 
(Offense, Defense, Retrograde, et cetera). Especially the weapons part held lots of diagrams 
and pictorials, describing the development of weapons systems. The doctrine part then 
outlined how “firepower” should substitute manpower and even that part held graphs about 
first round hit probability and so on. That manager attitude led to the FM 100-5, 1976 being 
more a detailed mathematician’s guide on how to beat back a Warsaw Pact attack in a more 
technical way. Kretchik criticizes the 1976 version of FM 100-5 as resembling “nineteenth-
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century army drill manuals in form and content.“166 Indeed it has rather the look of a comic 
than that of a serious military handbook. Jonathan M. House describes General DePuy's 
procedures and solutions as being too “simplistic, more appropriate for teaching recruits in 
basic training than for equipping officers to make their own decisions based on a commonly 
held set of doctrinal principles.”167 NATO or United States forces should be able to hold 
positions, even if inferior three-to-one or more. The end state should be a concentration of 
forces at the point of Soviet breakthrough at the culminating point, according to Clausewitz, 
as Tomes describes; in reality, only a geographical point was meant in the Active Defense.168 
The FM 100-5 from 1976 mirrored different trends in the United States Armed Forces. 
Certainly focusing on one threat and one scenario with one possible answer was a first 
trend, mirrored by a scientific approach169 with lots of formulas, charts, maps, graphs and 
statistics. This conception fit well to the approach of the so-called guardians, if one wants to 
put Brian Linn’s approach to use. The respective emphasis on training and drill matched, on 
the other side, more the concept of the managers.170 As NATO forces would have been 
numerically inferior, they would have had to be deployed against the enemy in a 
concentrated way: 
“It is almost inevitable that initially we will be outnumbered in the theater of war. But, 
whether the mission is to crush an enemy attack or to launch an offensive operation, it is 
the job of the corps and division commanders to bring about a winning concentration of 
force at the point of actual combat.“171 
House argues that the West German government’s desire to protect every kilometer of its 
shallow territory in the United States Army’s sector would have obligated the United States 
Army in Europe to defend along the interzonal border established in 1945, with little space 
for delaying or maneuver tactics. So at least during the first battle(s) of the contemporary 
war scenario United States Army units would have had to fight outnumbered and outgunned 
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by a superior Soviet foe.172 The concentration of United States Army forces seemed 
therefore indispensable as it was agreed that the enemy would bring its forces to bear on 
one point on the frontlines en masse as well: “Soviet doctrine calls for the concentration of 
forces of up to six divisions echeloned in depth on a 10 to 12 kilometer front.“173 According to 
the threat being discussed in military publications the FM 100-5 Operations from 1976 said 
clearly for which type of war the United States Army had to prepare: “[…] the first battle of 
our next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted […] The 
United States could find itself in a short, intense war – the outcome of which may be dictated 
by the results of initial combat.”174 Subsequently, the FM described how the enemy would 
have looked like in this future war in the eyes of the authors: 
“The US Army must prepare its units to fight outnumbered, and to win. […] The armies of 
the Warsaw Pact, fashioned on the Soviet model, incorporate masses of tanks, backed by 
an impressive industrial base producing large numbers of quality armored fighting 
vehicles. […] it emphasizes heavy concentrations of armor.”175  
Here again an image of masses of attacking Warsaw Pact tanks was shown as well as the 
capability to stop this “mass”. Interestingly, here the quality of the Soviet armor was 
deemed high. 
The role of modern technology 
Active Defense was strongly bound to the development of new weapons systems (and 
therefore technology, itself an enduring discourse) and the deployment of United States 
forces in known and prepared terrain. The circumstances necessary to win the battle 
comprised the concentration of United States forces on the right time at the right spot: the 
control of military means to bring maximum “firepower” to bear on a desired area; 
combined arms warfare and coverage, concealment as well as deception; and, last but not 
least, the crews of weapons systems had to be maximally efficient, whereas the FM did not 
turn this “efficiency” into precise numbers.176 As Kretchik describes, “Modern technology's 
ability to generate firepower took priority over maneuver. […] But doing so meant that the 
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Army had relegated people to being components of a machine.“177 The discourse on 
“firepower“ and “maneuver“ will be visible throughout the study at hand. General Starry was 
quoted in 1978 at the annual AUSA symposium: “At battalion level and below, the battle is 
won by destroying enemy systems – servicing targets.”178 So indeed, Starry saw mainly 
“firepower“ being the decisive element to win, being connoted to technological means. 
In a special chapter in the FM 100-5 from 1976 the United States Army described what stood 
in the center of warfare: “Changes in intensity and lethality of modern battle and the need to 
fight outnumbered present the US Army with challenges greater than those faced on 
previous battlefields. The objective, however, remains unchanged – to win the land 
battle.”179 The idea of being numerically inferior was downright talked up in this edition of 
the FM 100-5. Support by the United States Air Force in favor of ground operations was 
envisioned, too: 
“The Army expects the USAF to penetrate enemy air defenses and to attack reserve and 
reinforcing units, fire support sites, command and control facilities, and logistic activities. 
The Army recognizes that air forces are most effective against the larger, more 
vulnerable targets deep in the enemy’s rear.”180 
Interestingly, a whole chapter in the 1976 edition dealt with the terminus Air-Land Battle 
(hereby the spelling has to be duly noted), whereby the authors wrote at the beginning of 
the chapter, lapidary, “the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force. In fact, the 
Army consciously avoids the development of weapons or equipment to perform functions 
which the Air Force can perform more effectively.”181 This is very interesting, especially with 
the background of the discussion on the Airmobile Concept and the dissatisfaction of the 
United States Army with the Close Air Support (CAS) provided by the Air Force in Vietnam.182 
Cooperation between Army and Air Force was hereby of utmost importance. Therefore, as 
early as 1975 a study group was established including ALFA in 1978 cooperation in-between 
Air Staff and Army Staff and was institutionalized with a treaty between TRADOC and 
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Tactical Air Command (TAC).183 Testing to integrate Army and Air Force assets into Joint Air 
Attack Teams were conducted: 
“The joint air attack team is a combination of US Army attack helicopters and US Air 
Force close air support aircraft operating together to locate, engage and destroy tanks, 
armored vehicles and other battlefield targets. It is normally supported by US Army field 
artillery or mortars, sometimes by both.”184 
ALFA was an integrating element from 1975 towards an inclusion and teamwork with the Air 
Force. Within the scope of a memorandum, the Army’s Corps should select targets in the 
“depth” of the area in the future, and then the Air Force should select the means and 
provide it to the Army. This way CAS should stay under the control of the ground forces.185 
An ALFA primer in 1978 had stated earlier: 
“Air and land elements must fight as an integrated team to achieve the needed 
concentration. As an example, the Air Force will provide close air support (CAS) to 
engaged ground forces in those areas where success of the overall effort is at stake. The 
Army in turn provides support in the suppression of enemy air defenses through 
firepower and electronic means.”186 
So in exchange, the Army should use its own “firepower” to help the Air Force fly its 
missions. And further: “The Air Force can strike advancing Warsaw Pact forces while they are 
still beyond the range of Army weapons and can continue to strike Pact forces in concert with 
the Army after the ground forces engage.”187 Already the idea of AirLand Battle, which will 
follow in the next chapter, was filtering through. In 1979 the Joint Second Echelon 
Interdiction Study followed. In 1982 the concept Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) 
was written, which was then tested in exercises in the National Training Center (NTC). The 
authors of said study proposed the possibility of having Army officers identifying targets on 
every level. The decision if the selected target should be attacked by means organic to the 
erstwhile unit or if it should be given to the next higher echelon of command would be made 
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in cooperation with the responsible Forward Air Controller (FAC). The study Joint Suppression 
of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) had a similar way; enemy air defense systems on the 
battlefield should be primarily suppressed by Air Force means as targets of opportunity, but 
their suppression by ground fire could also be requested. And in 1983 efforts to cooperate 
peaked in the Agreement of Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine.188 Here the 
spelling had already changed due to the AirLand Battle doctrine. 
Army and Air Force cooperation 
Nevertheless, in the Air Force discussions took place if at all, (and if yes, to what extent?) 
CAS was part of the Air Force’s missions.189 Apart from CAS, (Battlefield) Air Interdiction (BAI) 
too, belonged to the Air Force’s missions. The Air Force spotted absolutely a (secondary) role 
for itself in the ground war, as described in the following paragraph in the Air Force Manual 
1-1 from 1975: 
“Air interdiction operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay enemy ground 
and naval forces before they can be brought to bear against friendly forces. These 
operations also restrict the combat capability of enemy forces by disrupting their lines of 
communications and by destroying the supplies that sustain an effective level of enemy 
activity.”190  
The Manual explicitly stated that deterrence of strategic nuclear war was the highest 
defense priority of the United States and the Air Force. Wielding two of the three nuclear 
triad elements (ICBMs and bombers), it listed the strategic attack as its first and foremost 
mission.191 The 1979 AFM 1-1 edition as well listed Strategic Aerospace Offense before Air 
Interdiction: 
“Air Interdiction operations are conducted against the enemy’s military potential before 
it can effectively be used against friendly surface forces. These operations restrict the 
combat capability of the enemy by delaying, disrupting, or destroying their lines of 
communications, their forces, and their resources. It is used to disrupt enemy plans and 
time schedules.”192  
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The AFM 1-1 from 1979 comprised, according to Tomes, early basic approaches to AirLand 
Battle Doctrine; not only replenishments but reinforcing enemy troops should be attacked 
too. The same can be said about the 1975 edition, as seen above. 
Comparing these three Manuals (AFM 1-1, 1975; FM 100-5, 1976; AFM 1-1, 1979) in the 
1970s is relevant as they show the increasing development of the idea of combined arms 
warfare on the operational level (and therefore the integration of aerial means) at least in 
spirit joint. Still the strategic level would have top-most priority in the Air Force Manuals for 
the time being. Tomes compares the AFM 1-1 from 1979 with a Comic Book, which 
comprises many pictures, but few new ideas and no progress at all. Indeed, compared to its 
immediate predecessor, which was small and somewhat austere, the 1979 edition obviously 
tried to make the Air Force better off and promote its main deterrence mission to the public 
and its own airmen. But the AFM 1-1 in 1979 still paid relatively little attention to the 
introduction of PGMs, electronic warfare, strategic airlift or CAS. PGMs had already been 
used in the later phases of the Vietnam War and using Forward Observers, Air Force fighter 
aircraft had already supported ground forces. Parts of the Air Force (primarily proponents of 
the nuclear triad) were not content to loose nuclear capable fighter aircraft in a first, 
conventional phase of war in Europe.193 Only at the beginning of the 1980s more and more 
fighter pilots held important positions in the Air Force leadership after it was dominated by 
bomber pilots for decades.194 The strategic level lost top priority which facilitated the 
demand for General Purpose Forces which were able to bring more power to the operational 
level, too, and act in concert with ground forces. The Vietnam War led to the realization on a 
broad front that more flexible, tactically deployable means as transport aircraft, aerial 
refueling craft, reconnaissance aircraft, Electronic Warfare aircraft (EW), aircraft suited to 
CAS or to suppress enemy ground-based air defenses (SEAD, Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defenses) and Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) were needed. This insight led to the development 
of a new generation of fighter aircraft such as the F-15, the F-16 and the A-10.195 This 
evolution of Airpower culminated when strategic B-52 Stratofortress bombers in the 1980s 
began further to train for conventional deployments as they had done in Vietnam already.196 
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While Active Defense therefore brought many technological developments and an increased 
Army-Air Force cooperation in concept development, it also stipulated a very narrow view of 
potential future war scenarios. The FM 100-5 1976 show explicitly how the United States 
Army (and its allies) would fight while outnumbered in Central Europe. Active Defense 
therefore did indeed lay the foundation for many of the discourses and discussions which 
would dominate the image of war in the next few years. 
1.5. The Big Five and the Offset Strategy 
Apart from a new doctrine, technical innovations seemed to be necessary to overcome the 
numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, as shown above. Technology as a 
driving force of military imagination was not entirely new at this time, but, as will be seen, it 
does indeed get into full spin during the 1980s. Early efforts culminated in the Offset 
Strategy in the 1970s with the aim to further disavow the Warsaw Pact technologically. 
Advances in the area of electronics enabled the development of more and more advanced 
computers as well as electronic warfare and more precise weapons such as the Hellfire 
Missile and the Copperhead Artillery Projectile.197 As the United States Armed Forces 
developed an even more technologically-driven image of war, this chapter will explain some 
of the important developments taking place in the 1970s and 1980s which still are mainstays 
of the United States’ conventional military advantages until today. 
Big Five 
Emblematic for the idea of an aspired technological superiority to offset the numerical 
inferiority were the so-called Big Five already mentioned above. Among these five systems is 
counted the M1 Abrams MBT, introduced in 1980. It was powered by a gas turbine (a 
novelty for the United States Army), and it had a fire extinguishing system, a digital fire 
control system, a thermal imaging device, as well as a fully stabilized gun wherewith the M1 
could fire at moving targets while driving. The further developed M1A1 had the edge against 
its opponents concerning the range of its gun, target acquisition, and tracking system. The 
M1A1 should have also coped with a direct hit by the Soviet 125mm gun, which its 
contemporary opponents T-72 and T-80 also had. A new armor consisting of ceramics, steel, 
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titan and nylon webbing provided enough protection.198 The M1s companion was the M2/3 
Bradley, which was introduced beginning in 1981. This IFV was the United States’ answer to 
the Soviet BMP-1 which had impressive “firepower” available thanks to its 73mm gun and 
ATGMs. With a 25mm cannon, TOW missiles (Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided), 
and armor consisting of aluminum and laminate, the M2/3 should have assisted the M1 on 
the battlefield with its own weapons and dismounted troops. However, its armor was 
criticized as insufficient even before introduction. The armor was then improved with the 
M2A2, and it proved to be absolutely sufficient in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm.199 With 
the duo M1/M2 mechanized units should have fought battles out shorthanded; units would 
have had to “maneuver” quickly to be able to overcome multiples of their own number on 
the battlefield as imagined with Active Defense.200 Other elements of the Big Five were the 
medium utility helicopter UH-60 Blackhawk, the attack helicopter AH-64 Apache, and the 
SAM system Patriot. Especially the Apache, introduced in 1986, should have helped as a 
heavily armed successor to the AH-1 Cobra, a Vietnam-era derivative of the Utility Helicopter 
UH-1 Huey, to stop the Warsaw Pact’s armored armies in Europe. The Hellfire Missile should 
have enabled the Apache to destroy as many enemy armored vehicles as possible. The 
Blackhawk was not only thought to transport the soldiers in air assault or airmobile divisions, 
it should also have moved their heavy means such as howitzers. And Patriot should have 
defended mechanized forces as well as forward bases against aerial attacks. 
With the Assault Breaker project the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)201 
then as well wanted to gain the capability to destroy 2,000 enemy vehicles in a distance of 
between 20 and 100 kilometers behind the frontlines in a time period of about ten hours. 
Sensors such as the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) and the Stand-off Target 
Acquisition System (SOTAS), which later on would be merged into Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS), should detect enemy vehicles through greater distances.202 
The phased-array radar built into the E-8 JSTARS is able to monitor the movement of troops 
and materials on distances up to 250 kilometers, independent of any weather influence. The 
first JSTARS were introduced in 1988 and gave their debut in the 1991 Gulf War. The 
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Multiple-launch Rocket System (MLRS) could then fire together with attack planes and 
helicopters into the “depth”. MLRS was introduced into United States Army service in 1983 
and has a range in excess of 40 kilometers; the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
munitions, which can be fired from the same box launcher, reach about 300 kilometers. The 
system is capable of mining an area of one square kilometer with submunition firing one 
salvo. While MLRS was not counted in the Big Five, it certainly did fit together with them into 
the ongoing discourse on technology. While the Warsaw Pact’s advance was associated with 
the terms “mass” and “speed”, “firepower” should then be the main answer the United 
States prepared. 
Air Force developments 
Apart from the mentioned development of new fighter planes for aerial combat and CAS, 
measures against enemy air defense were intensively searched for in order to be able to put 
“firepower” to good use against enemy units. In Vietnam in 1965, every sixteenth enemy 
SAM had downed one United States plane. Using electronic countermeasures this enemy 
rate of success was then brought down to one in a hundred over the course of the war.203 In 
the already mentioned Arab-Israeli War in 1973, Soviet SAMs204 once more proved to be 
immensely effective, so further electronic countermeasures were developed. But the USSR 
seemed to be one step further ahead every time, which led to the initiation of the Stealth 
program in 1974. Stealth, or low observable technology, covers a range of techniques to 
make them less visible to radar, infrared, or other detection methods.205 
Therefore, projects such as the F-117, B-1 and B-2 were being started. The B-1A strategic 
bomber flew for the first time in 1974. This aircraft was thought to be the successor to the B-
52 and should intrude in low flight into Soviet territory to attack using nuclear weapons. 
After the Carter administration issued a stop order in 1977, the program was re-initiated in 
1981 under the Reagan presidency. The B-2 Stealth bomber flew for the first time in 1988. Its 
design is based on the flying-wing principle, whereas a drastically reduced Radar Cross 
Section (RCS) results from. With the B-1 and B-2, bombers should not only provide the 
capability to intrude Soviet air defenses, but they should also be pressed to permanently and 
expensively upgrade their systems. Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in 1987 that the 
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USSR lagged behind the United States in the area of Stealth technology according to 
intelligence analysis.206 In 1977, the HAVE BLUE demonstrator flew for the first time; its 
design characteristics were later merged into the F-117 program. The facetted structure of 
the F-117 together with radar-absorbing construction materials provided a reduced RCS, but 
apart from these high-tech components, the F-117 used the undercarriage of the F-15, 
engines and avionics from the F/A-18, and the Fly-by-Wire system from the F-16. So between 
1982 and 1990 a whole 59 pieces were provided to the Air Force. 
Since 1973 the Air Force led the United States’ satellite program as well, which going 
forward incorporated the efforts of all the services. In 1978 a preliminary version of the 
later-on GPS-satellite (Global Positioning System) was put into orbit, but only in 1995 GPS 
reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) comprising 24 satellites. Also at the end of the 
1980s a number of United States satellites, which were able to digitally transmit image to 
earth, were put into service for the first time. From 1976 until 1988 the KH-11 (Keyhole) type 
satellites were launched, which, for the first time, did not have to send a re-entry capsule to 
earth containing the film rolls. This boosted reconnaissance tremendously.207 
But the United States not only wanted to fight outnumbered on the ground and win thanks 
to superior quality, it also wanted to counter Soviet development in the fighter aircraft area. 
Quality here as well had to prevail over numbers. With the F-15 Eagle, the Air Force 
developed a new air dominance fighter which grew ever more sophisticated over time. This 
happened as well because the USSR had in 1967 revealed the MiG-25 Foxbat, an enormously 
fast high-altitude interceptor aircraft. While the F-15 was initially thought to only have to 
outmatch the MiG-23, now it had to be able to cope with the MiG-25. 
Opposition 
At the same time, the Military Reform Movement formed against these technological 
advancements and projects. It saw the weapons being developed were fragile and difficult to 
maintain. The F-15, for example, was seen to be too expensive and maintenance intensive 
even before it was introduced into service; the M1 main battle tank was named as a 
“cripple“. The movement’s arguing led, in the case of aircraft development, to the 
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procurement of cheaper and lighter alternatives such as the F-16.208 The resistance led to 
the high-low-mix in regard to fighter aircraft (Air Force: F-15-F-16; Navy: F-14-F/A-18). But in 
the end, modern technology – and the hopes and beliefs dependent on it – would until 
today very much determine the development of the image of war in the United States. 
1.6. Critique of Active Defense and the concept AirLand Battle 
While technological developments were already on their way in the late 1970s and a new 
doctrine had been put into service in the Army with Active Defense, the glimpse of the 
developing OMG threat in the Warsaw Pact together with the realization that possibly no 
nuclear weapons could be used against an attack in Central Europe brought Active Defense 
under scrutiny. This would finally lead to the concept AirLand Battle, which then stressed 
“depth“ much more, complementing “firepower“ as a dominating term regarding the 
discourse on warfare. 
Active Defense’s deficiencies 
In the light of the Flexible Response strategy, NATO planners thought to allow bringing 
tactical nuclear weapons to bear on attacking Soviet tank armies. But in the late 1970s this 
assumption lost its credibility, as mentioned earlier. General Donn A. Starry, who led 
TRADOC from 1977 until 1981, also propagated the opinion that NATO or its political 
leadership, respectively, would react too late. He therefore matched the opinion voiced in 
military publications.209 Starry had already commanded V Corps in Central Europe in 1976/77 
and exercised the Active Defense doctrine; he had seen a battle uncoordinated on all levels, 
predictable tactics and piecemeal destruction of blue forces at the end.210 Starry criticized 
the Active Defense primarily for its accent on defense. He also judged it as being wrong, as 
the middle leadership level (Corps or operational level, respectively) was rarely included in 
the warfighting.211 Starry had also visited the theatre of war in Israel 1973.212 Other critics 
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blamed Active Defense as too dependent on “firepower“ and huge resources as well as 
holding too much to linear formations.213 Brigadier General Donald Morelli, United States 
Army Readiness Command, wrote to General Starry: “We believe it [FM 100-5, 1976] to be 
too pedantic in parts and not in sufficient detail elsewhere. We must answer some of our 
more knowledgeable critics – not to necessarily agree but rather set the doctrine straight.”214 
The FM 100-5 from 1976 was further blamed by its critics for being focused only on the first 
battle of a future war. Indeed, within the scope of the Active Defense Attrition Warfare was 
deemed more important than Maneuver Warfare. The enemy should be delayed at the 
frontlines as long as it took to have reinforcements to facilitate a counter concentration and 
mount a counter offensive215; in principle, Active Defense was rather not active, according to 
contemporary critics.216 The defenders would have relied mainly on “firepower“ rather than 
on “maneuver“ or initiative, as House argues.217 General Edward C. Meyer, CSA from 1979 
until 1983, argued that the Army did not even possess the means for such an Attrition War 
and would itself end as the defeated war party.218 House further writes how it was obvious 
that even if the NATO forces defeated the first and second echelons of a Soviet attack, they 
would lose the war if they could not slow down and weaken other Soviet units following in 
the second echelon.219 Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, one of the writers of the FM 100-5 
1982 and AirLand Battle, would then write in 1983 about Active Defense: “The basic question 
of why this doctrine is now being changed can answered simply: Army commanders became 
convinced as a result of their field training and war games that they would be unable to 
defeat the Soviets using the doctrine of 1976.”220 De Czege expressed the constraint laying 
on the Army’s shoulders to win. General DePuy himself described in autumn 1980, what was 
thought to be wrong with Active Defense: 
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“Criticism often heard within the working Army include statements such as these: The 
defensive doctrine is too reactive – the enemy calls the tune. There is too little offense in 
the defense. Or, put another way, too little action in the active defense. The defense does 
not adequately exploit the less flexible and more centralized procedures of the Russians 
by retaining the initiative and confronting him continuously with new situations to which 
he will find it difficult to respond. The defense does not actively integrate fires with 
maneuver to shape the battlefield in ways advantageous to the defender. Lastly, and 
most importantly, the active defense is regarded by many officers simply as a delay 
triggered by the mere appearance of the enemy.”221 
Therefore, not only would Active Defense inadequately integrate “firepower” and 
“maneuver”, in its entirety it did not take Soviet doctrine into account. As mentioned earlier, 
analysts in the United States until the end of the 1970s had seen Warsaw Pact forces only 
attacking along one line of approach until exercises had shown how Soviet forces 
systematically tried for gaps and weaknesses in the defense perimeters. By using Active 
Defense one left the initiative to the enemy.222 Critics mentioned also that Active Defense 
provided only for minimal reserves, a pessimistic attitude and only focused on the European 
theatre.223 Robert R. Leonhard, who was employed by TRADOC temporarily, concluded, like 
Starry, that the biggest fault of Active Defense was the non-existent differentiation between 
the tactical and the operational level. He also criticized the focus being on the First Battle 
because the Warsaw Pact had the ability, owing to its material superiority and echelons, to 
lose a first battle and yet win the war in the long term. The movement of United States 
forces only to “concentrate“ would, realistically, not have been feasible under battle 
circumstances; the main routes would not have been continuously drivable, troops would 
have been tired after these movements, and the enemy could have influenced the 
deployment of forces disturbingly.224 In the April 1984 edition of Military Review Colonel 
John G. Hines argued accordingly:  
“The Warsaw Pact's leading echelons would probably try to exert pressure across the 
entire NATO Central Region front. […] This would help to conceal the location of the main 
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thrusts and thereby delay or prevent NATO's lateral redeployment of troops to reinforce 
defenses on the most threatened axes.“225 
Starry’s Central Battle 
General Starry had already analyzed 150 battle situations using computer simulations to 
optimize the conduct of battle within the scope of the concept Central Battle as 
commanding general (CG), V Corps. Starry told his audience in 1977, “After some 
examination, we decided that, in every conflict, be it game, simulation, or real war, there is a 
central battle – a place where all the combat systems come together violently. It is the critical 
place where all the firepower maneuvering forces come together.”226 Variables comprised 
the number of enemy tanks, weapons systems, and soldiers, as well as the advancement of 
the enemy (in kilometers/time period), propagated ranges of weapons systems, and other 
benchmark data. “In the place where the central battle occurs, there will be quality weapons 
whose ranges, accuracy and lethality, will be significantly improved over anything we’ve 
known before. The central battle will be extremely dense in both people and weapons 
systems.”227 The terminus Central Battle not only refers to Central Europe; it seemingly also 
pointed out the centrality of what the Army planned to fight for. In the scope of this analysis 
Soviet echelonment was focused on for the first time more forcibly to show the uselessness 
of Active Defense.228 Starry questioned himself as to how many Soviet units could reach the 
frontlines in which timeframe and how many aerial attacks would be necessary to stop 
them. “The field of the central battle will be crowded with large quantities of weapons 
systems, and such a variety of systems that no single weapon system can cope. To win, it’s 
going to take some balance of everything – a well integrated combined arms team.”229 As 
can be seen, Starry also mentioned the Army’s burden to win. With the concept Integrated 
Battlefield at the Field Artillery School tactical nuclear strikes against a second enemy wave 
were considered too. The necessity to obtain the National Command Authority‘s (NCA) 
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approval for the release of nuclear weapons was considered to be a hampering 
circumstance, as could be seen in  the general thrust in the military publications analyzed.230 
Starry is named by Citino as the right man at the right time, who brought the United States 
Army back onto the right way after Vietnam.231 His idea was to attack the enemy 
reinforcements, which would reach the FLOT (Forward Line of Troops)232 after a first wave a 
long time before they could reach the frontlines at all. Using a further developed Interdiction 
(done by Airpower and rocket artillery) and the so-called Integrated Battle Planning233 
conventional as well as chemical and nuclear weapons should be deployed.234 Starry focused 
in his concept on offensive operations, “firepower“, “speed”, “maneuver”, as well as human 
factors such as training, exercising, leadership, courage, and character. He imagined the 
modern battlefield as being like the one in the Arab-Israeli War, as very compact. While 
tanks and mechanized formations hit each other on the ground, aerospace would be full of 
fighter aircraft and attack helicopters, which fought each other as well as targets on the 
ground, being themselves fired upon by SAMs. At the same time, leadership would be of 
utmost importance under these circumstances as well as being rather difficult. Commanders 
would not have a splendid amount of time to take decisions, which made eventuality plans 
absolutely necessary. The antagonist with the numerical superiority on his side would not 
necessarily prevail, contemporary analysts argued, but rather the one who took the initiative 
and kept it had advantage.235 In the May edition of Military Review in 1982 John S. Doerfel, 
Chief, Concepts Division, Directorate of Combat Development, United States Army Field 
Artillery School, discussed the solution to the dilemma faced by NATO in case of a possible 
Warsaw Pact advance as mentioned and described already: 
“NATO success requires the defeat of enemy armies through combined air and ground 
actions and a resultant ability to maneuver in support of the theater mission. […] To be 
successful, the application of maneuver and air/ground firepower against uncommitted 
second-echelon forces must be achieved early.”236  
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“Maneuver” and especially “firepower” should now prevent Warsaw Pact reinforcements 
from flowing to the frontlines. Both these terms would dominate discussions on warfare in 
the near future especially regarding the ground battle as they are the counter argument 
opposite “mass”. As early as in 1981 TRADOC published a preliminary concept towards a 
new doctrine, which had been drawn under the guidance of Starry. The concept The AirLand 
Battle and Corps 86 demanded the Deep Attack, battling with “firepower“ enemy forces 
moving up to isolate the first wave at the frontlines.237 Bringing fires to bear against enemy 
forces moving up to the frontlines should enable own “maneuver”. Enemy strongpoints or 
key systems should also be targeted with fire.238 This concept differed from the Soviet idea 
of the Deep Operation which rather saw “maneuver” in “depth“ and less emphasized 
“firepower“. Under the axiom Extending the Battlefield, the foremost enemy wave should be 
destroyed at the first encounter, and, at the same time, a second wave had to be attacked in 
the “depth“ of the battlefield and prevented from intervening at the FLOT in order to take 
the initiative from the enemy, making him collapse in the end. A strong Covering Force 
should not yield territory without fighting: “They fight to destroy as much of the enemy 
forward of the main battle area as possible.“239  
German concepts 
To be successful at the described battlefield, German concepts such as the “Auftragstaktik“ 
were incorporated. The term “Auftragstaktik“ (engl. Mission Command) was never officially 
part of the German military lexicon, but was rather coined by opponents of the idea of 
mission-type tactics where subordinates have to understand the intent of their 
commander’s orders, have to be given proper guidance and have to be trained accordingly 
to act independently.240 This idea stems from the war realities encountered and analyzed by 
Clausewitz and other Prussian-German military theorists and generals: “modern war(fare)“ 
was shaped by chaos, insecurity and chance. Therefore, offensive, independent, uniform 
thinking, discipline, judgement and the process of leading, were stressed to be victorious in 
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combat.241 The commanding general, FORSCOM (Forces Command), General Robert M. 
Shoemaker, proposed at a meeting with General Starry in 1981 to adapt the “Auftragstaktik“ 
for the FM 100-5 to be developed.242 But neither in the 1982 nor in the 1986 edition of FM 
100-5 is either “Auftragstaktik“ nor Mission Command covered. What can be found, 
nonetheless, are descriptions about the “flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior 
leaders“ or on “clearly defined objectives and operational concepts“ as well as about “a 
clearly defined main effort“.243 Also notable was the United States Army’s understanding of 
“Auftragstaktik“ in the December edition 1982 of Military Review as described by Anthony 
M. Coroalles, Aide-de-camp to the commanding general 4th Infantry Division: 
“The next war is likely to be fluid and chaotic […] Such conditions dictate that 
commanders and subordinates operate from a common thought process. That is, 
commanders must clearly convey their intent when issuing operations orders to 
subordinates.”244  
“Modern warfighting“ materials in mass lead to the hereby described chaos on the 
battlefield in which the commander had to communicate to his troops a clear intention. 
Apart from the “Auftragstaktik“ the concept of the “Schwerpunkt“ (engl. point of main 
effort) was adopted in the scope of renewed works about Clausewitz, translated into termini 
such as center of gravity (CoG). The latter is more a literal mistranslation by United States 
military thinkers: it is not about a point where forces are concentrated but more about a 
thing or person which concentrates forces and gives them purpose and direction. It is all 
about unity and connectivity of forces.245 But the basic idea underlying a new FM should be 
to locate enemy vulnerabilities and concentration of the own point of main effort at exactly 
the same location, differing from Clausewitz’ original idea.246 
The AirLand Battle and Corps 86 
The study Corps 86 put the Corps and the parallel to be introduced operational level as the 
implementing element for the AirLand Battle into focus. The Corps should coordinate its own 
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battle into the “depth“ with the Numbered Air Force247 in the same Area of Operations (AO) 
and “work“ in an Area of Influence with a “depth“ of 150 kilometers behind the FLOT as well 
as an Area of Interest as far as 300 kilometers behind the frontlines; the Corps should at the 
same time fight against the first and second enemy wave.248 AirLand Battle and Corps 86 
propagated the absolute necessity of the battle into the “depth“ of the area as well as the 
absoluteness of a “synchronization” with the battles at the FLOT and in the own backyard 
(Rear Battle), taking place in parallel: 
“Deep attack is […] an absolute necessity to winning. […] deep attack particularly in an 
environment of scarce acquisition and strike assets, must be tightly coordinated over 
time with the decisive close-in battle. Without this coordination, many expensive and 
scarce resources may be wasted on apparently attractive targets whose destruction 
actually has little payoff in the close-in battle. […!] It's all one battle.”249  
Hereby again the constraint to win got into the foreground of the argumentation, why the 
Deep Battle had to take place. General Glenn K. Otis in 1984 spoke about the “simultaneity” 
of the different battles in front of a German audience as Commander in Chief of United 
States Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR): 
“AirLand Battle doctrine says that when a unit is fighting, it has to orchestrate three 
forms of battle: the battle at the front (that is where the tanks and the infantry meet 
head to head); the battle in the friendly rear (because the enemy is going to put stuff in 
your rear. They're going to put airborne, air mobile, and infiltrators, and so on. So there’s 
going to be some fighting in your rear, and you’ve got to orchestrate that); and the third 
element is that you have to fight the enemy in his rear (so that he doesn’t have a safe 
haven).”250 
The second enemy wave should be slowed, broken up, and destroyed. If not, the enemy 
would sooner or later reach numerical superiority at the FLOT and break through. Brigade, 
Division and Corps were therefore altogether obliged to fight the Deep Battle on their own 
level with fires as well as Air Force support.251 In a downright Symphony of Destruction252 
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advances of mechanized forces, Cruise Missiles, Air Interdiction, and air assaults should 
impede the arrival of further enemy waves on the battlefield whereas “firepower“ had to be 
decisive. When enemy second echelon units would be disrupted by indirect weapons 
(especially nuclear ones [sic!]) they would have taken time to reorganize and reestablish 
control over their subordinate units. During this period, as described by Corps 86, United 
States and NATO forces “would maneuver to the flanks and rear of the assaulting division 
and attack to collapse its ability to conduct combat operations.”253 
Apart from military theoreticians such as Clausewitz and Liddell Hart (Indirect Approach), 
AirLand Battle, as illustrated above, incorporated German concepts and put emphasis on the 
initiative; there was even an active exchange with German officers taking place on an official 
level.254 As a result of these contacts involving German officers, the new FM 100-5 had 
indeed to be based on the Heeresdienstverordnung (HDv) 100/100 Truppenführung im 
Gefecht from 1974.255 The concept AirLand Battle turned away from the idea of the 
guardians and managers and put morals as well as discipline at the same level as a scientific 
approach. Decentralized leadership and “synchronization” were in stark contrast to the 
micromanagement that took place under Active Defense.256 With the AirLand Battle, the 
weaknesses of Soviet doctrine, as shown above, had to be exploited, including the rigid 
leadership system, the general tendency to hold precisely onto battle plans at higher 
command, and the education system, which allowed little creativity and adopted a more 
scientific approach to the battle.257 At the same time authors in military publications were 
deeply concerned with the topic of Deep Battle or Attack from a United States Army 
perspective, represented here by Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, Doctrine Writer in the 
Department of Tactics, United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), in 
the May edition 1982 of Military Review:  
“The current idea of deep attack stresses the use of the long-range sensors and weapons 
that are available now and will become more numerous in the future. It places great 
reliance on our ability to coordinate intelligence from all sources with timely delivery of 
attacks in depth. Electronic warfare, cannon and missile artillery, and conventional and 
unconventional ground forces are among the attack means although the Air Force’s 
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battlefield air interdiction capability will be the mainstay of deep attack in the present. 
[…]  It will only work in our favor if we take steps to deny the enemy the comfort of tidy, 
linear operations.”258 
So the United States should, on one hand, try to fight a non-linear battle and also, on the 
other hand, try to synchronize its own efforts. At this point one has to remark that the 
United States Army’s perception of Deep Battle or Deep Attack differs strongly from the 
Soviet concept of Deep Operations: The first one sees the enemy to be battled with 
“firepower“ and the decision reached in the Close Battle; the latter bases on decisive ground 
action in the “depth” of the area using “maneuver” and not mainly “firepower“.259 
1.7. The AirLand Battle: FM 100-5 Operations from 1982 and 1986 
When General Starry and his co-authors had finished circulating the concept AirLand Battle 
and Corps 86 within the Army, the basic ideas were incorporated in the new 1982 edition of 
the FM 100-5 Operations. Another edition was published in 1986, once NATO members 
voiced critique towards the 1982 edition which proposed the deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons without restrictions. In 1986 this guideline was relativized, and it was determined 
that the deployment of nuclear weapons was only to be done with agreement by the other 
member states. Hence the doctrine was reasonable to the allies, as especially the BRD would 
have massively suffered from the use of nuclear weapons on their territory in the defense 
against Warsaw Pact troops. 
The FM 100-5 in 1982 
AirLand Battle not only brought “firepower“ and “maneuver“ to the center stage of the 
discourse on warfare, it also changed the perception of the battlefield, which was now 
thought to be non-linear not only geographically but temporally as well. FM 100-5 
Operations 1982 differed not only in its layout and structure but also in focus from its 
predecessor. The 1982 edition did not have that many graphs and pictures; rather, it focused 
more on the envisioned warfare, describing every aspect of “modern war“ and AirLand 
Battle explicitly, in offensive and defensive fashion. The authors of FM 100-5 Operations 
1982 tried well at the beginning to break with the last edition. Hence they wrote in the 
introduction to the first chapter: “There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating 
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enemy forces in battle will not always insure victory.“260 This was a stark contrast to the 
formula used in 1976, which predicted only one decisive battle: “[…] the first battle of our 
next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted.”261 While the 
1982 edition therefore spoke about how only winning the battle would not suffice to win, 
the 1976 edition had only foreseen one first battle. Warsaw Pact forces would entangle 
those of the United States in a costly war, as written in the FM 100-5 from 1982: “To win, we 
must coordinate all available military forces in pursuit of common objectives. We must retain 
the initiative and disrupt our opponent’s fighting capability in depth with deep attack, 
effective firepower, and decisive maneuver.”262 The authors therefore again stipulated how 
the Army was constrained to win, to defeat the enemy. The Manual described as well how 
the authors saw the enemy “maneuver” on the battlefield and what challenges the United 
States Armed Forces would have to overcome to win: 
“In modern battle, the US Army will face an enemy who expects to sustain rapid 
movement during the offense and who will probably use every weapon at his disposal. 
[…]  We must be prepared to fight campaigns of considerable movement, complemented 
by intense volumes of fire and complicated by increasingly sophisticated and lethal 
weapons used over large areas.”263  
Here the intense battlefield from 1973 was again shown, focused on “speed”. This new 
edition of FM 100-5 again pointed out that the different parts or areas on the battlefield 
would become blurred and therefore a non-linear battlefield would take place: 
“Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly, distinct lines. […] This means that linear 
warfare will most often be a temporary condition at best and that distinctions between 
rear and forward areas will be blurred.”264 
In the 1986 edition the so-called non-linear operations were similarly named: 
“Similarly, from the first hours of battle, deep reconnaissance, air mobility, long-range 
fires, and special operating forces (SOF) will blur the distinction between front and rear 
and will impose requirement for all around defense and self-sufficiency on all units.”265 
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The battlefield was, within the scope of the AirLand Battle, more and more seen as 
something moving and chaotic, simply described by the terminus non-linear. Chaos would 
not only prevail in a strictly geographical fashion but temporally as well, as the battle would 
simultaneously be raging against forces arriving at the FLOT as well as against second 
echelon units. The Manual from 1986 described in the third chapter, Operational and 
Tactical Planning and Execution, the idea of AirLand Battle in a similar way: “AirLand Battle 
doctrine recognizes that modern warfare is likely to be fluid and non-linear. Therefore it takes 
an enlarged view of the battlefield, stressing unified air, ground, and sea operations 
throughout the theater.”266 Both FM now imagined a battle taking place that would take 
days instead of weeks to unfold and argued that the front and rear on the battlefield would 
become blurred as well.267 Air Force General Wilbur L. Creech, who commanded Tactical Air 
Command from 1978 until 1984, described the battlefield similarly in 1981 at an Association 
of the United States Army (AUSA) event: 
“I suppose the first thing one can say about the battlefield on which we will fight with 
our air-land forces is that it will be distant. […] The second thing about that battlefield of 
the future is that it will be very dynamic, which will recall the battlefields of the past that 
required all kinds of versatility and flexibility and response to changes on the battlefield – 
massive surges of activity, very high rates of fire – both in the air and on the land, high 
sortie rates, the need to attack shallow or deep etc.”268 
While Creech here indeed spoke a very similar language to Starry or the Army in its FMs, this 
statement shows perfectly how the United States (at least the Air Force and Army) got away 
from strictly linear thinking in terms of the battlefield and warfare, away from the picture of 
a frontline to a battlespace (which would later be named that way). General Glen K. Otis, 
commanding general, TRADOC from 1981 to 1983269 looked forward to the 1990s at a 
conference in Brazil in autumn 1981: “The battlefield of the nineties will be inundated with 
sophisticated combat systems whose range and lethality and employment capabilities 
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surpass anything known in the history of warfare.”270 Saying this Otis had already shown a 
glimpse into future Army thinking. Later in 1985 he told his audience at the AUSA Landpower 
Forum: “AirLand Battle Doctrine envisages a very fluid and deep battlefield, which 
acknowledges fairly deep penetrations into western territory by pact forces. It is also possible 
that there will be some penetrations into East Germany by friendly forces.”271 The latter idea, 
having penetrations into enemy territory, differed from Active Defense thinking – 
“maneuver” should as well be part of AirLand Battle, attacking the enemy as well in “depth” 
with units on the ground. To benefit thereof, “chances”, which emerged on the battlefield, 
had to be exploited, as written in the 1982 FM 100-5 edition: 
“This requires that the entire force thoroughly understand the commander’s intent. […] 
They must develop opportunities that the force as a whole can exploit. Large unit 
commanders […] must also be able to shift their main effort quickly to take advantage of 
enemy weaknesses that their subordinates discover or create. […] Destruction of the 
opposing force is achieved by throwing the enemy off balance with powerful initial blows 
from unexpected directions and then following up rapidly to prevent his recovery.”272 
The first part of this statement reflects “Auftragstaktik“ partially, as the intention of the 
commanding officer or general as interpreted in the United States Army. Army operations 
had to be quick, unpredictable, and disorienting. Improvisation, initiative and aggressiveness 
were desirable.273 Starry was quoted speaking at an American Defense Preparedness 
Association (ADPA) meeting in 1981: “The purpose of this whole operation is to wrest the 
initiative from the enemy. You cannot fight successfully and win if you don’t seize the 
initiative at some point.”274 Similarly the Fundamentals of AirLand Battle Doctrine in the 
1986 edition: 
“The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy – to achieve our 
purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an 
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unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue275 
operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander’s goals.”276  
Terms such as “balance” and “will” let a boxing fight take place in front of the inner eye, in 
which the enemy would be brought off “balance” by targeted “blows” and then beaten 
unconsciously. Here too the influence of Clausewitz was evident, as it was he who proposed 
to attack or at least, affect “Schwerpunkte” to bring the enemy off “balance”. On the one 
hand, the doctrine showed the image of chaos on the battlefield, and yet, on the other hand, 
the military wanted to regulate it through “synchronization”: 
“Synchronization includes but is not limited to the actual concentration of forces and 
fires at the point of decision. Some of the activities which must be synchronized in an 
operation – interdiction with maneuver, for example, or the shifting of reserves with the 
rearrangement of air defense – must occur before the decisive moment, and may take 
place at locations far distant from each other.”277  
“Synchronization” was therefore a topic in military publications as well, here Lieutenant 
Colonel Donald L. Mercer, Assistant Army Attaché at Moscow, in the May edition of Military 
Review in 1984: “By synchronizing the attack means to strike at specified points and times, a 
synergistic effect can be obtained. That is to say the results of such an attack will be far more 
catastrophic than separate attacks on the same elements over a longer period of time.”278 
Thus, the multiplication of all attacks should have a devastating “effect“ on the enemy. 
Bronfeld argues that the new weapons systems, which were based on still emerging 
technologies, would have enabled the “synchronization” of both the engagement of the 
follow-on echelons and the defense against the first echelon.279 
The role of technology 
The said Soviet echelons should be attacked by artillery and fighter planes in the “depth“ of 
the area. Charles J. Dick wrote in Military Review in September 1985: “Each will seek to 
disrupt the enemy and force him onto the defensive in a disadvantageous position. This will 
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be done at first by air and long-range artillery strikes and the use of forward and raiding 
detachments, and then by the attacks of advanced guards.”280 Dick here as well counted 
raiding forces as part of the effort to disrupt the enemy’s advance. Indeed, Warsaw pact 
planners even counted on the 101st Airborne Division as raiding force to attack in-depth with 
helicopters and its ATGM-equipped infantry units.281 But mainly “firepower” was imagined to 
stop the enemy. To facilitate this Way of Warfare, new, undeveloped weapons systems 
should be deployed. A network of sensors and weapons systems such as the already 
mentioned JSTARS, AH-64, Pershing II, MLRS, ATACMS, Copperhead Projectile and TACFIRE 
(Tactical Fire Direction), should locate the second and third wave of the Soviet armies as well 
as the OMGs and destroy them before they could reach the FLOT.282 This way the recourse 
to technical means to destroy the enemy “mass“ is obvious regarding AirLand Battle, 
especially the faith towards weapons which would be mature only in the decades to come. 
The 1982 edition of the Field Manual 100-5, for example, described a new Fire Support 
System which would coordinate the fire of the different weapons systems: “The weapons of 
the system are mortars, guns, cannons, rockets, guided missiles and tactical fighter 
aircraft.“283 The mentioned new weapons were not named explicitly but they occupied the 
professional audience. In August 1984 the commanding general, 2d Armored Division 
described the implications of the microchip in Military Review: 
“The chip is the technological key to the new doctrine – the counterpart to the 
blitzkrieg’s use of the gasoline engine. […]  The chip is also the basic technology for 
turning ‘dumb’ munitions into precision-guided munitions and for developing advanced 
night vision devices that will allow us to fight at night almost as we do in the daytime.”284  
The technological foundations were therewith acknowledged already: modern sensors as 
well as precise weapons systems were based on electronics. Tanks, aircraft, helicopters were 
the same basic system as 20 years before, but now – thanks to the beginning digitization – 
those weapons became much more effective. The Manual from 1982 described further how 
the enemy in a future conflict would deploy “probably […] large quantities of high-quality 
                                                            
280
 Dick, Charles J.: Soviet Operational Concepts, in: Military Review, September 1985, p. 29-45, here p. 33. 
281
 Lautsch, Kriegsschauplatz Deutschland, p. 85. 
282
 Mahnken, Technology, p. 128f. 
283
 FM 100-5, Operations, 1982, p. 7-10. 
284





weapons systems whose range and lethality equal or exceed our own“285, which as well 
propagated the image of the superior enemy. Most interesting is the contrast shown 
towards the “weaknesses“ of the Warsaw Pact, which otherwise was imagined as being 
technologically inferior, as described by Skinner. But the FM 100-5 1986 edition as well 
spoke of “modern tank, motorized, and airborne forces like the Warsaw Pact armies“.286 In 
this case either different assessments were far apart or the intention was to promote 
something other to the outside world or public to support the acquisition of all the 
aforementioned weapons systems. 
“Maneuver“ or “firepower“? 
It seems therefore appropriate to discuss further the two terms “maneuver“ and “firepower“ 
and their respective meanings in AirLand Battle. Both terms were either emphasized or 
paraphrased in the official FMs. In a chapter named Conduct of Operations the Manual from 
1982 did explain AirLand Battle further: 
“AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area, 
stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. […] It recognizes the 
nonquantifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver which is as important 
as firepower.”287  
In comparison the 1986 edition about the terms “maneuver“ and “firepower“: 
“Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain 
positional advantage. It is the dynamic element of combat – the means of concentrating 
forces at the critical point to achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical 
momentum, and moral dominance which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. […] 
Firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy’s ability and 
will to fight.”288 
“Maneuver“ was hereby the geographical repositioning of units and/or “firepower“ to bring 
the enemy off “balance” psychically as well. Nevertheless “firepower“ seems to be 
predominant in the imagination of a skirmish and shall lead to the physical destruction of the 
enemy in the end: “Firepower exploits maneuver by neutralizing the enemy's tactical forces 
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and destroying his ability and will to fight“.289 Kretchik describes how the discourse on 
warfare used the terms “maneuver“ and “firepower“ differently in the FM 100-5 editions: 
“The 1976 doctrine had promoted firepower while the 1982 doctrine upheld maneuver. The 
1986 version aimed to balance the two by advocating that maneuver and firepower were 
essential components of warfare regardless of attacking or defending.“290 Authors in military 
publications as well debated these central terms. Captain Anthony M. Coroalles wrote in 
1982: “At this [operational] level of war, a maneuver may solely consist of the movement of 
combat power to a location which, when occupied, will make an enemy's position untenable. 
“291 Coroalles hereby suggested as well more a geographical idea. An article contained in the 
March edition of Military Review in 1983 by Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, a 
retired United States Navy officer, about “maneuver“: “Recognition and exploitation of 
enemy vulnerabilities subsume under the whole concept of maneuver warfare. Maneuver is 
not limited merely to repositioning military forces […] It can defeat a superior enemy country 
or enemy military force.”292 There one can see now an interpretation of “maneuver“ even 
deviating from the official regulations, contradictory to the general interpretation of the 
United States Army. Westwood wrote about a mental rather than physical type of 
“maneuver“. Deep Battle as well was described as basic element of the concept in the Field 
Manual in 1982: 
“Combat will extend throughout the operational area, and deep actions will influence the 
outcome of the battle between committed forces. Improved sensors, long-range 
weapons, and a responsive intelligence distribution system can be used to great 
advantage in the deep battle.”293 
Further: 
“The deep battle component of the AirLand Battle doctrine supports the commander’s 
basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. […] Deep battle prevents 
the enemy from massing and creates windows of opportunity for offensive actions that 
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allow us to defeat him in detail. […] Our primary strike assets for deep attack are air and 
artillery interdiction.”294 
Deep Battle in the AirLand Battle indeed officially meant “firepower“: fires from the air and 
ground (artillery). The disruption of enemy forces in the “depth” of the battlefield was as 
well discussed in the military community: Colonel Victor T. Letonoff and Lieutenant Colonel 
Edward H. Robertson, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army [Doctrine] (ODCSDOC), 
Headquarters, TRADOC, wrote in a 1983 paper: 
“The need for fighting close in and deep in the AirLand Battle emerges from the nature of 
our potential enemy – his doctrine and his numerically superior force. What is important 
is that superiority in numbers permits him to keep a significant portion of his force out of 
the fight with freedom to commit it either to overwhelm or to bypass the friendly force. 
The existence of this force gives the enemy a strong grip on the initiative which U.S. 
forces need to wrest from him, then retain in order to win.”295 
And finally a quote from the AirLand Booklet published in 1984: “The battle in the depth 
should delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s uncommitted forces and isolate his committed 
forces so that they may be destroyed.”296 Colonel Wass de Czege wrote similarly in a 1983 
United States Army War College (USAWC) paper: “The aim of the deep battle is to prevent 
the enemy from massing, and to create opportunities for offensive action – 'windows of 
opportunity' – that allow us to defeat him in detail.”297 Not only should the enemy be 
prevented from massing, he was to be forced to deviate from his plans. This idea would also 
be discussed in military publications, for example by Colonel William G. Hanne in Military 
Review in June 1983: 
“The deep attack is supposed to create a situation whereby the enemy commander is 
forced to deviate from his plan and is confronted with changes that occur so rapidly that 
he is unable to keep up with it. He would thus lose the initiative and arrive at the point 
chosen for the decisive collapsing blow."298 
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So the enemy should be forced to change or give up his plans through “maneuver“ and 
“firepower“ into the “depth”; he would lose the initiative therewith. Another quote from the 
AirLand Booklet: “Army units will fight in all types of operations to preserve and to exploit the 
initiative. They will attack the enemy in depth with fire and maneuver and synchronize all 
efforts to attain the objective.”299 “Depth” was, as described in the FMs, also understood in a 
temporal fashion as shown here by Mercer in the Military Review: “The AirLand Battle will be 
fought in time and space throughout the depth of enemy territory.”300 In opposition to the 
Active Defense not only the geographical distance should be the measurement parameter 
for responsibilities on the different command levels but more so the time which enemy units 
needed to reach the frontlines. The Brigade was responsible for battling the enemy who 
stood about 12 hours away from the FLOT; the Division for 24 and Corps for 72 hours. Here 
two things have to be mentioned. On one hand, while the discussions in the journals and in 
papers described the Deep Battle as being fought by “maneuver“ and “firepower“, the 
official 1982 Manual spoke mainly about fires. And although Starry was at least credited with 
bringing back “maneuver“ after Active Defense, in the end, AirLand Battle depended on the 
“firepower“ to fight the Deep Battle/Attack. Then of course, the introduction of time 
responsibilities (12, 24, 36 hours and so on) clearly suggested another type of linearity and 
contradicts the non-linearity propagated with the concept. 
Army and Air Force 
To indeed get enough “firepower“ into the “depth” of the battlefield, the Air Force had to 
deliver much of these fires. As the terminus AirLand Battle let assume, the concept indeed 
depended on cooperation by the Air Force. Starry stated in 1981: 
“This is an Air-Land Battle. You cannot fight the interdiction battle without Air 
Power. However, Air Power can’t fight the close in battle alone nor can Air Power 
fight the deep battle alone. Although the deeper it goes, the more it is a Air 
Power battle as opposed to an Air-Land Battle.”301 
The authors of an Army-Air Fore Agreement on Apportionment and Allocation of OAS 
(Offensive Air Support) in 1981 stated similarly: 
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“Close air support missions require detailed control to integrate them with the fire 
and/or movement of friendly forces and must therefore be responsive to direction by the 
land force at all stages of execution. On the other hand, BAI missions once requested by 
the land commander are conducted entirely under Air Force direction, though fire 
coordination arrangements are necessary if the targets are short of the Fire Support 
Coordination Line (FSCL).”302 
So in “depth”, the Air Force officially should be in the lead regarding the direction of air 
strikes, but discussions would follow about which service was responsible for what type of 
strike and so on. TAC commanding general Wilbur L. Creech voiced his support for AirLand 
Battle in 1981 in front of an AUSA audience: “I want to assure each person here that the Air 
Force has a very strong commitment – very strong commitment – to the Air-Land concept, 
the Air-Land Battle, the Air-Land Interface.”303 Creech therewith at least confirmed that 
there would be some sort of a joint fight. And further speaking at an Air Force Association 
(AFA) event: 
“I agree totally with my Army colleagues – we are in absolute agreement – that we, in 
our concepts and doctrine, must address the extended battlefield. There is a propensity 
in the part of some to view the enemy in the narrow context of moving tanks near the 
FEBA [Forward Edge of the Battle Area] 304. But the second echelon must also get lots of 
our attention because if the enemy is allowed to arrive at the FEBA unimpeded, history 
proves that we will be overwhelmed.”305 
The history which Creech spoke about certainly meant on one side the Arab-Israeli War in 
1973, but as well the imagination shown earlier, the “magnetic steamroller”. The FM 100-5 
from 1982 indicated similarly the official stance: “The Air Force is an equal partner in the air-
land battle. It supports the battle with counterair and air interdiction operations […] Air 
interdiction operations destroy, isolate, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential 
before it can influence friendly operations.”306 Hence it is clear how fundamental the role 
was which the Air Force had to play: 
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“BAI [Battlefield Air Interdiction] is air interdiction against hostile surface targets 
nominated by the ground commander and in direct support of ground operations. It is 
the primary means of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. […] It also destroys, 
delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy units before they can encounter the close battle.”307 
While Lewis308 argues that, primarily (primary means) the Air Force should conduct the Deep 
Battle, attack the second and third enemy waves as the Army stopped the first wave, it 
seems rather that the Army had enough means at its hands to facilitate the Deep Attack on 
enemy forces, namely  the 1982 FM 100-5 missiles mentioned above and attack 
helicopters.309 The Manual from 1986 then stated about Tactical Air: 
“While the urgency of enemy actions may require direct attacks against forces in 
contact, air forces are normally more efficiently used to attack in depth those 
targets whose destruction, disruption, or delay will deny the enemy the time and 
space to employ forces effectively.”310 
As the 1986 edition stressed the importance of fires delivered by aircraft, it also 
incorporated Army missiles and attack helicopters that would be suited to “Conduct raids in 
enemy-held territory” or “Attack the flanks and rear of attacking or withdrawing enemy 
formations”.311 Thus, the question is how the AirLand Battle concept was incorporated into 
the official Air Force documents. The AFM 1-1 from 1984 sketched how the enemy‘s 
Warfighting Potential could be attacked: 
“Attacking an enemy's warfighting potential includes actions against the will of an 
enemy and actions to deny him the time and space to employ his forces effectively. This 
involves coordinated attacks against an enemy's warfighting potential not yet engaged 
and attacks against an enemy's forces in contact.”312 
It is interesting to see a certain similarity to the speech of the Army as it spoke about the 
enemy’s “will”. Furthermore, the AFM 1-1 from 1984 recited elements from the Army’s 
AirLand Battle Concept: 
                                                            
307
 FM 100-5, Operations, 1982, p. 7-11. 
308
 Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 302. 
309
 FM 100-5, Operations, 1982, p. 7-6. 
310
 FM 100-5, Operations, 1986, p. 47-48. 
311
 Ibid. p. 43. 
312
 United States Air Force: Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 




“[…] an air commander must exploit the devastating firepower of airpower to disrupt 
that momentum and place an enemy's surface forces at risk. To do that, an air 
commander must attack not only those enemy forces in contact, but enemy forces in 
reserve or rear echelons as well.”313 
The attacking of enemy forces in the “depth“ of the area was at that time described as “as 
well“ and not (yet) as a primary mission. And the “firepower“ of Airpower is described as 
being “devastating“. In a third chapter the AFM 1-1 from 1984 describes the Air Force 
Missions. Apart from specific aerial tasks such as Air Superiority there were some especially 
to support ground troops, as well: “Air Interdiction (AI) objectives are to delay, disrupt, 
divert, or destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively 
against friendly forces.”314 That Air Force mission in the Deep Battle provoked discussions 
which can be found in military publications related to both services. The connectedness of 
operations on the ground and in the air were described by General William R. Richardson, 
commanding general TRADOC in the Military Review, March edition 1986: 
“The modern battlefield demands close and continuous Army-Air Force coordination. […] 
The new edition [of the FM 100-5] recognizes that future campaigns and major 
operations will be joint undertakings with mutually supporting air and ground 
functions.”315 
A more critical perspective on AirLand Battle was shown by Thomas A. Cardwell III, Deputy 
Commander for Operations, 323rd Flying Training Wing, in the Air University Review, March-
April 1983: 
“The Air Force view of the extended battlefield is from a theater perspective. Since 
tactical air assets are limited and must be responsive theaterwide, the planning and 
execution of TACAIR [TACtical AIR]316 is accomplished at the air and land component 
interface – an echelon above the corps level. […] Only when air assets are controlled by a 
single air component commander can they be applied to the extended battlefield at the 
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time and in the amount needed to affect the outcome of the battle in support of the land 
commander.”317 
These last paragraphs suggest a certain restraint regarding the supposition Air Force means 
under the command of a ground force commander. Rather explicitly, the author suggests 
that only air assets coordinated by an airman can have enough “effect“ on the enemy, and 
the author emphasizes how the Air Force has another perspective, a “higher“ point of view 
onto the battlefield. Here it ought to be acknowledged that Warden (later the promoter of 
the System-of-Systems-Analysis and Effects-Based Operations) published as early as in 1983, 
being Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, and stated: 
“Air forces may attack the enemy hundreds or even thousands of miles ahead of surface 
forces. Theoretically, air forces can destroy enemy ground forces, but with great 
certainty they can slow and even stop advancement. […] This significant capability must 
not be ignored or denied. It may be the key to victory.”318 
Hence Warden was indeed supporting the idea of AirLand Battle and showcased at the same 
time the self-confidence of a fighter pilot, displaying Airpower as the “key” to the victory 
that the Army had as a constraint in its thinking. Warden afterwards described in a 
monograph about modern Airpower strategy how future technologies such as PGMs and 
GPS could facilitate beating an enemy on the strategic level without having to resort to 
massive airstrikes.319 A more critical voice came with Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, former 
President and Executive Director of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization 
(HERO) in the Air Force Magazine edition in April 1983, a retired Army officer: “All previous 
versions of attacks into an enemy’s rear area – whether by long-range artillery or by some 
version of long-range penetration – have historically had only limited success.”320 Dupuy not 
only questioned the success of attacks into the “depth”, but he criticized the idée de 
manœuvre of AirLand Battle altogether too, disputing the capabilities of the weapons 
systems which were still to be introduced. He as well questioned if there would be NATO Air 
Superiority at all.321 Dupuy as well called into question if Army-Air Force coordination would 
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really work, Cardwell in the April edition of Military Review in 1984 similarly wrote about the 
problems arising with the cooperation between Air Force and Army: “The Air Force controls 
assets in the area where the Army wants to control assets. […] The Army’s extended 
battlefield, with its corps orientation, appears to be incompatible with the Air Force concept 
of the theater control of air assets.”322 Here the author showed a glimpse of the almost 
institutional incompatibility between Air Force and Army, and he emphasized as well the 
constrained perspective of the ground commander. Furthermore, Major James A. Machos, 
Joint Air Operations Staff Officer with ALFA, criticized the idea of an Army commander having 
fighter planes at his command in the Air University Review May-June edition in 1984: 
“However, to allow each corps commander the luxury of 'calling his own shots' with air 
interdiction would fragment the theater air interdiction effort. The theater perspective would 
be replaced by several narrow, possibly competing, corps perspectives.”323 The FM 100-5 
1982 planned to have Air Force and even Naval liaison teams to coordinate the fires from 
aircraft and ships.324 Nonetheless, the author of a 1979 study had argued similarly: “I believe 
TAC should provide strong direction to TRADOC concerning the unrealities of addressing 
interdiction requirements, be it BAI, BI o AI, in terms of anything lower than Army Group in 
Central Europe. The two primary reasons are that the WP [Warsaw Pact] Commander, 
unfortunately, will not line up his boundaries of Divs and Armies with NATO’s so that each of 
our Division Commanders can plan and execute his own tidy little war, and our sensors, even 
in 1986+, still will not tell us what the enemy plan is.”325 At least parts of the Air Force 
therefore seemed to be uncomfortable that within the scope of the AirLand Battle concept 
fighter planes were being treated as flying artillery systems which thereby would be more 
vulnerable to ground-based air defenses; let alone the planes would be like subordinate to 
the ground battle.326 The 1984 AFM 1-1 as well stated that “battlefield air interdiction 
requires joint coordination at the component level during planning, but once planned, 
battlefield air interdiction is controlled and executed by the air commander as an integral 
part of a total air interdiction campaign“327, reiterating the Air Force stance that aircraft had 
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to be controlled by Airmen when supporting the Deep Battle. James C. Slife seemingly rightly 
writes how the concepts underpinning the AirLand Battle doctrine seemed to be 
troublesome to many airmen who saw it as an Army attempt to gain increased control over 
tactical airpower.328 
The emergence of the “Joint idea” 
Within the scope of the concept Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD), among 
others, emerged that the Air Force wanted to retain control of Deep Strikes, but the Army 
would prioritize the attacks on follow-on Soviet forces. Some years later the Army would 
take hold of planning authority for CAS at least partially, but not for BAI.329 The Air Force 
accepted AirLand Battle non-officially and cooperated with the Army within the scope of the 
already mentioned working/study groups, though the concept AirLand Battle did not appear 
in official Air Force documents.330 At the same time AirLand Battle was further criticized 
openly as shown here by Major Jon S. Powell, Plans and Requirements Officer at the Defense 
Mapping Agency, in the Air University Review May-June edition in 1985: 
“AirLand Battle ignores the most serious threats to NATO's forward-deployed defenses – 
operational maneuver groups and air assault brigades. NATO's greatest danger will not 
be mythical second echelons far from the main battle. Instead, it will be these quick-
striking units driving through our forward defenses and leading major enemy forces.”331 
Here even the basic ideas regarding AirLand Battle were questioned. The Army imagined a 
battle fought through great distances, but Powell states that this battle would possibly not 
take place at all. But with Thomas A. Cardwell III again an Air Force officer wrote in Military 
Review September 1985, more conciliatory: “Now, to make the AirLand Battle doctrine work, 
we must put aside our service bias and look at the doctrine from a joint perspective. Granted 
this is easier said than done, but only by viewing the battle from this joint perspective can we 
ever hope to fight and win.”332 And James P. Coyne, Senior Editor of the Air Force Magazine, 
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Colonel as well as retired fighter pilot showed glimpses of further possible Air Force-Army 
cooperation in the October edition in 1985: 
“In a theoretical scenario, the Air Battle Captain333 might preside over a battlefield where 
an Army OH-58 helicopter would laser-designate a target for a missile attack by A-10s, 
followed by attack helicopters mopping up, after which troop-carrying choppers would 
deliver forces to secure the area. He would run the operation. USAF fighter pilots who 
have flown under this system have no problem with it.”334 
Coyne hereby stated that he would not have had problems being commanded by a ground 
commander – the Air-Battle Captain could, in his eyes, even be an Army officer. Army 
General Fred K. Mahaffey, CINCREDCOM (Commander-in-Chief, Readiness Command)335 was 
then quoted in the April edition of the Air Force Magazine in 1986 as follows: 
“Air interdiction missions can no longer operate freely forward of some clear, straight 
fire-coordination line. The battlefield will be nonlinear and full of enemy and friendly 
pockets. Battlefield air interdiction may look a lot like close air support of a deep-
attacking ground force.”336 
Mahaffey hereby propagated the image shown in the FM 100-5 of a non-linear battlefield 
and he saw CAS as well as BAI in a more similar way and with a more similar connotation to 
the ground war. While the Army and Air Force absolutely saw the necessity of coordination 
regarding the Deep Battle, Mahaffey at the same time hints at the difficulties which the 
coordination of “firepower“ and “maneuver“ (e.g. Airmobile units) would pose. In an article 
about Ground Attack Jeffrey P. Rhodes, Defense Editor of the Air Force Magazine described 
in the November edition in 1986 Battlefield Air Interdiction: 
“His [the pilots] thing will include flying as deep as 800 kilometers behind the Forward 
Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) through radars, SAM, and enemy fighters to attack 
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targets that do not have a near-term effect on the battle, such as airfields, or critical 
chokepoints, such as bridges and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) storage areas.”337 
BAI therefore covered more than the 300 kilometers for the Corps as described by the Army 
and should rather not go against targets which are decisive for the immediate battle 
(whereas Rhodes showed a more Airpower-oriented perspective). While Rhodes in his article 
further described the different aircraft types and weapons necessary to conduct BAI, his 
statements as well show how the distances and responsibilities in the Deep Battle were 
differently looked at by Army and Air Force personnel. Even AFM 1-1 1984 did not define 
exactly how far BAI should reach into enemy territory. Edgar Ulsamer, Senior Editor at the 
Air Force Magazine, described his vision of a 1990s battlefield in the March edition in 1987: 
“Among the central conclusions to emerge from the TAC/TRADOC analysis is that the 
battlefield of the 1990s will be dominated by Soviet attack strategies centered on fast-
moving, around-the-clock, multiechelon operations linked to coordinated rear actions 
designed to disrupt US offensive and defensive moves. As a consequence, the separation 
between close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) will become 
blurred.”338 
Ulsamer here argued similarly as General Mahaffey: CAS and BAI would most certainly 
overlap somehow, and therefore the coordination problem would persist as well. House 
concludes that despite the best intentions on both sides the BAI issue was not resolved.339 
Consequence of AirLand Battle in the discussion in the Air Force seems to be mainly the fact 
that, with the chaos on the battlefield as imagined by the Army BAI und CAS became blurred 
more and more. Similarly, as some authors in the journals suggested, there remained 
questions how effective United States and NATO airstrikes in the Deep Battle would in reality 
be against the Soviet SAM network and enemy Air Superiority fighters. 
One means to overcome the air defenses would certainly be new standoff weapons with 
precision guidance. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy pointed out as well in 
1988 that PGM in future could substitute tactical nuclear weapons in their spectrum of 
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operations, which comprised (at least in the heads of some planners) even the deployment 
in the Deep Battle.340 Starry recounted in an interview in 1995: 
“That was the genesis of the deep attack part of the AirLand Battle. It was an attempt to 
raise the nuclear threshold, in Europe particularly but elsewhere as well, by substituting 
for what we had originally thought we needed nuclear weapons for, conventional 
weapons, with accurate surveillance and target acquisition systems, accurate delivery 
systems, and accurate fusing and sensing systems aboard the weapons themselves, in 
many cases.”341 
As mentioned earlier, technology was thought to be one of the pillars on which AirLand 
Battle rested: new and more precise weapons systems, accurate thanks to the beginning 
digital age, and networked to locate and destroy as many targets as possible. In 1988 Major 
Robert M. Chapman, Chief, Air Warfare and Simulation Branch at the Air Command and Staff 
College, wrote in the Airpower Journal about the role of technology: “The battlefield was 
never a safe place, but technology has increased the danger. […] One advantage of precision 
guidance is that fewer weapons are needed to destroy a target.”342 Hence the new smart 
bombs343 would increase destructive power. The PGM’s advantages had been discussed as 
well by James P. Coyne in the October edition of the Air Force Magazine in 1985: 
“Key to the employment of these weapons on the modern battlefield is minimum 
exposure time for the aircraft employing them. In the Vietnam era, ground support 
aircraft operated in flights of four, staying over the target area for periods of several 
minutes to deliver ordnance. This would be suicide today because of the deadly ground-
to-air defenses. […] Weapons coming into the inventory in the future will enable pilots to 
reduce exposure time even more, perhaps to as little as five seconds.”344 
According to Coyne, the technological possibilities would facilitate the more precise 
destruction of targets in the future and enable pilots to stay out of the dangerous SAM 
umbrellas. 
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Apart from the fighter plane and the rocket artillery (MLRS) the Army’s attack helicopters 
were as well planned to be attacking into the “depth” in the realm of AirLand Battle. In 1988 
Lieutenant General Crosbie E. Saint, commanding general, III Corps and Colonel Walter H. 
Yates Jr., commanding officer, 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), discussed the role of the AH-
64 Apache the June, July and October editions of Military Review. First, the advantages in 
the Close Operations were mentioned: 
“Attack helicopter units […] have the ability to focus combat power and influence the 
tempo of battle with awesome speed, flexibility and versatility. […] That is, they are not 
committed, to battle pending full development of the scheme of maneuver and the 
appropriate moment to strike at a created or recently discovered vulnerability.”345 
Then the Deep Operations: 
“It becomes clear that air maneuver with attack helicopters is the most responsive and 
sustainable operation available to a corps commander for influencing the deep 
operation.”346  
As the attack helicopter battalions were directly subordinated to the ground commander 
(e.g. part of their Corps and Divisions), they could directly be put to good use without having 
too much coordination with the Air Force, but problems regarding the latter would most 
certainly have emerged, too. Nonetheless, both authors seemed to be stark supporters of 
the attack helicopter. Indeed, the combination of the Apache and its Hellfire Missile 
represented a quantum leap over the AH-1 Cobra with its wire-guided missiles (TOW), as 
Hellfire was a fire-and-forget-missile, not requiring the helicopter to expose himself during 
the time the missile flew towards its target. 
While defining a new Way of Warfare, AirLand Battle mainly rested on “firepower“ and 
“maneuver“ as the defining terms in the discourse on warfare. While the enemy discourse in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s shaped the term “mass“ attached to the Warsaw Pact’s 
forces, the Deep Battle together with the emerging technologies should counter the masses 
mainly with “firepower“. To be mentioned as well is how AirLand Battle seemed to be almost 
entirely focused on the imagined battle against the Warsaw Pact’s forces in Central Europe, 
leaving not only other theaters, but as well other forms of warfare out. Major General 
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Charles R. Sniffin wrote about the draft of FM 100-5, 1982: “The manual concentrates on 
operations in Central Europe to the virtual exclusion of other areas. If it is necessary to retain 
the emphasis on Europe, consideration should be given to adding annexes dealing with other 
potential operations areas.”347 The next chapter will show how there were, nonetheless, 
other ideas around at the end of the 1980s. 
1.8. The end of the USSR and AirLand Battle Future 
In the course of the 1980s and more prominently in the era of Soviet President Mikhail 
Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the USSR passed through an incisive process of change, reaching a 
preliminary climax with the Fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th in 1989 and ending with 
the decision of the Highest Soviet on December 26th in 1991 to dissolve the USSR.348 
Nevertheless, the United States Army was in the late 1980s still working on the concept 
AirLand Battle Future (Heavy) (ALB-F, sometimes as well ALBF) as a successor to the AirLand 
Battle. This chapter will show how especially the Army at the end of the 1980s adhered to 
old concepts and threat perceptions. But there will be shown that nonetheless discussions 
did take place on what kind of war, enemy and therefore warfare had to be expected in the 
near future 
A new generation of warfare? 
Despite the coming upheavals the United States Armed Forces felt still being threatened by 
the masses of mechanized Warsaw Pact forces. Obviously the looming upheavals were not 
being appreciated accordingly. It seemed still to be necessary to be able to protect oneself 
using combined arms warfare, despite the interventions in Grenada (1983) or Panama 
(1989). Therefore Army General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1987 to 1991, 
addressed the Armor Conference in 1989: 
“In spite of the General Secretary’s speech at the United Nations, the Soviets and the 
Warsaw pact allies remain a significant threat to the global interests and responsibilities 
of the United States of America. […] And threats in other parts of the world are not 
diminishing at all. They continue to grow in complexity. They continue to be challenging 
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to all of us. Some of the lesser developed countries in the world have significant 
conventional capabilities.”349 
Vuono saw not only the Warsaw Pact but other countries as well having developed 
conventional capabilities against which the United States Army had to be prepared to fight 
and win. But nonetheless, the Warsaw Pact’s forces still stood out. In the March edition of 
Parameters in 1989 Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, temporarily chief of the Current 
Doctrine Division at the Airpower Research Institute wrote about the cooperation of Army 
and Air Force regarding Interdiction: “The nature of Soviet capabilities (force size and 
emphasis on surprise, shock, initiative, coordination, and depth) makes it quite unlike any 
other threat we have faced in the past.”350 Army War College student Allen P. Hasbrouck 
warned how the USSR and other regional powers would be able to counter the United 
States’ technological advances: 
“The recognition of the various uses of aerial platforms evidenced in U.S. doctrine has 
not been missed by our potential adversaries. In addition to the Soviet Union, various 
regional powers have adopted a similar air and ground operations doctrine. Therefore, 
multiple potential adversaries in the world present a technologically sophisticated threat 
committed to fully utilizing the airspace over the entire battlefield.“351 
Here the entirety of the battlefield and the airspace above it showed how the discourse on 
warfare developed further with AirLand Battle Future. Hasbrouck as well pointed to other 
powers being able to counter the United States’ advantages. He even went further and 
described how “The Soviets have recognized the dependency of modern military forces on 
command, control and communications and have developed a formidable capability to 
degrade the C3 of enemy forces.“352 Electronic Warfare, e.g. Jamming communications, was 
developed extensively during the late 1970s and 1980s.353 But other authors already argued 
that a new type of battlefield comprised more than only military hardware. In the October 
edition of Military Review in autumn 1989 a group of authors analyzed the “most modern 
generation of war“: 
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“The fourth-generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy's society. 
[…] Mass, of men or firepower, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass 
may become a disadvantage, as it will be easy to target. […] [It] is a goal of collapsing 
the enemy internally, rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such 
things as the population's support for the war and the enemy's culture. Correct 
identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly important. […] Actions 
will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a 
cultural, not just a physical, entity.“354 
The concept of the fourth-generation battlefield (as well fourth generation warfare, 4GW) 
mentioned would signify at least from a military point of view the recurrence of total war.355 
The fourth-generation battlefield would see few differences between war and peace, as well 
as between military and civilian. Small, highly mobile and high-tech units would “maneuver” 
on this battlefield. 356 But the fourth-generation warfare types were very vague; many of 
their prescriptions (such as that “mass” could be a disadvantage) had been around since the 
days of the first atomic weapons. On the other side, the military’s tendency to speak about 
generations has to be seen as similar to the idea of different RMAs as well. Nonetheless, this 
article illustrates the growing importance of the technological possibilities, which emerged 
as a result of the development efforts coming from AirLand Battle and the widespread use of 
computers at the same time. This statement differs remarkably from the AirLand Battle 
speech – “mass” is not anymore defined as an advantage – a huge quantity of materials, as it 
was with regard to the Warsaw Pact’s forces. Neither is it a huge intensity of “firepower”. 
Quality counts more than quantity, representing a turn in the discourse on “mass” versus 
quality. And while AirLand Battle wanted to attack the enemy’s “balance”, these authors go 
much further into the direction of effectively bringing an enemy to collapse rather with 
“precision“ than with masses of “firepower”. The battlefield hereby gains more dimensions 
as foreseen by AirLand Battle. A TRADOC memo in 1990 stated: “Clearly we are headed into 
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another era of non-linear warfare. […] Even on the densest battlefield, concentration of 
forces necessary to reach an operational objective would leave great gaps between forces 
and create a non-linear battlefield.”357 “Mass” thereby is rather a problem on the type of 
battlefield as described in this passage. Another paragraph looks into the future and how it 
would manifest subsequently: 
“Small, highly mobile elements, composed of very intelligent soldiers armed with high- 
technology weapons, may range over wide areas, seeking critical targets. […] Remote, 
‘smart’ assets with pre-programmed artificial intelligence may play a key role. […] The 
tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent's political infrastructure and 
civilian society become battlefield targets.”358 
Smart belongs to the termini coined as well as the idea that “mass” could be relieved by 
single powerful elements. “Mass” or quantity would therefore be replaced by quality. In the 
same edition Robert A. Strange described the American dependence from “firepower” and 
technology: 
“The American experience in warfighting led the military to rely ever more heavily on 
firepower rather than maneuver. By bringing to the battlefield the mechanical 
advantages of industrialization, we sought to increase the lethality of our weapons in 
order to place our opponents in the untenable position in which resistance equaled 
annihilation. “359 
This more critical vote somehow partially unmasks the concept of victory thanks to 
overwhelming technology in the discourse. At the same time, Strange shows how the United 
States Army believed in “firepower” more than it believed in “maneuver”. Likewise in the 
October edition of Military Review in 1989 Clayton R. Newell wrote: “We are in a 
technological age and there is every reason to believe that technology will exert an 
increasing influence on planning and conducting war. The future of war, however, depends 
on man, not technology.”360 That the single, personal soldier is more decisive than 
technology is a duly recurring element in the discourse on warfare, dating even back to the 
19th century, when technological advances led to changes in military thought as well. 
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Besides such critical voices authors in military-related publications began similarly to think 
about the possibility that doctrine had to be adjusted to new forms of threats. In January in 
1990 for example Steve Metz, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Department of 
Joint and Combined Operations of the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, discussed AirLand Battle and its applicability in conflicts below conventional war in 
the Military Review: 
“Despite the fact that the preface to FM 100-5 indicates that AirLand Battle can be 
extrapolated to all conflict environments, current Army doctrine for low-intensity conflict 
(LIC) does not rely heavily on it, but rather stresses a somewhat different body of 
principles labeled ‘low-intensity conflict imperatives’.”361 
Low-Intensity Conflict 
While the then still valid 1986 edition of FM 100-5 very much focused on conventional 
operations, it nonetheless paid attention to the problems of LIC, first time this series of 
capstone Manuals had done so since Vietnam. Kretchik comments: “While the Manual, the 
fact that it even mentioned LIC as possible mission illustrated the growing prominence of the 
concept and the possibility that the lessons of Vietnam could be rethought.“362 The earlier 
1982 edition of FM 100-5 included significant adjustments to the previous Manual in an 
effort to avoid fixation upon European warfare. But out of seventeen chapters overall, that 
edition had devoted fewer than four pages to contingency operations (the deployment of 
army forces during a crisis). Despite the fact that the 1986 edition had stressed how army 
forces must prepare to fight a variety of operations across the spectrum of war (including 
LIC), “the overwhelming amount of time spent in BCTP [Battle Command Training Program] 
seminars and doctrinally based training at the national training centers was devoted to mid- 
to high-intensity conventional combat.“363 But the authors of the final report of the Joint 
Low-Intensity Conflict Project reminded that “For over two decades, various conflicts short of 
conventional war have threatened United States global interests. This form of warfare is the 
most probable conflict this country will face in the foreseeable future.”364 The report stated 
                                                            
361
 Metz, Steve: AirLand Battle and Counterinsurgency, in: Military Review, January 1990, p. 32-41, here p. 32f. 
362
 Fitzgerald, David: Learning to forget: US Army counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from Vietnam to 
Iraq, Stanford, 2013, p. 72. 
363
 Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine, p. 208-215. 
364
 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command: Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, Final Report, 
Volume I, Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict, prepared by: Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, United 




how “FM 100-5 contains the Army’s basic operational concepts for the modern battlefield.” 
But “while FM 100-5 asserts its universality for all levels of conflicts, it does not adequately 
address low-intensity conflict. […] It contains the Army’s basic operational concept – the air-
land battle [sic!]. This doctrine is heavily influenced by the Soviet threat, concentrating on the 
mid- to high-intensity battlefield.”365 The authors stressed further that: 
“The 1986 version [of FM 100-5] recognizes that low-intensity conflict is different, but it 
ignores how it is different and how the Army should cope with these differences. […] No 
one reading this manual would make the mistake that it concerns itself with low-
intensity conflict. Yet, the FM influences force structuring which in turn drives capability 
and thinking. By not adequately addressing low-intensity conflict in an integrated or 
sophisticated fashion, it dismisses by omission this entire spectrum of war.”366 
The neglect regarding LIC would continue for a few years to come, even as the Center for 
Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) began its operations in January 1986. 367 But the corresponding 
thoughts were absolutely present and would increase after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In a 
memo to the TRADOC commander and its staff officers R. Roger Wolfe wrote in 1990: “The 
probability of global war/major theater conventional war is low, but the probability of 
regional conflict is high. Some mid-intensity conflict could occur but conflict will most likely 
occur in low-intensity environments. The spread of challenges in low-intensity conflict is 
broadening and taking on more dimensions.”368 And an Army lessons learned bulletin in 
1990 stated: 
“Low Intensity Conflict is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or 
groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among 
nations. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and 
ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is 
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waged over a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and 
military instruments.”369 
The bulletin as well told the Army audience that “Military power is only one instrument of an 
integrated solution to a LIC.”370 Even COIN was discussed as was insurgency in a time when 
the United States had or did still support foreign internal disputes: “There are four broad 
categories of operations in LIC: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combating Terrorism, 
Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacetime Contingency Operations. Any conflict may involve 
one or more of these categories simultaneously.”371 While COIN would later be the main 
terminus referred to in the realm of these types of operations, at that time it was most 
commonly called Foreign Internal Defense (FID), when the United States in the realm of the 
Cold War supported friendly governments battling insurgencies or helped insurgents to fight 
against governments that did not support United States political objectives. The authors 
then described in-depth both COIN and insurgency: “Insurgency primarily involves 
Unconventional Warfare, or the organization, training and support of guerilla forces. […] 
Counterinsurgency involves the full range of operations in support of a friendly foreign 
government. Nation building is a key operational concept.”372 The bulletin’s authors realized 
that there were obstacles to be overcome: “Overcoming this void in our doctrine and 
training will take a concerted effort on everyone’s part. There are few absolute formulas or 
rules which will work under all circumstances. LIC requires analysis and thought rather than a 
checklist application of a school solution.”373 LIC would then be incorporated into the FM 
100-5 in 1993, becoming part of the official military nomenclature.374 
But obviously the transition from a quasi-bipolar to a multipolar world became a topic at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Lieutenant Colonel Philipp S. Meilinger, Air Operations Staff Officer 
at the Doctrine Division of the Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts Development of 
the United States Air Force, described possible threats in the winter edition 1990 of the 
Airpower Journal as follows: 
                                                            
369
 Center for Army Lessons Learned: Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin 90-4, May 90, Introduction to 
Low Intensity Conflict, Combined Arms Training Activity, Fort Leavenworth, May 1990, p. 2. 
370
 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Introduction to Low Intensity Conflict, p. 4. 
371
 Ibid. p. 9. 
372
 Ibid. p. 10. 
373
 Ibid. p. 17. 
374




“The Soviet Union is not the only threat to the United States. […] The information 
revolution has permitted people all over the globe to see the freedom, vitality, and 
especially the affluence of democracy and capitalism. […] Insurgencies have been the 
major source of third-world conflict since World War II. […] Terrorism, especially that 
related to the narcotics trade, is an increasing threat.”375 
Next to the notion that not only the USSR would be a threat to the United States stood the 
terminus Information Revolution whereby a statement by Meilinger regarding high-tech 
seems to be interesting: 
“The battlefields of the future at all levels of conflict will be increasingly dominated by 
technology. Indeed, battlefield lethality has increased to the point that cheap but 
effective weapons – such as the Stinger and tube launched, optically tracked, wire 
command (TOW) missiles – may restore the infantry to dominance after a 100-year 
hiatus.”376 
The idea that technology would enable the common Foot Soldier (even the irregularly 
fighting or the insurgent!) to become more dominating is noteworthy; something like that 
had already been claimed at the end of the 1970s, when ATGMs became a threat to tanks. 
Looking further back into the history of the United States Armed Forces, The United States 
Army brass377 had as late as in the First World War and Interwar period believed in Open 
Warfare378 even as the technological advances became obvious (tanks, machine guns, 
artillery, airplane, among others). The wishful thinking that modern weapons would be less 
costly and at the same time more effective coins the discourse on warfare even today 
despite that it was disproved often; “mass” should be substituted with quality and 
“precision“. Many modern weapons systems such as the F-22 or the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) should be more efficient and maintenance-friendly compared to their ancestors, but 
their development costs vast sums of money and makes them more expensive in service, 
too. In January 1991 James B. Motley wrote in the Military Review in addition: 
“Reality is that the world in which the United States must coexist is one marked by civil 
disturbances, terrorist violence, subversive activities, surrogate wars, insurgencies, 
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guerrilla warfare and other forms of low-level violence. It is a world embroiled in a form 
of warfare that is unsettling to the US perception and approach to war, but the kind of 
war that the United States will be called upon to fight in the foreseeable future.”379 
So doctrine was also discussed by Motley and the question was, if it was tailored to the 
likeliest threats. 
AirLand Battle Future 
Despite these warnings and discussions at this moment the Army continued working on the 
AirLand Battle Future and tried to adapt the concept at the end of the 1990s accordingly to 
the new circumstances as well as including the technological advances. Chief of Staff of the 
Army General Army Vuono stated at the Armor Conference in May 1989: 
“AirLand Battle makes sense. It’s a doctrine that will take us forward over the next 
several years. We are refining our doctrine and developing concepts that will take us out 
to the next century. We call this doctrine AirLand Battle Future […] how we are going to 
fight in the next century with our heavy forces so we can develop our battlefield systems 
around that concept.”380 
Not only did Vuono officially state the usefulness of AirLand Battle (Future), he also 
advocated the use of heavy forces, one of the Army’s main statements. Richard Noel argued 
similarly in an Army War College study in 1990: “Air Land Battle has provided the U.S. Army 
the doctrinal base for the past two decades and can still provide a critical basis as we prepare 
our doctrine for the 21st Century.“381 AirLand Battle and its tenets would indeed be reused in 
future doctrine documents. The February edition of the Military Review in 1991 then 
contained several articles about the new version ALB-F. Major General Steven Silvasy Jr., 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine and Developments at TRADOC, discussed the 
future battlefield: 
“Increasingly, we will fight on less dense, more open battlefields. […] Ironically, the 
growth in lethality relates less to the enhanced capabilities of direct-fire systems than it 
does to the tremendous advances in the ability of military forces to acquire information 
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about the enemy; to fuse and distribute it on a real-time basis; and to engage high-value 
targets at great distances with exceptional accuracy.”382 
While information about the enemy was increasingly important in AirLand Battle (find him, 
locate him and then destroy him) it became even more important in AirLand Battle Future, 
when and if the battlefield became even larger geographically. The image of war as well did 
not change significantly compared to AirLand Battle: 
“The corps commander […] will control long-range fires to weaken the enemy force and 
to allow our forces to break through (in an offensive) or to force a decision (in an 
operational defense). […] Units will move quickly along multiple axes, concentrate rapidly 
at the appointed place and time and strike the enemy.”383 
Noel as well did portray the idea of quickly massing forces: “The concept for Air Land Battle-
Future will use technology to find the enemy and link these sensors to the attack assets. The 
first priority will be to mass fires to destroy the enemy. If forced to commit ground forces, 
then dispersed attack forces will be massed, fight, redisperse and reconstitute.“384 “Mass” 
therefore still played a role, but only to concentrate fires. And the image of quickly massing 
and then redespersing forces would resurface again in the realm of AirSea Battle.385 
In the future shown farther ranging “firepower” would be deployed on a larger battlefield. A 
TRADOC memo stated in 1990: “We are at appoint where improvements in weapons system 
technology […] will give us the capacity to engage enemy forces at long range (in excess of 
100km), with very accurate and very lethal weapons.”386 At least the term “maneuver” 
seemed to reach a higher importance however. Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, 
former Chief of Armor of the United States Army, spoke about the “depth” of the battlefield 
in another article: 
“ALBF [AirLand Battle Future] is the logical extension of ALB [AirLand Battle], envisioning 
what can be possible in the latter half of this decade. The doctrine will use to advantage 
the quality of our equipment and the competence of our professional force to create a 
non-linear battlefield, where our commanders both know combatant locations and can 
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engage to the full 500-kilometer projected depth of the battlefield-technology and 
resources permitting.”387 
So new technologies would make it possible to attack enemy armored columns yet “deeper“ 
in the area, farther distant from the FLOT. The increasing dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
seemingly did not cause a breach with the planned type of war. While the Army’s doctrine 
thinkers seemed to come away from the focusing solely on the Warsaw Pact, they did try to 
sell their concept as working as well against other, possibly regional, threats with 
conventional capabilities (see above). Noel summed the principal idea of ALB-F up: “Air Land 
Battle-Future provides the wrath of overpowering, massed, focused weapons system brought 
to bear against an adversary.“388 Eventually Major General Rudolph Ostovich Jr. III, 
commanding the United States Army Aviation Center, wrote about the role of army aviation: 
“Army Aviation stands at the threshold of a unique opportunity, an opportunity to write 
a new chapter in the book of land warfare – one that capitalizes on its inherent 
versatility, lethality and deployability. Aviation will play a more important role than ever 
before on the future battlefield. […] The establishing of conditions for decisive operations 
stage of ALBF is where long-range, lethal weapons systems come into play. It is here that 
attack aviation can best combine its speed and firepower with that of extended range 
artillery and tactical air systems.”389 
Here as well farther ranging “firepower” is mentioned again. Major Edward J. Sinclar wrote a 
diploma thesis at the School of Advanced Military Studies at the Command and General Staff 
College with the title Attack Helicopters: Airland Battle Future’s Sword of Vengeance; he also 
saw the attack helicopter being one of the central elements of AirLand Battle Future: 
“Current ALB doctrine envisions linear warfare that becomes nonlinear when opposing 
forces become intermingled. ALBF envisions forces employed initially in a nonlinear 
configuration. The central idea of the ALBF concept is to use technologically advanced 
sensors to find, track, and target the enemy for destruction by massed indirect fires 
followed by fast-moving combined arms teams to complete the destruction of the 
attrited forces. […] Enemy forces are engaged at extended ranges by all available fire 
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assets. The corps commander may commit attack helicopter units throughout the depth 
of the battlefield to maximize their mobility, speed, and firepower advantages. “390 
In the end, within the scope of the concept AirLand Battle Future the technologically logical 
extension of AirLand Battle was discussed. Technology in this way of thinking generated 
more “precision“, networking and range; the network which was already envisioned with 
AirLand Battle would later develop in its own concept altogether. It should enable the 
dispersed forces to be more effective and efficient, again replacing “mass” or quantity with 
quality. And this in the end led to a battlefield on which the single elements operated more 
scattered. “Firepower” and “maneuver” remained important terms in this context, with a 
slight advantage benefitting the former. However, the basic principles and planning 
scenarios stayed the same as with AirLand Battle. Only the distances seemed to be greater, 
as Colonel John A. Warden pointed out in a memorandum to General McPeak, Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force from 1991 until 1994: “The ALB-Future, despite its words to the contrary, 
doesn’t seem to be much different than ALB-Present in that it assumes enemy ground 
formations {read second-echelon} would move hundreds of miles to attack a particular US 
corps and that US ground forces would bear the brunt of responsibility for stopping the 
attack.”391 While AirLand Battle did lead to its own Manuals, ALB-F then did not get into an 
official document at all. The Gulf War in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) would alter the 
discourse on warfare as will be seen and therefore ALB-F would not appear in the next 
iteration of FM 100-5. AirLand Battle Future seems to be the fitting concept in two different 
ways for the conclusion of this first period until to the Gulf War in 1991. The excerpts taken 
out of the different Field Manuals or Air Force Manuals and contemporary articles in the 
military publications are indicative of the perception of the “modern war”. 
1.9. Interim conclusion: fighting against the Warsaw Pact 
This first part already analyzed different discourses that can be discerned as separate 
topics/subjects. The discourse on the battlefield described a spacious chaos starting with the 
Manual from 1982, without any clear linear frontlines, while the 1976 edition had rather 
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seen only one important frontline. The battlefield was therefore thought mostly in a 
geographical way, adding time as another dimension with AirLand Battle. 
Regarding the discourse on the type of war or the spectrum of conflict, the United States 
Army at the close end of the Cold War still seemed to overwhelmingly focus on the 
conventional High-Intensity Conflict. Therefore, the counterinsurgency mission remained 
sidelined, as House argues, notwithstanding its brief resurgence in the guise of LIC.392 The 
eventual concept of AirLand Battle Future then only described long range “firepower” on an 
even more enlarged geographical battlefield.393 The High-Intensity Conflict was that much 
focused on Central Europe that the Central Battle seemed not only to be in the main focus of 
military thinking; it even was named accordingly. However, the war, which had been 
imagined for the better part of a decade, would not be fought in the forests and plains of 
Central Europe. It would rather take place in the Southern Deserts of Iraq. 
The discourse on the enemy presented the Soviet “mass” army “speeding” across Central 
Europe. The enemy was exaggeratedly thought as gigantic and overwhelming, and the 
Warsaw Pact soldier, compared to the Western one, imagined as being mentally less free, 
having less initiative, flexibility and decentralized control. Especially the Warsaw Pact and 
Soviet officers had allegedly a scientific and rigid attitude towards war; at the same time 
United States officers tried to cope with the enemy “mass” first using scientifically perfected 
capabilities, then using technical means. 
Technology would thereby primarily play a role as facilitator of “firepower“. While AirLand 
Battle did propagate soft factors such as initiative and was indeed based on German 
concepts, in the end, it resorted to “firepower” and therefore technological means. 
Leonhard therefore rightfully accuses AirLand Battle of being too much technology-based 
and having still neglected the dynamics of leadership, morals, deception, fatigue, and other 
factors.394 House even speaks of “a cultural affinity to leverage the challenges to national 
interests by technology.”395 And this even as initiative, mental agility and “Auftragstaktik“ 
were presumed to be decisive for the conduct of the battle, which was being seen as chaotic 
as described through the discourse on the battlefield.  
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In the realm of the discourse on warfare, as a doctrinal concept, AirLand Battle was neither 
revolutionary nor cribbed from the Blitzkrieg concept, but it was nonetheless shaped by 
German ideas.396 United States military thinkers indeed never abandoned the predominance 
of “firepower” and therefore interpreted Deep Operations and combined arms differently as 
had the Germans or Soviets earlier. Regarding the term “maneuver”, according to Leonhard 
the Army in 1982 came close to the actual (Soviet) idea of “maneuver” with AirLand Battle, 
but more and more went back to the principle of attrition using the scope of technological 
possibilities. While “maneuver” had been the repositioning of forces along a frontline in 
Active Defense, AirLand Battle first foresaw its own units “maneuver” behind the frontline. 
But the actual idea of “maneuver”, to outmaneuver an enemy mentally, was not 
implemented accordingly. House writes, how the 1982 and 1986 Manuals reflected how 
AirLand Battle was in part a natural reaction against the cold calculations of the Active 
Defense. It seemed to reemphasize the importance of leadership and “maneuver” and 
specified that commanders of larger units must concern themselves with higher levels of the 
opponent’s army and larger, deeper areas of the battlefield.397 “Depth”, another of a set of 
important terms in the discourse on warfare, was seen as a geographical parameter as well, 
becoming important in scope of AirLand Battle. While the time factor was as well included, it 
was mostly used to measure the distance of enemy forces to the front. 
Fighting that enemy and bringing him off “balance”, imposing one’s own “will” on him. That 
was what Landpower, what the Army was for. But the decisive close battle or fight, that had 
been decisive in the first and last battle of a short war with Active Defense, was 
supplemented by the Deep Battle within the scope of AirLand Battle. And at that point 
discussions began on the role that the Air Force, or Airpower, would have providing large 
parts of the “firepower” necessary for the Army’s idea of Deep Battle. Looking at the 
discourse on Airpower and its abilities, some pilots or airmen did not seem to be 
comfortable with their planes being imagined as flying artillery systems supporting the Army 
on the ground. Being subordinated to the ground battle did not fit into the image of war that 
these airmen had. Indeed, only air assets coordinated by an airman could have enough 
“effect“ on the enemy in large part because the Air Force has another perspective, a 
“higher“ point of view onto the battlefield. 
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II. From the Revolution in Military Affairs to Effects-Based Operations 
(1991-2000) 
2.1. Conclusions drawn from Operation Desert Storm 
Citino names Operation Desert Storm the “long road back from Vietnam“; in his eyes it was 
the most successful military operation In the United States’ military history (measured 
against the limited ends).398 The Air Force thought that it had, for the first time in history, 
beaten an enemy state only by using airstrikes. However, the Army believed it had given the 
decisive blow to the Iraqi forces despite the airstrikes. Both are old ideas and arguments, and 
despite termini such as Jointness, the traditional mindsets of both branches were 
everywhere to be seen.399 In spite of some first attempts to true Jointness, the Air Force 
tried to develop technologies and doctrine to prove ground troops unnecessary. However, 
the Army thought that ground troops would be decisive in the future too.400 A report of the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 1991 criticized that Operation Desert Storm had not 
been a severe test of the AirLand Battle doctrine. The report stated that Iraq’s air force had 
put up only little resistance and that Iraqi ground forces had adopted a static defensive 
posture in fortified positions, which allowed the United States Army to freely exploit AirLand 
Battle’s emphasis on initiative in picking the time and place of attack and “maneuver” in its 
sweeping flank attack through southern Iraq. Iraqi ground forces as well had fought only 
seldom against coalition ground forces.401 Max Boot argues that “although the ‘left hook’ 
that swept around Iraqi forces entrenched in Kuwait showed some operational flair, it was 
hardly a gamble – the eight-division allied force was so heavy that it simply crushed 
everything in its path.”402 In a 2001 interview, Army Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Winton, a 
retired career officer, who had held postings as Professor of Military Art and Science at 
USAWC and as Professor of Military History and Theory at the Air University, stated: “I mean 
we were lucky in a way between Vietnam and Desert Shield. It was a set up. All we had to do 
was change the theater. Okay? And it was easier to fight AirLand Battle in the desert than in 
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Europe. […] Yes we did very, very well. But we were given exactly the kind of war that we 
wanted.”403 The stage had been set for a demonstration of AirLand Battle-derived 
capabilities such as Deep Battle, especially its technological applications. However, the Iraqi 
army was neither poised nor instructed to operate offensively against the coalition forces, 
and so the United States Army chose the time, place, and date to begin and end its 
operations.404 
Airpower and Desert Storm 
Nonetheless, above all in the military publications the success against Iraq was appropriately 
honored and consequences for the image of the future war were drawn. James W. Canan, 
Senior Editor of the Air Force Magazine, described the air war above Iraq in the March 1991 
edition: 
“Operation Desert Storm had begun, set off by an air campaign that would soon prove 
unprecedented in its intensity, precision, and lethality. […] Desert Storm soon made the 
point. By itself, airpower may not have been enough to dislodge Saddam Hussein's forces 
from Kuwait, but it surely was needed to soften them up, and it did so.”405 
Airpower only had, according to Canan, made possible the ground offensive by 
metaphorically “softening up” the Iraqi Armed Forces in a way that had never been seen 
before. Though, there had been similar applications of Airpower before. One example was  
Operation Cobra in 1944, when the First United States Army’s offensive into Brittany was 
initiated by concentrated aerial bombardment.406 Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham in the 
Airpower Journal in Winter 1991 argued similarly: 
“As a result, perhaps the most important lesson the US military could learn from Desert 
Storm is that it needs to change its doctrine to recognize the reality that air power can 
dominate modern conventional war (as opposed to revolutionary war and some military 
activities short of war like Operation Just Cause)407.” 408 
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Bingham confessed here (only in brackets although), that Airpower is not for all cases or 
scenarios the right instrument. Despite that, he demanded an adjustment to the whole Army 
as well as Air Force doctrine because Airpower had displayed a dominance. The term 
Airpower was therefore used prominently and defined further as the capability of the Air 
Force to have decisive “effect” on the ground. Furthermore, Bingham in the scope of his 
argumentation handled the concept AirLand Battle quite harshly: 
“Perhaps because it is called AirLand Battle doctrine, many of these same commentators 
also mistakenly believe that it is Air Force as well as Army doctrine. Yet, despite the 
opinion of these commentators and the ‘air’ in its title, comparison of Army doctrine to 
the conduct of Desert Storm reveals that it failed to anticipate the dominant role played 
by air power.”409 
AirLand Battle was, according to Bingham, not Air Force doctrine, hence because the Army 
had not incorporated the possibilities of Airpower accordingly. Note the perpetuation of the 
discussions that had already taken pace in the 1980s after AirLand Battle had been 
developed. In 1992 John D. Morocco, Senior Military Editor of Aviation Week & Space 
Technology described in the January edition of the Air Force Magazine that the visions of 
Airpower theorists had become true: 
“After more than forty years of unfulfilled promises, airpower achieved nearly all that its 
most vocal advocates had said it could do. The concept of ‘victory through airpower’, 
espoused by Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and other prophets410 of airpower, was largely 
realized in the war against Iraq.”411 
Whereas Morocco also remarked how the circumstances in the Gulf had been ideal, in the 
Air Force even the own institutional orientation was criticized after Desert Storm, as 
Lieutenant Colonel Meilinger wrote in the Airpower Journal in spring 1992: 
“One would think that the Gulf war, the most decisive air war in history, would sweep 
away the doubts and uncertainties regarding the potentialities of air power. 
Unfortunately, that may not be the case. Some leading airmen are still reluctant to draw 
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lessons regarding the role of air power in future wars. […] Air power had always 
promised decisive results, and although it had indeed delivered on those promises over 
Germany, Japan, the Sinai in 1967, and North Vietnam in 1972412, many people insisted 
on muting or diluting those lessons. Even our overwhelming victory in the Gulf air war 
seems not to have removed all of these doubts.”413 
So Meilinger saw the prophecy of earlier Airpower proponents coming true, but his 
proposition was and still is disputable at the very least, as the aerial bombardments over 
Germany in the Second World War and their impact are debatable. But Meilinger believed, 
as Bingham, that Airpower had been handled unjustly before.414 Meilinger as well brought 
up the “future wars“, showing off his ideas on the imagined next war. In autumn 1992 
Colonel Dennis M. Drew, Professor at the Air University, took in the Airpower Journal the 
same line on Airpowers’ role as Meilinger did: 
“The most obvious symbolic meaning of the Desert Storm experience was that air power 
has matured as an instrument of war. […] However, the dominant nature of air power is 
not a surprising ‘bolt from the blue.’ Rather, it is the culmination of a long-term trend. 
[…] The air campaign in Desert Storm illustrated the advantages of parallel operations in 
a three-dimensional model of war.”415 
Airpower now seemed to dominate “modern warfare” or the “model” thereof (note the 
scientific style of language) and should be conducted parallel on different levels and against 
different types of targets. The terminus parallel warfare will thereby not be seen for the last 
time. The idea of “precision“ attacks was also propagated by Lieutenant General Buster C. 
Glosson, then Air Force Deputy chief of staff for plans and operations: 
“We are writing a new and exciting chapter on air power – a chapter made possible in 
part by precision guided munitions (PGM). […] Air power's precision, lethality, and ability 
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to paralyze an adversary is at an all-time high. […] I cannot imagine a future conflict in 
which air power will not be a major factor in achieving our national objectives.”416 
Here was an even lavish appearing imagination of Airpower capabilities celebrated. General 
Glosson was chief of the Black Hole planning group in the scope of Operation Desert Storm, 
and he would have preferred to attack earlier and only with Airpower to win the war 
without the Army, according to Lewis.417 He even openly blamed the political and military 
decision-makers for not having had the will until then to bet on Airpower. The self-esteem of 
the Air Force was also obvious in another article by Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham in 
the Airpower Journal in autumn 1993: 
“The performance of air power in Operation Desert Storm bears witness to the 
revolutionary impact of these technical developments. […] Such advantages demonstrate 
that in many circumstances air power should be the primary tool for destroying an 
enemy army. Land forces would still be necessary but normally in a supporting role.”418 
Airpower was hereby presented as being the primary means of “modern war” too. Bingham 
saw the Army doctrine represented by the AirLand Battle to be “obsolete”.419 He also 
advanced the opinion that ground troops would play a secondary role in future. They would 
also be saved from suffering casualties according to Air Force General John M. Loh, 
Commander, ACC from 1992 until 1995: “We saved a lot of lives in the Gulf War by taking full 
advantage of the airpower our nation wields.”420 Note the quite cynical appraisal of 
Airpower in the face of an enemy who had been shot up and clubbed without restraint, 
especially by Airpower and on the retreat. Similarly, Colonel Larry D. New wrote in the 
Airpower Journal in autumn 1996 that the coalitions losses had been minimized by Airpower: 
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“Iraq’s will to fight, from its foot soldiers to its national command authorities, was all but 
eliminated by the air war. Air forces of all the coalition services, employed under 
centralized control, prevailed while our surface forces suffered very few losses (total 
Americans killed in combat were 147). The ensuing ground action was essentially an 
unexpected mop-up operation against a fielded military that started at a strength of 44 
army divisions!”
421 
New saw ground troops to be some kind of a “cleaning force” that was to be deployed only 
when the aerial offensive had been already conducted. Bert Cooper wrote in the CRS report 
in 1991: “Coalition ground forces didn’t exactly walk into Kuwait unopposed, but the 
surprisingly rapid and completely one-sided nature of the ground campaign confirmed for 
many the essential validity of the airpower argument in this case.”422 Airpower proponent 
Benjamin Lambeth wrote in his monograph: “Clearly it took both assets to produce the final 
victory. However, owing in considerable part to air power's preparation of the battlefield, 
only 148 U.S. military personnel were killed423 and 458 wounded during the actual course of 
fighting.“424 But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in an assessment, 
that ground forces in 1991 in the short ground offensive (100 hours) had destroyed more 
enemy equipment than the Air Force in one month.425 Despite that the Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force (CSAF), General Gene Meyers, wrote similarly in the Airpower Journal in summer 
1996: 
“Unfortunately, it was not until Desert Storm that we discovered that conventional air 
operations could not only support a ground scheme of maneuver but also could directly 
achieve operational- and strategic-level objectives – independent of ground forces, or 
even with ground forces in support.”426 
Herein one has to mention critically that Airpower had accomplished goals at the 
operational or even strategic level before Desert Storm, even as they were not as successful 
as Meilinger had argued (see above). Interestingly, Meyers did not copy the argumentation 
many of his fellow airmen used in the journals. He possibly did want to sell the strategic 
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ramification of Airpower as something new. General Meyers in his article accordingly 
highlighted the strategic attack: 
“Air forces again demonstrated the utility of strategic attack – this time conclusively – 
during the Persian Gulf War, when the coalition marshaled airpower in all its forms and 
service livery to render the adversary leadership deaf, dumb, and blind, and isolate it 
from its military forces. Only then did the ground war proceed.“427 
Here too one can find the reference regarding the preparatory work done for the ground 
force in Desert Storm. Again, there is the interesting hint that Airpower had really proved its 
decisive capabilities, leaving the enemy absolutely without a chance. In the 1996 December 
edition of the Air Force Magazine General Chuck Horner, chief of aerial operations against 
Iraq in 1991, registered: 
“Desert Storm marked the first large-scale employment of stealth aircraft – the F-117 – 
equipped with precision weapons. The combination has revolutionized warfare. […] The 
F-117s did more than just pave the way for less-capable aircraft. They allowed us to 
strike the ‘heart’ of the enemy – downtown Baghdad – with impunity, regardless of the 
defenses. […] The Gulf War gave me a glimpse into the future of warfare.”428 
The combination of Stealth and PGM appeared here as a revolutionary element. Noteworthy 
as well is the utilization of the word “heart“, to label an enemy control center or even a point 
of main effort. The following was then to be found about the role of Stealth in the Gulf War 
Air Power Survey, written in 1993 under the lead of Professor Eliot A. Cohen on behalf of the 
Air Force: 
“Low observability made possible direct strikes at the heart of the Iraki [sic] air defense 
system at the very outset of the war. In the past, air forces fought through elaborate 
defenses and accepted losses on their way to the target or rolled those defenses back. In 
the Gulf War, the Coalition could strike Iraqi air defenses immediately, and they never 
recovered from these initial, stunning blows.”429 
Here as well the enemy’s “heart“ was emphasized. The “blows” resemble the image of the 
boxing fight the Army wanted to stage in the scope of AirLand Battle, but its use here means 
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airstrikes. Even as the Air Power Survey stressed these initial attacks, during the course of 
Desert Storm, Airpower would still encounter difficulties in its application. For example, 
despite JSTARS, satellite reconnaissance or AWACS the “fog of war“ existed further on.430 
Either these systems were not capable of covering the whole battlefield or the analysis of 
the data they produced was plainly too time-consuming. Sometimes Army units 
encountered large Iraqi formations of which they did not know beforehand.431 In reality, the 
idea of a victory only through airstrikes was hampered by bad intelligence, difficulties with 
targeting, and the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), as well as the rivalry in-between the 
branches, bad weather, bureaucratic obstacles and the limitation of human and 
technological capabilities.432 All the problems mentioned were neither new nor unique to 
the Desert Storm air campaign. Neither did the Air Force have any more Forward Air 
Controllers (FAC) who would have been immensely important to coordinate with the ground 
forces.433 The deployment and success of the F-117 were indeed remarkable, but most of the 
airstrikes lacked any “precision“ and finesse. In the scope of the much propagated Parallel 
Operations, F-117s were able to attack strategic-level targets such as the Air Defense Centre 
in Baghdad thanks to their Stealth from the beginning, before Air Defense forces were rolled 
back by systematical attacks. The F-117 hit 40 percent of all strategic targets using PGM, 
flying only two percent of all attacks. But the 170,000 PGMs deployed represented only 8 
percent of all the weapons dropped and had to cope with restrictions. CRS wrote in its 1991 
report: “Although U.S. military briefings on the air campaign focused on ’smart‘ air-to-
ground munitions, the vast majority of air-to-ground munitions used in the Persian Gulf War 
were gravity bombs.”434 Technical difficulties and restrictions hindered deployment of PGMs: 
For example, targets had to be illuminated by laser until the weapon hit. However, smoke or 
dust could interfere with the deployment of laser-guided PGM, as well as weather, in 
general, even if the open desert environment had offered a near ideal employment arena for 
allied air power.435 Even Airpower proponent Benjamin Lambeth had to concede that “three 
weeks into the war, a full half of the planned attack sorties into Iraq had been either diverted 
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to secondary targets or cancelled because of weather. Weather frequently hampered the 
delivery of laser-guided munitions as well.“436 Moreover only 118 Air Force aircraft were 
capable of utilizing PGM and only the F-117 as well as the F-111 were capable of deploying 
bunker-busting LGB.437 Hereto the Gulf War Airpower Survey: “The U.S. fighter bombers 
designed in the 1970s, the F-16 and F/A-18, could not laser designate, and the first squadron 
of F-15Es received laser-designating equipment only after deploying to the theater, as did the 
RAF Tornados.”438 The PGMs which were deployed, such as Paveway, had been utilized as 
early as in the Vietnam War but only as a niche system against special targets like bridges.439 
So the B-52 attacks with bomb carpets against Iraqi ground troops stood in stark contrast to 
the limited deployment of PGM.440 Bert Cooper wrote that it was difficult to contest the 
success of the air campaign during Desert Storm. But at the same time, he argued that it 
seemed important to note that the Persian Gulf War was a scenario that mostly played to 
the strengths of Airpower. According to Cooper, the terrain was predominantly flat and bare, 
which made it hard for Iraqi forces to hide from aerial attacks. Moreover, the Iraqi Air Force 
did not participate in the war after the first few days, thereby enabling coalition aircraft to 
focus undisturbed on attacking ground targets. The Iraqi leadership had adopted a fixed 
defensive strategy, which in turn made most Iraqi units in the desert ideal targets.441 
Therefore, the discourse on the “efficiency“ and advantages of Airpower in the realm of 
Operation Desert Storm has to be criticized and dismantled accordingly: even from a pure 
technological perspective, there were many difficulties that were mostly spared from the 
argumentation in favor of Airpower, of course. 
A new American Way of War – and the Army? 
Beneath the positive conclusions drawn from the United States Armed Forces’ fighting 
concept in Desert Storm, especially by Air Force officers, other voices spoke (against the 
background of the collapse of the USSR) about the future of war and the American 
Way/Style of War, mostly in the Army’s entourage. 442 In the Military Review October 1991 
edition Colonel James R. McDonough, acting director of the School of Advanced Military 
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Studies at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, drew consequences 
from Desert Storm. He wanted to hold on to the principles of AirLand Battle using the new 
terminus AirLand Operations: 
“Some things should not change. […] Air-Land Operations does not radically change Air-
Land Battle; rather it expands and refocuses the concepts inherent in AirLand Battle for 
the Army in a changing strategic environment. It builds on the foundation of our current 
doctrine for the employment of Army forces across the operational continuum of peace, 
crisis and war.“443 
So the Army should further develop the concept of AirLand Battle Future and transfer it to 
the newly possible scenarios, the “operational continuum of peace, crisis and war”, a sort of 
perpetual war. Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono told the participants of a Pre-Command 
Course (PCC) in April 1991: “You know the Soviet Union, for example, is going to continue to 
modernize over the years. I do not know what rate, but they are going to modernize and even 
though the immediate threat to the Soviet Union is reduced, we may not fight Soviets and 
Soviet tanks, but we may Soviet tanks again as we did in the Gulf.”444 At the TRADOC 
Commanders Conference at the end of the month, Vuono stated that “AirLand Battle – a 
product of TRADOC’s imagination and perseverance – is now part of the lore of America. Your 
challenge is to now ensure that our doctrine continues to evolve so that AirLand Battle-
Future will be as effective on the battlefields of tomorrow as AirLand Battle was during 
Desert Storm.” Then, referring to ALB-F, Vuono went further to open the spectrum of 
possible missions for the Army: “AirLand Battle-Future must now include not only the 
classical principles for combat but also encompass the entire range of military operations 
from peacetime engagement to major war.”445 At the Armor Conference, in May 1991, 
Vuono stated: “The violence that we unleashed during Operation Desert Storm only 
foreshadows, in my view, our future capability.”446And Vuono further told his audience: 
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“It [the AirLand Battle Doctrine] was manifested, seriously, in the images of armored 
cavalrymen spearheading the assault deep into Iraq of tens of thousands of Iraqi 
prisoners plodding south past the burned-out remnants of a once proud army, of Abrams 
tanks and Bradleys making a mad dash north to seal the fate of the Republican Guard 
divisions.”447 
So Desert Storm and AirLand Battle seemed to be the template for the immediate future or 
“modern warfare” in the Army brass’ view. In February 1992, General Gordon R. Sullivan, 
successor to Vuono as CSA, wrote in Military Review: 
“Today’s fights are likely to be at a faster tempo, to cover more ground, and to be more 
continuous – day and night in all weather. The implications for our doctrine are wide-
ranging. […] The revised doctrine will build on the widely acknowledged strengths of 
AirLand Battle.“448 
Sullivan too saw the new doctrine being an update of the AirLand Battle. His image of the 
“modern” battlefield was characterized by an even faster “speed” and all-weather capability. 
In the very same edition of the Military Review in 1992 Colonel Peter F. Herrly, Chief of the 
Joint Doctrine Branch at the Joint Staff, described the American Way of War: 
“This American way of war focuses on joint campaigns seamless operations from air, 
land, sea and space, operating with overwhelming force from every conceivable 
dimension and direction to shock, disrupt and rapidly defeat opponents. Such effectively 
integrated joint forces expose no weak points to the enemy, but find and attack enemy 
weak points with devastating precision and power.“449 
Herrly wrote about Jointness as an evolution of combined arms warfare and stipulated it as 
the American Style of War as well. “Shock” was an addition to AirLand Battle doctrine, which 
did not foresee an immediate defeat of the enemy. The idea that enemy weaknesses had to 
be found and exploited was, on the other side, not new at all and can be traced back to the 
writings of Sun Tse. But apart from ideas and termini, which came newly into the Army’s 
discourse on warfare, the Deep Attack was still one of the mainstays of the general 
warfighting idea. In July 1993 General Sullivan wrote in the Military Review: 
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“Perhaps one of the most unarguable objectives is the value of being able to reach deep 
into the enemy's territory and conduct precision strikes against his combat, logistic and 
command formations and lines of communication. […] If we can plan and conduct 
simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of every sector to destroy, disrupt and 
control the threat information flow […] we can attain decisive victory.“450 
The Army was, from its leadership’ point of view, still the decisive element451 on the modern 
battlefield, which had been enlarged by modern technology physically as well as mentally 
regarding the stronger inclusion of society. Not only would the Air Force be capable of 
delivering decisive blows; the Army’s actions could also be simultaneous with them. 
Air and Ground perspectives 
If one differentiates now both the discussions and argumentative structures of both the Air 
Force and Army, some statements and terms specific to this discourse can be disregarded as 
they differ only slightly from their counterparts at the end of the 1980s. Airpower dominated 
“firepower” in the conventional war in the Gulf, but the Army still saw the “depth” of the 
battlefield, enlarging it, but still adhering to AirLand Battle. The Air Force interpreted the 
victory against Iraq as a cause to see earlier theories of aerial warfare strategy as being 
finally implemented. The “finally“ is therefore representative of the relief, which airmen now 
propagated and their newly-gained self-confidence. In its self-perception, now, after years of 
negation by the other branches, the Air Force had been decisive to victory thanks to modern 
weapons systems. Against the background of an impending “peace dividend“, in the eyes of 
Airpower advocates Stealth-bombers and PGM would be the most cost-effective means to 
contain threats, and no other branch was able to attack as quickly and decisively as the Air 
Force. Quickness was then as well promoted by the Air Force in its official statements, here 
an excerpt from a White Paper published in 1990 already: “Airpower’s speed, range, and 
lethality allows rapid shifting of effects, concentrating firepower wherever the joint force 
commander needs it – from the close battle, across the length and breadth of the theater, to 
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its deepest reaches.”452 And to further emphasize the Air Forces advantages compared to the 
other services: 
“While complementary forces of all the Services will be essential – the Air Force offers, in 
most cases, the quickest, longest range, leading edge force available to the President. 
[…] The Air Force can deter, deliver a tailored response, or punch hard when required – 
over great distances – with quick response. We can provide a presence, or put ordnance 
on a target worldwide in a matter of hours.”453 
The paper therefore named all the elements which constituted the Airpower discourse 
during these years: “speed”, range, “precision“ (“tailored response”) and its global ambitions. 
The Army for its part seemed to have more difficulty to benefit from the victory. The medial 
appearances of the F-117 hereby were less advantageous. To the contrary, as it seems, the 
Army found its way after the Cold War less easily. AirLand Battle was warmed over again, 
and after Operation Desert Storm over a third of the Army’s ground troops were deactivated, 
the 6th, 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions among others.454 Some analysts believed that Desert 
Storm represented the most challenging military contingency the Army would likely 
encounter in the near future. They argued that in the foreseeable future it seemed unlikely 
that the Army would be called upon to deploy that many forces on such short notice. In 
contrast with the decision to deactivate the Infantry Divisions, commentators believed that 
smaller LIC were likely.455 But the Army itself believed that the massive armored operations 
against the Iraqi military reinforced its preference for conventional operations.456 
At the same time, Army-Air Force relations became much more difficult, as James C. Slife 
wrote in his 2002 thesis: “After Desert Storm, Army and Air Force relations took a decided 
turn for the worse as airmen began to reassert the decisiveness and independence of 
airpower, often at the expense of the cooperation and general harmony that had 
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 Infantry Division was deactivated in 1994, only one brigade still exists today and is part of the 25
th
 
Infantry Division at this time. The 7
th
 Infantry Division staff was as well deactivated in 1994, only one brigade 
exists still and is part of the 2
nd
 Infantry Division. The staff was reactivated in October 2012, but only to serve as 
an administrative unit. The 9
th
 Infantry Division had even been the first to be deactivated in 1991; one of its 
brigades became the 2
nd
 Armored Cavalry Regiment. 
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characterized Army-Air Force relationships since the end of the Vietnam War.”457 The times 
of a General Starry and a General Creech working together between TRADOC and ACC to 
fight the Central Battle in Europe seemed to be over, and a period of competition over 
funding would begin.  
2.2. The Military-Technological Revolution and the Revolution in Military 
Affairs 
The Gulf War experiences did not only lead to the revival of aerial warfare as the decisive 
means. Military officers such as Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov458 in the USSR had already 
believed in the 1970s that computers, satellites, long-range weapons, or missiles would alter 
the character of war.459 In the 1980s the Soviets saw a Military Technical Revolution (MTR) 
thanks to the United States‘ PGM, which they considered to be as effective as nuclear 
weapons, and the growing network with sensors (Reconnaissance Strike Complex).460 Tomes 
defines the synergy of different elements as Revolution in Military Affairs: ISR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance), automatic target identification, PGM, Stealth, better 
education and training, a more offensive doctrine and Jointness belong to it. Dima Adamsky, 
specialist on modern military thought, argues that the AirLand Battle doctrine laid down the 
technological foundation of the future American RMA.461 This Military Revolution brought 
fewer changes in structure, character, and scope of the United States Armed Forces as 
hoped for, but it was a welcome new concept at the end of the Cold War.462 Throughout the 
early 1990s the RMA idea would shape the cognitive landscape of American military 
thought, their image of the future war.463 The 1991 Gulf War thereby served as sort of 
catalyst and projection surface by serving as a medial presentation of the modern, 
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technological, and “clean war“. However, despite different reports, such as the National 
Defense Panel Report: Transforming Defense – National Security in the 21st Century464 from 
1997 or the concept DoD Warfighting Transformation of the Defense Science Board (DSB)465 
from 1999, no really new equipment was procured or no new doctrinal ideas were 
researched (especially by the Army) in this first ten years after the Cold War.466 
Technological progress 
On the part of the Air Force the Gulf War Airpower Survey first of all apprehended the 
network of sensors and weapons predicted by Soviet analysts: 
“[…] ‘reconnaissance-strike complexes’ would enable commanders to detect targets and 
attack them effectively, at long ranges, and within minutes. […] Episodes such as using 
JSTARS to detect Iraqi forces moving up for the attack on Al Khafji at the end of January 
were important exceptions, but exceptions nonetheless.”467 
But at the same time, the Survey chilled the already stirred expectations: “If history is any 
guide, the technologies necessary for such dramatic change may require much time and trial 
before armed forces can use them as effectively as theory might predict.”468 Even before this 
Airpower Survey from 1993, Andrew Krepinevich, back then working for the Office of Net 
Assessment in the Department of Defense, wrote in a paper assessing the Military-Technical 
Revolution: 
“There is the growing ability to gather, process, and disseminate information (especially 
information concerning potential targets) far more rapidly than ever before. […] 
Complementing these dramatic increases in information capabilities are the major 
improvements in the range, accuracy, and lethality of conventional munitions that may 
allow us to destroy large numbers of targets over the length and breadth of the theater 
of operations.”469  
Here Krepinevich mentioned accuracy (a hint to the PGM) as element of the Reconnaissance 
Strike Complex and the advantages of networking, and the term “depth” was circumscribed 
with the “length and breadth” of the theater. According to Adamsky, the MTR Preliminary 
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Assessment became the intellectual starting point for the future Defense Transformation in 
the United States. Because of the assessment, five task forces exploring the RMA and its 
consequences were established the following year.470 And there was as well a discussion 
going on in military publications at this time. In 1994 Dr. David Jablonsky, Professor for 
National Security at the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States 
Army War College, wrote in Parameters about the RMA: 
“Change resonates for the American military today as it seeks to come to grips with what 
the Soviet Union once called the Military Technological Revolution (MTR) and what is 
now considered a broader Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). […] The major force for 
change in that revolution is technology.“471 
Jablonsky hereby saw technology as the primary driving force behind the Revolution. While 
there will be critical voices to be found further below regarding the role of technology, the 
discourse on Airpower was very much dominated by it, especially by Stealth and the PGM. 
The Stealth-bombers were the new panacea, according to Air Force General Loh: “Stealth 
gives us certainty that we can penetrate the world’s most sophisticated integrated air 
defenses.”472 Similarly, in summer 1995 Mark Clodfelter and John M. Fawcett Jr., both Air 
Force officers, discussed the RMA in Parameters, too, and emphasized Stealth: 
“If the perceived RMA is in fact under way, it is likely in its nascent stages and could take 
20 years to implement. The key to the revolution, however, will not be technological 
change, but rather a change in the Air Force mind-set about how to organize and use the 
weapons at hand. […] A future restructuring may combine stealth and precision 
munitions in unique ways to accomplish air power’s basic goals of destroying an 
adversary’s war-fighting capability and his will to resist.”473 
But these authors as well stressed the nascence of the RMA and that organizational and 
doctrinal changes had to be made to implement it. In comparing the last three text passages 
cited, the differing emphasis on technology seems interesting, especially given that Air Force 
exponents characterized the combination of Stealth and PGM as being not entirely mature, 
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similar to the doctrine. But the most prominent Air Force proponents would argue vigorously 
in favor of Stealth during the 1990s, especially for the bomber force, which would then be 
enhanced by the acquisition of the B-2 stealth bomber. 
Airpower: long-range and stealth 
Long range and precise conventional weapons seemed to be the new panacea for war: “A 
prominent characteristic of the emerging global environment is uncertainty and instability. 
[…] A flexible long-range bomber force, capable of rapidly and precisely delivering 
conventional ordnance against an enemy’s most valued assets anywhere on the globe, can 
help prevent or delay potential escalation and achieve our national objectives over a wide 
range of conflict levels.”474 ACC Commander General John M. Loh spoke in front of an Army 
Command and Staff College audience in 1994: “Our bomber force has the speed, range, and 
mass to take the fight to the enemy in the opening hours of a conflict when we don’t have 
the option of working from forward bases.”475 Loh used terms such as “speed” and “mass” 
hereby in a different manner than they were applied during the Cold War: now they 
described not tank armies, but “firepower” delivered by Airpower. And General Charles 
Horner brought the cost argument into the fight for resources: “Viewed in terms of the total 
requirements to hit a target – stealth provides the best bargain. Initial acquisition cost is 
higher, but stealth systems expose fewer lives, reduce total sorties, and reduce requirements 
for munitions, manpower, fuel, support infrastructure, and therefore overall cost.”476 Cost 
was meant to be “precision“ and therefore “effectiveness”. An Air Force paper in 1990 
argued accordingly that “In the conventional role, the B-2 is a formidable weapon. Its stealth 
characteristics make defense against such a bomber extremely difficult, while its long-range 
and high payload ensure that any adversary would remain vulnerable. […] The B-2 can 
penetrate to any location on the planet to deliver massive quantities of ordnance 
precisely.”477 The technology bias further shined through:  
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“Stealth not only protects an aircraft (defense), but greatly enhances the aircraft’s 
likelihood of prosecuting a successful strike (offense). It enables the attacker to slip in 
around the most critical defenses of an opponent, and get so close to a target before 
finally (possibly) being detected that there is little chance of thwarting the attack. It 
reduces the effective range of an adversary’s defenses to the point where they are 
essentially nullified. Stealth thus provides a revolutionary force-multiplying combat 
leverage.”478 
The terminus force-multiplying was therefore the perfect argument in favor of Stealth, 
representing the maximum of cost “effectiveness”. And the Air Force continued to bring 
forward its cost argument in official statements and papers: “The bomber’s long range 
means that the United States can project power and enhance presence in a very short time – 
and often at lower cost relative to other options – regardless of conflict location.”479 Stealth 
indeed stood for one of the most important concepts in these early years after Desert Storm. 
It was the perfect argument in favor of Airpower in the discussion regarding “modern 
warfare”, meaning fewer costs in hard currency and in lives, perfectly fitting to the 
perceptions of a new world order after the Fall of the Berlin Wall. 
RMA: the pros and cons 
In the future, the enemy’s “will” should be “broken“ not only through quick “precision“ 
attacks but also thanks to a better base of knowledge, which would produce advantages on 
the strategic level. Stealth alone would not suffice to form the RMA; the United States would 
also have to know where to hit the enemy. Captain James R. Fitzsimonds, a Navy officer, 
wrote about the RMA in Parameters in summer 1995: 
“It is commonly accepted that future information technologies will allow the commander 
to know a lot more about the battlefield – to have greater situational awareness of both 
his own and enemy forces. […] At best, this ability may help us to achieve the goal of 
universal strategic leverage – compelling any adversary to accede to our will, be that 
unconditional surrender or some lesser requirement.“480 
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This very confident image of war is more a linear evolution of the battlefield and warfare 
that the United States Armed Forces envisioned in the late 1980s and would not encompass 
other types of war or enemies as had happened in 1993. Adamsky argues that the Air Force 
and Navy traditionally were the most “techno-friendly and techno-dependent“. The Army, in 
his eyes, kept its distance from such a techno-bias, and the Marine Corps valued technology 
the least. Being “boots-on-the-ground“481 services, the Army and Marine Corps seem to rely 
to a greater extent on the human element – the soldiers – than on machines, and they put 
the former at the center of warfare. Adamsky cites the saying that the Air Force and Navy 
man the equipment, while the Army and Marine Corps equip the man.482 But this has to be 
questioned as, for example in Active Defense, the Army saw its soldiers manning new 
equipment, being only operators. It would take some time and the emergence of the COIN 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s, for the Army in its discourse to again 
get back to the single soldier being at the center stage. But there were, at least in-between, 
more critical voices like John T. Correll, editor-in-chief of the Air Force Magazine, who 
showed a more critical stance towards RMA, here in the August edition in 1995: 
“Nevertheless, the ‚Revolution in Military Affairs‘ suffers from a definite credibility 
problem. The first reason is that the name is misleading. ‚Revolution’ implies a 
suddenness that isn't there. Change has not come as a bolt out of the blue but rather 
from the maturation and application of technology that was pioneered years ago. 
Second, some of the prophets of the Revolution get carried away and exaggerate.”483 
As mentioned earlier, the terminus Revolution implies a fast change, which was not 
conceived everywhere.484 Some authors took the view that some technological 
developments facilitated brand new possibilities in “modern warfighting“. The new 
approach which should revolutionize the battlefield most recently using Stealth and PGM 
had – quite understandably – found more fertile grounds in the Air Force. But as explained at 
the very beginning, an RMA is composed of technological, organizational, as well as doctrinal 
elements. The RMA would further evoke critical voices, which cautioned against future 
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opponents who would not want to play the game according to the United States’ rules. Mark 
Clodfelter and John M. Fawcett Jr. write in Parameters in summer 1995: 
“The next enemy, however, may not be as vulnerable as Iraq was to high-tech wizardry. 
Agrarian or semi-industrialized countries may be immune to an air campaign based on 
stealth and precision. In Somalia, American forces could do little to halt or intercept 
information exchanges among rebel groups that communicated via signal drums.”485 
Despite these authors’ statements, the intervention in Somalia in 1993486, which failed from 
a military point of view, seemingly had little impression on RMA thinking even as the 
perceived weakness of the enemy is questioned. Interestingly Andrew Krepinevich wrote in 
his 1992 Military-Technical Revolution about a modern enemy who would not want to cope 
with the United States at eye level: 
“A ‚Streetfighter State’ […] would attempt to exploit those aspects of the U.S. social 
culture that would inhibit the effective application of American military power. 
Specifically, acts of aggression would be low-intensity in nature and ambiguous in 
execution, with emphasis on terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.”487 
This enemy, which would have been only on the receiving end of United States “firepower” if 
one believed the RMA proponents’ image of war, would rather fight in a way not suited to 
the United States’ conventional arsenal. With Low-Intensity Conflict a contemporary 
terminus for conflict below war was coined. Critical voices existed as shown; nevertheless, 
problems had nearly no influence on doctrine development– with the failed Somalia 
deployment in 1993 leading the way – which had shown in a grave way how little superior 
technology worked against an unconventionally fighting enemy. This enemy did not or only 
partially fit into the image of war of the United States Armed Forces, being only part of the 
foggy MOOTW (Military Operations other than War). The FM 100-5 1993 introduced the so-
called Operations other than War to differentiate the increasing (humanitarian) 
interventions below the level of war (earlier called Mid- or High-intensity Conflict). In the 
1986 edition of the FM 100-5 the terminus Low-intensity Conflict had been used. Krepinevich 
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described in his Vietnam assessment in 1986 that LIC would be the most probable form of 
conflict for the United States Army and that it as well tried to change this form of conflict 
into something it could handle. 488 Counterinsurgency specialist David Fitzgerald writes: 
“In fashioning these new concepts for the future international security environment, 
proponents of the RMA certainly did not extrapolate from contemporary operations or 
adversaries. It seems more likely that their vision was premised on a bizarre 
preengineering of what would be possible in the future with the application of 
technology if future adversaries were the same as the ones that the army had prepared 
for since World War II.“489 
But critical voices did indeed exist. Here is Earl H. Tilford Jr. in 1998: “One of the problems 
with the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) is that we are not even sure it is a real 
revolution. And if it is, very few service advocates are willing to consider the kind of changes 
necessary to make the RMA truly revolutionary.“490 And he warned further that “it is 
dangerous to depend on technology. If a foe with symmetric capabilities emerges in the 21st 
century, they will attack our technological capabilities and probably degrade them. Or, if they 
have niche capabilities, they can use them as the North Vietnamese used SA-2s and MiG 
fighters, to attack our air strategy asymmetrically.“491 In the end, the kind of “superficial” 
thinking that accompanied the mostly uncritical embracing of the RMA corrupted American 
strategic and operational thought in subsequent decades, as Adamsky writes.492 
2.3 The Air Force and the strategic attack after the Gulf War 
For this thesis two doctrine documents of the United States Air Force from the 1970s, the 
AFM 1-1 from 1975 and 1979, have been analyzed earlier. In both documents the nuclear 
strategic triad consisting of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, respectively, stood in the first place 
of the exercise of power. As the chapter about the lessons drawn from the 1991 Gulf War 
showed, the Air Force evaluated the air war against Iraq as a success and to be the future 
form of warfare. It is worthwhile to show now how the image of war of the Air Force 
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presented itself relating to strategic warfare before and after the Gulf War und finally 
culminated in a new AFM 1-1 in 1992. 
The strategic attack in earlier AFM 1-1 editions 
While there had been the White Paper The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global 
Reach – Global Power in 1990, the Air Force took twelve years to publish a new edition of its 
main AFM. The argumentation of the advocates of strategic attack in its general outline was 
still not new. As early as in the 1975 edition in the Air Force saw aerial warfare as a decisive 
instrument: 
“Of all military forces, aerospace forces have the greatest capability to take the initiative 
and to carry out offensive operations quickly against an enemy at any desired time and 
location. […] The speed and destructive power of aerospace weapons portend that in 
certain kinds of conflict the initial military offensive action may be immediately decisive. 
[…] Military and psychological advantages may be gained by striking an enemy at a time 
and place not of his choosing, and in a manner for which he is unprepared.”493 
The argument that the Air Force could hit an enemy all the time in all kinds had been already 
postulated by theoreticians such as Gulio Douhet and could even be stipulated as one of the 
mainstays of the Airpower idea.494 Further the Functions and Missions of Aerospace Forces 
were highlighted, here the strategic attack as one of the primary missions: “Strategic attack 
is directed against selected vital targets of an enemy nation so as to destroy that nation’s 
war-making capacity or its will be [to?] continue the conflict.”495 Similarly the following 
characteristics described Aerospace Forces in the AFM 1-1 from 1979: 
“The freedom of operations permitted in aerospace allows our forces to exploit the 
characteristics of speed, range, and maneuverability. These characteristics enable the 
direct application of power against all elements of an enemy’s military resources to a 
degree not possible by other forces.”496 
Especially the destructive power was emphasized: “The concentration in time and space and 
the shock effect of the destruction that can be achieved by aerospace forces is without equal. 
Properly employed, aerospace forces are capable of selective or widespread destruction of 
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any enemy forces and other assets.”497 In both editions the reference to the capability of 
Airpower was already mentioned, being able to exercise power on a wholly different level 
(compared to ground forces!). “Shock” and “effect” are to be seen as terms describing the 
results of airstrikes, which should make clear the inherent violence even to laymen. In a last 
chapter about the Evolution of Basic Doctrine, the AFM 1-1 from 1979 looked back at the 
past evolution of Airpower and cherished: “Technology advanced the capability of air 
weapons systems to the point where they could match their theoretical potential. […] the 
destructive power of strategic forces was generally immediate and overwhelming.”498 
The argument that the possibilities of aerial warfare could only now be fully exploited 
therefore was already brought up years before the 1991 Gulf War. Whereas the 
interpretation, that strategic attack had an immediate “effect”, has to be questioned when 
looking at the experiences against Germany in the Second World War and against Vietnam. 
The AFM 1-1 from 1984 argued as follows: 
“The nature of the medium gives aerospace forces versatility not common to surface 
forces. […] For military operations, the aerospace medium exposes an enemy’s entire 
power structure to assault by the aerospace vehicle, including his sustaining warfighting 
components vital to the prosecution of war.”499 
Accordingly the enemy could be attacked in its entirety; nothing would be spared by 
Airpower. Further aerial forces were rumored to have capabilities which differed from those 
of the land or naval forces: 
“Aerospace forces can deliver destructive firepower worldwide. The shock effect inherent 
in aerospace power is the product of an unequaled capacity to concentrate combat 
power in time and space. Aerospace forces provide commanders with the capability of 
selective or widespread destruction of an enemy's military capacity and the ability to 
conduct these actions rapidly against any enemy.“500 
Here as well the authors imagined “shock” to be the “effect” of airstrikes similar as 
concentrated “firepower”. The AFM 1-1 from 1984 then stated how the Air Force thought 
about fighting the enemy: 
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“Strategic actions produce effects and influences which serve the needs of the overall 
war effort; tactical actions produce direct effects on the field of battle. […] An enemy's 
will and capabilities are the fundamental elements of his warfighting potential. An air 
commander has the capability to attack this potential in depth through strategic and 
tactical aerospace actions.”501 
Without wanting to anticipate the following part about Effects-Based Operations, it has to be 
noted that the term “effect” had also been used in earlier documents. And, obviously, the 
“depth” was still around, one of those terms continuously referred to in the discourse on 
warfare by both the Army and Air Force.  
The 1992 edition of AFM 1-1 
The AFM 1-1 from 1992, written after the 1991 Gulf War, differed significantly from its 
predecessors as it was composed of two volumes, one covering doctrinal basics such as The 
Nature of Aerospace Power and even Airmindedness [sic!], the other consisting of essays 
about specific subjects such as The Tenets of Aerospace Power or Capabilities. The AFM 
dedicated its second chapter to the “nature“ of Airpower as did its predecessors: 
“Aerospace power can quickly concentrate on or above any point on the earth's surface. 
Aerospace power can exploit the principles of mass and maneuver simultaneously to a 
far greater extent than surface forces. […] Aerospace power can apply force against any 
facet of enemy power. Aerospace power can be brought to bear on an enemy's political, 
military, economic, and social structures simultaneously or separately.”502 
Here differences to the 1984 edition were obvious: Airpower should now be brought to bear 
“simultaneously” instead of selectively and broadly against various elements of the enemy, 
no longer merely against its warfighting potential. The 1984 edition had provided more 
leeway, while the 1992 AFM formulated more en detail how Airpower had to be applied – 
while still the image of Total War remained, although in a new fashion. “Mass” and 
“maneuver” were as well mentioned, but in a different meaning than the Army had done so 
in the realm of Active Defense and AirLand Battle – not the masses of Soviet tanks but the 
massing of “firepower” and “maneuver” globally. Roles and missions of the Air Force were 
outlined as well, here the strategic attack and the Battlefield Interdiction: 
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“The objective of the strategic attack mission is to destroy or neutralize an enemy's war-
sustaining capabilities or will to fight. Interdiction delays, disrupts, diverts, or destroys an 
enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear against friendly forces.”503 
The terminus point of main effort loaned from Clausewitz, which grew in popularity after the 
Gulf War, was emphasized as well: “The nature of the enemy defines the enemy’s centers of 
gravity, how the enemy will fight, and thus the threat the enemy poses to the achievement of 
friendly objectives.“504 In the subchapter Aerospace Operational Art apart from the 
traditional Air Force roles also its capabilities on the strategic level were referred to: 
“Strategic attacks should produce effects well beyond the proportion of effort expended 
in their execution. Strategic attacks are carried out against an enemy's centers of gravity 
including command elements, war production assets, and supporting infrastructure (for 
example, energy, transportation, and communication assets). […] strategic attacks 
(conducted at the right time, place, and intensity) can, as a secondary effect, produce 
shock that demoralizes the enemy’s leadership, military forces, and population, thus 
affecting the enemy’s desire to wage war. […] Precision weaponry has greatly enhanced 
the efficiency of strategic attack. Being able to hit a precise target in the first attempt 
provides tremendous leverage. It also reduces the need for large expenditures of air 
power and reduces the risk of collateral damage.”505 
Here as well the “effect” together with “shock” could be found, generated by the fielding of 
PGM in the strategic attack. However, Stealth was, remarkably, not mentioned. Airpower 
proponent Lambeth argues: “Properly applied, the term strategic refers not to any particular 
delivery platform or target type, but rather to decisive operational effects.“506 So apart from 
the term “efficiency” the “effect” was introduced on the tactical and operational level as 
well: 
“Depending on a variety of factors, such as the nature of enemy forces and 
communications infrastructure, interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear will have a broad 
operational or strategic-level effect but a delayed effect on surface combat. […] Air 
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interdiction’s ability to delay and disrupt may have a devastating impact on the enemy’s 
plans and ability to respond to the actions of friendly forces.”507 
These advantages of the Air Force, especially the said “efficiency“ and responsiveness, were 
utilized strongly by advocates in the military publications. In November 1992 Colonel Price T. 
Bingham discussed the new AFM 1-1 in the Military Review: “The doctrine’s guidance on 
strategic attacks is that they should produce effects well beyond the proportion of effort 
expended in their execution. These attacks should be persistent and coordinated so as to 
affect the enemy’s capability and possibly his will to wage war.“508 Here as well the term 
“effect”, together with the accentuation that it (the “effect”) went far beyond the actual 
deployment of the weapons used. Beneath that as well the “will” of the enemy was stressed 
again. But Airpower would even help to stop an enemy before ground operations would be 
necessary. 
The Halt Phase 
General Loh would in August 1993 tell an Air War College audience: “Nothing can inject 
American military power as quickly, project as much power, hold as many enemy targets at 
risk, or halt an invasion with such little peril to American lives as airpower.”509 Airpower 
proponents would later on resort to the idea of the Halt Phase when arguing in favor of 
theirs versus Landpower. In October 1993 the Air Force Magazine published an article based 
on the position paper Long-Range Airpower: A Report of the AFA Advisory Group on Military 
Roles & Missions, written by Generals Russell E. Dougherty, Charles A. Gabriel, Michael J. 
Dugan and Major General John R. Alison, every one of them being retired Air Force Generals: 
“Armed conflicts vary, but the strategic heart of a theater air campaign usually will be 
deep attack and interdiction, used rapidly to deny enemy control of forces and events 
and reduce the enemy’s assets and capabilities – which include forces, direct war-
supporting materiel, essential war-supporting infrastructure, and lines of 
communication.”510 
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Deep Attack was however an “old“ concept, interpretable as an AirLand Battle relic, but 
understandable, as these were indeed retired Generals. Cohen and Keany conveyed in 1993 
in the Gulf War Air Power Survey another term, better fitting to “shock”: “In contrast to 
attacking the industrial production that in the past wars had provided the arms and 
munitions for forces in the field, the Desert Storm air campaign sought preeminently to 
disorganize the ‘central nervous system’ of the enemy regime.“511 Whereas it has to be 
mentioned that Iraq in 1991 had only marginal industrial (and not strategic) infrastructure 
and therefore in this regard was not as vulnerable as Germany or Japan, for example, in the 
Second World War. On the other side, Airpower could concentrate on a small set of targets. 
Still the reach back to the central nervous system as body part is interesting, as it fits 
perfectly to the image of the “heart” of the enemy. Not only the “heart”, the body as a 
whole should now be paralyzed: and with strategic paralysis, a new conceptual idea got into 
the Airpower discourse. Major Jason B. Barlow, Action Officer in the Operational Issues 
Group of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations of the United States Air Force, 
wrote in 1993 about the idea of strategic paralysis: 
“[…] strategic paralysis calls for precise aerial attacks against an enemy’s most vital 
targets to paralyze his ability to continue the conflict and perhaps even break his will to 
do so. […] If strategic paralysis is to attain quick victory by applying technologically 
superior air power, planners must identify important, vulnerable targets. Such targets 
are readily found in a modern, industrialized society that relies on a fixed and vulnerable 
infrastructure.”512 
But Barlow may be possibly mistaken; if he refers to Iraq, his definition of a modern society 
does not fit. At the same time, Barlow speaks of an idea which was not really new, but he 
sees, thanks to the PGM, the possibility to attack more precisely: “Innovations as precision 
guided munitions, cruise missiles, global positioning systems, and stealthy airplanes now give 
air power the penetrative capability, persistence, and specialized weaponry necessary to 
directly attack an enemy’s strategic centers with devastating accuracy.”513 The terminus 
paralysis has to be emphasized especially relating to the central nervous system mentioned 
before. This strategic paralysis seems to be another terminus derived from the strategic 
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attack. Air Force General John M. Loh argued similarly: “With the precision-guided weapons 
we have now and that we have under development, we have greater assurance of success 
with less collateral damage.”514 The collateral damage meant a significant change in culture, 
closely related to the new image of war and world order dominant after the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall. The same Symphony of Destruction, which would have taken place in AirLand Battle’s 
fight in Central Europe was no longer present. 
More critical voices also discussed the propagated self-evidence of strategic paralysis, for 
example Captain John R. Glock, Command Targeting Officer at the Air Combat Command, in 
the Airpower Journal in autumn 1994 about targeting: 
“Since the end of the Gulf War, many have written about the war’s lessons. Most authors 
have addressed how precision weapons and stealth platforms have altered the nature of 
warfare. This masks another more critical lesson – the importance of targeting. Not only 
have most authors failed to address the significance of targeting, they have also failed to 
see how greater precision requires even greater and more detailed target analysis.”515 
The targeting, the choice of targets in aerial warfare, was described as being the big problem 
of strategic paralysis. For sure the author had to argue this way in his function. Which 
targets had to be destroyed to have the desired “effect” against the enemy? As early as in 
the Second World War, planners had to look out for specific targets, for example German 
ball bearing production facilities, although these were arguably not attacked in a “precision“ 
manner, by all means not in the “precision“ manner envisioned in the 1990s. Therefore the 
1992 AFM 1-1 indeed wrote about targeting: 
“Precision weaponry requires precise intelligence and effective command and control. 
Achieving the full potential of aerospace power requires timely, relevant intelligence and 
sufficient command and control assets to permit commanders to exploit its speed, range, 
flexibility, and versatility.“516 
But how to find the very specific targets to achieve strategic “effect” was not described. Not 
astonishingly, but nevertheless very prominent, it is obvious regarding the already analyzed 
AFM 1-1, how the Air Force tried to stand out with its capabilities from other branches and 
saw itself as sole guarantor of certain victory. However, this applies to the Army, the Navy, 
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and the Marine Corps as well, especially considering the budget cuts in the 1990s.517 The Air 
Force not only did this with its inherent capabilities but in its language too. The enemy was 
destroyed using nuclear strikes against cities and troop concentrations in the 1970s and 
paralyzed in the 1990s with precise needle sticks using PGM. The Air Force thereby used new 
vocabulary and a new image of war in discussions throughout the discourse about warfare, 
how war would have to be conducted in the future. The goal was to “mass” as many 
“effects” as possible, but the term itself remains ambiguous. Yes, an “effect” is caused by 
weapons deployment, but this was and is intended after all. That Iraqi air defense did not 
activate its radars after being hit by multiple High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM)518 
attacks is quite understandable and not an indication of a new type of warfare. But the 
image of a war with surgical “precision“ was further developed by the Air Force in the 1990s 
steadily, whereby Desert Storm was drawn on often. 
2.4 The Army‘s search for a new enemy and the concept Force XXI  
The 1993 FM 100-5 
In 1993, two years after Operation Desert Storm and already seven years after the last 
edition, the Army published also a new version of its capstone Field Manual 100-5 
Operations.519 This edition is nearly exclusively composed of text; there are barely no 
pictures or graphs as were overly present in the AirLand Battle editions of FM 100-5. At the 
beginning of the first chapter about the Challenges for the US Army the first FM 100-5 after 
the collapse of the USSR declared what had changed since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: “Unlike 
the Cold War era when threats were measurable and, to some degree, predictable Army 
forces today are likely to encounter conditions of greater ambiguity and uncertainty. Doctrine 
must be able to accommodate this wider variety of threats.”520 The insecurity regarding 
possible enemies is clearly recognizable. One concluded from it that doctrine had to 
incorporate these new threats too. Further the Manual stated about the modern battlefield: 
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“The components of battle can be joined in a limitless array of complex combinations. 
Army forces maneuver to bring firepower on the enemy, and bring firepower on the 
enemy in order to maneuver. […] Unconventional and conventional warfare can exist 
side by side, the one flowing to the other and back again. […] the commander does 
everything in his power to throw the enemy off balance, to strike the enemy with 
powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions, and to press the fight to the 
end.”521 
Here alterations compared to the predecessor in 1986 such as the “simultaneity” of 
conventional and unconventional warfare are recognizable, but the statement about the 
enemy’s “balance” is rather well known. “Firepower” is spoken of with a similar meaning as 
earlier, being an Enabler for “maneuver”. Similar to its predecessor, the 1993 edition held 
formative elements of the AirLand Battle but without mentioning the doctrine itself, for 
example noting instead the “depth” of the area and the “synchronization”: 
“Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. […] What is 
most important, however, is the fact that in any operation the Army must have the 
ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of the 
battlefield. […] Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the 
decisive point. […] It means that the desired effect is achieved by arranging activities in 
time and space to gain that effect. Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, the 
massed effects of combat power at the point of decision.”522 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine thoroughly the 1986 edition again: “Depth is the 
extension of operations in space, time, and resources.”523 Save for the terminus purpose the 
definition is exactly the same; the former seems to be a concession toward the feeling that 
the modern battlefield was being enlarged (and possibly towards the term “effect”, too) or 
being a new definition of victory. “Synchronization” hereby is, emphasized, being described 
as “massed effects of combat power” too, and as such uses the language of the Air Force 
(see chapter above). Furthermore, the desired “effect” had to be achieved. The 1993 edition 
as well emphasized other elements of AirLand Battle: 
“Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, 
psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance. 
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Successful maneuver requires anticipation and mental agility. […] Firepower provides 
destructive force; it is essential in defeating the enemy’s ability and will to fight. It is the 
amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system. […] The 
extended range and precision of direct and indirect fire weapon systems, using laser-
guided munitions and integrated target acquisition systems, make firepower more lethal 
than ever before.”524  
Here again “maneuver” was utilized mostly as a geographical term, associated with the en 
vogue expressions “effect” and “mass”; “firepower” on the other hand was understood more 
as “mass” of destructive power, whereby the enemy’s “will” represents the target. In the 
scope of interdiction the strategic attack, an element, which was not present in the last 
edition, as well came into the language use of the Army: 
“Strategic attacks are carried out against an enemy’s center of gravity, which may 
include national command elements, war production assets, and supporting 
infrastructure (for example, energy, transportation, and communications assets).”525 
In that case Operation Desert Storm seems to have had an influence, as the strategic attack 
was a cornerstone of the Air Force’s argumentation after all, but no mention of the Air Force 
can be found in the FM. The adoption of these terms seems to support the thesis that the Air 
Force dominated doctrine development at this time. When the Army had already published 
its new FM 100-5 in June 1993, Major Wayne K. Maynard wrote about the American Way of 
War in the Military Review in November 1993: 
“The promise of technology as a force multiplier in the substitution of firepower mass for 
manpower mass has finally been realized. […] The technology of ‘the new American way 
of war’ employs a systems approach that first improves the individual pieces, then ties 
them together in ways that further enhances the improvements.“526 
Here, too, one can spot the reach back to AirLand Battle which was no longer present as a 
concept name in the new FM 100-5. As well “finally“: the materialization of the technological 
advantage in the form of the network of weapons and sensors (Systems Approach). This 
argumentation seems similar to the one used by the Airpower proponents. In the December 
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edition of the Military Review in 1993 an article can be found by General Frederick M. Franks 
Jr., then Commanding General TRADOC: 
“Information age technologies are beginning to revolutionize the battlefield and even 
change the basic nature of warfare. We are approaching what some call ‘Third-Wave’ 
warfare or knowledge-based warfare. […] It goes beyond AirLand Battle to full-
dimensional operations, with the Army at the center of the joint team addressing the 
fundamentals and inherent requirements for a force-projection army.“527 
Knowledge or (intelligence) information should accordingly become one of the new buzz 
words of the information age. And AirLand Battle was substituted by Franks through the 
terminus Full-dimensional Operations. The Army at the same time was at the center of the 
joint team, obviously. Colonel James R. McDonough at the School of Advanced Military 
Studies argues similarly in the same edition: 
“It is no longer just AirLand Battle, a doctrine steeped in the Cold War assumptions of a 
forward defense […]; it is now a doctrine of full-dimensional operations for a force-
projection Army whose units will normally act in conjunction with air, naval and space 
assets and seldom be involved in operations outside the United States separate from the 
forces of allied nations. The view of the new doctrine is not only of conventional battle, 
but of operations across the spectrum of conflict.“528 
This enlargement of the battlefield by the information domain to Full-dimensional (including 
the so-called Low-Intensity Conflict) was then as well included in the concept Force XXI 
Operations in 1994, written at TRADOC.  
Force XXI Operations versus Low-Intensity Conflict 
The concept postulated the substitution of the industrial age for the information age in 
which, thanks to modern communication technology, a near real-time transmission of 
information became possible. TRADOC Commanding General William W. Hartzog stated in 
1996 in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee: “We know that our future force will 
operate in an expanded battlespace. We will have to attain success across the width, depth, 
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height, and electro-magnetic dimensions as well as the human dimension.”529 Courtesy of 
other now mature technologies such as Stealth, PGM and satellites a modern, clean war 
without any casualties should be fought using new aerial and space means with no collateral 
damage (see above).530 The concept Force XXI drew the following image of future conflict: 
“Future conflicts may involve simultaneous operations against foes of varying 
capabilities. […] Preindustrial nations and most nonnation [sic!] groups cannot, or will 
not, invest in the weapons and technology necessary to keep pace with the best 
militaries in their regions. […] when faced with a large, technologically advanced army, 
they are likely to attempt to redefine the terms of conflict and pursue their aims through 
terrorism, insurgency, or partisan warfare.”531 
What is interesting is the annotation that future enemies could possibly shift to 
unconventional means, as Andrew Krepinevich had some years before already outlined and 
General Powell stipulated in an article in 1993: “We must be ready to meet whatever threats 
to our interests may arise. We must concentrate on the capabilities of our Armed Forces to 
meet a host of threats and not on a single threat.”532 However the authors of Force XXI 
imagined the combating of these new forms of threats to be conventional, such as the Army 
had already tried in Vietnam.533 Force XXI therefore was a series of experiments using virtual 
simulation methods and software to simulate new unit designs, for example the Force XXI 
division. The real Force XXI was then planned to emerge between 2000 and 2010. It was to 
be largely based on technology and knowledge. A paper written at the Army-Air Force Center 
for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) therefore criticized Force XXI: 
“The force XXI army alluded to in the document [TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 Force XXI 
Operations] focuses on themes of high-tech, higher leader to led ratios, greater 
situational awareness, and greater lethality. This is exactly the type of force required to 
defeat the most lethal threat posited for the next century: a high technology, nation-
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state army. This type of force probably represents the least likely employment of US 
forces in the 21st century however.”534 
But high-tech as well as more situational awareness and a higher leader-to-led-ratio (more 
officers and non-commissioned officers in relation to soldiers) would nonetheless fit even 
into a LIC environment. A-AF CLICs mission was “to enhance the capabilities of the Army and 
the Air Force to address the exigencies of military operations other than war (MOOTW) with 
understanding, competence, and effectiveness.”535 A working paper in 1995 stated that “The 
army must prepare for military operations other than war. Forces for MOOTW cannot be 
tailored from a mechanized Force XXI unit on an as needed basis without dire 
consequences.”536 But In 1995, the Army terminated its participation in the CLIC arguing it 
was duplicating MOOTW related work the Army was doing in other organizations 
elsewhere.537 As foreign policy specialist David Fitzgerald writes: “Although the soon-to-be-
closed Center for Low Intensity Conflict organized a 1995 conference on counterinsurgency 
because they felt that the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine was badly outdated […] others 
saw Somalia as a reason not to relearn counterinsurgency.“538 The commitment to decisive 
victory and quick resolution of conflict did not only manifest itself in the United States 
Army’s view of war (and therefore in the Way of Warfare the Manuals propagated) but also 
in the underlying definition, what was not war: “strikes and raids (such as the 1983 
intervention in Grenada), peacekeeping, peace enforcement, antiterrorism, and support for 
insurgency and counterinsurgency“ were all not part of the discourse on war, but rather 
“operations other than war“.539 And even as the Army now seemingly understood the 
importance of LIC and MOOTW, there was no significant reorganization of United States 
Army units or material to reflect this. As demonstrated with Force XXI, the Army focused 
almost exclusively on conventional forces.540 The so-called Clinton Doctrine elevated 
MOOTW as a mission set for which the Army would have to prepare, but the Army’s focused 
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still on the two MRC (Major Regional Conflict)541 principles as stipulated in the first part of 
the recommendations made by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review conducted by Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin.542 Not only was the Army, the Air Force was more focused on the MRC. 
General Loh argued in 1994: “While we are comfortable with participating in peacekeeping 
and peace enforcing as we stand today, I will not be happy until we are satisfied that we can 
handle the two MRC scenario just as comfortably.”543 Loh described then accordingly the 
greatest threat to the United States at this time being “the possibility of a regional conflict 
escalating into a full-blown war or the new democracies and reform movements of the 
former Warsaw Pact countries collapsing into chaos.”544 It seemed logical then, that the Gulf 
War would be the “measuring stick” even though the United States did not have the kind of 
force structure available in the 1990s as it did in 1991.545 But there were other opinions 
nonetheless. Army historian John F. Guilmartin wrote in a 1994 Army War College study: 
“For the foreseeable future, the United States is more likely to be engaged in relatively 
small-scale regional conflicts where leadership, cultural symbols and political motivation 
are key factors than in major conflicts where we can target the industrial base. In the 
past, the United States has not always been spectacularly successful in evaluating such 
intangible, human factors. It badly needs to improve its intelligence and analytical 
capabilities.“546 
Possibly having the 1993 intervention in Somalia or other smaller scale military operations at 
the back of his mind, Guilmartin showed the exact opposite of the technology-centered way 
in which the Army was heading. And Joe W. Trimble had, in a study two years earlier, written 
similarly: “The probability of being involved in a global nuclear war or high intensity 
protracted conventional war is rapidly diminishing. The most likely scenario for future battles 
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are regional conflicts fought at the low to mid intensity levels.“547 But the official TRADOC 
nonetheless saw its new FM 100-5 1993 edition as fitting to the challenges the United States 
Army would face in the near future: 
“The new version of FM 100-5 is the most consultative version of doctrine ever written by 
the Army. […] The challenge for the Army and its new doctrine is one of providing the 
intellectual basis for an Army that will always operate as a part of a joint and 
interagency effort – and often a coalition effort.”548 
Indeed, the 1993 edition had been discussed and rearranged many times and been 
circulated extensively before being published. But that must not be seen in all cases as a sign 
of quality. In retrospect, critics argue otherwise. Fitzgerald for example states in his 
monograph on COIN that “this [1993] edition largely marked an evolution from the AirLand 
Battle concept, rather than a revolutionary approach to reflect the similarly revolutionary 
change in the international environment.“549 Kretchik argues that MOOTW operations were 
considered unique in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5. Because they were not war, “not all of 
the principles of war applied“, did the Manual suggest.550 The Manual clearly stated at the 
beginning of the OOTW chapter: “The Army’s primary focus is to fight and win the nation’s 
wars.”551 The chapter thereafter comprises different principles about OOTW but consistently 
argues that “In preparing to fight the nation’s wars, the Army develops the leadership, 
organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of operations other than war. 
Doctrine for war complements that for operations other than war.”552 Nonetheless, 
Operation Uphold Democracy, which was conducted in 1994 and 1995 in Haiti, “illustrated 
that while the 1993 FM 100-5 listed MOOTW principles that must be considered, the chapter 
lacked sufficient detail to be more than just a general overview.“553 The Manual had even 
devoted only one single paragraph to post-conflict considerations.“554 Therefore, Kretchik 
argues that the limited guidelines for conducting MOOTW in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 
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demonstrated that the Army understood conventional war better than MOOTW.555 Linn 
similarly writes how the few exceptions to the 1993 Manual’s intense focus on the 
conventional battlefield and the few sentences devoted to counterinsurgency and 
peacekeeping would provide little preparation for Somalia – much less Iraq and Afghanistan 
at the beginning of the 21st century.556 
New terms and termini in warfare? 
The concept Force XXI did show partially the impetus that new technologies would have on 
the conduct of war but not the grave consequences it would have if one predominantly 
focused on conventional operations. The RMA idea would forestall any possible adverse 
tactics by the United States’ enemies, but rather focus on an idealized Way of War: “Force 
XXI operations will be non-linear – devoid of rigid organization of unit or function – 
decentralized and simultaneous. Operations will be characterized by faster tempo, precision, 
and a common view of the battlefield enabled by the bow wave of information 
technologies.”557 The new terminus to name the battlefield was battlespace, consequential 
to the information age: 
“Looking at conventional and high-intensity warfare, recent military-technical 
developments point toward an increase in the depth, breadth, and height of the 
battlefield. This extension of the battlespace with fewer soldiers in it is an evolutionary 
trend in the conduct of war. […] formations will be more dispersed, contributing to the 
empty battlefield. Commanders will seek to avoid linear actions, close-in combat, stable 
fronts, and long operational pauses. Recent U.S. operations show that deep battle has 
advanced beyond the concept of attacking the enemy's follow-on forces in a sequenced 
approach to shape the close battle to one of simultaneous attack to stun, then rapidly 
defeat the enemy.”558 
The simultaneous in this case was the terminus for the “synchronization” in the AirLand 
Battle. The “stun” resembles the Air Force‘s paralysis. The idea of the “empty battlefield“, on 
which only few but powerful units would “maneuver”, stands out too; actually an ideal 
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conception. Termini such as Full Dimensional, Knowledge-based Warfare, battlespace or 
Force Projection coined the discussion about an Army for the 21st century (Force XXI being an 
appropriate name). General Vuono had as early as in 1991, shortly after the conclusion of 
Desert Storm, coined the projection of forces: “We’ve got to be able to project power swiftly 
and massively to trouble spots around the world to meet whatever the requirements are to 
execute whatever the objectives the National Command Authority wants us to.”559 The 
battlefield as well as the enemy could not be precisely circumscribed in the early 1990s. 
Therefore the whole spectrum, the Full Spectrum560 of scenarios had to be covered. But 
nevertheless, the discourse on warfare allowed critics. In the Parameters in summer 1995 
William S. Lind, director of the Institute for Cultural Conservatism, an organization which 
wanted to reinvigorate American culture, discussed the new doctrine critically: 
“We can eliminate hostile governments in some developing countries – seize their 
leaders, take control of their institutions, and turn the levers of power over to their 
opponents. We can destroy the regular armed forces in those countries, if our own forces 
can move fast enough to encircle them before they disperse. […] But we cannot carry on 
a prolonged counterinsurgency war.“561 
Lind suggested that the political pressure would become too great to bear as soldiers are 
killed. Obviously there were indeed analysts criticizing the concept of having a technological 
answer to all possible problems. And, “speed” again seems to be a hallmark of the Army’s 
forces. Other critical voices discussed buzzwords such as center of gravity. In the same 
Parameters edition Lieutenant Colonel David A. Fastabend from the staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) wrote: 
“If war will be characterized by simultaneous operations, redundant processes, 
extraordinary situational awareness, and a reduced efficacy of hierarchical 
organizations, then it may be less important to encourage planners to look for ‘the hub 
of all power and movement.’ The Army’s fascination with the center of gravity is out of 
balance.” 
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Here also was a critical voice against the idea of searching for Centers of Gravity and 
attacking them; this was indeed contrary to the trend and image of war adopted by the Air 
Force. If the battlefield grew increasingly bigger and unit leadership was to be decentralized, 
why try to find the center? Or was there even one to be found? Fastabend identified more 
flaws in the logic of the 1993 edition FM 100-5: “FM 100-5/1993 never considers that 
operational pauses and reductions in tempo give the enemy the opportunity to respond and 
reform his defenses. […] In the face of a motivated, determined, well-equipped enemy, 
slowness kills more surely than speed.”562 Fastabend denounced the image of the easily 
predictable enemy who would not show initiative (and reverts even to Desert Storm). And 
the FM stated that “Victory is the objective, no matter the mission. Nothing short of victory is 
acceptable.”563 And the Army stated that it would operate to “concentrate forces and 
execute with speed, audacity, and violence, continually seeking soft spots.”564 But the more 
critical articles by Lind and Fastabend seem to be a warning to the military elite. Obviously 
United States interventionism in the 1990s brought discontent regarding the FM 100-5 
edition of 1993 and its seemingly updated but nevertheless outdated doctrine. The 
imagination of an enemy waiting for its own destruction (similarly to the Iraqi Army in 1991 
which did not really act at all and did not appreciate the operational tempo of the 
coalition)565 was called in question. The discussion somehow swung between criticizing the 
outdated doctrine and the question of a new doctrine altogether. The paper Army Vision 
2010 from November 1996, which accompanied the Joint Vision 2010566 of the Department 
of Defense, postulated: 
“The significance of land power as the force of decision will continue to rise for several 
reasons. […] most future operations will occur on the lower and middle portions of the 
continuum of military operations ranging from disaster relief to global war, where land 
forces provide unique and essential capabilities, the most options, and the most useful 
tools. “567 
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In this case the authors seemed to be willing to profit from the hype about the Low-Intensity 
Conflict concept. Who else than the Army should be capable of operating in this new type of 
operating environment? However, the term “decision” matches a conventional image of war 
more closely. Decisive seemed to be another one of the new buzzwords derived from RMA-
thinking. In 1993, General Colin Powell had warned: “Decisive means and results are always 
to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-
called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a 
limited attack.”568 And then the authors of Army Vision 2010 wrote the Patterns of 
Operation of the Army: “Project the Force, Protect the Force, Shape the Battlespace, Decisive 
Operations, Sustain the Force, and Gain Information Dominance.”569 Whereas project really 
meant that only the being of a force should deter. And as the battlespace could be formed as 
well, operations could be decisive: 
“Decisive operations force the enemy to decide to give in to our will. They are inextricably 
linked to shaping the battlespace and precision engagement in that decisive operations 
are vastly enhanced by the precision fires, precise information, and precise detection 
capabilities inherent to precision engagement.”570 
To be mentioned especially are termini such as Dominant Maneuver, which give a hint to the 
military’s self-image and its concept of war as well as the belief in technology571, which 
should provide the United States Armed Forces with a dominance on the battlefield: 
“Strategic maneuver equates to the Army's requirement to project the force. It initiates 
the process of creating an image in the mind of an adversary of an unstoppable force of 
unequaled competence. […] Operational maneuver, the other element of dominant 
maneuver, equates to decisive operations.”572 
“Maneuver” in this case was strategic, as movement and projection of military power 
through large distances was incorporated. 
                                                            
568
 Powell, Colin L.: U.S. Forces: Challenges ahead, in: Foreign Affairs, Volume 71 No.5, Winter 1992/93, p. 32-
45, here p. 40. 
569
 Army Vision 2010, p. 10. 
570
 Army Vision 2010, p. 11ff. 
571
 Krepinevich located in his Vietnam War assessment a tendency by the Army to have a very specific concept 
of war. Things which do not fit into this concept are either made fitting or excluded from it, like the already 
mentioned unconventionally fighting enemies. Cf. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, p. 5. 
572




The Army After Next 
In 1996 the project Army After Next was initiated, about which in 1997 a report was 
submitted to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, introducing: 
“The union of knowledge and speed will do more than increase linear velocity; it will also 
quicken a commander’s ability to divine and exploit an enemy’s weaknesses [sic] and to 
offset the influence of chance and uncertainty.”573 
Knowledge or “information” should enable “speed” and therefore success in battle. And the 
authors wrote, regarding “maneuver”: 
“Knowledge dominance on the battlefield will allow a dramatic increase in the speed of 
maneuver […] Blue forces employed an air-ground tactical method of maneuver that 
combined lighter surface fighting vehicles with advanced airframes capable of 
transporting them at speeds as great as 200 kilometers per hour over distances in excess 
of 1500 kilometers.“574 
So the Army after Next should be able to move rapidly with light and air-maneuverable units 
on the battlefield, supported by precise fires. Lightness and air mobility here facilitated 
speed too. In the March-April edition of the Military Review in 1997 Major Charles A. 
Charnot, staff officer at the 1st Battalion, 25th Attack Helicopter Regiment, wrote about the 
Air Mech Strike Concept: 
“The Air Mech Strike concept charts new ground in airmechanization by departing from 
the force design assumption that the direct-fire fight is the ultimate way to defeat the 
enemy. […] Heavy mechanized units will be tracked at great distances and destroyed by 
indirect precision munitions attacks (PMAs), rendering large-scale direct-fire fights 
between massed armored formations obsolete.“575 
In this case the author seemed to reject the concept of “mass” as such, similar to the Air 
Force. At the same time, he brought up arguments favoring the attack helicopter, while 
arguing against heavy mechanized units. Similar arguments had already been brought up in 
the scope of the AirLand Battle Future concept. Then in the Military Review, September-
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October edition in 1997, Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, member of the Army after Next 
project team, wrote detailed about the battlefield: 
“Military operations can now occur simultaneously and continuously throughout the 
extended battlespace. Consequently, traditional, linear battlespace divisions such as 
close, deep and rear place artificial and unnecessary constraints on combat power 
application. “576 
Again obviously visible is the emphasis on the enlargement of the battlefield to a battlespace 
and “simultaneity” visible and the missing term “depth”. In the spring edition of Parameters 
in 1998 Colonel Robert B. Kilbrew, back then initiator and head of the project Army after 
Next, wrote about the Wargames conducted by the Army: 
“Two overriding factors support ’speed’ as the second dominant characteristic of the 
future force. First, a force that can deploy rapidly at strategic ranges, maneuver theater-
wide against an enemy center of gravity, and take down tactical objectives on the 
battlefield should be capable of forcing decisions quickly and at low cost to the United 
States. […] Second, assuming the inevitable spread of ‘smart’ weapons, speed will be 
necessary for survival under precision attack, at whatever ranges are then possible.”577 
Kilbrew utilized a collection of termini and terms. He interprets “maneuver” as being 
Theater-Wide or even strategic; “speed” as the dominant characteristic of the operation 
itself and the destruction of the enemy. Dominance in the area of “information” as well as 
regarding the “speed” should secure success for military operations. Termini such as 
Dominant Maneuver or battlespace named terms such as “maneuver” or battlefield. 
Interestingly, Kilbrew (and the Army as well) copied the Air Force’s idea of hitting enemy 
targets / objectives “tactically” over “strategic” distances. 
Concluding this chapter, it seems necessary to note that despite the Army incorporating the 
Low-Intensity Conflict, a conventional image of war was predominant which prospered 
further, somehow detached from reality. Kretchik writes how the Army leadership indeed 
struggled to find both relevancy and a credible threat at the end of the Cold War.578 
Although the Army planned for and conducted different MOOTW throughout the 1990s, this 
mission type and the corresponding mindset was treated only as a subset of and therefore 
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distraction from preparing for “real“ war.579 Fitzgerald argues that the services least likely to 
have a significant role in MOOTW environments – the United States Navy and Air Force – 
somehow assisted the Army in justifying and developing a force based on their preferred, 
but narrow, vision of the future of war. Disconcertingly, (or deliberately) they helped ensure 
that the Army would be less adaptable to the operational environments and adversaries it 
would continue to face throughout the 1990s and at the very beginning of the twenty-first 
century. The increasing usage of termini such as dominance and battlespace in the realm of 
the discourse on warfare or “modern war” supposed an operational environment where the 
Army would be the dominant force, an operational environment remarkably different from 
that in which the Army was increasingly being asked to operate.580 Obviously the Army 
leadership saw large parts of its existing and planned force structure being more and more 
challenged by the new concepts of operations being promoted mostly by the Air Force which 
sought to make the most of technology to find, fix, and engage targets in near-real time from 
standoff distances. That, in turn, spurred the Army to compete more in the indirect-fire area, 
traditionally an acknowledged preserve of fixed-wing aviation (shown above in the AirLand 
Battle discussions), by seeking to enhance its primary reliance on direct-fire weapons 
through the acquisition of accurate indirect fire systems like extended-range ATACMS and by 
stealthy, deep-attack helicopters that promised to cost as much as an F-16, the RAH-66 
Comanche.581 
2.5 Warden, the System-of-Systems-Analysis and the Global Attack 
This chapter will show how the Air Force, or some of its proponents, respectively, further 
developed their image of war during the second part of the 1990s and how the 1999 aerial 
campaign against Serbia, Allied Force, was discussed accordingly.  
Warden and the System-of-Systems-Analysis 
The aerial campaign against Iraq in 1991 had indeed shown facets of a new type of war. On 
one side, the Iraqi Army had been attrited; on the other side its Command and Control 
capabilities (C2) were hampered, as was shown in an above chapter. Despite that, the ideas 
of Airpower proponents such as General Glosson or Colonel Warden, who would have 
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preferred to have no ground war at all were not entirely implemented.582 Some argue that 
Warden “reverse engineered“ or retroactively rewrote the Gulf War to vindicate his earlier 
theories. Warden saw Operation Desert Storm as a blueprint for how the future enemy and 
war would look: 
“The most likely kinds of wars that we will fight will be the kinds that are intended to 
stop offensive behavior on the part of a country that is working its own agenda, that is 
trying to steal something from us or from some other country, or in some way or other is 
doing something that is entirely unacceptable to us, not because we are the world 
policeman, but because it interferes with very legitimate US interests. These wars that 
we conduct to stop offensive behavior on the part of other states will be characterized by 
sharp, decisive action on our part, designed to reach a conclusion as quickly as possible, 
and to do so with few or no US casualties […] Next, we will certainly be conducting some 
covert or some quasi combat operations against terrorist or drug traffickers. We will also 
be doing things that are not combat but in the coming world may have significance 
approaching that of combat operations.”583 
Few casualties and decisive action are both statements which were and are still graciously 
used by Airpower-proponents in their discourse. But interestingly, Warden saw the 
possibility of conflicts involving non-state actors, but seemingly conventional combat 
operations would be conducted in that case as well. It was Warden, then, who conceived the 
idea of the enemy as a system in an article in the Airpower Journal in spring 1995 and 
therewith carried his modern vision of aerial warfare to extremes. Hereby the System of 
Systems as a network of sensors and weapons and Warden’s enemy as a system have to be 
differentiated. System of Systems was a buzz word in the Transformation dialogue of the 
time. But Warden wanted to discern an enemy’s system. In the 1995 article Warden wrote 
about a Five Ring model which he foresaw adaptable for any type of enemy: 
“If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed 
of numerous subsystems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much 
better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing 
so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.” 584 
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Warden named leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population and fielded military 
forces to be the five parts of this system. Analogous to the human corpse, the “brain“ would 
be the center: “At the very center – the personal strategic center – is the brain.“ 585 The 
problem in that case would be the identification of the centers of gravity: 
“Every state and every military organization will have a unique set of centers of gravity 
or vulnerabilities. […] The most important requirement of strategic attack is 
understanding the enemy system. The system understood, the next problem becomes 
one of how to reduce it to the desired level or to paralyze it if required.”586 
Warden carried the image of a (de)human(ized) corpse to extremes; his statements fueled 
the discussions already going on in the military publications. Not a boxer sporting “balance”, 
but a corpse with “pressure points“ (points of main effort), a nervous system, “heart” and 
“brain“ laying on the dissecting table represented the enemy, after it was earlier paralyzed. 
And the search for points of main effort was equal to the search for weaknesses: 
“Technology has made possible the near simultaneous attack on every strategic – and 
operational – level vulnerability of the enemy. This parallel process of war, as opposed to 
the old serial form, makes very real what Clausewitz called the ideal form of war, the 
striking of blows everywhere at the same time.”587 
Ultimately, it was now finally possible to attack the enemy parallel on different levels. And 
Warden argued for Airpower as the perfect means to facilitate attacks on Centers of Gravity: 
“As you think through this concept of centers of gravity it strikes you how important it is 
to be able to attack these centers of gravity as directly as possible. Then it concomitantly 
strikes you that air power in one form or another will frequently give you the best, most 
effective way to get to these enemy centers of gravity. Therefore, we believe that air 
power is going to be far more important than it has ever been.”588 
General Fogleman, then Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, described a very similar 
imagination in the April edition of the Air Force Magazine in 1996: 
“While these may vary as a function of the enemy, these centers generally include things 
like the leadership elite, command and control, internal security mechanisms, war 
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production capability, and one, some, or all branches of the armed forces – in short, it’s 
the enemy ability to effectively wage war.”589 
The terms (“effectiveness“) and termini (center of gravity) used were, in the essence, the 
same as Warden’s. The editor-in-chief of the Air Force Magazine, John T. Correl, wrote about 
the Deep Strike (Deep Attack as from the concept of AirLand Battle) in 1996 and adopted 
termini from Warden such as parallel attack on Centers of Gravity: 
“The dominant requirement for deep attack in a major regional conflict is to strike the 
enemy’s centers of gravity and to do it rapidly, accurately, and with intensity. […] The 
objective is to attack these centers of gravity ‘in parallel’ – all of them at once – rather 
than serially.”590 
But the new language, which the Air Force was using, did not please everyone. In the 
summer edition of the Airpower Journal in 1996 Colonel Richard Szafranksi, Chair of National 
Military Strategy at the Air War College, discussed the problems the Air Force faced, when it 
had to demonstrate the worth of its means considering the budget cuts hitting all branches: 
“The Air Force can talk of the ‘enemy as a system’ or of striking plural strategic ‘centers of 
gravity’, but few people in the Air Force know precisely what those phrases mean.”591 
Szafranski hereby points to the problem of targeting which even Warden had not been able 
to clarify properly. 
Global attack 
The Air Force paper Global Engagement in 1996, which represented kind of an Air Force 
answer to the Joint Vision 2010 published by the Defense Department, did again mention 
the center of gravity in a passage about “modern war”: 
“The Air Force also recognizes the emerging reality that in the 21st Century it will be 
possible to find, fix or track and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth. 
Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force is based on a new 
understanding of what air and space power mean to the nation – the ability to hit an 
adversary’s strategic centers of gravity directly as well as prevail at the operational and 
tactical levels of warfare.”592 
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This document contains a lot of confident statements and visions regarding future war, even 
though not all can be cited here. It contains as well the terminus center of gravity. Air Force 
General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air force from 1994 to 1997, promoted 
Airpower in front of an Air Force Association audience in 1996: “Our vision is based on the 
premise that only air and space power provide the nation with the ability to find and hit 
strategic centers of gravity directly, […] it is the combination of speed, range, precision and 
lethality that makes airpower such a powerful force.”593 And especially important was the 
global aspect which the Air Force had already argued with concerning the B-2 stealth 
bomber: “A core competency we’ve added is one we elected to call Global Attack. […] The 
primary aspect of Global Attack is the ability of the Air Force to find and attack targets 
anywhere on the globe using the synergy generated by air and space assets to operate at the 
strategic level of war.”594 A summary for AFDD 2, Airpower Operations stated how 
“Employment options for air and space forces are possible within hours rather than in 
days or weeks. Air and space forces operate daily at global ranges, from aircraft 
transiting continents to spacecraft circling the globe. […] Air and space forces, from their 
elevated vantage points, furnish a perspective that provides commanders a full 
dimensional picture of the theater of operations.”595 
The Air Force did want to present the advantages of its capabilities by all means (against the 
backdrop of the mentioned budget cuts). Warden’s argumentation as well results in less risk 
to American soldier’s lives: 
“The Air Force becomes so important because it has a unique ability to get itself to the 
combat area with massive power and to affect enemy operational and strategic centers 
of gravity. […] Air power then becomes quintessentially an American form of war; it uses 
our smarts and our hightech to overwhelm the enemy without spelling too much blood, 
especially American blood.”596 
While fewer casualties among ground troops had been already a criterion for Airpower in 
Desert Storm, it would now be more and more important an argument. Directly heading into 
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a time of post-heroism, the loss of any soldier was increasingly unbearable.597 The authors of 
the draft for an Air Force Strategic Vision Document wrote: “New technology and new 
operational concepts for using air and space power already offer an alternative to the kind of 
warfare that pits large numbers of young Americans against an adversary in brute, force-on-
force conflicts. […] It is a strategy of asymmetric force that applies U.S. advantages to strike 
directly at an adversary’s ability to wage war.”598 And, resorting to the Full-Spectrum 
Dominance idea: “Modern technology and advances in the operational art give air and space 
power the ability to dominate all dimensions of an adversary’s operations across the 
spectrum of time and conflict.”599 Therefore “Full Spectrum Dominance depends on the 
inherent strengths of modern air and space power – speed, global range, stealth, flexibility, 
precision, lethality, global/theater situational awareness and strategic perspective.”600 Again, 
this statement presented the main terms and termini used in the discourse on Airpower: 
“speed”, range, precision, and now as well the strategic perspective and Stealth. Finally, 
although “all military services provide strike capabilities”, only the Air Force had the ability 
“to attack rapidly anywhere on the globe at any time”.601 Air Force General Fogleman argued 
similarly in favor of modern Airpower as a substitute for attrition warfare on the ground: “US 
military forces now leverage sophisticated military capabilities to achieve national objectives 
and avoid bloody force-on-force engagements that characterized America’s traditional 
strategy of attrition and annihilation. Airpower is particularly relevant to this new way of 
war.”602 More than a few of these arguments and terms and termini which came with them 
in 1997 got into the new Air Force Doctrine Document. In the second chapter in this AFDD 1 
about the The Airman’s Perspective, the authors emphasized the special capabilities of air 
forces: 
“Generally, surface forces must mass combat power before launching an attack, whereas 
airpower is singularly able to launch an attack from widely dispersed locations and mass 
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combat power at the objective. Moreover, from an airman’s perspective, mass is not 
based only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed. […] Mass is an effect that 
air and space forces achieve through efficiency of attack. Today’s air and space forces 
have altered the concept of massed forces. […] Today, a single precision weapon that is 
targeted using superior battlespace awareness can often cause the destructive effect 
that in the past took hundreds of bombs.”603 
While “precision“ had already become an important part of the Airpower discourse in the 
immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, in the second half of the 1990s it would be stressed 
even more, leading to ever more “efficiency”, which was also an important term for 
Airpower. A draft for AFDD 2, Theater Air Warfare, stated that “With the fielding of 
advanced precision weapons (those weapons/weapon systems that have the ability to 
destroy dozens of targets on a single pass), and the exploitation of the information aspect of 
the battlespace, airpower’s impact on joint warfighting and theater warfare will continue to 
increase.”604 The document directly drew on the air campaign against Iraq: 
“Operation Desert Storm validated the concept of a campaign where airpower, with 
precision and lethality, applied simultaneously against enemy centers of gravity, 
rendered opposing military forces ineffective. Airpower emerged as a dominant form of 
military might. It was decisive, and more importantly, it achieved strategic paralysis of 
the enemy with minimal casualties to friendly forces.”605 
Timothy D. Gann argued similarly in his 1997 Army War College study: “What finally 
emerged from the experience in the Gulf was the evidence that under certain conditions, an 
air-oriented (as opposed to air-only) strategy can achieve decisive results.“606 And Chief of 
Staff Fogleman wrote similarly in a Joint Forces Quarterly article in November 1996: “The 
now famous footage of targets destroyed during the Gulf War has set the standard by which 
Americans think precision weapons employment today.”607 The earlier claim, that one smart 
bomb could do the work of thousands of dumb bombs, was a constant in Air Force claims. 
The authors spoke about a – at least from an Army perspective – more traditional idea of 
ground war because the Army, too, pointed as early as in its concept Force XXI to the future 
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deployment of smaller units and not masses of tanks.608 The termini parallel and 
simultaneous as well were brought up: “Parallel operations can be conducted at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and either symmetrically against the 
adversary’s air and space forces or asymmetrically against the enemy’s surface forces – often 
simultaneously.”609 Whereas it was hereby not the first time, that the obvious simplicity of 
strategic attacks was mentioned, the central idea of the System-of-Systems Approach as well 
pushed strongly through: “Increasingly, air and space power is providing the ‘scalpel’ of joint 
service operations – the ability to forgo the brute force-on-force tactics of previous wars and 
apply discriminate force precisely where required.”610 Here as well the promotion for the Air 
Force’s capabilities; the terminus scalpel fits marvelously into the image of a paralyzed 
enemy. It could even be stopped before a ground intervention in the so-called Halt Phase611: 
“In this view of warfare, the halt phase may be planned as the conflict’s decisive phase, 
not as a precursor necessarily to a build-up of ground forces. The point of the ‘decisive 
halt’ is to force the enemy beyond their culminating point through the early and 
sustained overwhelming application of air and space power.”612 
With Clausewitz‘ culminating point a terminus appeared, which had come up before in scope 
of the Active Defense, but with a more geographical meaning. In another chapter of this 
AFDD were then, similar to its predecessors, the Air and Space Power Functions explained. 
Apart from the missions unique to the Air Force such as Air Superiority missions in support of 
the ground forces were present too: “Air interdiction’s ability to delay and disrupt may have 
a devastating impact on the enemy’s plans and ability to respond to the actions of friendly 
forces, even before friendly surface forces appear in the battlespace.”613 And another 
proposal for AFDD 2 then as well stated that “Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays or destroys 
the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly 
forces.”614 Even more interestingly, CAS was then as well described as “the least efficient [!] 
application of air power, but at times may be critical to the success or even the survival of 
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ground forces.”615 Obviously ground forces were, on the one hand, dependent on Airpower 
and, on the other hand, barely necessary anymore. Furthermore, their support was the least 
“efficient” mission [!]. It seemed as though the Air Force rather wanted to win wars on its 
own, so the strategic attack was mentioned as well in the 1997 AFDD 1: 
“Strategic attack is defined as those operations intended to directly achieve strategic 
effects by striking at the enemy’s COGs. These operations are designed to achieve their 
objectives without first having to necessarily engage the adversary’s fielded military 
forces in extended operations […] It is the effect of a relatively few well-placed systems, 
weapons, or actions on a few targets or target sets of extreme value that distinguishes 
strategic attack from other functions […].”616 
The above mentioned AFDD 2 proposal as well went into details about the strategic attack 
and described it in-depth: “Strategic attack, especially when conducted as parallel warfare, is 
intended to produce a shock effect that demoralizes the enemy’s leadership, military forces, 
and population, thus affecting a leader’s will and a nation’s capability to continue the 
conflict.”617 The “shock effect” was indeed one of the hallmarks of the concept which 
Warden had proposed; earlier seen as a “shock” to the “balance” of the enemy in AirLand 
Battle (see chapter 1.7). The main idea was to attrite an enemy’s “will” to fight: 
“The adversary’s supporting infrastructure may be so damaged that maintaining 
sufficient military strength to assure victory is impossible; the adversary’s will to resist 
may be so lowered that no national determination remains to prosecute a war; the 
adversary’s government may lose the necessary mean of communication and control to 
unite the people and direct the war effort; the capabilities of the adversary’s Armed 
Forces may be so reduced that effective resistance is no longer possible.”618 
But not only the enemy’s “will”, its “heart” as well got again into the discourse: “Airpower 
allows us to go to the heart of an enemy’s power structure without having first to deal with 
its military forces in detail.”619 The image of a surgical operation (hence the slogan surgical 
strike) was drawn by Airpower proponents (scalpel, paralyze), somehow even promising that 
thanks to the advanced weaponry, less or no collateral damage at all would occur: “Since the 
Gulf War, the capabilities of the USAF have been enhanced by an exponential rate of change 
                                                            
615
 Proposal of AFDD-2, 1997. 
616
 AFDD 1, 1997, p. 51f. 
617








in information and stealth technologies. […] Improved stealth technology and precision have 
provided the capability to accurately remove military targets while minimizing collateral 
damage.”620 And for sure attacks would be aimed at nodes, being synergistic in “effect” 
more efficient and overwhelming: “Today, precision engagement allows to simultaneous and 
rapid attack on key nodes, producing a synergistic effect which may overwhelm the enemy’s 
capacity to recover.”621 The key node possibly stood for the center of gravity itself. Indeed 
here was presented, what the strategic attack should cause – as long as executed rightly – 
but the Manual did not waste any word explaining how the right targets for the mentioned 
effects could be chosen at all. Only C2 were addressed. “Efficiency” was then emphasized as 
well in the 1997 AFDD 1: “If properly applied, strategic attack is the most efficient means of 
employing air and space power.”622 
Airpower’s “efficiency” 
Efficient in Airpower parlance meant without ground forces: “The defeat and annihilation of 
opposing surface forces is no longer a fixed, unalterable prerequisite to the achievement of 
national objectives in war. Air forces can swiftly cross the seas or areas of surface conflict to 
strike at the core of a hostile nation and reduce its capacity to continue the conflict.”623 In 
March 1997 John T. Correll, editor-in-chief of the Air Force Magazine, again advertised the 
role of the Air Force in the so-called Halt Phase, which obviously had a special position in the 
argumentation of the Airpower proponents: 
“Joint force planners undervalue airpower in the critical first stage of conflict. […] The 
two-MRC strategy is stiffly traditional. In the initial phase, US forces, chiefly airpower, 
seek to halt an invasion. […] The Air Force believes early arriving US forces can achieve 
more than is now expected of them in the halt phase of a conflict.”624  
By drawing a scenario analogous to the 1991 Gulf War and proposing to halt the enemy by 
mainly using Airpower, Correll and other Airpower proponents brought Warden’s and 
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other’s statements about the utility of ground forces forward.625 The August edition of the 
Air Force Magazine in 1997 cited General Charles D. Link about the Halt Phase who had, as 
Special Assistant to the United States Air Force Chief of Staff, worked at the Quadrennial 
Defense Review 1997 (QDR)626: “We can do that, pretty much, with modern airpower. Once 
you have him stopped, you can then keep him from regaining any military effectiveness with 
a smaller amount of force than it took you to stop him.”627 Link pointed to the increasing 
displeasure against risking the life of one’s own soldiers. The idea of the Halt was then as 
well discussed by James Kitfield, Defense Correspondent of the National Journal, in the 1998 
January edition of the Air Force Magazine: 
“The example of the Desert Storm campaign forms the crux of the argument that 
airpower should be given a more prominent, and to some extent independent, role in 
future warfighting scenarios. Instead of launching a synchronized ground/air 
counteroffensive as prescribed by the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the 1980s, […] a 
combination of advanced technologies, […] had vastly increased the effectiveness of US 
airpower against massed armored forces, even when the latter were in dug-in 
positions.”628  
The technological development efforts of the 1980s had indeed given Airpower more 
capabilities against ground forces and had therefore enabled at the same time the type of 
discourse that Airpower’s proponents coined in the later 1990s. Generally, the 1991 Gulf 
War with its very specific circumstances (long build-up phase, coalition partners with 
infrastructure in the theater, enemy without far-going ambitions) is rehashed again and 
again as the ideal image of war. In December 1998 Elaine M. Grossman, Senior 
Correspondent of Inside the Pentagon, wrote in the Air Force Magazine about the Halt 
Phase: “A decisive halt, airpower proponents believe, could provide a ‘culminating point’ at 
which the theater commander has a number of options to further disable the enemy regime, 
ranging from a ground offensive to continuation of the air campaign.”629 Again Clausewitz’ 
culminating point served as some type of buzzword, without being clear, how that point 
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could be determined at all. Army proponents on the other side, here Dr. Earl H. Tilford Jr. of 
the Strategic Studies Institute at the Unite States Army War College, questioned whether a 
future enemy could be stopped by only using air strikes: “Perhaps, if all our enemies confront 
us with large mechanized forces in open terrain, […] Halt will probably work. But just because 
the last enemy we fought was so obliging is no indication that the next one will be.”630 Tilford 
criticized the ideal image coming from the Air Force which was based on Desert Storm. Frank 
Finelli did argue similarly in the summer edition of the Airpower Journal in 1999: 
“If an adversary chooses to mass his military formations deep in the battle space and 
segregate them from his populace, then aerospace power may work wonders. However, 
an adversary is likely to disperse his force to make us employ our aircraft and precision 
munitions at uneconomic rates.”631 
And in 1999 Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II wrote in the autumn edition of the 
Airpower Journal:  
“If twenty-first-century information technology is actually capable of producing a 
revolution in military affairs, that revolution must include the ability to wage war 
without resorting to linear, sequential campaigns.
 
If it does, airpower and land power 
must fuse in order to execute simultaneous, highly precise tactical-, operational-, and 
strategic-level air-ground attacks throughout the new global theater.”632 
Echevarria, an Army officer, interestingly published in an Air Force journal and pointed out 
that air strikes alone could not be decisive. He described a more joint approach. Tilford had, 
in 1998, argued similarly: “Despite the previously successful rhetoric, the reality is that air 
power has yet to be the single decisive instrument in any war.“633 Nonetheless, Air Force 
proponents during the 1990s mostly came to the conclusion that thanks to Airpower a 
ground offensive had become unnecessary. This discussion has to be looked at against the 
backdrop of hot budget debates and quarreling during these years.634 In this period the 
United States intervened, as mentioned before, mainly using air strikes or peacekeepers 
(prominently in the Balkans, but for example in Haiti too). 
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Proponents of the Systems Approach assumed that to analyze the enemy and search for the 
important center of gravity was the most difficult part of the concept. The terminus scalpel 
brought the image of war then to the point; after the paralysis by the strategic attack the 
enemy had only to be dissected. Lewis compares Warden’s thinking – to bypass the enemy 
military potential with a direct attack on the political leadership – with the theoretical 
approaches to aerial warfare of the Second World War (Douhet, Mitchell), only deploying 
new technology. Lewis criticizes that strategic decapitation strikes could only be effective 
against states but not against nations with elected governments. Attacks on the political 
leadership were a sign to the population but were seldom decisive because nations can 
offset these casualties. Attacking enemy infrastructure would provoke solidarity in the case 
of nations too. In the case of states or dictatorships, support for the leaders would falter, but 
they would seldom lead to the fall of the dictator because dictatorship could use the attacks 
as part of its own propaganda. Historically, that could as well be seen in scope of the aerial 
bombardments against Nazi Germany in the Second World War.635 Lambeth argues that 
there had been underlying hope among the United States Central Command’s (CENTCOM) 
air planners that the early attacks against infrastructure targets in and around the “so-called 
Baghdad center of gravity“ would weaken Saddam Hussein’s control over his people. That 
hope had proved to be groundless; according to Lambeth, popular attitudes did not matter 
“given the depth and pervasiveness of Hussein's grip on the country“. The strategic part of 
the air campaign did little “effect” to the immediate course and outcome of Desert Storm.636 
On the other side, there are also arguments to rebut the Airpower-proponents idea of the 
Halt Phase. It was only a matter of time before the Iraqi Army ran out of critical supplies and 
fighting strength, mostly owing to the international trade embargo and Russia’s compliance 
in halting arms transfers to Baghdad. Lambeth argues further that the United States and its 
principal allies will not always be able to count on such cooperation in future crises.637 The 
coalition furthermore enjoyed a mint basing infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region that left 
almost nothing to be desired, “largely owing to the military assistance that the United States 
had provided Saudi Arabia over the preceding four decades.“638 But there had also been 
voices in the Air Force who did realize that the United States would not always profit from 
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favorable circumstances: “In the future, we can expect our enemies to enjoy a homefield 
advantage […] and we shouldn’t expect to be handed several months to move ourselves into 
position and prepare before we are forced to engage. […] We should expect our nation, the 
people we serve, to demand we win quickly, decisively, and with little loss of life.”639 
Operation Allied Force 
Nonetheless, Air Force officers would then argue that in the aerial war against Serbia in 1999 
Milosevic’s relenting had been reached without deploying ground force entirely.640 But 
Serbia was able to minimize casualties using concealment and deception; according to Tuck 
only an impending ground offensive forced the Serbian government to relent. This happened 
because the deployment of NATO ground forces would have forced Serbian forces to come 
out of their concealed positions where they would have easily been attacked and destroyed 
by NATO Air Forces in the open.641 Lambeth argues, that as there was no credible NATO 
ground threat (what the NATO allies had ruled out from the start because of an assumed 
lack of popular willingness to accept casualties), most of Serbia’s ground forces were able to 
survive the air attacks simply by dispersing and concealing their tanks and other vehicles.642 
Bradley J. Smith analyzed in a 2002 study: “With no ground force to tie down or identify 
enemy forces, the Serbians were able to easily move small units from house to house to 
continue their campaign against the largely defenseless Kosovar civilians. These small units 
were hard to identify and target from the air.”643 Brian P. Stephenson argued similarly in his 
War College Study: “In fact, the air-only campaign failed to stop accelerated brutality in 
Kosovo. […] Moreover, Serbia’s military was left essentially intact.”644 And Troy R. Stone even 
concluded in a 2001 thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower 
Studies: “In the end NATO was never able to credibly threaten the FRY’s [Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia] military forces.”645 Even Adam J. Hebert, Executive Editor of the Air Force 
Magazine, a strong Airpower proponent, would argue in a 2009 retrospective: “The absence 
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of a credible ground threat meant Milosevic’s forces did not have to mass in defensive 
positions, where they would be easy targets for airpower. They were instead free to disperse 
as single trucks or tanks, hide under trees, and spread out through neighborhoods.”646 In the 
end, Milosevic probably decided to accept NATO’s demands simply out of a rational 
calculation that he would nothing gain by holding out any longer. According to Lambeth, a 
ground invasion could have meant Serbia’s loss of Kosovo for good, posing the direst threat 
to Milosevic’s political, and possibly even personal, survival.647 
On a more technical side, Serbia’s ground forces had developed simple tactics and 
techniques to prevent their destruction. JSTARS and other airborne infrared sensors to 
locate enemy tanks and other military vehicles, which had worked well in Desert Storm, 
were largely inapplicable in the very different setting of Kosovo, where the climatic and 
geographical circumstances differed remarkably from the desert terrain in Iraq. In the 
aftermath of Allied Force, surveys of bomb-damage effects confirmed that NATO attacks 
against Serbian ground forces accomplished considerably less than initially thought.648 NATO 
as well had to dedicate a larger-than-usual number of airstrikes to the SEAD mission as a 
credible SAM threat persisted throughout the air campaign. That, in turn, meant fewer 
sorties to allocate against Serbian military and infrastructure targets.649 Former TAC 
commander Wilbur Creech in 2000 argued that “In contrast to the far more satisfying SEAD 
experience in Desert Storm, the effort to neutralize Serb air defenses did not go nearly as well 
as expected.”650 The same applied to efforts to attack mobile enemy troops operating in 
Kosovo where NATO was all but completely ineffective.651 Creech as well wrote in his 2000 
paper that 
“Most of the attack planning that was done throughout the campaign was not driven by 
desired effects, but rather entailed simply parceling out sortie and munitions allocations 
by target category as individual targets were approved, without much consideration 
given to how a target’s neutralization might contribute toward advancing the 
campaign’s objectives.”652 
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Mahnken points to various examples, which should show, that the thesis about the 
combination of PGM and modern sensors did not prove itself. In his opinion as well the No-
Fly Zones (NFZ) over Southern and Northern Iraq did not have any impact on Saddam 
Hussein, and NATO operations in Bosnia in 1993 could not stop the massacre of Srebrenica 
because more ground troops with corresponding means would have been necessary.653 
Operation Allied Force in 1999 should only last for a few days but instead lasted 78 days in 
the end, and some claim that it proved that ethnic cleansing increased during the air 
strikes.654 Therefore in hindsight, it seems as the Air Force’s doctrinal ideas were not suited 
to real world applications and were not at all as flexible as stated in official documents and 
envisioned by their proponents. 
Lewis argues that while technology, operational doctrine, and new adaptive organizations in 
the realm of the RMA were to come together in ways that created synergies, there was a 
problem with this thinking: “It left out the human beings.” It is a fact, that people are more 
than the sum of their biological parts. The RMA idea diminished or somehow hid the fact 
“that wars are not won until people accept defeat.” If humans do not accept the outcome of 
a war, it is not over. So to speak in the language of the RMA proponents, “The brain, the 
central nervous system, and the muscles can be destroyed, but if the people don't accept 
defeat, the struggle continues.“655 Lambeth wrote in 2000 that although Airpower can be 
surgically precise when “precision“ is called for, it still is a blunt instrument designed to 
destroy things and kill people.656 Even as the Airpower discourse did repeatedly stress 
“speed”, range, “precision“ and work with the image of a paralyzed enemy corpse, it did not 
adequately reflect real world circumstances, neglect the “will” which had to be shocked and 
was therefore rightfully criticized as well. 
2.6 Transformation and Effects-Based Operations 
President George W. Bush held out the prospect of a deep change in the United States 
Armed Forces even before his inauguration in January 2001.657 The 21st century, according to 
then Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, held ready a whole range of unknown, 
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uncertain, and unexpected threats to the United States. The United States were far superior 
to their rivals and enemies in the area of conventional arms, which is why they would resort 
to unconventional or asymmetric means: battling the United States by stressing their own 
weaknesses using other means than heavy weapons and technology. While the United 
States Air Force had propagated Asymmetry advantages in the 1990s, now the enemy would 
try to cope with the United States Armed Forces in an asymmetric way as well. The 
distinguishing of conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular and now 
symmetric/asymmetric points to the military way of categorizing types of enemies, types of 
means and types of warfare throughout the discourses. 
Transformation 
The Transformation concept foresaw that own vulnerabilities should be searched for, found 
and eliminated (in a mostly technological sense).658 As early as in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review in 2001 six goals for the modification of the Armed Forces were listed, among others 
measures to be taken against enemy weapons which could deny the United States access to 
an operational theater659, the introduction of further space-based systems, and the creation 
of an integrated C4ISR architecture (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) by exploiting advances in “information” 
technology.660 Distinct course decisions, such as the abandonment of certain procurement 
programs to facilitate others or implement them faster, did not appear before 2001, but the 
spiritual framework for a deep reorganization and modification of the Armed Forces was 
outlined.661 
Similar to the Air Force’s documents in the late 1990s, the Army did a lot of conceptual work. 
Projects like Army After Next or Force XXI were translated into brochures in 1997 and 1999. 
The 1997 leaflet Full Spectrum Force – Globally Engaged – Changing to Meet the Nation's 
Needs called the United States Army “the Nation’s Full Spectrum Force” and argued that 
“Land forces provide the Nation the full range of options for shaping the world 
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environment.”662 Budgetary concerns were included as well; the Army was “responding to 
the fiscal realities the Nation faces”663 and it was as well “a cost effective force”664, without 
providing any more details about that, but using the term “efficiency”, as the Air Force 
already had done earlier. In the author’s eyes “the deployment of land forces […] was the 
most compelling response that can be made, short of war, to demonstrate the national will 
to prevent conflict.”665 And then in 1999, the paper America’s Army, Ready Today… Ready 
Tomorrow described the Army as “agile, adaptive and able to meet the challenges of an 
uncertain future.”666 With its subtitle Knowledge – Speed –Power the paper directly 
pinpointed towards the Force XXI idea, serving the discourse on the advantages brought by 
the technological developments. Army leaders wanted to develop “the 21st Century’s most 
effective fighting force.”667 Interestingly, the Army originally wanted to publish a new version 
of its FM 100-5 in 1997 and according to Kretchik, the 1997 draft was a significant effort to 
blend war and MOOTW into one theoretical approach.668 But then the Transformation idea 
set out another set of signposts. The edition of FM 100-5 – which was finally published in 
2001, renumbered FM 3-0, and hugely influenced by the Transformation idea – was then 
going into a rather different direction accordingly. The current chapter will first examine this 
last FM Operations published before the prolonged COIN campaigns in Afghanistan since 
2001 and in Iraq beginning in 2003. 
The FM 3-0 from 2001 
In the 2001 edition of the FM 3-0 Operations authors describe the Role of Land Power: 
“Today, potential adversaries rely on land-based military and paramilitary forces to retain 
power, coerce and control their populations, and extend influence beyond their borders.”669 
The enemy could as well have (para-)statelike structures and would be beatable on the 
battlefield. Already at the beginning the concept Joint Force was mentioned; jointness at this 
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time was one of the newly important termini, even though the AirLand Battle as well had 
incorporated the cooperation between Air Force and Army. Quick deployment of forces had 
first priority: “Army forces deploy quickly into an area of operations (AO) to deter adversaries 
and potential enemies from establishing their forces and preclude them from gaining an 
operational advantage.”670 The spectrum of missions did change, too: 
“The airborne and air assault capabilities of Army forces allow JFCs [Joint Forces 
Command] to seize airfields or other important facilities, such as WMD [Weapon of Mass 
Destruction] production and storage sites. […] Only land forces can exercise direct, 
continuing, discriminate, and comprehensive control over land, people, and 
resources.“671 
While the Air Force at the same time had emphasized how it only and alone could reach 
globally and attack targets with pinpoint accuracy, the Army on the other side did in its own 
discourse describe itself as being able to act discriminately and directly as well. Only soldiers 
could, in the eyes of the Army brass, control land and people – that was a very new 
argumentation – which was being directly aimed at the Air Force’s propositions. Obviously 
experiments in the scope of the concept Army after Next did influence the new Manual, with 
aerial deployment leading the way.672 Respect of enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) seemed as well to be ever-present, corresponding to the threat scenarios described 
by George W. Bush. But while WMD had been part of another style of warfare in the 1980s, 
they now were counted as one of the means groups or Streetfighter States had at their 
disposal to fight unconventional, asymmetric and irregular. In the modern land warfare 
terms such as “simultaneity”, “depth”, “maneuver” and “will” reappeared, known from the 
AirLand Battle: 
“Land combat […] usually involves destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking land 
objectives that reduce the enemy’s effectiveness or will to fight. […] Land combat 
involves contact with an enemy throughout the depth of an operational area. Forces 
conduct simultaneous and sequential operations in contiguous and noncontiguous AOs 
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[Areas of Operation]. Commanders maneuver forces to seize and retain key and decisive 
terrain.“673 
“Depth” hereby again was understood as a geographical element of the battlefield, 
“maneuver” as well. Operations could now be simultaneous and sequential, referring to the 
“simultaneity” of OOTW or LIC and conventional war. Therefore, operations throughout the 
whole spectrum were mentioned: “Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, 
stability, and support operations.”674 The concept of stability operations obviously emerged 
from OOTW or LIC as a terminus to name unconventional or below-war-level conflicts 
referring most certainly as well to the operations conducted in the Balkans in the 1990s. In a 
chapter about the Strategic Responsiveness of the Army, the Manual also postulated: “Taken 
as a whole, effective and efficient force projection exhibits four characteristics: precision, 
synchronization, speed, and relevant information. Commanders incorporate these 
characteristics into the conduct of force projection operations.”675 Not only the Air Force, but 
the Army also drew on the term “efficiency”; and the authors as well used the terminus 
projection of military power. Terms such as “synchronization”, “information” and “speed” 
appeared repeatedly as well and showed the concept of war in the information age, but two 
of these terms, “synchronization” as well as “speed”, had already been present in the 1980s. 
The basics of warfare as portrayed in the 2001 FM 3-0 included the Elements for Combat 
Power, wherewith this edition did not differ significantly from its predecessors. To be 
mentioned are at this point “firepower” and “maneuver”: 
“Maneuver is the employment of forces, through movement combined with fire or fire 
potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish 
the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power 
to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. […] Firepower provides the 
destructive force essential to overcoming the enemy’s ability and will to fight. Firepower 
and maneuver complement each other. Firepower magnifies the effects of maneuver by 
destroying enemy forces and restricting his ability to counter friendly actions; maneuver 
creates the conditions for the effective use of firepower.”676 
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The description of the term “maneuver”, which could be found more or less identical in the 
earlier Manuals, shows one thing for sure: despite modern termini such as Full Spectrum 
Operations or Dominant Maneuver the Army did not seem to have departed from AirLand 
Battle’s basics, since they could be found with a similar weight after all. “Maneuver” was still 
mainly used to facilitate the destruction of the enemy by “firepower”. 
Shock and Awe and “effects” in Army parlance 
The “Shock” was one of the terms used by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in a 1996 
National Defense University study, and it could as well be found earlier with AirLand Battle. 
The two authors developed the idea of Rapid Dominance, referring to the enemy’s “will”: 
“To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a variety of approaches and 
techniques to achieve the necessary level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and 
military leverage points.“677 Shock and Awe had to be achieved by leveraging new 
technologies to shorten the sensor-to-shooter-cycle: “At whatever the unit level, Shock and 
Awe are provided by the speed and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this 
simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing 
forces, their leadership, and populace. This simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets 
of imposing Shock and Awe.“678 Ullman and Wade in this last statement used a variety of the 
most important terms: the “effectiveness” and “speed” thanks to technology. The rapidity of 
the decision cycle was not entirely new; Boyd had already coined it earlier.679 Rapid 
dominance depended, therefore, mostly from an information superiority: “The weakness of 
this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on intelligence. One must be certain that 
the will and perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated.“680 The authors rightly 
reckoned that dependency as well, seemingly, and they even knew that not all conflict 
scenarios would fit to their ideas: “Operations Other Than War present a different set of 
challenges. These challenges are likely to require discrete dominance of specific 
circumstances rather than total dominance.“681 But nonetheless, Shock and Awe foresaw the 
image of a battlefield with pressure points to attack with “firepower”: 
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“The battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that controls or 
influences the elements of the battle. In examining this battlefield and the application of 
force and Shock and Awe, we seek to mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous 
firepower on critical nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than 
necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one another.“682 
But the ideas of Ullman and Wade did not get into the discussion without being criticized. In 
2001 Antulio J. Echevarria II wrote about the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept which 
was interconnected to Shock and awe: 
“RDO’s first and most egregious assumption is that the National Command Authorities 
(NCA) will desire military forces that are rapid and decisive in all scenarios. Political 
leaders might well prefer a gradual approach in most cases. The second faulty 
assumption is that U.S. forces will possess perfect or near-perfect knowledge of the 
enemy. Information technologies have not yet lived up to expectations in this regard. The 
third flawed assumption underpinning RDO is that an adversary is a system of systems 
that can be paralyzed by a few well-placed strikes against his critical nodes.”683 
Echevarria, therefore, did directly question Warden’s (and the Air Force’s) idea of how an 
enemy system could be analyzed as well. Nonetheless, the termini used by the authors 
Ullman and Wade did quickly find their way into official Army language. Shock and Awe 
would then be the extension, utilized to name the strategy against Iraq in 2003. 
Even though the lethality of the modern battlefield was not celebrated as it was in the 
1980s, the battlespace seemed to be a newer version of the earlier enlarged (“depth”) 
battlefield. Noticeable is the term “effect”, which interestingly seemed to have become a 
buzzword in the Army too, if one looks at the repeated naming in the analyzed FM from 
1993 and 2001. The Army’s fascination with “effect” was reflective of AirLand Battle’s 
fascination with “synchronization”. The ideal in both cases was that limited actions could 
have decisive consequences. The illusion was that these consequences could be predicted 
and planned for. And the focus on “effects” in the scope of Dominant Maneuver speaks 
against the raison d’être of heavy armored and mechanized units because these could be 
less prepared to attack targets precisely or to fight insurgencies, as Tuck argues.684 Tuck, in 
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his 2008 monograph, further describes the danger that a more networked Army could 
indeed cause “effects” but would itself be susceptible to “effects” by the enemy, as 
Krepinevich had well reckoned and as had been discussed in military publications before.685 
But that thought seemingly had no place in the discourse on warfare and the role of 
technoogy in the latter. 
At least parts of the military realized that after the victory in the Operation Desert Storm, 
which was interpreted as overwhelming, not all of the possible future opponents would like 
to fight the United States with conventional means. But this thought does not seem to have 
influenced doctrine development, which correlates with the special authoritative image of 
“modern war” which the institution Army cultivates. This image still comprises the land war 
against a militarily or at least para-militarily organized enemy sporting clear structures as the 
most prominent type of war. But in Somalia, where the United States were involved from 
1993 until 1994, neither Battlefield Dominance nor Precision Engagement or even Precision 
Maneuver did work against an enemy, who evaded Overwhelming Force in the open country 
or in cities. This type of enemy seemed to pose an enduring problem for the Army, at least 
doctrinally.686 But to the contrary, Desert Storm still served as the origin for the Army’s 
Transformation. Steven Metz wrote in a 2000 Army War College study: 
“Again, the expectation is that future warfare will be a reprise of Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm – unambiguous, cross-border aggression by one state against another. The 
services, however, offer few explanations of why American political leaders would use 
military force early in a crisis when they traditionally consider it a last resort. Similarly, 
there is little indication of how the various future strike and expeditionary forces might 
be used against nontraditional enemies or ambiguous aggression. ’Strategic preclusion’ 
may be an example of the tendency to prepare to fight the previous enemy rather than 
future ones.“687 
But the scenario was further refined, as described by then Chief of Staff of the Army General 
Eric K. Shinseki: 
“Had Saddam followed our doctrinal rules of thumb – having initiated combat on his 
terms, had he retained the initiative, stayed on the offensive, denied us the ports of entry 
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and kept us from transitioning out of Europe and CONUS [CONtinental United States], it 
would have been a different war. […] Our early arriving forces lacked the staying power 
to fight against large mechanized formations, and our heavy forces were challenged to 
get to theater quickly.”688 
So further developed from AirLand Battle Future, the focus lay again on the conventional 
type of war. 
The Objective Force 
To be able to overcome the difficulties posed by an enemy who would not wait, until the 
United States Armed Forces stood locked and loaded on their doorsteps, Army leaders 
imagined a future Objective Force, who could handle the threat: “The Transformation will 
produce a future force, the Objective Force, founded on innovative doctrine, training, leader 
development, materiel, organizations, and soldiers.”689 The Objective Force was the force of 
the future, which the Army should at some point in time be able to field. It was therefore the 
focus of The Army’s long-term development efforts (objective). It would “maximize advances 
in technology and organizational adaptations to revolutionize land-power capabilities.”690 
The concept of Landpower here appeared for the first time as a counterpart to Airpower. 
According to General Shinseki, the Objective Force was “The Army’s ultimate goal for 
Transformation.” The Objective Force should then be 
“Operating as part of a joint, combined, and/or interagency team, it will be capable of 
conducting rapid and decisive offensive, defensive, stability and support operations, and 
be able to transition among any of these missions without a loss of momentum. […] The 
Objective Force will provide for conventional overmatch and a greater degree of 
strategic responsiveness, mission versatility, and operational and tactical agility.”691 
So the Army went from Overwhelming to Overmatch. Shinseki as well described warfare in a 
distributed manner on a diverse battlefield: “While operations were planned as sequential 
events on a linear battlefield, we now look to master continuous and simultaneous 
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operations on noncontiguous and distributed battlespace in the future.”692 And that 
battlefield required a dominant Army because “Ground forces are central to achieving […] 
dominance. Ground forces are often the only precise instrument that can attack conflicted 
targets – targets, for instance, that the enemy shields in sanctuaries or extremely hardened 
targets.”693 And Shinseki could not hold himself back from criticizing the Air Force’s 
“precision“ mantra: “Precision munitions for imprecise and mobile targets have not worked 
very well.”694 
At the same time, the Army tried, obviously, to match the Air Force’s Global Engagement 
idea. Having not been able to quickly deploy its forces in the realm of Operation Allied Force 
in 1999, future Army units should be rapidly deployable but at the same time able to beat 
any enemy: 
“Objective Force units will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances, 
creating diverse manifold dilemmas for our adversaries by arriving at multiple points of 
entry, improved and unimproved. As necessary, Objective Force units conduct forcible 
entry, overwhelm aggressor anti-access capabilities, and rapidly impose our will on our 
opponents. In this manner, Objective Force units arrive immediately capable of 
conducting simultaneous, distributed and continuous combined arms, air-ground 
operations, day and night in open, close, complex, and all other terrain conditions 
throughout the battlespace.”695 
Rapid deployment (“speed”) was demanded as well by retired Army Brigadier General David 
L. Grange, executive vice president and chief operating officer of the McCormick Tribune 
Foundation; Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Liebert, United States Army Reserve, staff leader 
and instructor, 11th Battalion, 6th Brigade, 104th Division; and Major Chuck Jarnot, 
operations officer, Active and Reserve Component Training Support Battalion, Fort Riley, 
Kansas: “Today’s requirements demand the ability to project forces rapidly worldwide with 
an overmatch capability throughout the spectrum of conflict.”696 Here another counterpart 
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to an Airpower argument or term appeared: worldwide. And at the same time, with the 
publication of FM 3-0 in 2001, the terminus project had found its way definitively into Army 
language, describing the deployment of forces all over the globe. The authors saw 
deployability as making the Army relevant for the 21st century: “US Army relevance in the 
21st century depends on the ability to deploy sizable forces rapidly from the Continental 
United States.”697 To merge deployability and combat capability, the Army shared the Air 
Force’s Systems Approach as well, but in a different vision: 
“Platform designs in an arrangement of system-of-systems technologies will enable 
decisive maneuver, horizontal and vertical, day and night, in all terrain and weather 
conditions. These breakthroughs will give Objective Force units the lethality and 
survivability needed to deliver full spectrum dominance, the versatility to change 
patterns of operation faster than the enemy can respond, and the agility to adjust to 
enemy changes of operation faster than he can exploit them.”698 
The so-called Objective Force was fittingly the objective for the modernization of the Army’s 
ground forces, the Transformation, as it would later be named. Now weapons systems were 
named as platforms, signifying the idea of a networked force to come. A 2002 White Paper 
read: 
“At the strategic level the Objective Force deploys from either forward sanctuaries or the 
continental U.S. The force has both expeditionary and campaign qualities; is configured 
for rapid deployment and ready at a moment’s notice for sustained operations. At the 
operational level the Objective Force arrives at multiple austere points of entry via air 
and sealift. Tactically, the Objective Force deploys and re-deploys in tactical aircraft 
capable of short field and unimproved runways.”699 
This fast-to-be-deployed force would help bring the Army up-to-date technology-wise: “Our 
future Army, the Objective Force, will be the most capable Army in history. There is unlimited 
potential for increased capabilities beyond our wildest dreams.”700 Multiple authors were 
positive as well towards a technologically advanced force: “The Objective Force will bring 
formidable firepower at a rate and speed that will overpower any adversary. The key to 
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success is to overwhelm the enemy’s ability to respond.”701 Despite modernization and 
speech about platforms instead of weapons systems, obviously still “firepower” counted 
most. Military operations should be quick and not cost many lives, “speed” therefore was 
most important: “Rapid, violent, integrated, simultaneous military operations conducted 
speedily in locations that will overwhelm the enemy’s decision cycle and response time will 
defeat the enemy with a minimal loss of American lives.”702 And the Army here as well 
expertly took the post-heroism stance as the Air Force had done before. Lives of American 
soldiers had to be spared by technological overmatch. The violence cited still imposed the 
image of extremely powerful weapons clashing and unleashing their “firepower,” but other 
voices had already warned that the enemy could be seen and located. However, his 
intentions could not. General Montgomery C. Meigs, Commander of United States Army 
Europe and 7th Army, wrote in 2001: 
“In spite of the precision and speed of information, fog and friction will continue to 
bedevil military operations. Fatigue, confusion, fear, and the effects of stress wear down 
the ability of units to execute competently. Despite the growing visibility of the enemy as 
he moves equipment on the battlefield under the watchful attention of our sensors, our 
sense of his will and intent will remain vague. Ubiquitous technologies for encryption, 
passive measures like camouflage, and low-tech countermeasures will see to that.”703 
Montgomery here was referring to Clausewitz’ concept of fog and friction and he was trying 
to show that Krepinevich’ Streetfighter State was still possible despite all the technological 
means available. Nonetheless, the Army went straight on its path to the Objective Force. The 
weapon system which should be that deployable and networked to be faster than its 
enemies was then dubbed the Future Combat System (FCS). It should be formed from 
different, lightweight, tracked, networked vehicles, driving and flying through the battlefield. 
These systems would then have an advantage over the enemy’s weapons thanks to their 
networked fashion and the resulting information superiority: “Achieving information 
superiority increases the speed of command preempting adversary options, creates new 
options, and improves the effectiveness of selected options. This promises to bring operations 
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to a successful conclusion more rapidly at a lower cost.“704 Here again, one can note the cost 
argument. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka und Frederick P. Stein argued in their February 
2000 study: 
“NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or 
networking of the warfighting enterprise. It is characterized by the ability of 
geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared 
battlespace awareness that can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-
centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent.“705 
Now there would be not only “synchronization”, but indeed even self-synchronization, a 
dream about a common picture which is enabled to self-synchronize thanks to modern 
computer systems. Not only the FCS but it especially should be more adaptable to the 
battlespace than legacy (in-service versus transformational) systems: “The net result will be 
a dynamically re-configurable force that can take on the characteristics best suited for fast-
paced battlespace domains where opportunities are fleeting and delay can be fatal.“706 Re-
configurable could hereby as well be some sort of modularity – having different types of 
systems which can in different compositions do different tasks. And so “effectiveness“ was 
one of the main arguments in favor of the networked force: 
“NCW offers a promising opportunity to both improve the effectiveness of military 
operations and to reduce their costs (measured in terms such as number of casualties, 
collateral damage, and strategic fallout). It promises to raise the art of war to new 
heights and enables us to compress military campaigns into time frames to be more 
consistent with our 21st century world.“707 
New arts or ways of war had to be expected, again thanks to technology. The NCW force 
should dominate its enemies: 
“At its most fundamental level, war is a brutal contest of wills. Winning decisively means 
dominating our enemies. Potential opponents must be convinced that we are able to 
break them physically and psychologically and that we are willing to bear the cost of 
doing so. For some opponents, mere punishment from afar is not enough. With these 
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adversaries, the only way to guarantee victory is to put our boots on the ground, impose 
ourselves on his territory, and destroy him in his sanctuaries.”708 
Referring again to Clausewitz (“war as a contest of wills”), the authors imagined the 
Objective Force to close with the enemy and beat him, again referring to the “boots on the 
ground”. The Air Force could not close with the enemy from afar; only ground forces could 
break them not only physically but also mentally. And the NCW units should be dispersed, 
but “mass” their “firepower”, as Commander Paul Murdock, a retired United States Navy 
officer and consultant in Saudi Arabia, teaching a six-month course modeled on the United 
States Naval War College curriculum, wrote in Parameters: 
“First, network-centric warfare could permit a geographically dispersed force to operate 
as a system – in effect, as a dispersed mass. That is, such a force, though its elements 
might be spread over a large area, should be able to concentrate precision weapons 
rapidly upon targets hundreds of miles away. Further, its units may be able to mass fires 
not only with decisive effect but without needing to maneuver – without, that is, having 
to get closer to targets, avoid geographical constraints, or achieve some positional 
advantage.”709 
Murdock now even imagined “firepower” without “maneuver”. Dispersed elements did not 
anymore have to “mass”; they could affect their enemy in a dispersed fashion, concentrating 
their “firepower” (“effectiveness“). John D. Norwood argued similarly in favor of a more 
networked force in a 2001 Army War College study: “It is possible to envision combat in the 
future where real-time intelligence, combined with robotic systems using largely non-lethal 
means could quickly and decisively render an industrial age force combat ineffective.”710 
Norwood here brought unmanned systems – a new element – into the game. Norwood also 
argued against traditional, heavy vehicles: “The tank may be an industrial-age weapon 
system that has seen its day. All other battlefield operating systems from aviation to artillery 
must be similarly scrutinized to determine how they will fit into combat operations in the 
future.”711 But at the same time Norwood also cautioned that not all the technologies 
envisioned in the realm of the Objective Force or FCS were already available and working 
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properly: “Many of the nascent concepts being considered for the Objective Force place 
heavy reliance on remote sensing and robotic platforms; however, neither of these 
technologies is currently on revolutionary timelines.”712 Dr. David Jablonsky, retired Army 
Colonel and professor of national security affairs in the Department of National Security and 
Strategy at the United States Army War College, wrote similarly: “There is no guarantee, for 
example, that the technology for the Objective Force will materialize, potentially leaving a 
‘worst-of-both-worlds’ force that could still consume substantial amounts of strategic lift, 
while lacking combat punch and sustainability. Nor is it ever a certainty that some new 
technological variant will be correctly understood.”713 But not everyone was satisfied with 
the imagined Way of War. David Isenberg, an analyst in the Arms Control and Threat 
Reduction Division, DynMeridian, in Military Review: “Major conflicts remain not only 
possible but probable. However, unlike Federal Express packages, US ground forces do no 
really have to get there overnight. To makes US forces formidable when they do arrive, heavy 
weapons systems, such as Crusader714, are still good investments both for the 21st-century 
Army and national security in an uncertain world.”715 Isenberg therefore did not see why the 
Army’s forces would have to be that fast and rapidly deployable. Others argued in favor of 
heavier legacy systems, which enemy forces would still have when FCS is fielded. Brian J. 
Dunn, a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan Legislative Bureau: “A dangerous 
assumption is to think victory is certain and the only challenge is getting to the theater fast 
enough. If MBTs maintain their dominance with suitable modifications, enemies will have a 
tremendous advantage over the revolutionary FCS.”716 Dunn would then even argue that the 
Army wanted possibly too much from FCS: “The Army must field an FCS to be lighter, faster, 
and more agile than the Cold War Army yet still meet threats in 2025. We are clearly asking 
too much of this envisioned FCS. […] Envisioned capabilities include flying, tremendous sprint 
speed, self-healing attributes, and blasting or disabling weapons.”717 
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Nonetheless, it seemed like the Army would try to somehow keep up with the future image 
of war the Air Force was already envisioning since Desert Storm. It was essential to the Army 
to prove how Landpower was still necessary; the Air Force could not beat the enemy from a 
distance. In the near future, Army units would dominate the enemy with technologically 
refined means. Jablonsky analyzed correctly: “Nevertheless, there was an urgency to the 
transformation process for the Army, concerned with becoming more relevant in a rapidly 
changing geostrategic environment in which strategic speed and lethality could no longer 
successfully exist as separate variables.”718 The Army tested its new concept in war games 
like Dominant Warrior. Lieutenant Colonel Bo Barbour, United States Army, retired, a Senior 
Military Analyst for the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute; and Lieutenant 
Colonel Bill Hix, assigned to HQ, TRADOC, wrote about the exercises: “The US Army’s 
mentally and physically agile forces the end state of Army Transformation were twice as 
lethal and had about half the deployment and logistic footprint of previous US armed 
forces.”719 And the war game had apparently shown how fast the force could be projected: 
“During the war game, employing land power early in crisis response deterred and 
stabilized the conflict by precluding the adversary from rapidly achieving operational 
objectives. This outcome required a joint, early application of force with the clear signal 
that overwhelming decisive force was rapidly building momentum. The capability to 
project a combat brigade in 96 hours, an Army division in 120 hours and five divisions in 
30 days created an overwhelming challenge for the adversary.”720 
An “asymmetric” enemy 
But others in the Army community asked what, then, the enemy would potentially do about 
the United States’ plans. He could possibly stall any decisive battles, as Jacob W. Kipp, a 
senior analyst, and Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, a military analyst with the Foreign 
Military Studies Office, wrote: “The side with the less-robust technology can offset this 
disadvantage by changing the nature of the conflict from a war of annihilation to a war of 
attrition.”721 The aforementioned David L. Grange, Chuck Jarnot and Richard D. Liebert, 
wrote: 
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“Potential adversaries recognize our dependency on secure ports and airfields along with 
the time required to build combat power. It is unlikely that US forces will be allowed 
Desert Storm buildup luxuries in future conflicts. Dangerous geopolitical and 
technological trends, along with antiaccess weapons such as long-range missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction, demand an extended-range, power-projection, forced-
entry capability.”722 
Here a first glimpse of the A2/AD discourse can be seen. The enemy in turn was watching the 
United States’ capabilities and trying to adapt: 
“At the same time, potential future adversaries are studying the U.S. closely, learning 
from our operations and adapting selected advanced capabilities and innovative 
strategies to overcome U.S. military dominance, particularly with respect to ground 
forces. Weapons of mass effects and destruction, and cyber attacks will be a part of the 
threat framework.”723 
The Objective Force White Paper itself contained warning notices: “The operating 
environment brings new challenges and threats to U.S. C4 capabilities as resourceful 
adversaries recognize and attempt to counter U.S. dependence on information superiority 
and situational understanding.”724 Edward T. Bohnemann described in a Command and 
General Staff College study, how future adversaries would somehow try to circumvent the 
United States Armed Forces technological superiority: 
“Adversaries attempting to challenge the United States are unlikely to match it with 
firepower alone, but are more likely to attempt to counter the technology overmatch by 
using unconventional means, such as fighting within cities or using chemical or biological 
weapons. As we prepare to face our next adversary, we must look to conflicts in the 
Balkans, Somalia, Chechnya, or Afghanistan for the pertinent lessons learned about the 
face of modern warfare.”725 
But somehow the thinking did not get away from the fight against a state which should form 
the enemy: 
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“In the near future, the United States is not likely to face an enemy willing to fight 
another conventional war as fought by the Iraqis during Desert Storm, but will attempt 
to fight using asymmetric means. The use of weapons of mass destruction, denial of 
lodgment areas, more integrated air defense systems, and the use of special force type 
units against softer targets will likely be the norm.”726 
WMD were one of the main threats as identified by the Bush administration. However, the 
Army’s leader hereby did not resort to the Streetfighter idea, which early in the 1990s was 
seen as a realistic threat or type of enemy. However, Robert Martinage and Michael Vickers 
from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a think tank working for 
the United States Government, wrote in 2001: 
“It is at least theoretically possible that a future adversary could denude the United 
States of critical space-based assets in a bolt from the blue. A preemptive strike could, for 
example, involve the coordinated use of CNA [Computer Network Attack] capabilities; 
ground-based ASATs [Anti-satellite Weapon] of various types; prepositioned, co-orbital 
microsatellites capable of conducting lethal proximity operations; and perhaps, space-
based, ASAT platforms that employ a DE [Directed Energy] beam to destroy or disable 
U.S. satellites.“727 
Air defense weapons were also part of the mix an enemy could use against United States 
Airpower, as Colonel Robert E. Chapman II, wrote in the Aerospace Power Journal in 2002: 
“A number of potential adversaries are pursuing advanced weapons systems that could deny 
or restrict America’s future ability to project combat power abroad. Of particular concern are 
increasingly lethal integrated air defense systems (IADS) and mobile surface-to-surface 
missile systems.”728 But high-tech weapons could also be jammed, as Major Tracy A. Ralphs, 
an imagery and intelligence officer with the United States Army Military Traffic Management 
Command Transportation Engineering Agency, argued: “Threats could easily and quickly 
build and deploy cheap but numerous, effective jammers to defeat GPS-guided weapons.”729 
Future enemies could indeed attack the United States Armed Forces’ vulnerabilities 
asymmetrical. Alberts and his co-authors wrote similarly in their 2000 study: “The increasing 
                                                            
726
 Bohnemann, Rapid, Decisive Operations, p. 6. 
727
 Martinage, Robert / Vickers, Michael: Future Warfare 20XX Wargame Series: Lessons Learned Report, 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Prepared for OSD Net Assessment, December 2001, p. 
30f. 
728
 Chapman II, Robert E.: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles – Dawn of a New Age?, in: Aerospace Power 
Journal, Summer 2002, p. 60-73, here p. 60-61. 
729




availability and affordability of information, information technologies, and Information Age 
weapons increases the potential for creating formidable foes from impotent adversaries.“730 
And Steven Metz argued similarly: 
“In a future where enemies have some precision guided munitions and weapons of mass 
destruction (along with delivery systems), in-theater sanctuaries may not exist. […] An 
enemy using a counter-deployment strategy would have to be met with a combination of 
strategic airpower, naval strike forces, theater air superiority, theater missile defense, 
focused logistics to minimize the supplies needed in theater, and a range of methods to 
limit the need for a lengthy build-up of forces, equipment, and supplies.“731 
The scenario as described by Metz would later be named as anti-access threat or A2/AD, 
describing how enemies could deny the United States Armed Forces to enter an area of 
operations.732 However, some authors cautioned how the enemy would not even have to be 
equipped with other high-tech weapons. He could as well be using cheap things. Colonel 
James K. Greer, director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, wrote in 2002: 
“Rather than facing opponents trained and equipped to fight along the lines of the old 
Soviet model, the Armed Forces will face opponents who will combine conventional, 
unconventional, and information operations in a variety of new and effective ways. 
Those opponents will take advantage of the global proliferation of cheap, high-
technology weapons systems to modernize selected portions of their armed forces, while 
seeking to take advantage of low-technology asymmetrical approaches to offset the 
United States’ high-end warfighting dominance.”733 
With “asymmetry” the growing imbalance between the technologically advanced and less 
advanced enemies was circumscribed. David J. Shaughnessy, senior intelligence analyst, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Cowan, a military intelligence officer for HQ TRADOC wrote in 
2002: “It remains clear that any campaign conducted against the United States, today or in 
the foreseeable future, will be a mix of asymmetric, adaptive, and conventional operations 
against the nation’s vulnerabilities.”734 But high-tech supporters used the “asymmetry” 
argument to promote even more technology: “Defending the nation and its vital interests in 
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the future will involve more of an emphasis on asymmetrical threats and the conduct of 
operations other than war.“735 And: “Asymmetric warfare involves each side playing by its 
own set of rules, determined by their respective strengths and attempts to exploit an 
adversary’s weakness. It is a far cry from the tank on tank battles or naval engagements of 
the past.“736 With these arguments, supporters of NCW and the FCS would then seek to 
replace older, heavy units such as tank battalions with smaller, more networked systems. Yet 
somehow the fight between nations was still the main scenario. At least smaller operations 
were included in the discussions: “While the Army must remain optimized for major theater 
war, it must be sufficiently versatile and agile to handle smaller-scale contingencies which 
will occur more often, presenting unique challenges.”737 Full-spectrum operations included 
war and OOTW in the 2001 FM 3-0.738 But authors such as Dr. Thomas Hughes criticized 
nonetheless: 
“Although many observers view MOOTW as far more likely than war in the near term, 
military professionals have long been ambivalent toward operations short of war. In 
their doctrine, they have sought to fire-wall MOOTW from war by espousing very 
different principles for each; war is guided by offensive, surprise, and mass, while 
MOOTW relies on restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.”739 
Nonetheless, the discussions in the publications revealed some thoughts on the modern 
battlefield reality. Major Michael A. Carlino, Battalion Operations Officer in the 1st Battalion, 
6th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany, wrote in a 2002 article 
in Parameters: “However, the nature of the modern battlefield inherently blurs the 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants; soldiers and civilians are now 
inextricably woven together in an amorphous battle space, and so the age of segregated 
battlefields has all but vanished.”740 The blurring of civilians and combatants would be even 
more visible in an urban setting. A group of authors wrote in Military Review: “The United 
States has obvious capability and power advantages over potential adversaries. To offset 
those advantages, adversaries may attempt to exploit perceived U.S. weaknesses by using 
asymmetric operational strategies, tactics, and techniques using urban terrain and 
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information operations.”741 Captain Steven E. Alexander, a small group instructor for the 
Infantry Captain’s Career Course, United States Army Infantry School, argued: “No modern 
force has achieved strategic-level victory through an offensive campaign waged in an urban 
environment. The simple fact is that doctrine based on offensive action loses tempo in 
severely restricted terrain. Any technological advantage an armed force might have is 
mitigated in similarly restricted terrain.”742 And Harold S. Orenstein wrote with other 
contributing authors from the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD): “Urban 
environment – complex terrain, concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems – 
is the operational environment in which Army forces will operate. It may be the predominant 
future operational environment.”743 Not only would the urban area be predominant, it would 
as well somehow inhibit high-tech advantages, as Colonel Robert E. Chapman II, an Air Force 
officer, wrote in a War College study: “The nature of the urban environment […] affects the 
strategic context by countering the American preference for rapid, decisive operations. It 
conjures perceptions of not only protracted conflict and casualties, but also the old American 
way of war centered on mass and firepower concepts.”744 But another Air Force officer, 
Captain Troy S. Thomas, countered: “Depending on the circumstances, precise air-power can 
be less destructive than imprecise land power and, therefore, valuable to the urban fight.”745 
Arguing in favor of another Airpower application, Thomas brought up the “precision“ as 
favored by the Air Force. Coming back to the Army’s new FM, one of the authors, Lieutenant 
Colonel Michael D. Burke, argued: 
“FM 3-0 moves beyond war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) to the 
complex challenges of today’s operating environment. It establishes full-spectrum 
operations as a flexible means of conceptualizing what the Army does during peace, 
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conflict, and war. Every operation is a combination of the following types of military 
operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support.”746 
Kretchik writes that the 2001 FM 3-0 was not only a tactical warfighting Manual alone, but it 
tried to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War world, where the Army was reliant upon 
other services for mission support as well as had to work with allied nations.747In its typology 
of operations, the 2001 FM 3-0 placed stability operations along with support operations 
(nonmilitary missions that covered disaster relief and aid to the civil authorities) alongside 
offensive and defensive operations as the Army’s core missions. But in practice, conventional 
warfare remained the prime focus of the Army.748 Chad C. Serena, who had himself done 
several deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, wrote about the Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team (SBCT): “The doctrine that the SBCT had to use or build upon was decidedly 
combat oriented and provided only scant instruction or guidance for operations or planning 
in MOOTW.”749 The SBCT was conceived to be an Interim type of force until the Objective 
Force could be fielded. It was based on the Stryker family of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV). 
Having a networked layout, the SBCT should be able to even go after more powerful enemy 
formations. Serena criticized the NCW idea: 
“Despite claims to the contrary, even if the SBCT were to achieve situational awareness 
and operational omniscience by incorporating the information technology capabilities of 
the RMA, situational awareness does not necessarily present as situational 
understanding, does not bestow predictive capacity and intent discernment, and does 
not allow for action in a time, place, and manner of the protagonist's choosing. The 
enemy has a vote in how any conflict situation develops and is perceived.”750 
The deployment goal for the SBCT was “to place a credible combat force on the ground 
anywhere in the world in 96 hours from liftoff.”751 But a 2002 RAND study came to the 
conclusion that this requirement would not be possible: “The main conclusion of this report 
is that a force with more than 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed by air from CONUS to the 
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far reaches of the globe in four days.”752 But the vote the enemy had was not visible in the 
early 2000s, only later would the boundaries of the Transformation idea be acknowledged. 
Effects-based Operations 
The Rumsfeld concept of Transformation coincided with a paper by Air Force Lieutenant 
General Deptula about the Effects-based Operations. Deptula did not write about a 
revolution in warfare but rather about monumental changes, and he further developed 
Warden’s concept: 
“The capacity for a simultaneous attack on the entire array of high value objectives with 
little or no need to suppress enemy air defenses opens the door to monumental changes 
in the conduct of war – enables surprise at the tactical level, a larger span of influence, 
fewer casualties, paralyzing effects, and shorter time to impose effective control over the 
enemy.”753 
Deptula did combine Warden’s paralyzing strategic attack with the term “effect” and 
similarly imagined a certain amount of control over the enemy and therefore over warfare 
as well. He consolidated Warden’s Five Ring Model and further emphasized that every 
possible entity could be thought of as a system (obviously a terrorist group, too!): “Any 
political entity can be thought of as a system consisting of a number of subsystems, or to 
borrow a term coined in the former Air Force Systems Command – a system of systems.”754 
The obvious problem seems to be that if everything can be a system of systems, the terminus 
has no meaning at all. Everything is a system and it is impossible to determine which systems 
have a higher priority than others. Deptula as well utilized the terminus paralysis: 
“Effective control of enough of the adversary’s enabling operational level systems will 
paralyze his ability to function at the strategic level. At that stage, the enemy has no 
choice but acquiesce to the will of the controlling force or face ever increasing degrees of 
loss of control.”755 
The system language of which the enemy consists was even more abstract with Deptula than 
with Warden. And Deptula saw physical destruction to be only an “effect”: 
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“In this approach, destruction is used to achieve effects on each of the systems the 
enemy organization relies on to conduct operations or exert influence – not to destroy 
the systems, but to prevent them from being used as the adversary desires.”756 
Air Force Colonel Edward Mann, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Endersby and Tom Searle wrote 
similarly: “Focusing on the conditions desired – the effects – to achieve assigned objectives 
enables one to avoid focusing on pseudo-objectives, such as destruction.”757 Moreover, 
Deptula differentiated the serial and the parallel approach: 
“The serial approach targets those elements of an adversary’s defenses that restrict 
access to targets of critical value. […] The ideal application of force in a parallel attack 
strategy to achieve rapid dominance involves the application of force against all targets 
in each target system at one time.“758 
Deptula thus as well emphasized how the enemy system could be hit simultaneously at 
different points. But he did differ from Warden’s idea in that he did still foresee serial attacks 
occur. And he argued as well in an Aerospace Power Journal article, how to overcome the 
aforementioned anti-access threat: “Potential adversaries are taking advantage of various 
methods to deny US forces access to their centers of gravity. We must deny the enemy his 
antiaccess strategies through the use of stealthy, long-range platforms that can apply precise 
force with great rapidity.”759 According to Deptula, it is no longer necessary to roll back 
enemy ground and air forces in advance; he cites different politicians and military decision-
makers to prove that point, though without explicitly stating it himself. Deptula as well used 
the terminus center of gravity and spoke about the usefulness of ground forces: “Surface 
forces will always be an essential part of the military, but massing surface forces to 
overwhelm an enemy is no longer an absolute prerequisite to impose control over the 
enemy.”760 Deptula thereby escalated the idea of the decisive airstrike (against the backdrop 
of the budget discussion) further. It is indeed possible to argue that the deployment of a 
mechanized unit does imply much more effort necessary than an attack by Stealth aircraft. 
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Nonetheless, the “effect” would be very different, if one argues in favor of a more ground-
centered approach; only Landpower could, according to its proponents, decisively beat an 
enemy by occupying ground. A similar image of Airpower presented the editor-in-chief of 
the Air Force Magazine in June 2001: “In theater conflict, the first substantial force to engage 
the enemy will be advanced stealthy aircraft that open the door for other land, sea, and air 
forces to follow.“761 This description seems to be a derivative of the Halt Phase concept and 
symbolizes the hype about the Stealth bomber still persistent. In a position paper Army 
Colonel Gary H. Cheek, contradicting, held the opinion that Airpower would as well in the 
future not be able to end a conflict: “Thus, while air power is alluring because it does not 
require American soldiers on the ground, by itself it lacks the compelling force that ensures 
decision in conflict.”762 He blamed the Airpower proponents for underestimating the enemy: 
“Advocates of effects-based operations misread this trend in lethality, as if enemies will not 
be able to react to the use stealth and precision weapons.“763 Cheek defined EBO as follows: 
“By its nature, an effects-based operation is an analytical form of warfare; it anticipates 
events and enemy reactions, then acts, assesses, and acts again. It is analogous a chess 
match; methodical and deliberate – a contest of action and reaction.”764 He saw the concept 
as being an attempt to convey some sort of strategy game to real war. But critics such as 
Colonel James K. Greer argued that a modern enemy would not be that easily analyzable: 
“Centers of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive points are difficult to discern in a 
complex mix of political, economic, and military peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans or when 
attacking a worldwide, web-like, self-organizing, transnational terrorist organization such as 
al-Qaeda.”765 But Lieutenant Colonel Phil M. Haun felt confident that Airpower would be 
able even to attack an adaptable enemy: “Airpower can now destroy what it finds, however 
an enemy under air attack quickly adapts, using dispersal and deception to conceal its 
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location. Based on the experience of Desert Storm and Allied Force, a systems approach is 
required to efficiently locate and attack such an enemy.”766 
Both officers in the Army and the Air Force were convinced they could achieve specific 
“effects”; their argument was whether airplanes or troops were better calculated to achieve 
these effects. Cheek confronts this idea with a boxing fight: “At the tactical level, war more 
closely resembles a boxing match than a game of chess. The boxer strives to deliver a rapid 
series of blows to weaken, then knock out his adversary, all while avoiding or absorbing the 
blows of his opponent.”767 Here as well the differing point of view (or, heretical, flying 
height) of the advocates of the various branches can be seen. Bradley J. Smith argued in 
favor of the Airpower idea in a 2002 Army War College Study: “Employing airpower 
inherently places fewer friendly forces at risk than employing conventional ground forces. A 
large air operation might place a few hundred airman at risk at any one time, while 
deploying a single army brigade potentially places thousands at risk.”768 Air Force Lieutenant 
Colonel Price T. Bingham argued similarly: “The same technologies that make it feasible to 
target an enemy’s military vehicles also provide the advantage of dramatically reducing the 
risks facing friendly military personnel. On the ground, stopping militarily significant enemy 
movement would mean that friendly forces would have less need to fight powerful enemy 
units.”769 There was even again the recurring Desert Storm idea. Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, 
brought up the “efficiency” as well alongside the reduction of casualties: “In short, modern 
air warfare has reduced casualties among both the attackers and the attacked, thus making 
it an increasingly efficient, effective, and humane tool of American foreign policy.”770 
Meilinger here conceded that there would be casualties on both sides and, arguing in a 
clausewitzian way, in his eyes war and in this case Airpower was an instrument for the 
politicians. And Bingham argued how ground forces should assist Airpower more instead of 
fighting themselves: “In contrast to what they do in today’s training, Army and Marine Corps 
forces must design their land maneuver to make US air forces more effective at targeting 
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opposing forces without becoming engaged in costly close combat.”771 And all of this only 
served “efficiency”: “Effects-based joint operations would increase strategic options by 
permitting US personnel to achieve success faster, more efficiently, and with less risk than is 
possible in operations that depend primarily on physical attrition and the close battle to 
defeat enemy land forces.”772 Here it seems appropriate to ask for the contents of the term 
“efficiency” as well: less costly in money, faster, or less casualties? It remains unclear and 
seems as well to be a buzzword. Not having to risk the lives of soldiers on the ground was a 
recurring proposition of Airpower supporters. And for sure, wars should be over quickly, 
therefore the important notion of “speed” as well. The other main argument was and would 
be for the time to come, the “efficiency”: 
“Effects Based Operations focus not on individual targets but the strategic and 
operational effects that the warfighter wants to create. Using systems-based 
intelligence, one then determines the best targets to hit in parallel to create the desired 
effect on the entire system. In many cases, effects based operations are more efficient 
than merely servicing a target list in priority order because all targets in a given system 
need not be destroyed to create a system-wide failure.”773 
And Smith brought as well the paralysis idea: “This simultaneous, or parallel attack can 
create parallel effects, leaving the enemy with multiple crises to deal with. The goal of 
parallel attack is to create strategic paralysis wherein an enemy faced with simultaneous 
breakdowns at the strategic, operational and tactical level loses its effectiveness and ceases 
to operate as a coherent force.”774 Navy Commander Paul Murdock argued similarly in favor 
of the “effects” language: 
“The effects are what is important. The goal of war is to achieve political goals by using 
organized violence to influence the mind and behavior of the enemy leadership. Joint 
doctrine duly refers to massing effects ’to achieve decisive results.’ The idea is to achieve 
such a strong impact as to compel the enemy to accept the political goals of one's 
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government. To mass effects that do not contribute to this end is to practice poor 
operational art.“775 
Murdock again stated in the clausewitzian sense, how military power was an instrument for 
politics. And he as well used Deptula’s parallel terminus: “Parallel war might be able to "lock 
out" (preclude) options, create despair, even lead the enemy to give up. The point is that to 
achieve results of such magnitude, fires must often be distributed, coming from diverse 
locations, killing the enemy not with one massive blow but by ‘a thousand vital cuts’ that 
collectively induce a paralyzing hemorrhage of will.”776 And here Murdock goes back to the 
human corpse language as well. 
For the EBO idea it is further necessary to cast a scrutinizing glance in the new edition of the 
AFDD 1 from 2003. This Manual did dedicate two huge chapters on one side to the Principles 
and Tenets, and on the other side to the Roles, Missions, and Functions of Air and Space 
Power. Already at the beginning of that publication some basics related to Air Force doctrine 
were explained, such as: “Doctrine is about effects...not platforms. This focuses on the 
desired outcome of a particular action, not on the system or weapon itself that provides the 
effect. “777 The “effect” was here even more abstracted. The disengagement from the acting 
platform corresponded strongly to Rumsfeld’s Transformation idea and its ideal image of 
Special Forces guiding airstrikes while riding on a horseback. Under the title Changing 
Character of the American Way of War the reader as well could find this passage in the 
AFDD: 
“Early airpower advocates argued that airpower could be decisive and could achieve 
strategic effects. While this view of airpower was not proved during their lifetimes, the 
more recent history of air and space power application, especially since the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War, has proven that air and space power can be a dominant and frequently the 
decisive element of combat in modern warfare.”778 
Here again Desert Storm was reactivated as starting point of the “modern” image of war of 
the United States Air Force. Afterwards as well a New View of Conflict was postulated, using 
again the term culminating point and the terminus Halt Phase: “[…] in this new view of 
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warfare […] aggressive application of air and space power, in parallel operations against 
many objectives simultaneously, may force the enemy beyond his offensive culminating 
point, resulting in a turnover in initiative in our favor.”779 This language was to be read 
similarly to the Systems Approach: “It is possible to directly affect adversary sources of 
strength and will to fight by creating shock and destroying enemy cohesion without close 
combat.”780 But the authors did not mention the center of gravity and that was discussed: 
“Curiously, there is no mention in the new AFDD of ‘centers of gravity’ – the assets of 
greatest strategic importance to the enemy – which was a leading operational concept and a 
staple of doctrine through the 1990s. Nor is there direct discussion of targeting the enemy’s 
infrastructure, other than that which ‘contributes directly’ to the ground battle.”781 It seems 
as if the community waited for EBO to take place even more in official documents as it did. 
As Lewis describes, the task of the Air Force was to hamper the flow of instruction through 
the enemy’s system, “and then move rapidly, faster than the enemy could respond, to 
destroy the brain, or sufficient parts of the central nervous system to paralyze the enemy and 
thereby achieve military and political objectives.“782 The “shock” here as well played again an 
important role, immediately beneath the “will” of the enemy. At the same time, EBO was 
officially introduced in this Manual: 
“A vital part of the new approach to warfare is the emerging arena of effects-based 
operations (EBO). A further step away from annihilation or attrition warfare, EBO 
explicitly and logically links the effects of individual tactical actions directly to desired 
military and political outcomes.”783  
In this last Manual which was analyzed in the scope of this part, the mental reflections of the 
ten years since the Gulf War in 1991 culminated. As Linn notes, the foreword to the 2003 
AFDD 1 acknowledged the danger posed by asymmetric adversaries who threaten the nation 
with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and information attacks, as stipulated by the 
Bush administration. But to counter these threats the Manual reiterated earlier concepts for 
the most part, such as EBO and “precision“ strike, and the authors did view the early 
experiences of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as further vindication of these 
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approaches.784 But indeed, Army and Air Force leaders did not see that many of the United 
States’ emerging post-Cold War adversaries would have little interest to challenge the 
United States Armed Forces conventionally even if they were able to do so.785 
The image of war of the United States Air Force comprised now, in the ideal case, single 
precise airstrikes to stop an aggressor before the deployment of ground forces became 
necessary. The Army on the other side throbbed on its still decisive role in the scope of the 
Full Spectrum Operations, even though it had interestingly incorporated the terminology of 
the Effects-based Operations. Contrary to the recommendations of some higher-ranking 
officers786 the United States Armed Forces invaded Iraq in spring 2003 with the strategy 
Shock and Awe, without having deployed enough ground forces for the subsequent 
occupation. Against an enemy who was not (or no longer) capable of maneuver warfare, a 
handful of United States units supported by airstrikes beat the Iraqi Army in the field. In the 
following years the United States had to cope with an insurgency which made the massive 
deployment of additional troops necessary, as will be further described in the following, 
third part of this thesis. 
2.7 Interim conclusion: towards a New American Way of War 
To conclude this second part, it seems appropriate to recap some of the main ideas and 
discussions in the prominent discourses. At the beginning of the 1990s, the much-heralded 
success of Airpower in Operation Desert Storm did on one side rather increase single-service 
parochialism instead of improving the combination of the air-ground team, the so-called 
joint operations.787 Others would then suggest as well that the coalition’s success on the 
ground was not just a product of Airpower and modern technology, but as well a result of 
the carefully developed doctrine and training of the United States Army and Marine 
Corps.788 On the other side, clearly, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces were no match, neither 
doctrinally nor ideologically, technically or regarding their training.  
But Airpower and the related technologies (Stealth and PGM especially) would be a 
dominating discourse throughout the 1990s. The belief that Airpower could replace soldiers 
on the ground would become a tenet of American military thinking about the conduct of war 
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beginning with the 2000s.789 The discourse on Airpower brought new terms into the 
language and thinking of airmen or changed their meanings. “Firepower” could now be 
precisely delivered from the Air. “Speed” did not anymore stand for an armored thrust of a 
Warsaw Pact “mass”: it was one of the main advantages Airpower had over Landpower 
which was deemed too slow and even inefficient. And the enemy would be dissected like a 
human corpse with a scalpel, paralyzed by strategic attacks with PGM-toting Stealth-
bombers. From its “elevated vantage points”, Airpower could halt enemy attacks; and it 
could spare the lives of own troops – or even of enemy ones – making war more acceptable, 
taking a smaller blood toll overall in times when heroes dying was less acceptable than in 
other decades. 
But in the Landpower discourse, not only the Air Force, the Army as well was inclined to 
foresee a more technologically-driven type of war during the second part of the decade. In 
search of a new enemy after the collapse of the USSR, the Army later-on constructed its own 
newly imagined enemy that would have to be beaten on the information age battlespace. 
Whereas the battlefield discourse had foreseen a more or less flat geographical area covered 
by air, now battlespace incorporated the “information” domain, as well as space, and last, 
but not least, cyberspace. “Firepower” was to be applied to an enemy who was shocked and 
therefore could only be on the receiving end. “Firepower” would be “mass” for “effect” by 
dispersed forces on the new battlespace. Smaller, lighter forces had to be more efficient as 
well and the war had to be clean on the ground also, without casualties at best, easily seen 
from the TV screens of the post-heroic society. 
During the 1990s, Army and Air Force imagined enemies that would rather not appear, 
neither in Somalia nor over Kosovo. House argues that military organizations had always 
existed to apply maximum force against a clearly defined enemy, not to use minimum force 
in a quasi-police role, which the United States Armed Forces did sporadically during the 
1990s.790 Neither LIC nor MOOTW really brought changes into the image of war or into the 
enemy discourse; terms such as “asymmetry” or termini such as other than war only helped 
to marginalize other forms of violence which the Army (and Air Force) leadership did 
obviously not like to imagine. Interventions or MOOTW did not fit into the United States 
Armed Forces idea of war or their envisioned purpose. For interventions Airpower appeared 
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to offer the best available ability to first coerce Iraq through so-called no-fly zones, then 
intervene in the Balkans, and lastly retaliate against terrorist groups while avoiding the 
difficult decisions associated with a sustained commitment of ground forces, as House 
describes further.791 
Not only Airpower but as well computers should help the United States to win wars faster, 
cheaper, and more decisively; this idea coupled with the societal recess from war as a whole 
spurred the discussion about the RMA in the 1990s, dominating the technology discourse. Its 
proponents saw an opportunity to pursue new ways of war and buy sophisticated high-tech 
weapons.792 Dima Adamsky sees the tendency of the United States Armed Forces to 
transform the nation’s material superiority into battlefield “effectiveness” by pursuing a 
strategy of attrition and annihilating the enemy with “firepower” and technological means, 
given its abundant material resources, troops’ equipment, and excellent managerial 
expertise. Adamsky argues further that the United States for almost two hundred years did 
not face an enemy with a larger gross national product than its own, at least not solely.793 
And Adamsky finally sees the obvious strong bias toward techno-centric warfare as an 
essential component of American strategic behavior.794 
The United States’ obvious military might and technological superiority did as well change 
the discourse on the enemy. Whereas the United States had to face the Warsaw Pact during 
the Cold War, it now was factually superior to any other military might. That fact may have 
led to the techno-centric thinking about warfare and the scientific approach toward the 
enemy. In the end, seeing the enemy as a system and performing center of gravity analyses 
of that system seemed to be the beginning of a more sophisticated application of the New 
American Way of war. What then would be required to make this leap is the understanding 
that the enemy system, like any living thing, reacts both to external stimuli and attacks. And 
those reactions will never be fully predictable, as Kagan argues, because biological systems 
are too complex to permit completely accurate predictions of their behavior.795 
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III. From Counterinsurgency to AirSea Battle (2001-2012) 
3.1 Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom: Transformation and Airpower test 
bed 
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on 
September 11th in 2001, the United States started offensive operations against Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan shortly thereafter (Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF). 
Later-on the Bush administration also planned and executed Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
against the regime of Saddam Hussein.796 The so-called Bush Doctrine included, among other 
foreign policy principles, preemptive strikes or wars against perceived threats to the United 
States National Security.797 This chapter will show the backlash and judgement of the 
conduct of both the aforementioned operations in the various military publications and 
studies with respect to the discussions about the New American Way of War, EBO and 
Transformation. 
Operation Enduring Freedom 
In Afghanistan, the United States initially only relied on Airpower and SOF on the ground in 
order to topple the Taliban regime in concert with indigenous forces. The idea that Airpower 
could enable less trained forces in combination with SOF to beat an opposing force got fast 
into the discourse on Airpower. Jeffrey Record, teaching strategy at the Air War College, 
proclaimed this as a possible future modus operandi: 
“If weak and failed states are to dominate the US security agenda for the foreseeable 
future, and if America’s political and military leadership remains casualty-phobic, and if 
advances in military technology permit use of force with little risk – then a combination 
of airpower, small supporting specialty ground force contingents (backed by regular 
ground forces held in reserve), and indigenous proxies is likely to become the US model 
for waging future war.”798 
But Record as well acknowledged that there would still be the need for ground forces if the 
aims of a campaign did encompass more than only toppling a regime: “Obviously, our new 
way of war is of limited value in situations requiring the conquest, occupation, and 
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administration of territory. These missions require ‘boots on the ground’ in sizable numbers, 
although airpower would still serve as a powerful supporting arm.”799 Nonetheless John A. 
Tirpak, Senior Editor of the Air Force Magazine, wrote enthusiastically: “The rapid success of 
Operation Enduring Freedom stemmed mainly from the unprecedented combination of 
massive airpower – much of it in the form of heavy bombers – with small numbers of special 
forces on the ground, indigenous troops, and the full press of US Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance capabilities […].”800 And Rebecca Grant, then president of IRIS 
Independent Research, an organization that specializes in national security research for 
government and industry clients, argued similarly: “In the first phase of Enduring Freedom, 
the joint air forces pulled off what critics had long said could not be done: They fought and 
won a sustained campaign with limited access to the region.”801 But William R. Hawkins, 
Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the United States Business and Industry Council 
Educational Foundation, did not see that big an accomplishment: “US forces could attack 
Afghanistan with impunity. The only real challenge was the remote geography and lack of 
existing agreements with neighboring states regarding base rights. The military victory over 
the Taliban rabble looked easy because it was.”802 And Stephen Biddle argued: “The Afghan 
Model will not always work as it did in Afghanistan, because we will not always enjoy allies 
who match up so well against their enemies. But where we do, we can reasonably expect the 
Model to be roughly as lethal as it was last fall and winter.”803 Biddle here did as well 
describe Operation Enduring Freedom as a “model” for or of war, revealing a scientific way 
of thinking about war. And in late 2002 Rebecca Grant still felt certain, that the combination 
of Airpower, Special Forces and indigenous allies could be a recipe for future interventions: 
“With a minimum of collateral damage and bloodshed, the air strikes enabled the 
Northern Alliance to overcome the Taliban’s numerical advantage and their supply of 
tanks, artillery, and vehicles and retake the 85 percent of Afghanistan once controlled by 
that oppressive regime. […] While this will not be the solution for every potential 
campaign, it is now beyond dispute as a proven model for coalition operations.”804 
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Interestingly, there is no real analysis of the enemy to be found. Robert S. Dudney, the Editor 
in Chief of the Air Force Magazine wrote, rather triumphantly, in October 2002: 
“Suddenly, it was over. The Taliban-Qaeda force that once controlled 85 percent of 
Afghanistan was, by early December, in control of nothing, on the run, and hiding in 
caves. Some attributed the rout to the presence of Afghan ground forces. […] Each US 
armed service (and those of allied forces) had a hand in the victory. Still, the Air Force 
contribution stood out.”805 
Rebecca Grant would further herald the Airpower-SOF combination, still in 2011: “It was 
only the beginning of the War on Terror, yet the first phase of the campaign delivered major 
victories – and hatched a new operating concept where precision strike and surveillance 
achieved goals with just a handful of special operations teams on the ground.”806 Grant 
hereby did as well use the political branding that was used for Operation Enduring Freedom: 
War on Terror. 
As soon as ground forces were induced in greater numbers, problems arose. Operation 
Anaconda was meant to rout and destroy Al-Qaida forces in 2002. However, the United 
States Armed Forces underestimated the quality and quantity of enemy forces in the valley 
where the battle took place. And discussions arose as well about the “effectiveness” of allied 
air support. Rebecca Grant described the operation as a success in the end, again thanks to 
Airpower: “After initial contact sparked heavy fighting, airpower was called in to provide 
close air support and later to herd and pound the enemy. Ultimately, Operation Anaconda 
was a success, due in no small part to the contributions of airpower and the bravery and 
heroism of those on the ground and in the air alike.”807 Problems and losses were attributed 
to flawed planning by the Army and certainly not to the limits of Airpower. John A. Tirpak 
and Adam J. Hebert wrote: “In Anaconda, the Army complained, it didn’t get enough close air 
support, although it hadn’t even told the Air Force what was being planned until the 11th 
hour.”808 And Rebecca Grant did as well criticize the preparations: 
“One clear lesson was that air-ground coordination – a stunning success in the earlier 
phases of Operation Enduring Freedom – was given short shrift in the original planning 
for Operation Anaconda. The 72-hour operation stretched over more than two weeks, 
                                                            
805
 Dudney, Robert S.: Beat the Devil, in: Air Force Magazine, October 2002, p. 2 
806
 Grant, Rebecca: Enduring Freedom’s New Approach, in: Air Force Magazine, October 2011, p. 62-67, here p. 
63. 
807
 Grant, Rebecca: The Airpower of Anaconda, in: Air Force Magazine, September 2002, p. 60-68, here p. 61. 
808




demanded intense air support, and might well have had seen higher casualties had the 
joint air support – from B-52s to F/A-18s to Apaches – not been there when needed.”809 
But critics argued that modern technology did not suffice to locate and see an enemy who 
was able to conceal himself from the sensors and weapons Airpower needed. Stephen 
Biddle wrote in late 2002 in a War College study: 
“In fact, most fire received by U.S. forces in ANACONDA came from initially unseen, 
unanticipated al Qaeda fighting positions. How could such things happen in an era of 
persistent reconnaissance drones, airborne radars, satellite surveillance, thermal 
imaging, and hypersensitive electronic eavesdropping equipment? The answer is that the 
earth’s surface remains an extremely complex environment with an abundance of 
natural and manmade cover and concealment available for those militaries capable of 
exploiting it.”810 
In contrast to Desert Storm, where the coalition could well see and attack Iraqi forces in the 
open desert, the Afghani terrain was not that well-suited to the United States’ capabilities; 
especially the ones the Air Force could field. Dr. Mark Clodfelter cautioned similarly that the 
Taliban did switch their style of warfare and that this style could be problematic: 
“For the first four months of the conflict, the Taliban provided the bulk of the forces in 
Afghanistan and fought a ‘conventional’ war against Northern Alliance and allied forces. 
Airpower contributed enormously to wrecking Taliban strength during that span. Since 
that time, however, the fighting has resembled the guerrilla conflict that plagued Soviet 
forces for much of their eight-year ordeal. Both Afghanistan’s terrain and its climate 
have proven less than ideal for air operations, although technology has helped to 
overcome some of those difficulties. Military controls have also affected the air effort in 
the form of legal re-views of potential targets.”811 
Stephen Biddle argued in a similar fashion: “The American military is extremely adept at 
destroying massed, exposed targets in the open, and this is precisely why the Taliban 
abandoned such postures: they realized they would fare much better if they avoided 
exposure.”812 And he pointed as well to a problem which would then arise in Afghanistan as 
well as in the forthcoming operation in Iraq: “To invade without sufficient ground forces on 
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the assumption that there will be no fighting to be done would thus be a major gamble.”813 
He therewith argued against the Air Force’s claim that modern Airpower would make ground 
forces less necessary. He further warned the defense community from using the Afghan 
model as a template for Rumsfeld’s Transformation: “As a whole, then, we should be wary of 
claims that Afghanistan represents a revolution in warfare with the potential to motivate 
sweeping changes in American defense policy and the structure of the American military.”814 
Douglas Porch writes how the speed and ease with which a handful of SOF backed by 
airpower working together with local warlord allies toppled the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan in late 2001 in a matter of weeks nonetheless appeared to confirm all of the 
RMA assumptions.815 Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper had already in spring 
2001 claimed how the concept favored by Airpower proponents would look like: 
“Today, we stand on the brink of technological advances that can prompt a new concept 
of aerospace power employment. Stealth applied to bombers and maneuverable 
fighters, all-weather precision-guided munitions (PGM), and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) will allow us to maneuver over, around, and through – or to stand off outside 
advanced defensive systems and networks already available to potential adversaries.”816 
Airpower with its Stealth and PGM would therefore form the core of the New American Way 
of War, even if Jumper did not speak that out loudly. Jumper planned the so-called Global 
Strike Task Force (GSTF): 
“GSTF will rapidly establish air dominance and subsequently guarantee that joint 
aerospace, land, and sea forces will enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack. It 
will combine stealth and advanced weapons with a horizontally integrated command, 
control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) constellation that provides 
lethal joint battle-space capability.”817 
Air superiority could even faster be achieved over Afghanistan, as the Taliban did not possess 
even the slightest hint of an Air Force. So Peter Grier, a Washington editor for the Christian 
Science Monitor and longtime defense correspondent as well as a regular contributor to Air 
Force Magazine argued: “On a larger scale, such integration will result in the Global Strike 
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Task Force, in which horizontally linked ISR will be combined with the ground attack 
capabilities of the F-22 and the B-2 to provide kick-in-the-door capability.”818 The so-called 
“kick-in-the-door capability”, meaning a forceful intervention or entry against an enemy 
state, was probably aimed at the Army’s idea of projecting forces globally to achieve tactical 
objectives. At the same time, Grier imagined the Army to field lighter forces thanks to 
Airpower: “Modern close air support capability will complement the Army’s development of 
new, lighter forces. It will fit hand in glove with another Air Force goal – the ability to watch 
an area of interest 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, in all weather, and to 
identify anything that moves.”819 And Rebecca Grant supported the claim that Airpower 
would indeed support the reduction of heavy Army units in favor of lighter ones: 
“Army commanders will face difficult choices when they deploy lighter, more agile forces. 
The Army’s dependence on CAS in fact may be increasing as future concepts bring about 
‘distributed forces’, with units spread across a large battlespace. Where CAS was once a 
mission in decline, it may again be a key component of planning for 21st century joint 
warfare.”820 
Grier and grant both argued therefore on the Transformation line where lighter systems 
should replace legacy, heavy systems. CAS would also be one of Airpowers main missions in 
the upcoming Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The aforementioned Shock and Awe concept was modified, and became known as the 
Rumsfeld doctrine: “It was based on speed, maneuver, shock effect, extensive covert 
preparation of the battlefield, precision strikes at strategically significant targets, and 
information dominance” as Lewis describes. The doctrine was based on the premise that the 
United States was fighting a state, not a nation, and that it was possible to maintain the 
separation between the people and the government.821 Rumsfeld did in 2003 only want to 
use minimal ground forces. Lewis describes how Rumsfeld believed that a new approach to 
how the United States went to war was necessary. He seemingly believed that new doctrine, 
new technologies, and the RMA had dramatically changed the conduct of war. Rumsfeld, so 
Lewis, believed that the Army was “a dinosaur, unwilling to change, and incapable of looking 
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beyond its traditional ways of doing things.” But somehow Rumsfeld was planning to fight 
the wrong war.822 The core of the Rumsfeld doctrine were high-technology combat systems 
heavily reliant on Airpower, with nimble, light ground forces that would have both a smaller 
supply chain and fewer soldiers exposed to danger.823 But the forces at disposal in 2003 
were still conventional, or legacy (in the words of the Transformation experts) units such as 
the 3rd Infantry Division. David Fitzgerald comments: “The hard lessons on the limitations of 
technology, seen so clearly in Vietnam, seemingly remained unlearned.”824 While technology 
had always played a large part on the Army’s Way of War, especially since AirLand Battle, 
what Rumsfeld was proposing to do now was to make intervention possible again in the age 
of the Vietnam syndrome; fast, decisive, with minimal casualties and quick conflict 
termination.825 Therefore, the biggest part of the “shock” would be delivered by Airpower, 
as described already by Ullman and Wade in their 1996 concept paper: 
“Air power can punish, simultaneously destroy center-of-gravity targets, and so 
demoralize the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with 
smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air campaign may 
result in an early cessation of conflict before the land campaign is necessary. This is more 
likely against a modernized, developed state than an underdeveloped government.“826 
While Ullman and Wade very much used the center of gravity language, the last part of the 
above statement seems to be the most interesting: the concept presented would be much 
more useful against a modern state than against an “underdeveloped government“. And 
indeed the United States Armed Forces beat the regular Iraqi units in a matter of weeks; the 
problems would arise later. Airpower proponents celebrated this early success in their 
publications, here John A. Tirpak in Air Force Magazine: “With an emphasis on speed, 
flexibility, rapid maneuver of ground forces, surgical strikes, and information operations, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was in many ways a demonstration of the ‘transformational’ 
concepts and technologies championed by the Pentagon leadership.”827 Tirpak saw EBO 
vindicated as well: “Gulf War II had all the hallmarks of an ‘effects-based operation’ – speed, 
precision, and effectiveness enhanced by use of minimum force but backed by the willingness 
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to employ massive force where warranted to mold the enemy’s perception.”828 And Rebecca 
Grant saw even a new level of Airpower “precision“: “As foreshadowed in Operation Allied 
Force and in Enduring Freedom, coalition airpower attained a new level of precision and 
persistence.”829 But not only “precision“ and EBO were seen as vindicated, Deptula’s parallel 
strategic attacks as well: 
“Strategic forces did not mount a parallel attack in isolation. Rather, strategic airpower 
bent and flexed to fit an array of campaign objectives, ranging from suppressing enemy 
communications to pursuing time critical targets. Strategic airpower could operate 
anywhere, anytime, and commanders varied the phasing of strategic attacks with other 
jobs of the air and land campaign.”830 
“Speed” was now mostly associated with Airpower and being advanced as an inherent 
capability that Transformation brought. While “speed” had been attributed to the Warsaw 
Pact’s forces in AirLand Battle, now it was one of the hallmarks of the United States Armed 
Forces’ capabilities. Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief Air Force Magazine, saw Airpower as 
well in a pole-position to dominate warfare to come, thanks to the technology available 
now: 
“Careful targeting and precision munitions lessened the danger to noncombatants, 
producing fewer civilian casualties. Today, EBO is largely an airpower domain. A 
fundamental difference between Gulf War I and Gulf War II was use of information to 
dramatically compress the time required for an attack. The infrastructure that made the 
difference mobile intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance systems, powerful and reliable 
voice and data communications – was provided by air and space forces.”831 
Information was the decisive element to wage war, and Air (and Space) Forces would provide 
it. Still Desert Storm was used hereby as some kind of important starting point, surpassed 
now by the continuing development of technology. The concept Shock and Awe was 
certainly praised as well: “The 3rd Infantry’s audacious entry into Baghdad provided a 
healthy dose of shock and awe.”832 The dash through Southern Iraq which to United States’ 
ground forces had mounted in March and April 2003 was as well associated with the term 
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“speed”, as the 3rd Infantry Division and its Marine counterparts did indeed reach Baghdad 
rather fast. And Robert S. Dudney commented Shock and Awe similarly: “As applied to 
strategic airpower, the shock-and-awe concept also retained the core DNA of strategic 
campaigns: the notion of independent effects so powerful they would put all other aspects of 
air warfare and joint operations in the shade.”833 But in hindsight, Saddam Hussein’s regime 
did not falter because of Shock and Awe attacks delivered by Airpower. In fact, he never 
surrendered. The regime fell only when tanks and soldiers physically occupied the capital.834 
One has to note also how the discussion observed did mostly not really analyze the enemy. It 
seems rather that the enemy was blanked out. At the same time, even traditional Airpower 
commentators such as John T. Correll were critical towards the accomplishments: “What the 
fires and explosions seen on the skyline did not show was the extraordinary precision of the 
strikes and the care taken to avoid hitting the civilian population. The effect on military and 
government targets was ruinous. However, it was not what the public expected, having been 
spun up by hundreds of stories about Shock and Awe. Saddam Hussein’s regime did not fall 
overnight.”835 Frederick Kagan as well relativizes the initial success and argues that the Iraqi 
armed forces were only a third as powerful as they were in 1991, and Iraq was 
geographically and politically isolated.836 Lewis even writes how the Iraqi military was that 
weak, just about any plan to beat it would have succeeded in driving Saddam from power.837 
Airpower, which constituted the biggest part of Shock and Awe campaign, did not produce 
the immediate collapse many analysts and Airpower proponents expected and demanded by 
their own doctrine. While the air attacks produced partial paralysis of the “brain“, the limbs, 
the Iraqi ground combat forces, were still active; and that in turn, made the ground war still 
necessary. While the vast majority of Iraqi forces decided not to fight, it must be 
remembered that Iraq was not a unified, cohesive nation, especially after a decade and more 
of sanctions. Lewis argues that it was only a state with deep fractures that precluded that 
the Iraqi people fought cohesively against the United States’ forces and its allies.838 The 
Rumsfeld doctrine would not have worked against a unified nation-state fighting as a 
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whole.839 But Airpower advocates nonetheless saw the initial success primarily attributed to 
Airpower and argued, once again, how ground forces had not been really necessary: 
“The war has unexpectedly renewed the debate about the future of heavy ground forces. 
Gulf War II’s ground force was only half the size of that deployed in the 1991 war, even 
though the 2003 war aims were more ambitious. […] However, the swift victory of the 
smaller ground force put such critics in an awkward spot, facing the question of whether 
modern airpower means commanders need fewer heavy ground forces to attain 
victory.”840 
Kretchik describes how the OIF planners tried to design operations to prevent extensive 
damage, for the mission aimed to liberate the populace and not conquer it. Thus, planning 
focused on how to disrupt but not destroy the country through systems-based planning. 
Planners viewed Saddam’s power as emanating from his ability to control Baghdad through 
economics, human factors, political mechanisms, infrastructure, internal security and 
intelligence organizations, and the military. Therefore, the intent was to attack real and 
symbolic urban control mechanisms with Shock and Awe and bring about submission 
without extensive house-to-house fighting.841 But the planners had neglected the aftermath 
and the ensuing ramifications the collapse of the regime would have not only on Baghdad 
but on the whole country. Serena describes how RDO offered neither a response nor a 
solution to stability operations. In the eyes of the planners, stability was to naturally and 
somewhat seamlessly follow the cessation of hostilities, and as such was not part of the 
discourse on warfare at all.842 Anthony H. Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies warned in a July 2003 paper: “It is one of the iron laws of military 
history that armies are far better equipped to win the war than to win the peace, and that 
strategic objectives in warfighting are far easier to achieve than the grand strategic 
objectives necessary to shape the peace that has lasting value.”843 And Cordesman would as 
well include Serena’s argument that the United States had counted on a smooth transition 
to post-combat operations: “Conflict termination has generally been treated as a secondary 
priority, and the end of war has often been assumed to lead to a smooth transition to peace 
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or been dealt with in terms of vague plans and ideological hopes. The United States and its 
allies are now paying for this failure to look beyond immediate victory on the battlefield.”844 
Fitzgerald argues similarly that a doctrine that emphasizes paralyzing an entire system 
through psychological “shock” would almost certainly cause not just paralysis but the 
collapse of the very system war planners assumed would remain in place.845 Correctly, 
Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, a retired Army officer, in late 2003 warned: “We 
cannot yet predict the outcome of the regime change in Iraq, but near-term omens are not 
favorable.”846 And when the security situation in Iraq was deteriorating more and more, 
John D. Nelson wrote in an Army War College study in 2004: 
“The ‘New American Way of War’ cannot deliver on the promise of reduced ground 
forces that the authors of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review hoped for. In the drive 
to swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary and return conditions to status quo ante 
bellum American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace than to 
complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct a [win?] decisive campaign in a 
major combat operation the United States will require more ground forces to remove a 
regime.”847 
Lewis calls it an irony that the high-tech war, which was supposed to be won by Airpower, 
evolved into a primitive ground war where foot soldiers had to physically close with the 
enemy, kill them, and then learn to work with the local population.848 And therefore the 
biggest strategic planning failure of the United States government was not having in place a 
significant plan to win the peace.849 Max Boot argued consecutively, that Airpower, no 
matter how awesome, simply is not able to police newly liberated countries or build 
democratic governments.850 While Airpower’s proponents had never argued accordingly, 
they had as well not thought as far in their theoretical discussions, and neither had the 
Transformation and RDO enthusiasts. 
                                                            
844
 Cordesman, Iraq and Conflict Termination, 2003, p. 23. 
845
 Fitzgerald, Learning to forget, p. 131. 
846
 Brown, Frederic J.: America’s Army – Expeditionary and Enduring – Foreign and Domestic, in: Military 
Review, November-December 2003, p. 69-77, here p. 72. 
847
 Nelson, John D.: Swiftly defeat the efforts: Then what? The „New American Way of War” and transitioning 
decisive combat to Post Conflict Stabilization, USAWC Strategy Research Project, United States Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, 2004, p. 13. 
848
 Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 493. 
849
 Ibid. p. 438. 
850
 Boot, Max: The New American Way of War, in: Foreign Affairs, Volume 82 No.4, July/August 2003, p. 41-58, 




A future ground force to fight a present enemy? 
Even before the situation in Iraq got problematic, the future role and shape of ground forces 
was discussed in different publications. William R. Hawkins had shortly before the war in Iraq 
written in Parameters: “The Army must be able to field a balance of units effective in 
operations from the heavy to the light ends of the conflict spectrum. Some lighter-equipped 
units are needed for certain missions and as a rapid reaction/deterrent/vanguard force. At 
the same time, larger, heavier-equipped units also must be retained and be capable of timely 
deployment.”851 Hawkins did therefore argue more against an only Transformation e.g. 
Objective Force. After the initial success of the more or less legacy units on the road towards 
Baghdad, Peter A. Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, and Colonel David E. Johnson, 
all of them employed by RAND, wrote: “Nevertheless, one potentially important lesson 
learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom is that existing US military forces are more than 
adequate for major combat operations in a non-nuclear environment against forces with 
second-tier technology and questionable quality.”852 And the three authors argued further: 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom has illuminated the usefulness of heavy armor coupled with 
mechanized or motorized, but dismountable, infantry in suburban and urban terrain.”853 The 
authors even questioned the necessity of the FCS or Objective Force altogether: “If the past 
decade is any guide, the US Army will spend most of its time in the next decade or more on 
stability operations. This calls into question the need for the expensive and very high-tech FCS 
combat vehicles for all maneuver brigades.”854 The urban terrain and the attacks by irregular 
units made armor necessary more than ever, but rather more as a measure of protection 
than a decisive element. Lieutenant General Brown stated as well: “The Abrams-Bradley pair 
clearly is world class – militarily and psychologically dominant. Would a lighter Objective 
Force, FCS-equipped, be as dominant and survivable?”855 General Brown therefore saw the 
legacy systems, the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley being part of the Big Five from the 1980s, to 
be even more psychologically effective. Their often criticized heavy armor and sheer size 
made them more impressive and nearly invulnerable against an opponent who relied mostly 
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on small arms. Only a handful of M1 Abrams were hit or even destroyed during the initial 
combat phase of OIF.856 Nonetheless, Army planners saw their doctrine fit to the new 
realities in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, the Director, CADD at 
the CAC, and Colonel Michael D. Burke, a Military Analyst, wrote in summer 2003: 
“Thus far, we believe, the [Field] manual [3-0, 2001] has successfully anticipated the 
environment and types of operations occurring in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Where the 
next operations manual might need emphasis lies in the presentation and understanding 
of second- and third-order effects associated with asymmetric land operations, and that 
should be predicated on a thorough review of military theory.”857 
“Asymmetry” was still, and would be for a certain period of time, a major part in the 
discourse on warfare. Major Robert M. Cassidy, a member of the United States Army, 
Europe, Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, wrote: “Asymmetric conflict will therefore 
be the norm, not the exception. The asymmetric nature of the war in Afghanistan 
underscores the salience of asymmetric conflicts.”858 What the United States Armed Forces 
encountered in Iraq was a blurring of civilians and combatants. Chester W. Richards 
incorporated this idea into the so-called fourth generation warfare: “In true 4GW, 
distinctions between civilians and combatants blur, so an enemy might seek to counter an F-
22 by poisoning the squadron’s mess hall, blowing up its barracks (as in Beirut), or even 
attacking schools and PXs back at the base.“859 And William S. Lind, director of the Center for 
Cultural Conservatism of the Free Congress Foundation, argued further that “In Fourth 
Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find 
themselves fighting nonstate opponents such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.”860 Lind 
criticized that the current Transformation did not really appreciate this kind of threat or 
enemy: “If you read the current Transformation Planning Guidance put out by DOD, you will 
find nothing on Fourth Generation war, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two 
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wars we are now fighting; it is oriented toward fighting state armed forces that fight us 
symmetrically.”861 But in the end, all buzzwords like 4GW or “asymmetry” did not describe 
something astonishingly new. Colin S. Gray argues even that 4GW is a rediscovery of the 
obvious and the familiar.862 Contrary to the descriptions in concepts such as Shock and Awe 
or EBO, the enemy surely had a vote in how conflicts and battles worked out. Colonel H.R. 
McMaster criticized these concepts in 2003: “The enemy is generally absent from these 
descriptions of future war. When the enemy does appear, he is quickly overwhelmed by 
American strength and the interaction between forces is limited to the application of U.S. 
military power followed closely by enemy capitulation.”863 This indeed resembles the 
jominian thinking which at foremost the United States Army scholars live.864 And Major 
Timothy M. Karcher, a student at the Army School of Advanced Military Studies, argued 
against EBO thinking: “A superficial understanding of the enemy’s culture will not determine 
accurately his likely courses of action or how he might react to one’s own actions.”865 
Similarly, Timothy R. Reese wrote in Military Review: 
“The enemy is not a lifeless mass of fixed buildings, information systems, or weapons 
platforms. Enemies do not surrender their strategic goals using a simple cost-benefit 
calculation. Mere destruction of the enemy’s means of war is not the true aim of war. 
Victory is achieved when the enemy’s will to resist is broken, and he is compelled to act 
according to his adversary’s will. Like water, the will to resist finds a path that allows it 
to continue, and wars fought primarily with precision firepower tend to leave paths open 
after strikes cease.”866 
The enemy’s “will” could not simply be broken through “firepower”. Here clausewitzian and 
jominian thinking do rather explicitly contrast: Jomini’s much more simple idea of winning 
battles by putting overwhelming force at the decisive point stands against Clauswitz’ war of 
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the “wills”. Major David W. Pendall, a Strategic Planner with the National Security Agency, 
argued similarly: 
“We should not rely on future adversaries to make the mistake of massing organized 
conventional-like forces and attempting to fight from fixed positions or from a definable, 
targetable geographic base of operations. More likely, future adversaries will strive for 
global dispersion, operate from networked structures, and avoid decisive engagements 
with conventional forces on land, sea, or air.”867 
Not only dispersion, but as well the usage of the environment in Iraq helped the enemy to 
fight a protracted war. Major Richard K. Sele, a civil affairs officer with the 351st Civil Affairs 
Command, saw the urban environment as an advantage for the enemy: “Future conflicts will 
likely be in urban environments, which reduce some of the U.S. military’s tactical 
advantage.”868 Apart from Sele, Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., retired, Army General 
and an independent consultant for defense matters, wrote similarly in Military Review: “The 
enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure American forces into terrain where Information-
Age knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the more traditional warfighting 
advantages of mass, will, patience, and the willingness to die.”869 While the Afghan terrain 
had been different than the Desert Storm terrain, now the fighting took again place in Iraq, 
not in the desert but in the cities. Following the New American Way of War and its emphasis 
on technological solutions, theorists and industry officials would certainly argue that with 
modern unmanned systems or the ability to see through walls, even the enemy in an urban 
terrain could be located and precisely destroyed. But Antulio Echevarria II nonetheless wrote 
in a 2004 War College study: 
“The new American way of war – which in practice amounted to small, mobile attack 
forces augmented by special operations forces and liberal, if precise, doses of air power – 
seemed, at least to those who wished to think so, to offer the possibility of winning the 
war quickly and relatively inexpensively. However, while this emerging way of war 
looked to employ new concepts, such as shock and awe and effects-based operations, 
designed to win battles quickly, it had no new concept for accomplishing the time-
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intensive and labor-intensive tasks of regime change more quickly and with less 
labor.”870 
Indeed, “small, mobile attack forces augmented by special operations forces and air power” 
had been successful in routing the conventional parts of the Iraqi Armed Forces. But, they 
were not prepared to fight an enemy hiding in suburbs and avoiding heavy clashes. 
Technology and the New American Way of War 
In general, the technologically-driven New American Way of War was discussed in a broad 
manner. Colonel Kip P. Nygren, Professor and Head of the Department of Civil & Mechanical 
Engineering at the United States Military Academy, cautioned in 2002: “Unfortunately, 
technology is always a double-edged sword. As it becomes more capable of providing 
positive benefits for society, technology also acquires more potential for injury and 
destruction.”871 But the thinking, that the United States must have the technological edge 
was widespread nonetheless. Colonel Kurt Dittmer, Chief of Combat Forces Capability 
Requirements, Headquarters USAF, argued in summer 2003: “If the United States does not 
continue to retain the technological lead and field new capabilities, at some point in time, we 
may see adversaries who determine that they can challenge us in a conventional war and will 
make engagement decisions based on that assessment.”872 Similar arguments could be heard 
and read in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Many participants in the discourse on technology 
throughout the analyzed period argue for the necessity of the United States’ technological 
advantage and its maintenance. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy R. Reese, U Director, Cavalry 
and Armor Proponency Office, United States Army Armor Center, even cautioned that 
enemies would gain similar capabilities: “The United States does not enjoy a permanent 
monopoly on the technology of precision firepower.”873 One of the mainstays of the United 
States’ technological edge, and especially of the Airpower concepts, was “precision 
firepower”. But Reese criticized: “An enemy’s ability to wait out, counter, or evade the effects 
of precision firepower neatly exposes the theory’s shortcomings.”874 Finally Reese concluded 
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that “Current experience in Afghanistan suggests that the effects of precision firepower are 
limited even against a primitive foe.”875 For sure a tanker would rather not laud Airpower too 
much, but still Reese himself used the terms associated with the technology and EBO 
language (“effects”). Airpower proponents on the other side were determined that the Air 
Force was at the edge of technological advance. Major General David A. Deptula, Colonel 
Gary L. Crowder, and Maj George L. Stamper Jr. argued in favor of the RMA: “Over the past 
decade, the Air Force has experienced nothing short of a revolution in military affairs in its 
capabilities to conduct counterland operations.”876 And James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air 
Force wrote in the Air Force Magazine: “Technology is creating dynamic asymmetric 
advances in information systems, communications, and weapon systems, enabling us to 
identify targets, employ forces, and deliver more precise effects faster than ever before.”877 
Roche not only used EBO speech (“precision“, “effects”), he as well brought the “asymmetry” 
into play, as an advantage of the United States again. And General Deptula and his co-
authors argued further, that Airpower could now on its own destroy an enemy ground force: 
“The Air Force has developed the capability to directly engage and render ineffective an 
adversary’s land forces – a capability that should be codified in doctrine.”878 Not only here 
did authors argue with the “effectiveness”, Colonel Anthony C. Cain, editor of the Air & 
Space Power Journal, did not even foresee the ensuing problems with stability in Iraq: 
“Air and space power will ensure that the stunning effectiveness that characterizes 
combat operations will carry over into war-winning, post-hostilities operations. The 
humanitarian crisis that many analysts expected has not occurred, largely because the 
precision-strike capability inherent in air and space power has limited the destruction 
that normally accompanies large-scale combat operations.”879 
Not only did Airpower, in the eyes of its proponents, limit damage, but “precision“ was 
inherent in Airpower. But others criticized that EBO proponents thought they knew 
everything about their enemies. The aforementioned Timothy R. Reese saw them rather 
falsely assuming that they could determine an enemy’s most valued assets: 
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“Precision firepower also assumes a number of things are knowable about the enemy 
when often they are not. EBO advocates offer policymakers a menu of desired effects to 
impose on an enemy. EBO advocates incorrectly assume the United States can accurately 
determine what assets an enemy values most and attack them. In this sense, precision 
firepower is a tool for believers in gradualism, escalation, and punishment game 
theory.”880 
Reese accused Airpower advocates to incorrectly believe in the possibility to escalate and 
de-escalate a conflict by applying “firepower” to punish and therefore coerce an enemy. And 
Reese described how Airpower proponents still mostly regarded conflicts as being 
conventionally fought and how they did leave terrorist groups or irregulars aside. That would 
only change in the discussions on COIN covered by the next chapter. But Lieutenant Colonel 
J. P. Hunerwadel, a retired Air Force officer, cautioned in early 2006: “Military operations 
today, however – even relatively small ones – can become too complex to rely upon genius 
for considering factors outside the traditional military understanding of cause and effect that 
may prove crucial for achieving objectives.”881 Gray sees therefore EBO as an oversold 
rediscovery of what military forces have always been about in action. For sure, all 
applications of military power are intended to achieve particular “effects”, and therefore the 
fact that new technology permits forces to be more precise in their behavior is simply an 
improvement upon what they have always striven to achieve. Gray concludes that EBO “is 
essentially void of meaning”882, putting it straight. 
Some authors then as well criticized the Airpower idea and argued that adversaries would 
not just let themselves be hit by the United States Air Force: “Instead, our competitors 
pursue strategies designed to negate the over-whelming technological and organizational 
competency that US air and space power represents.”883 Brian C. Dickerson wrote in an Army 
War College study: “America’s adversaries will modify their strategies and operational and 
tactical capabilities in an attempt to reduce U.S. technological advantages. Other state and 
non-state actors will challenge current U.S. military dominance in variety of innovative and 
asymmetric ways. They will not remain static in the face of American capabilities. They will 
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adapt.”884 And not only would enemies adapt, they would as well not let the United States 
win in a first and only decisive battle. Antulio Echevarria II warned accordingly: 
“Much like its predecessor, the current American way of war focuses principally on 
defeating the enemy in battle. Its underlying concepts – a polyglot of information-centric 
theories such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive operations, and shock and awe – 
center on 'taking down' an opponent quickly, rather than finding ways to apply military 
force in the pursuit of broader political aims. Moreover, the characteristics of the U.S. 
style of Warfare – speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision – are better suited for 
strike operations than for translating such operations into strategic successes.”885 
Echevarria therefore criticized the New American Way of War in its essence, disputing the 
possibility that an Iraqi Freedom-style intervention could be put to good use for a strategic 
end state. Boot already earlier rightly described how this Way of War was not suited for the 
long run: “Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the U.S. military has 
adopted a new style of warfare that eschews the bloody slogging matches of old. It seeks a 
quick victory with minimal casualties on both sides. Its hallmarks are speed, maneuver, 
flexibility, and surprise.”886 At the same time, the hallmarks mentioned did not really mean 
anything new at all: “Speed”, “maneuver”, and even flexibility had been touted as early as in 
AirLand Battle. But at least since the 1980s, if not earlier, the application of technology 
seemed to be the best way to defeat any enemy. But Steven Metz, Director of Research and 
Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 
together with Raymond A. Millen, Director of European Security Studies at the SSI, saw 
Airpower and technology as ill-fitted for the conflict which arose in Iraq: 
“If the United States reaches a point where all that it can undertake are rapid decisive 
operations relying heavily on standoff strikes, it will be like a 16th century armored 
knight or mid-20th century battleship – extremely adept at a type of combat that has 
declining strategic relevance. Winning 21st century armed conflicts will require more than 
servicing targets. American military strategy should thus seek rapid decisive operations 
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but also retain the ability to prevail in protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric 
warfare. To do this requires the versatility of landpower.”887 
This statement is interesting in two ways. First, the “armored knight” would certainly be 
exactly the description that Rumsfeld and the Transformation proponents themselves would 
use to describe the legacy force – not the Objective Force. But Metz and Millen used it to 
describe the type of force Rumsfeld wanted to have. Landpower or large masses of ground 
forces was the type of warfare the Rumsfeld doctrine did not want to put to use in Iraq. 
Then, second, the authors use “asymmetry” to describe again the other type of war that the 
Army did never really appreciate. But the legacy force, itself doctrinally unsuited to the war 
in Iraq that would follow the ground offensive, defeated the regular Iraqi Army with ease. 
Kagan even argues that the United States Armed Forces did not destroy Saddam’s regime in 
three weeks because of modern technology such as NCW, but instead because of the 
excellence in people and technology developed over the preceding two decades since 
AirLand Battle.888 Heavy weapons such as the M1 Abrams tank were indeed much more 
suited to the warfare in Iraq than FCS, Kagan writes: “Armor protection is essential for 
maneuver in the open, for urban warfare, and for counterinsurgency, and this unsung 
capability, created in the 1970s for a very different sort of war, was one of the most 
important factors that led to U.S. military success in Iraq at such speed and such low cost.”889 
Kagan further criticizes NCW for treating war as a targeting drill. In his eyes, NCW focuses 
entirely on the use of the military to destroy things and kill people, and thereby misses the 
point of war entirely.890 And Gray further argues how competent irregular enemies would be 
reluctant to present themselves as lucrative targets only set to be pulverized from the air.891 
There were however, some voices arguing in favor of a less technologically driven approach 
to the Transformation. Dr. Jack D. Kem, a retired Army Colonel favored a more 
comprehensive view: “We must keep our transformation efforts intellectually honest, taking 
a holistic, coherent view of transformation and looking beyond a gadget-oriented approach 
to change.”892 It is not surprising, that most of the more critical voices came from the Army 
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or Marine Corps. The Navy and the Air Force especially seem to inhabit military 
environments literally dominated by technology whereas the Marine Corps and the Army 
inhabit a type of environment that is far more complex and human.893 
Lewis argues that the Bush Administration, like the Johnson Administration in Vietnam, had 
placed too much faith in military solutions based on advanced technologies. By doing so, it 
misread the situation in Iraq.894 Not only in Iraq but in Afghanistan as well victory was 
declared prematurely. The United States would, almost a decade and the commitment of 
hundreds of thousands of soldiers and marines later, still be engaged in combat operations 
in both countries.895 Both conventional campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq could be 
considered a vindication of RMA-type concepts in that quality defeated quantity (or: only 
inferiority) with remarkable “speed“. But thereafter the United States Armed Forces were 
stuck in dealing with resourceful and determined irregular opponents, as Lawrence 
Freedman writes.896 Kagan even argues that had the United States simply developed and 
executed a plan as it normally would have to attack and defeat Saddam’s regular Army, 
there would have been enough troops on the ground to respond rapidly to a deteriorating 
situation, even if the pre-war planning had proved to be inadequate.897 But destroying the 
Iraqi military’s ability to continue to fight was never the major problem facing the United 
States Armed Forces in 2003.898 And the determination to use Shock and Awe contributed to 
these problems as that cocnept pays no heed to the post-war situation in-country at all. 
Shock and Awe share with NCW and the EBO the flawed idea that destroying enough things 
of value will be sufficient to force any enemy to stop fighting. “The enemy may or may not 
stop fighting, but the destruction of things of value may well complicate the development of 
an acceptable post-war environment badly.”899 While not fully implemented as neither FCS 
was available nor the whole force was really linked together, the RMA proved ineffective in 
achieving political objectives (stability) in Iraq and Afghanistan. And again Landpower as well 
as Airpower was needed to achieve the goals set, as will be shown in the next chapter.900 But 
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the Airpower discourse still flew high in the first few years of the 21st century. While “speed” 
was now not only connoted with Airpower but Landpower as well, still initially most of the 
military and therefore, tactical, successes where attributed to Airpower. 
3.2 Counterinsurgency, the Field Manual 3-24 and the future of war 
As the situation in Iraq deteriorated rapidly during 2004, critical voices gained ground in the 
publications. Obviously, pre-war planning had neglected to plan accurately for the 
stabilization after the high-intensity combat phase. At the same time, the orientation of 
especially Army Transformation was intensively discussed. This chapter will show how the 
discourse on warfare did take a turn away from the networked, High-Intensity Conflict 
imagined in the 1990s towards a Low-Intensity kind of conflict, facing the realities in Iraq 
(and less so in Afghanistan). The acronym COIN, standing for Counterinsurgency warfare, did 
get more attention as General David L. Petraeus and a team of authors then in 2006 released 
the FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. The chapter will also explain how Airmen discussed 
Airpower’s role in COIN and how, finally, the discourse on warfare would then again restart 
discussions if COIN would be part of the next future war. 
Stability operations 
Colin S. Gray, then Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies and Director of 
the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, commented in Spring 2005 on 
the ongoing Operation Iraqi Freedom: “There is some danger that the United States may be 
committed to a process of military transformation that is keyed to an inappropriately narrow 
vision of future war. Moreover, it is a vision that may lack empathy for development of a Plan 
B, should Plan A deliver less than decisive success.”901 Gray criticized the Transformation 
concept in its entirety. As Lewis describes, warfare with advanced technologies, primarily 
Airpower, was supposed to win the war without the commitment of large numbers of 
ground troops.902 But Conrad C. Crane, Director of the United States Army Military History 
Institute, described how that assumption or prerogative did hinder a quick stabilization: 
“Beginning occupations with a strong, pervasive ground presence to control and intimidate 
looters and deter potential resistance is always the best course of action, but this did not 
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occur in Iraq in 2003.”903 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen at the Strategic Studies Institute, 
United States Army War College described the flaws in American planning as well: “American 
planners appear to have underestimated the degree of instability that emerged when the old 
system collapsed. They expected many Iraqi military and police units to remain intact and 
switch loyalties, but none did. As a result, the United States did not have adequate forces on 
hand to deal with the massive looting and instability.”904 And Lieutenant Colonel John 
Gordon IV as well as Colonel Jerry M. Sollinger with RAND did argue in favor of Landpower: 
“As has been demonstrated several times since the Gulf War, ground forces are critical 
for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as other stability operations. It takes 
large numbers of ground forces – well armed, well equipped, and with the necessary 
command and control apparatus – to carry out these types of operations. Importantly, 
these are precisely the kinds of missions that will predominate in the next decade or 
longer.”905 
The stability operations which now gained a foothold in the discourse on warfare certainly 
favored Landpower as the type of force which was able to hold ground. But neither in 
AirLand Battle nor in the concepts surrounding Transformation ever had been huge numbers 
of ground troops to hold terrain mentioned (even in LIC!). While Airpower proponents and 
Army leadership as well had promoted quick and decisive operations in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, now there seemed suddenly to be another idea about what Landpower was 
made for, stability operations. In this type of operation, the adversary to be encountered did 
look and act differently as the one imagined with NCW or EBO. Colonel Richard D. Hooker, 
Jr., commanding the XVIII Airborne Corps Combat Support Brigade in Iraq in summer 2005, 
wrote how the operations conducted after the major combat operations differed from them 
and were a challenge: 
“In many ways the military problem in Iraq is harder today than it was during major 
combat operations. Only rarely can we expect to know in advance our enemy’s 
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intentions, location, and methods. In this sense, seizing and maintaining the initiative, at 
least tactically, is a difficult challenge.”906 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, a member of the United States Army, Europe, 
Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, described how the Army had marginalized the type 
of war it was now actually fighting: “As a result of marginalizing the counterinsurgencies and 
small wars that it has spent most of its existence prosecuting, the US military’s big-war 
cultural preferences have impeded it from fully benefiting – studying, distilling, and 
incorporating into doctrine – from our somewhat extensive lessons in small wars and 
insurgencies.”907 But Cassidy was positive that the Army would be able to adapt: “However, 
the lessons from previous US military successes in fighting the elusive guerrilla show that 
with the right mindset and with some knowledge of the aforementioned methods, the war of 
the flea is in fact winnable.”908 The “war of the flea” hereby stood for the asymmetric type of 
war an inferior enemy had to fight against the United States. Cassidy hereby referenced to 
Robert Taber’s War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare909, originally published 
in 1965. Taber described how the guerrilla would fight the “war of the flea” whereas his 
military enemy would suffer the dog’s disadvantages, having too much to defend against a 
too small, ubiquitous, and agile enemy to be able to come to grips with. Other authors, such 
as Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane were more critical towards the Army’s abilities: 
“American military forces would like to quickly win wars and go home, but the United States 
has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended 
American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.”910 The enduring 
presence as described by Crane would be absolutely necessary, as Major General John R.S. 
Batiste, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, and his Special Assistant Lieutenant 
Colonel Paul R. Daniels, wrote in 2005. 1st Infantry Division had recently returned from Iraq: 
“A true victor – long-term security and stability under competent civil and police authorities – 
will require persistence and patience. However, operations thus far appear to have validated 
the Army’s doctrine of full-spectrum operations – kill or capture the enemy, change attitudes, 
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and provide alternatives to insurgency.”911 Persistence and patience were inarguably linked 
to the terminus stability operations now used for the type of war fought. But Batiste and his 
subordinate saw the Army’s doctrine fitting, however. Thomas R. Searle, a military defense 
analyst with the Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, joined in the 
view that operations in Iraq would last longer than doctrine expected: “At a more basic level, 
our approach attempts to achieve rapid, decisive strategic effects on the enemy – and we 
assume that the enemy tries to do the same thing to us. Unfortunately, guerrillas follow a 
strategy of ’protracted war.’”912 British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, Deputy Commander of 
the Office of Security Transition in the Coalition Office for Training and Organizing Iraq’s 
Armed Forces, criticized the United States Army’s doctrinal stance: “In short, the U.S. Army 
has developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare, of a particularly swift and 
violent style, which left it ill-suited to the kind of operation it encountered as soon as 
conventional warfighting ceased to be the primary focus in OIF.”913 And John A. Lynn, 
Professor of History at the University of Illinois, looked forward to what the United States 
Armed Forces would have to accomplish in Iraq: “American troops must concentrate on 
state-formation and peacemaking, which require different tactics than conventional 
operations and a different psychology than the warrior ethos.”914 In sum, several authors 
criticized the Army for not being prepared at least doctrinally to fight the type of war now 
looming in Iraq. Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., commanding the Combat Support Brigade of 
the XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to Iraq, also criticized the Transformation idea: “Indeed, 
advocates of military transformation in the United States assert that technology has 
redefined war altogether. Nothing could be more mistaken. While the methods used to wage 
war are constantly evolving, the nature and character of war remain deeply and 
unchangeably rooted in the nature of man.”915 Other authors did proclaim a Transformation 
approach which was more suited to reality: “While the Army should and must keep most of 
its focus on the high end of the conflict spectrum (that is, ultimately, what armed forces are 
                                                            
911
 Batiste, John R.S. / Daniels, Paul R.: The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in Modern Warfare, in: 
Military Review, May-June 2005, p. 13-21, here p. 21. 
912
 Searle, Thomas R.: Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas, in: Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 2004, p. 
13-23, here p. 16. 
913
 Aylwin-Foster, Nigel: Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations, in: Military Review, November-
December 2005, p. 2-15, here p. 9. 
914
 Lynn, John A.: Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, in: Military Review, July-August 2005, p.22-27, 
here p. 27. 
915




created for), the reality is that the world and the nature of warfare are changing – indeed, 
much has changed already – and the Army must take a realistic approach to its current 
situation.”916 The argument, that the Army’s focus must be on the High-Intensity Conflict 
would still remain part of the discourse on Landpower because in the self-image the Army 
has, its main purpose is to fight this type of war. 
Indeed, as Serena criticizes in his monograph about the United States Army in Iraq, the 
Transformation concept’s focus on decisive combat operations was detrimental to the units, 
which were then charged with prosecuting stability operations in Iraq despite claims that 
Transformation enabled these full-spectrum operations.917 Metz would later-on state that “If 
the United States had been prepared to undertake a massive stabilization and reconstruction 
effort in Iraq in the spring of 2003, the insurgency would never have reached the level that it 
has.”918 Lewis argues that the people of Iraq naturally had expected the victorious coalition 
to fix their problems. And the victors themselves had expected to go home. But they had 
failed to recognize and understand the physical condition of Iraq and the psychological 
conditions of its people. As a consequence, a power vacuum emerged which then favored 
lawlessness and led to insurgency.919 The flawed assumption that stability would be a fait 
accompli of decisive combat operations had already led to an institutional disregard of 
training for and conducting stability operations before the war began and then led to a 
mismatch between mission and capability, as Serena writes.920 “The doctrinal guidance 
provided prior to and during OIF was developed for an enemy and an operational 
environment where linearity prevailed and uniformity was the norm.”921 In the eyes of the 
Transformation proponents, the modern battlefield was supposed to be programmatic and 
predictable. But the fight against an insurgency is not a technological task and predictability 
is unattainable.922 
An enemy off the books 
The United States’ opponents, as Serena writes further, generally have two options: either to 
inflict high losses early in a conflict in an attempt to turn public opinion against the war, or to 
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avoid a direct military confrontation and draw the conflict out over time.923 Robert R. Tomes 
described as early as in spring 2004, how the enemy in Iraq had already reached that state: 
“With the right cause, the insurgent can mobilize recruits. Combined with an intermixing 
of attacks on those aiding the new regime, a successful cause increases insurgent power 
while blunting the counterinsurgency’s intelligence capabilities. Over time, as the new 
regime appears powerless to prevent terrorism and restore stability, the mobilization 
potential of the cause increases when propaganda arms of the insurgency identify the 
new regime as the root of instability. Arguably, the Iraqi counterinsurgency has entered 
this stage.”924 
Tomes already in 2004 mentioned COIN, two years before FM 3-24 was published in 2006. 
Other authors, such as Eliot A. Cohen, the Robert E. Osgood Professor at Johns Hopkins 
University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, 
Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, a doctrine writer at the CAC and Lieutenant Colonel John 
Nagl, a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, did describe the insurgent, the 
type of enemy now to be fought: “Today’s competent insurgents are adaptive and are often 
part of a widespread network that constantly and instantly communicates.”925 These authors 
were participating in the revision of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Retired Colonel Joseph D. 
Celeski, a contributing writer and Senior Research Fellow at the Joint Special Operations 
University, acknowledged as well the network which the enemy used: “Modern insurgencies 
are networked, amorphous, headless, transnational, and criminal, and their doctrine is a 
complex gray stew.”926 And Major Lee K. Grubbs, Executive Officer, 2nd Brigade Special 
Troops Battalion, as well as Major Michael J. Forsyth, Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 25th 
Field Artillery, did also describe the enemy’s transnational structure: “The enemy has no 
national borders or traditional infrastructure.”927 Therefore the enemy in a stability 
operation did not fit into the image of war the Army had indeed propagated during the past 
20 years: that of a nation state. 
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While the Army had neglected the Low-Intensity threat in the past few years, participants in 
the warfare discourse now claimed that there exists even a modern insurgent. The problems 
the United States Armed Forces found while fighting against insurgents principally 
contradicted the image of war against a nation state, whatever technological abilities it had. 
Thomas R. Searle with the Airpower Research Institute wrote: “These new enemies generally 
lack the discipline and access to high-technology weapons typical of Cold War insurgents, but 
their undisciplined nature and the ever-evolving mix of different elements make them 
enormously complex. Worse yet, the old Cold War restraints have fallen away.”928 The 
boundaries, not only geographical, but as well structural and intellectual, posed a seemingly 
big problem. And what made the problem even more immense was that there was not only 
one enemy to fight against, there were different, with differing concepts, but with one 
objective, as Thomas R. Mockaitis wrote in an Army War College study: “The various 
insurgent groups have a clear goal and a simple, effective strategy for achieving it. Whatever 
their differences, they all want the United States and its allies to leave Iraq. They know full 
well that they can never defeat coalition forces. They do not, however, need to do so to 
succeed. They need only undercut the political will to continue to the struggle.”929 Mockaitis 
did, rightly so, as well mention the population of the United States as a part of the struggle: 
“The decisive battle may take place, not in the streets of Baghdad, but in the living rooms of 
America.”930 Mockaitis therewith brought a rather old concept back into the discourse: The 
homefront, where wars could be won or lost as well at home, especially those which are 
enduring. Similarly argued Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the Staff Judge Advocate, 
HQ Air Combat Command: “Most opponents of the United States no longer pursue 
traditional military victory, per se. Instead, they try to get us to perceive that the goal no 
longer justifies the anticipated sacrifice of American blood and treasure.”931 A protracted war 
against an enemy who did inflict losses on United States forces would, over time, possibly 
reduce support for the war effort. Dunlap reiterated later: “For insurgents, the center of 
gravity of American COIN forces is not their combat capability. It is the casualty-tolerance of 
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the US public that must, in a democracy, ultimately support long-term troop deployment.”932 
Robert R. Tomes did even question the political will of the coalition: “In previous 
counterinsurgencies, success required long occupation, something requiring a degree of 
political will that the current Coalition in Iraq may not have.”933 And Sarah E. Kreps, a senior 
fellow at the Institute of International Law and Politics and an adjunct professor of political 
science at George Washington University, argued similarly: “The centers of gravity against 
asymmetric adversaries may not be their infrastructure and command and control nodes, 
which are severely lacking compared to regular armies. Lacking high-value assets, the 
centers of gravity for asymmetric adversaries may become their citizens’ political will.”934 
Most certainly, the Vietnam memory was setting in again, as Lewis writes. With Kreps there 
could as well be found EBO parlance again (center of gravity, node). The United States 
Armed Forces could not be defeated in the field, whether in Iraq nor in Afghanistan. 
However, over time the expenditure of lives as well as hundreds of billions of dollars 
threatened to destroy the support of the American people. In other words, the war could 
well be lost in the United States, at the home front.935 This idea did surely awake memories, 
especially among those who were thought military history (for example about Vietnam). The 
concept of the homefront did gain renewed importance, not only because of the enduring 
nature of OIF and OEF, but rather as the military community realized which role, on one side, 
the media could play, and on the other side, how important losses were in times of post-
heroism. 
Meanwhile, not only where the so-called insurgents (who in the eyes of the United States 
government could only be insurgent versus the administration in Iraq which it had installed) 
networked and transnational, they blended as well into the population of Iraq in a difficult 
situation. Anna Mulrine, senior editor and defense correspondent for US News & World 
Report magazine, who reported frequently from Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote in the Air Force 
Magazine: “In counterinsurgency wars, the line between civilians and insurgents gets blurry, 
since insurgents and noncombatants live side by side.”936 And Lee K. Grubbs together with 
Michael J. Forsyth argued: “For example, an operational center of gravity in a hypothetical 
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insurgency might be a sanctuary within a sympathetic population. Denial of sanctuary would 
theoretically cause the insurgency to wither because of an inability to establish a safe base of 
operations.”937 Not only are there obvious elements of the center of gravity language to be 
found, but as well the population as a safe haven for the enemy. Therefore, the population 
had to be addressed first and foremost, as Troy Anthony Clay wrote: “U.S. success in Iraqi 
stability operations centers on its ability to establish a secure and stable environment. This by 
far has been the toughest challenge in Iraq. The inability of the U.S. and coalition forces to 
reestablish security has not only led to the large-scale insurgency in Iraq, but has also 
completely eroded the goodwill of the Iraqi people that we once enjoyed.”938 And Steven 
Metz suggested together with Raymond Millen, that there would be a concept necessary to 
stabilize Iraq which included psychology: 
“This concept needs to be solidly grounded in mass psychology, with the full integration 
of cultural distinctions. It should identify the type and phasing of military activities most 
likely to restore stability under specific conditions. […] And a new counterinsurgency 
concept is required to replace the current Cold War-era one, a concept that takes into 
account protracted opposition. The Army has published a new counterinsurgency 
doctrine, but this treats 20th-century, Maoist-style insurgency as a universal model, thus 
limiting its utility.”939 
The demand for a new Manual and new doctrine would indeed be fulfilled later on. The 
population as center of gravity in Iraq was therefore already well established. Interestingly, 
the techno-centric EBO language could now obviously as well be applied to population-
centric stability operations. Kalev I. Sepp, an assistant professor at the Department of 
Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, used the terminus center of gravity as well: 
“The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in 
any conflict – the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government.”940 
Hereby it is to be mentioned how the center of gravity was rather differently interpreted 
during the three decades analyzed in this thesis. Originating from a more geographical or 
equipment-related idea, the center of gravity became a rather esoteric target of “precision“ 
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weapons in EBO and now got as far as being the civilian side in COIN. But Christopher M. 
Schnaubelt, Deputy Director for National Security Affairs, Joint Strategic Planning and 
Assessment Office, at the United States Embassy Baghdad, did not believe that the United 
States had the abilities necessary to influence the population in Iraq: “The US military may 
be losing ground in the area where it is most vulnerable: the ability to influence civilian 
populations and – in concert with other US government agencies, allies, and international 
organizations – to provide basic needs and economic growth while concurrently developing 
national political structures and governing capacity.”941 Robert R. Tomes as well was 
negative in this regard: “Despite unparalleled improvements in military intelligence, the 
United States does not seem to have the depth and breadth required in human intelligence 
(humint) and cultural intelligence arenas.”942 But there were officers such as Major General 
Peter W. Chiarelli, Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division, who wanted to 
appreciate the situation correctly and try to stabilize Iraq by turning to the population and 
convince them of their cause: “We considered the fence-sitters as the operational center of 
gravity for both Task Force Baghdad and insurgent forces.”943 The fence-sitters were those 
Iraqis that, in the eyes of Chiarelli, did watch the situation from the outside of the “playing 
field”. Chiarelli and his co-author suggested more than only kinetic means to improve the 
situation: “It is no longer sufficient to think in purely kinetic terms. Executing traditionally 
focused combat operations and concentrating on training local security forces works, but 
only for the short term. In the long term, doing so hinders true progress and, in reality, 
promotes the growth of insurgent forces working against campaign objectives. It is a 
lopsided approach.”944 Kinetic was a rather new terminus used to describe military means, 
especially “firepower”. In the opinion of Chiarelli, a more diverse approach was necessary: “A 
confluence of military and nonmilitary operations defeats the insurgent. This requires an 
organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military 
elements.”945 
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Stabilization and reconstruction 
Therefore, reconstruction was then labelled as one of the countermeasures to the insurgent 
threat, differing much from the kinetic approach. Lieutenant Colonel Mick Ryan, 
Commanding Officer of the 1st Combat Engineer Regiment, Australian Army: 
“Every insurgency is unique; however, military-led reconstruction operations do provide 
the counterinsurgent with a powerful tool to shift support of the populace away from 
insurgents. Possessing the ability to destroy the enemy and make them irrelevant to the 
population through reconstruction operations is a powerful tool in any synchronized 
counterinsurgency strategy.”946 
Ryan as a member of the Australian Army had worked alongside United States Army units 
and took therefore part in the same discussions, perhaps with a different perspective. The 
terminus reconstruction operations suggested that the military should now as well re-build a 
nation’s infrastructure. And that would, rather interestingly, contradict the Army’s image of 
war. Possibly the authors participating in the discourse on warfare tried to show how 
relevant the Army indeed was for the Full Spectrum. What Ryan brought back into the 
discourse on warfare in the realm of the COIN idea was the “synchronization” which had 
already been an important part of the AirLand Battle. But nonetheless, in the first few years 
of the occupation, the United States just tried to kill the enemy, as it did in previous wars, 
and as the Army and Air Force wanted to do with their Full Spectrum doctrines. Lieutenant 
Colonel Jim Baker, working on the staff of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, criticized this kind of approach: “It appears straightforward to 
measure success in terms of dead or detained insurgents, and captured weapons, supplies, or 
territory. Certainly, this appears to be the most appropriate initial response to insurgent 
attacks and, perhaps, the best way to ‘drain the swamp’ in an effort to avoid future 
violence.”947 Baker saw two flawed assumptions with the so-called kinetic approach: “Yet, in 
this example, the would-be strategist has made two key assumptions that may prove to be 
untrue. The first being that more insurgents are being killed than are being replaced by 
whatever government tactics employed. Second that fewer insurgents means fewer 
attacks.”948 Here one can see certain lessons learned from the Vietnam War, where United 
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States officers had not only counted but also estimated casualties among their enemy. 
Steven Metz argued similarly: “The implications are stark; in the face of systemic failure, 
simply crushing insurgents and augmenting local security forces may not be enough to stem 
instability.”949 Metz therefore as well supported the idea of a comprehensive strategy to 
counter the enemy which encompassed not only military countermeasures, but as well 
civilian e.g. reconstruction: 
“A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy should offer alternative sources of identity 
and empowerment for the bored, disillusioned, and disempowered. Simply providing low-
paying, low-status jobs or the opportunity to attend school is not enough. 
Counterinsurgents – including the United States when it provides counterinsurgency 
support – need to recognize that becoming an insurgent gives the disenfranchised a 
sense of belonging, identity, and importance.”950 
And comprehensive was as well labelled by Metz as encompassing the whole live and even 
feelings of the population which now had to be accounted for. Eliot Cohen and his co-
authors, working on the new COIN Manual 3-24 stated as well in their article: “Mounting an 
operation that kills 5 insurgents is futile if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 
more.”951 Lewis writes in his monograph on the American Culture of War, how in COIN 
operations, it mattered that soldiers do not hide behind walls, in camps or in their vehicles: 
“A hundred soldiers out patrolling the streets and engaging the people can be more effective 
than a hundred soldiers mounted in M1 Abrams Tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.”952 
The United States Armed Forces’ initial hesitance to patrol the streets and rather barricade 
themselves in huge fortified bases would not help get things right with the population. While 
the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley had been hailed as decisive in the high-intensity phase 
of OIF, now they seemed to be too menacing and powerful for stability operations. For the 
United States Armed Forces, as military part of a western democracy, the use of heavy 
weapons to terrorize civilians never appeared either doctrinally and morally sound. But at 
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the same time, it seemed to be difficult to get the image of war to adapt to a reality where 
heavy weapons did not play center stage. 
An important part of the campaign against the insurgency would therefore rather be 
Information Operations (IO), another part of the comprehensive concept. “Information” 
hereby was not meant as the source for the United States’ advantages in the realm of 
Transformation. It was rather the realization that the communication to the civilian 
populace, or propaganda, was an important instrument to defeat an insurgency. Retired 
USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes argued: “Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted 
from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications 
campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations.”953 Hammes wrote further, how 
the enemy used modern means of communication: “Insurgents have been quick to exploit 
such powerful communication tools as the cell phone and the Internet for recruiting, training, 
communicating, educating, and controlling new members. They have shifted from mass 
mobilization to targeted individual mobilization.”954 Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, 
Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, therefore suggested: “We must learn to employ 
aggressive IO. We cannot leave this domain for the enemy; we must fight him on this 
battlefield and defeat him there just as we’ve proven we can on conventional battlefields.”955 
And Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, then senior military assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense, and Major Stephen M. Smith, a military assistant in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, suggested that the enemy was not abiding to the same rules as the United States: 
“Not bound by the same rules we work under, the enemy’s information attacks are very 
effective. Too often we have failed to take the initiative or even effectively defend ourselves 
in the information environment. We must look at ways to improve our competitiveness in this 
critical area.”956 Both authors as well claimed that the enemy was probably better at IO: 
“Currently, we do not respond well enough to deal effectively with enemies who can say 
whatever they want without retribution.”957 Sarah E. Kreps argued similarly: “In these 
asymmetric settings, much of the conflict may play out in the battlefield of the media.”958 But 
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it may have been possible that the United States Armed Forces at that time were like 
prisoners of their own language, their own discourse on war and its underlying logic. Media 
and corresponding IO were therefore identified as one of the less regarded elements of a 
concept to defeat an insurgency. However, more was necessary. 
The enemy as a network 
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor was the founding director of the United States Army and United 
States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. As executive officer to the Commanding 
General, Multi-National Force-Iraq he wrote about the analysis of the centers of gravity in 
COIN together with Major Mark S. Ulrich, a Special Forces officer with COIN experience in 
South America and the Middle East, then assigned to the Counterinsurgency Center: “Our 
aim is to understand the enemy’s specific strategy, get inside his decision cycle, and predict 
his likely actions.”959 Not only did Mansoor and Ulrich get back to Boyd’s OODA loop, they 
wanted to get to the root causes of the conflict in Iraq, using center of gravity analysis: 
“COIN COG analysis encourages the counterinsurgent to undertake tactical actions that 
address the root causes of conflict. It enables the counterinsurgent to achieve lasting effects 
that will survive successive unit rotations.”960 Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, a faculty member at 
the Army War College, as well promoted a systematic approach: “The only accurate way to 
determine a center of gravity involves using systems theory and taking a holistic viewpoint; 
anything else is just guesswork.”961 Eikmeier as well had to contend that there was no single 
center of gravity, as suggested by those who saw the population as the single one: “The 
enemy is a hydra with numerous heads and no single center of gravity.”962 It fits to Army 
thinking and discourse if an AWC faculty member joins an ancient serpentine water monster 
with reptilian traits from Greek and Roman mythology with EBO. But speaking about an 
enemy with connections to mythology and trying to fight him were two very different things. 
Colin S. Gray nonetheless saw the population as COG on COIN: “In COIN, the center of gravity 
is the people and their protection. The battlefield of most significance is the mind of the 
public. If people can be protected and believe they are protected, COIN is well on the way to 
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success, if not outright victory.”963 And Gray’s recipe would then be, accordingly: “If 
insurgents lose in the minds of the people, they lose, period. With superior intelligence, COIN 
wins.”964 But a few years before Joint Forces Command Commanding General James N. 
Mattis would ban EBO thinking from his doctrine documents in 2008, a submarine officer, 
Lieutenant Commander Muckian suggested the following steps to analyze insurgency: 
“The first step is to understand that the enemy is a network, not a hierarchy. Imposing a 
hierarchical framework on an amorphous organization will only hinder efforts. […] The 
next step is to understand that networks are very difficult to destroy, but they can be 
disrupted. […] First, attack critical nodes for maximum disruptive effect. […] Second, 
networked insurgencies do not necessarily have strong political cohesion. Attack the 
narrative by forcing the insurgency to respond to issues that are outside its scope – this 
can disrupt or even fracture the movement as each group responds to the issue 
according to its own ideology. Ideological differences are a primary cause of fracturing 
within networked groups. […] Third, attack the sources of support. This cannot be done 
effectively through traditional population control measures; the counterinsurgency must 
understand where the movement obtains its resources. […] Fourth, attack the 
information technology infrastructure of the network. A network is absolutely dependent 
on robust communications to function.”965 
When counting the word attack in this paragraph, one gets the feeling that only action or 
intervention is possible. Perhaps the Armed Forces are, in their own image of war, only 
capable, even forced to act. Muckian hereby brought most of the EBO terms and termini into 
COIN: the “effect”, nodes, the network (e.g. system) and “efficiency”. This thinking would at 
least partially influence the writers of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, a Manual published in 
2006.  
The new FM 3-24 in 2006 
The team of authors editing FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was led by Army General David H. 
Petraeus and Marine General James F. Amos. Petraeus had led the 101st Airborne Division in 
2003 and 2004 in Iraq. In-between returning in 2007 with his own Manual, he had also been 
head of the training of Iraqi forces. An airborne or light infantryman by military education 
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and training, Petraeus had already in the 1980s thought and written about other forms of 
warfare than High-Intensity Conflict. As a Major and Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, Petraeus wrote in 1986 in Parameters: 
“There has been developing, however, gradual recognition that involvement in small 
wars is not only likely, it is upon us. It would seem wise, therefore, to come to grips with 
what appears to be an emerging fact for the US military, that American involvement in 
low-intensity conflict is unavoidable given the more assertive US foreign policy of recent 
years and the developments in many Third World countries, particularly those in our own 
hemisphere.”966 
Petraeus’ vision would come true not only (on a lower level) in the 1990s, but more 
intensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. After returning to Iraq as Commanding General of the 
Multi- National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Petraeus published his own guidelines: 967 
“Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it.” 
“Map the human terrain and study it in detail.” 
“Every action taken by the enemy and our forces has implications in the public arena.” 
“Living our values distinguishes us from our enemies.” 
“Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that 
what works in one area may not work in another.” 
Petraeus used a new terminus especially fitted to the COIN problem: the human terrain. This 
seemed to signify the one part of “modern war” that could not that easily be grasped by 
military doctrine. But terrain is a typical military expression, a very geographical, physical 
one; now applied to and joined with a very non-physical entity: the human. At the same 
time, Petraeus expected self-reflection by his own troops. Petraeus emphasized his 
approach in a letter to the troops in Iraq: “Accomplishing this mission requires carrying out 
complex military operations and convincing the Iraqi people that we will not just ’clear’ their 
neighborhoods of the enemy, we will also stay and help ‘hold’ the neighborhoods so that the 
‘build’968 phase that many of their communities need can go forward.”969 Petraeus and his 
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FM 3-24 author team among other things proposed to map the human terrain. Therewith 
another facet of the modern battlespace took to the center stage. And Justin C. Gubler told 
how the soldiers and marines would have to work on the human terrain: “The only way for 
the U.S. to positively influence the mindset of an Iraqi is to build a relationship with him; this 
requires frequent visits and hours of socializing.”970 But there too did arise critics, such as 
Frank G. Hoffmann, a retired marine infantry officer and a national security consultant: 
“What the field Manual does not do is assist future commanders in understanding how 
different organizations, having different structures, operating methods and strategic 
objectives, may require a different strategies or doctrinal approaches.”971 And in the eyes of 
Hoffmann, the Manual did as well not work enough with IO: “The new manual does 
recognize the importance of the information dimension, but devotes just three and a half 
pages to the issue of media and information operations.”972 COIN expert David Fitzgerald 
criticizes then that while FM 3-24 did mark a significant shift from previous doctrine and 
effectively reintroduced COIN to the Army’s image of war for the first time since Vietnam 
(the 1986 Manual on Counterguerrilla operations and the 2004 interim Field Manual 
notwithstanding), the shift was only confirmed with the publication of the next FM 3-0 in 
2008.973 FM 3-24 suggested how military or, kinetic, measures and civilian projects should be 
rather optimally synchronized to combat the insurgency. Quality of life was dubbed much 
more important than the result of operations to kill insurgents. In different phases, the 
country where COIN took place had to be stabilized along Logical Lines of Operations (LLO) 
derived from an analysis of the insurgency. But to enact the doctrine as described by the 
Manual, the Army would have had to fundamentally rethink its service culture. Lots of 
historical vignettes and a scholarly bibliography contained in the Manual are described by 
Fitzgerald as an attempt to help reshape that culture by contesting the historical memory 
that forms such an important part of that culture.974 And the new strategy for COIN then was 
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not entirely based on humanitarian impulses; violence – and coercion – had their place.975 
Thomas H. Johnson, a research professor for the Department of National Security Affairs and 
director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
criticized together with M. Chris Mason, a retired Foreign Service officer who served in 2005 
as political officer for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)976 in Paktika, Afghanistan, 
how the new doctrine (or strategy) was put to use in Afghanistan and Iraq: “In both 
countries, heavy-handed and culturally offensive U.S. troop behavior and indiscriminate use 
of fire support turned rural villages into enemy recruiting centers.”977 Colin S. Gray argued 
that COIN doctrine is correct to identify enemy sanctuaries as important targets. But it must 
be apparent that the key to defeating an insurgency cannot lie in the removal of sanctuaries, 
as important though that must be.978 Johnson and Mason as well alleged that the United 
States Armed Forces again did not understand against whom they fought: “By 
misunderstanding the basic nature of the enemy, the United States is fighting the wrong war 
again, just as we did in Vietnam. It is hard to defeat an enemy you do not understand.”979 
They even suggested that the United States had somehow fought the wrong war in 
Afghanistan: “For eight years in Afghanistan we have fought exactly the way the enemy 
expected and hoped we would.”980 Gray as well wrote in 2006: “From the Indian Wars on the 
internal frontier, to Iraq and Afghanistan today, the American way of war has suffered from 
the self-inflicted damage growing out of a failure to understand the enemy of the day.”981 
Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and a combat Marine, author of 
numerous military books and articles, including The Villager: A Combined Action Platoon in 
Vietnam, and The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the End Game in Iraq, even criticized the 
mass media in the United States for cheering Petraeus’ new doctrine: 
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“Similar to Galula’s achievement in persuading academics, the theories espoused in FM 
3-24, Counterinsurgency, persuaded the mainstream media that General Petraeus’s 
forthcoming campaign in Baghdad was righteous. The FM appealed to liberals because it 
posited the concept of war without blood. Enemies were converted rather than killed. It 
was the only FM ever accorded a New York Times book review, written by a Harvard 
professor. In Iraq, every American brigade began to work along four lines of operation: 
economy, governance, security, and services.”982 
West demanded that the services teach more about the uncertain parts of war: “Our COIN 
doctrine needs a section devoted to uncertainty and humility. We cannot predict when and 
why people change allegiances.”983 Doctrine analyst and researcher Harald Høiback in a 2011 
article wrote how even formal doctrine could be electrified by linking it to a face and a 
history and in his eyes, that was the case with FM 3-24. Høiback argues that by adding 
Petraeus’ name to the document it ties it into a greater story, namely Petraeus’ personal 
history. “In addition to being one of the doctrine’s main contributors, Petraeus is a man who 
combines bravery in battle, wisdom in war, and a PhD in international relations, perhaps a 
perfect combination for fuzzy conflicts.”984 But mostly, Petraeus’s words focused on the 
people of Iraq and the actions of the United States soldiers and marines to influence the 
people. Not one of his observations was devoted to finding, fixing, and killing the enemy nor 
was he overly focusing on force-protection.985 
Airpower’s role in COIN 
But much critique towards FM 3-24 and COIN came from Airpower proponents. Major 
General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Deputy Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force, 
did not like how the Air Force saw itself in COIN operations: “Thus, it [the Air Force] 
undervalues the function of force in suppressing intractable insurgents. Perhaps most 
surprising is its seeming replication of FM 3-24’s relegation of airpower to an ‘enabling’ role 
as opposed to that of an independent maneuver force.”986 Dunlap further accused FM 3-24 
of being a “surface-minded” doctrine document, not taking Airpower into account correctly: 
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“Unfortunately, that doctrine relegates airpower to a five page annex in a 282 page 
document.”987 And Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Berg argued similarly: 
“Airpower’s proper role in IW [Irregular Warfare] has become a controversial topic. 
Complex challenges typically call for integrated joint and interagency solutions, yet some 
military doctrine depicts IW as a ground-centric activity in which air-power serves only a 
narrow, supporting role. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine corps Warfighting 
Publication (McWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, exemplifies that constricted view by 
confining airpower to a five-page annex in a nearly 300-page document.”988 
Dunlap would further reason that Airpower was more than only enabling in COIN: “The 
precision and persistence of today’s airpower creates opportunities to dislocate the 
psychology of the insurgents. Insurgents’ sheer inability to anticipate how high-technology 
airpower might put them at risk can inflict stress, thereby greatly diminishing their 
effectiveness.”989 Here Dunlap again used terms and termini describing the Airpower 
discourse: “precision“ would “dislocate the psychology of the insurgents” e.g. paralyze them. 
So insurgents now as well were measured by their “effectiveness” and Airpower had a 
psychological “effect” on them, as Colonel Robyn Read, a research analyst with CADRE’s 
Airpower Research Institute, contended as well: “Airpower can do far more than destroy a 
particular target – it can profoundly influence the human condition. Through selective 
engagement, airpower can support a recovering population; encourage one element while 
discouraging another; monitor, deter, transport, and connect; and assist in establishing the 
conditions for a safe and secure future.”990 So Airpower could work on the human terrain as 
well. And Dunlap would second that notion: “The psychological effect of air attack’s infliction 
of helplessness may exceed the physical effects.”991 The images taken looking through 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras and targeting systems of people getting blown 
apart by PGMs certainly made them look helpless, but not in the way the human dimension 
was thought by the Army and Marines in the realm of COIN. Looking at Fallujah, Iraq, 
Rebecca Grant would nonetheless cheer Airpower’s “precision“: “Air and space power 
working together can now engage targets with dial-up precision and immediate command 
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and control.”992 And Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief Air Force Magazine, argued similarly: 
“Airpower has proven to be a – maybe even the – crucial US edge in the fight against 
insurgents and terrorists.”993 USAF Major General Allen G. Peck even saw the global 
capabilities of the Air Force as decisive in COIN: “For instance, airpower’s ability to conduct 
precision strikes across the globe can play an important role in counterinsurgency 
operations.”994 Peck hailed how strategic bombers were used for CAS: “Innovation and 
adaptation are hallmarks of airpower. Cold War-era bombers, designed to carry nuclear 
weapons, can loiter for hours over the battlefield and deliver individual conventional 
weapons to within a few feet of specified coordinates.”995 But there were also skeptical 
voices to find, here Mark Clodfelter, then a professor of military strategy at the National War 
College: “Lethal airpower against insurgents works well only when they can be isolated from 
the ‘sea‘ of population in which they prefer to ‘swim.’”996 So the much-appreciated 
“precision“ was again praised by Air Force proponents and its use promoted in COIN. 
Some Airpower supporters went even further to argue that the airmen, or pilots flying above 
the battlespace, were especially suited for COIN operations. General Peck, continuing with 
his story of bombers doing CAS saw airmen as being adaptive: “Fortunately, adaptability and 
an inherent capacity for thinking above the fray are ingrained in the genetic code of 
airmen.”997 And Colonel Berg, as well attributed a special perspective to the airmen: “Experts 
at operating in the air, space, and cyberspace domains (all of them vital to IW), Airmen have 
the necessary perspective for devising innovative ways to exploit them.”998 Major Benjamin 
R. Maitre, a graduate student in the defense analysis department of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, even spoke about airmanship: “The concept of ‘airmanship’ allows aviators to go 
beyond simply flying an aircraft to effectively employing it towards a desired objective.”999 
General Dunlap in that place put the terminus airmindedness to argue how the airman could 
more than just propagate Airpower: “Airmindedness actually means more than that. It 
                                                            
992
 Grant Rebecca: The Fallujah Model, in: Air Force Magazine, February 2005, p. 48-53, here p. 53. 
993
 Dudney, Robert S.: On Fighting Irregular War, in: Air Force Magazine, October 2007, p. 2. 
994
 Peck, Allen G.: Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare, in: Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2007, p. 
10-15, here p. 11. 
995
 Peck, Airpower’s Crucial Role, p. 11. 
996
 Clodfelter, Mark: Forty-Five Years of Frustration – America’s Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents with 
Airpower, in: Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2011, p. 78-88, here p. 86. 
997
 Peck, Airpower’s Crucial Role, p. 14. 
998
 Berg, Paul D.: Airpower and Irregular Warfare, in: Air & Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, p. 21. 
999
 Maitre, Benjamin R.: The Paradox of Irregular Airpower, in: Air & Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, p. 36-




includes, for example, an airman’s predilection to especially value technology when seeking 
advantages over enemy forces. it reflects an airman’s desire to avoid the carnage of ground 
force engagements wherever possible.”1000 Dunlap even saw airmen giving decisive inputs to 
joint doctrine: “Taking advantage of the Airman’s way of thinking will optimize joint COIN 
doctrine because, among other things, the Airman is less encumbered by the kind of 
frustrations the ground forces suffer in battling a vicious and intractable foe without the 
expected success.”1001 Dunlap therefore saw airmen being less stressed by the COIN 
environment and therefore more adept at battling insurgents. The notions made above are 
striking: of all things the Air Force, which had dehumanized the enemy that far in scope of 
EBO, now claimed to be better able to battle insurgents on the modern battlefield, the 
human terrain. 
But what about the Air Force COIN doctrine in that case? Major Kenneth Beebe, then serving 
as the deputy information officer at II Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, contended: 
“Unfortunately, even as it appears that COIN will only become more common in the future, 
the Air Force has no workable doctrine for this emerging mission area.”1002 Beebe even 
argued that “The lack of COIN doctrine suggests that the Air Force deems it unimportant to 
include – a case of preparing to fight the wars we prefer and not preparing for the wars we 
are most likely to fight.”1003 Colonel John D. Jogerst, a retired C-130/MC-130 navigator, who 
had commanded deployed theater special operations aviation components for Operation 
Provide Comfort, OEF, and OIF blamed the Air Force for neglecting irregular warfare as a 
whole: “Contrary to doctrine and direction, the Air Force’s actions make clear that it does not 
consider IW a priority. It’s now fashionable in the Pentagon for airpower advocates to dismiss 
COIN as the ‘last war’ and call for an all-out push for modernization to prepare for war with a 
technologically sophisticated peer or near-peer enemy.”1004 Paul Smyth, a Royal Air Force 
pilot who had flown more than 2,200 hours in the ground attack and reconnaissance role 
and taken part in the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent no-fly zone over Iraq, wrote similarly: 
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“In light of an aggregate of over 13 years of combat experience across two theatres, the 
scarcity of specific air doctrine on the employment of airpower in a COIN campaign is 
startling.”1005 As a close ally, the United Kingdom and its Armed Forces fought alongside 
their counterparts from the United States in OEF and OIF and took part in the discussions as 
well. The United States Air Force did consecutively get an irregular warfare doctrine 
document in 2007, containing the notion that “Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly 
support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and 
coordination.” But “In other situations, Air Force capabilities may be used to achieve effects 
interdependently.”1006 Again one can found the EBO language (“effects”) and the notion that 
Airpower could be effective on its own. 
In the end, Airpower proponents would just repeat the idea of SOF supported by Airpower 
helping local, or indigenous, forces doing COIN by themselves. General Dunlap saw 
Landpower to be only marginally effective in COIN: 
“To be sure, a COIN doctrine compatible with America’s posture in the world, as well as 
its high-tech strengths, does not necessarily eliminate the need for ‘boots-on-the-
ground.’ It does, however, emphasize that indigenous forces should comprise the bulk of 
the counterinsurgent force ratios outlined in FM 3-24. They can be supported by US 
Special Forces, along with specially trained Army advisers, but the ‘face’ of the COIN 
effort interfacing with the local population should be native, not American. This blend of 
local ground forces reinforced with US advisers and sophisticated American technology 
can work; recent reports, for example, ‘showed the Iraqi Army to be considerably 
resilient when backed by Coalition airpower.’”1007 
Therefore, Dunlap argued (possibly quite rightly) that the so-called host-nation should fight 
COIN itself. Matthew Ford, a lecturer in war and security at the University of Hull, Patrick 
Rose, a senior analyst in the UK Defense Science and Technology Laboratory and Howard 
Body argued similarly in Parameters: 
“Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack 
capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective 
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military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-
scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-
building activities over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less 
definitive.”1008 
These authors indeed saw large-scale Landpower to be more a problem than a solution to 
COIN. Retired Air Force command pilot Phillip S. Meilinger wrote as well: 
“DOD’s leaders should re-examine the paradigm that was so successful in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. That was the use of air and space power, combined with 
SOF, indigenous ground forces, and overwhelming ISR. Given the outstanding results 
already demonstrated, an air-centric joint COIN model should be one of the first options 
for America’s military and political leaders.”1009 
But not only should Airpower help indigenous forces on the ground, it should also help build 
indigenous Air Forces, as Major William Brian Downs, a member of the 6th Special Operations 
Squadron, Air Force Special Operations Command, argued: “In some cases, rather than 
employ our own air assets, we should assist indigenous air forces so they can conduct 
operations against our mutual enemies. If a capable indigenous air force does not exist, the 
US Air Force should take the lead in developing one.”1010 And retired Colonel Robyn Read as 
well supported the idea: “We need to change the USAF’s mind-set from fighting COIN to 
enabling a partner to fight COIN.”1011 These ideas reach back into the 1980s as the United 
States was actively aiding other governments to battle insurgencies – as it had done as well 
in the Vietnam War with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). 
Effects-based Operations and Counterinsurgency 
While there had obviously been people thinking about Airpower doctrine for COIN, many 
discussions went on about EBO in IW. Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, then Vice-
Commander, Pacific Air Forces, wrote in early 2006: “If we focus on effects (the end of 
strategy) rather than force-on-force (the traditional means of achieving it), we can consider 
more effective ways to accomplish the same goal more quickly than in the past – with fewer 
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resources and, most importantly, fewer casualties.”1012 While Deptula was essentially the 
founder of the EBO terminology, others as well spoke his language in the Airpower 
discourse. So USAF Major General Allen G. Peck, who described the many “effects” Airpower 
could muster for COIN: “The fire hose of effects available from airpower operations can be 
focused where and when needed, according to the priorities established by the joint force 
commander.”1013 And Lieutenant Colonel Collin T. Ireton wrote in the Air & Space Power 
Journal: “The range, speed, and access inherent to airpower can make the multiple weapons 
effects associated with combined arms available to our troops over large or isolated 
geographic areas.”1014 Range, “speed” and access seemingly belonged ever since and only to 
Airpower. Colonel Tomislav Z. Ruby, Chief of Doctrine for the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, United States Air Force, promoted EBO as the 
overall recipe for COIN: 
“Effects-based operations are the key to attaining end-states in the Global War on 
Terrorism and other future conflicts. All students of military history recognize there is no 
immediate panacea for winning a war. But EBO never promised silver bullets. The EBO 
concept proposes that specific actions will result in specific effects, both positive and 
negative. The results in Iraq have been proven over the past five years.”1015 
Even if Ruby here admitted that EBO was no “silver bullet”, he saw the concept as having 
been proven in Iraq. Robert S. Dudney argued that EBO had saved many lives of American 
soldiers and marines in Iraq, at least in the initial invasion: “The effects-based approach, 
airmen maintain, dovetails with the American way of war – reducing risk to our forces while 
maximizing the risk to the enemy’s. In the Gulf, they say, the decimation of Iraq’s forces from 
the air likely saved the lives of thousands of soldiers and marines.”1016 But others criticized 
that notion. Charles Tustin Kamps had written earlier: “Ironically, even though the Air Force 
has fully embraced the modern interpretation of EBO, after-action reports from Operation 
Iraqi Freedom indicate that, for the most part, the service measured ’success’ by traditional 
attrition methods because of the high tempo of operations and the resultant inability of 
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headquarters to gauge or assess effects.”1017 And with respect to the difficulties targeting a 
networked insurgency, David B. Lazarus, a master’s degree student at the Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, contended in the Air & Space Power 
Journal in 2005: “From an EBO perspective, the challenges of targeting not a national leader 
but a globally dispersed network that is religiously and ideologically driven are profound. Al-
Qaeda truly represents the next generation of networkcentric adversaries, leveraging its own 
asymmetric advantage in employing its own objective-driven EBO.”1018 But EBO as well 
would help that no resources were wasted, as Colonels Steven D. Carey and Robyn S. Read 
suggested in Spring 2006: “EBO provides for synchronization of multiple actions to achieve a 
desired effect, and it encourages constraint in the application of power that could be 
wasteful or counterproductive.”1019 Carey and Read therewith argued absolutely in line with 
what EBO founder Deptula had argued five years before. Then Jim Pasquarette would argue 
in a 2008 War College Study: “Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of limited war 
are inherently complex – and lend themselves to a systems based analytical approach. 
Embracing effects based operations is a logical step.”1020 In Contrast to Pasquarette, who 
obviously saw the applicability of EBO in COIN, retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de 
Czege, one of the principal developers of the Army’s AirLand Battle concept and the founder 
and first director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), disagreed: “Human 
constructs are inherently fluid. Assigning mechanistic predictability to them in doctrine 
amounts to erecting false assumptions as dogma.”1021 Robyn Read as well had argued earlier 
that “EBO is most certainly not a checklist. Rather, it is a flexible and loosely adaptable 
process of affecting linkages within a system to achieve a predictable new behavior or 
condition.”1022 So EBO proponents themselves had to admit, that it was not that easy to just 
hit centers of gravity in a COIN environment. In the end, Marine General James N. Mattis as 
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command in 2008, banned EBO from doctrine 
documents, arguing that “Precision fires alone proved to be ineffective during Operation 
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Desert Storm in 1991, Kosovo operations in 1999, and more recently during the ‘shock and 
awe’ phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The inconclusive results of these operations 
underscore the fact that effects-based operations tend to be ineffective when used exclusive 
of ground maneuver operations.”1023 However, the concept remained in use by the services. 
Gray writes in his monograph Another bloody century: future warfare how the United States 
and as well the British Armed Forces were excited about what EBO suggested. But once the 
jargon and buzzwords are dismantled, the highly advanced sounding concept amounts to the 
praiseworthy intention to use military power with a view to achieve certain specifically 
desirable “effects”. So no matter how one explains it, the concept, stripped of its modern 
wording, is monumentally obvious. Gray sees EBO as carrying, beyond its unmistakable 
banality, a dangerous illusion. EBO encourages the notably “un-Clausewitzian” belief that the 
conduct of war can be precisely orchestrated, with the “effects” of particular enemies 
reliably predictable.1024 
Airpower versus Landpower 
Airpower advocates did not only struggle with applying their ideas to COIN, they also feared 
to be marginalized in OIF and OEF, as more and more ground forces, Landpower, poured into 
Afghanistan and Iraq to implement the COIN idea. Thomas R. Searle criticized the Air Force 
for not being proactive enough:  
“Airpower remains the single greatest asymmetrical advantage the United States has 
over its foes. However, by focusing on the demands of major combat and ignoring 
counterguerrilla warfare, we Airmen have marginalized ourselves in the global war on 
terrorism. To make airpower truly effective against guerrillas in that war, we cannot wait 
for the joint force commander or the ground component commander to tell us what to 
do. Rather, we must aggressively develop and employ airpower’s counterguerrilla 
capabilities.”1025 
The wording which Searle used (Counterguerilla) does not correspond with the termini used 
by the official Air Force document’s regarding irregular warfare, where COIN is included.1026 
But again the “effectiveness” was put into the foreground by Searle. Other authors even 
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suggested that the Army and Marine Corps wanted to focus too much unto the ground 
aspect, so Robert S. Dudney, in the Air Force Magazine: “The Army and Marine Corps 
concept of irregular war ascribes far more value to, well, themselves. That is, to say no more, 
a debatable proposition.”1027 General Dunlap would then even suggest that the 
abovementioned services would try to get more budget for themselves, using COIN doctrine: 
“What is, however, a concern is that FM 3-24 is being used (albeit not by its drafters) as a 
rationale to inflate the size of the Army and Marine Corps, a development that threatens to 
drain resources and energy away from airpower and other high-tech defense 
capabilities.”1028 And Dunlap further argued that soldiers and marines would be afraid of the 
technology the Air Force wielded: “Soldiers seem to be predisposed […] to be uncomfortable 
with any technology that might diminish or even displace the large ground formations so 
vital to their tradition-driven self-conceptualization. This kind of adherence to ‘tradition’ is in 
stark contrast to an Airman’s way of thinking.”1029 Dunlap therewith accused the Armay and 
Marines of being oriented backwards, at least technology-wise. Phillip S. Meilinger then 
reasoned: “If the US military could break the lock that the boots on the ground and the 
‘occupation of territory’ mind-sets have on strategy and switch to a more air-centric joint 
strategy, the end result could very well be more success – at a lower cost in both casualties 
and dollars.”1030 Now not only in conventional wars, even in COIN or stabilization operations 
there were too many soldiers and marines on the ground. And a more “air-centric joint 
strategy” obviously meant for sure that the Air Force had to get a bigger share of the budget, 
to finally destroy the enemy in an old-fashioned way, “with a lower cost in dollars” overall, 
yielding more “effectiveness”. General Dunlap even contended that “FM 3-24 gives too little 
consideration to the possibility that hearts and minds might sometimes be more efficiently 
and effectively ‘won’ without putting thousands of foreign counterinsurgents in direct 
contact with the host-nation population.”1031 Robert S. Dudney similarly argued: 
“Introduction of a large US ground force is a highly visible act, often breeding political 
resentment, especially in Muslim lands. US troops quickly become targets for attack by 
insurgent bullets, bombs, and broadcasts. This amounts to a grave weakness for a force 
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engaged in irregular warfare, in which support of ‘the people’ is of paramount 
importance.”1032 And finally Dunlap again reasoned how the airmen perspective would cost 
less lives thanks to its discipline: “Airpower offers casualty-minimizing advantages over 
landpower beyond precision weapons and other technologies. The air weapon is largely 
under the control of highly-disciplined, officer-pilots operating in relative safety above the 
fray. Decisions as to the application of force can be made without the chaos and enormous 
pressure a young COIN trooper faces under direct attack.”1033 Airmen were therefore even 
more disciplined, more senior than soldiers or marines, who certainly were mostly younger 
men than pilots were. 
The future war, with or without irregular enemies 
But Dunlap and other Air Force personnel not only questioned Landpower’s role in COIN; 
they also increasingly reasoned about the spectrum of conflict and COINs place in there: 
“Terrorists can wreak savage injury – especially using weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) – but only a peer competitor with a sizeable WMD capability can imperil 
America’s survival. This should give pause to those who ridicule so-called legacy systems 
such as attack and ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable bombers and missiles, 
and show-stopping weapons like the F-22A. As important as defeating terrorism and 
other low-intensity forms of warfare might be, considerations of the larger context must 
guide decision-making.”1034 
Dunlap here wrote about the larger context, meaning conventional warfare. Robert S. 
Dudney similarly suggested to think about the whole Full Spectrum, not only COIN: “The 
bedrock of current US military doctrine is ‘full spectrum dominance’ – the ability to defeat the 
enemy at any point on the ladder of escalation. It hinges on the ability to control the skies, 
swiftly defeat an invading enemy, and rapidly take the fight to the adversary. It requires, in a 
word, airpower.”1035 Airpower should lay its focus again more on gaining superiority over a 
conventional enemy. Rebecca Grant wrote about losing air dominance: 
“Moreover, the Air Force must contend with Pentagon efforts to downgrade air 
dominance in favor of increasing US emphasis on ground-centric irregular warfare. The 
Air Force’s core fighter force has gotten old. In the wake of the Gulf War, the Air Force 
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hatched a plan to acquire thereafter only highly advanced stealth fighters. That plan now 
has gone badly awry. USAF confronts the real danger of having insufficient numbers of 
advanced fighters for future needs.”1036 
And Lieutenant Colonel Rob Levinson, Chief, Strategic Plans, office of the Secretary of the Air 
Force, Public Affairs, Security and review division, argued further: “The current fight may 
belong to the Army and the Marine corps, but the future may belong to the US Air Force. 
When the nation needs overt military force, perhaps airpower will become the weapon of 
first – and last – resort.”1037 And Dunlap pointed to the PRC as a possible adversary who did 
exactly what the Air Force wanted, namely shrinking Landpower in favor of Airpower: “As it 
stands now, the United States is planning to increase its low-tech ground forces at the same 
time China, the twenty-first century’s emerging superpower, is increasing its defense budget 
but shrinking its ground forces in favor of high-tech weaponry, and especially advanced 
airpower.”1038 Dunlap hereby already showed a first glimpse of the next discussion looming 
on the horizon in the discourse on the possible future enemy and “modern war”. 
John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor of the Air Force Magazine even used the “asymmetry” 
argument to show how the United States had to invest heavily in modern aircraft and other 
Airpower technology: “Adversaries around the globe are aggressively pursuing new 
technologies to erase America’s asymmetric advantage in airpower, and their aircraft aren’t 
battle-worn.”1039 Tirpak hereby as well argued how the COIN operations brought wear unto 
the Air Forces aircraft, unnecessarily perhaps in his eyes. But other authors still saw the 
necessity to be able to wage low-tech wars, so Major Ronald F. Stuewe Jr.: “The danger to 
the Air Force of the future lies in the fact that developing a technology-centered force 
designed to fight large, interstate conflicts, by definition, creates a suboptimal force for 
waging small wars.”1040 And Colonel Willi, chief of the Personnel Recovery Core Function 
Team, Headquarters ACC, warned of the habit to leave small wars to history: “Although the 
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US Air Force must use its finite financial resources primarily against a high-end, near-peer 
opponent, it should not consign IW to the history books.”1041 
Nonetheless, different voices suggested taking a look at the peer or near-peer enemies, as 
they called now their perfected conventional enemy. John A. Tirpak wrote in 2008: “New 
adversary defenses have greatly expanded range, putting US fighters in danger far away 
from the target, and putting some targets flat out of reach.”1042 The anti-access idea, as 
mentioned before, featured again in military thought. Though, clearly it would not be an 
insurgent in downtown Baghdad that would make access difficult. Brigadier General Robin P. 
Swan, Director, Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Army Capabilities 
Integration Center at TRADOC and Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael, director and 
regional manager for System Studies & Simulation, Inc., thought again loudly about 
deploying Army forces globally and warned: “The United States can no longer take for 
granted that it will have the political access to theater staging bases, ports, or overflight 
rights that it has enjoyed in the past. Adversaries will, in fact, take overt action to limit U.S. 
regional access through a variety of means, including diplomatic action, threats, and 
coercion.”1043 Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, senior military assistant to the secretary 
of defense wrote together with Major Stephen M. Smith, military assistant in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense: “Additionally, while we attempt to improve our capabilities in 
nonlinear warfare, we must maintain our ability to defeat conventional military threats and 
deter the emergence of near-peer competitors. The challenge is to find the right balance 
without trying to attain competence in so many potential missions that we can’t do any of 
them well.”1044 General Chiarelli and Major Smith therefore suggested to not confine the 
thoughts only on COIN or irregular warfare. These statements came in a timeframe where 
COIN obviously dominated the discourse on warfare, being named as “nonlinear warfare” by 
Chiarelli and Smith. And finally Lieutenant Colonel Thomas McCabe, retired, a civilian analyst 
for the Department of Defense, saw the United States not having the initiative in a future 
conflict environment: “The enemy will have the initiative, and we will be reacting. Militarily, 
this means that we cannot expect to mass overwhelming power, as in Desert Shield, and that 
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we must expect to fight a war with little or no preparation. We must assume that the enemy 
will contest everything we try to do and that we may need to fight our way in.”1045 While the 
enemy had been only partially analyzed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, now a new type of 
enemy was being imagined. At the same time, Serena argues in his monograph how many 
military thinkers saw the current, post-Cold War conflicts as aberrations that distracted the 
military from planning for the next real war.1046 But Gray warned that even as there would of 
course be regular enemies in the future, they could be obliged by the United States Armed 
Force’s strengths to fight in irregular ways. Gray suggests refraining from drawing a 
misleadingly neat distinction between regular and irregular enemies and modes of struggle, 
which the United States Armed Forces like to do perpetually.1047 In Gray’s suggestions 
already a glimpse of the hybrid threat is visible which will get to the center stage in the next 
chapter. In his 2006 monograph Gray writes that future warfare must be assumed to 
encompass both regular and irregular combat.1048 It would be dominated by combat 
between professional militaries equipped with weapons that can kill or disable with 
“precision“ at a distance. In his eyes the demise of mass in favor of quality, is today the 
common understanding of the future of regular warfare in the technically more advanced 
countries. Therefore, armed forces would be smaller and equipped more lightly in the near 
future so as to be more agile in deployment.1049 Gray hereby not entirely, but at least 
partially gets back to the idea of the FCS and Transformation as well. But he is as well 
prisoner of the United States Armed Forces discourse on war, warfare and the enemy as he 
does discern regular and irregular from each other, categorizing enemies, or trying to. 
During the height of COIN operations in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, the United States 
relied heavily on “masses” of Landpower to reach a certain amount of security and therefore 
as well stability. The United States Army, Marine Corps, and coalition forces, reversed the 
situation in Iraq under the leadership of General David Petraeus. They turned what many 
Americans believed was another Vietnam-style debacle into a fragile, but lasting and stable 
peace, as Lewis describes. At least, until the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
emerged and occupied large parts of Iraq during 2014. Petraeus was able to change the way 
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the Army (and Marines) operated. He instructed soldiers to dismount, close with, and 
engage the people, not with weapons at the ready, but with the intent to gain “information” 
and secure civilians from insurgent threats.1050 But Porch argues that the renaissance of 
COIN doctrine filled a strategic vacuum in Baghdad with at best a system of grand tactics and 
no grand strategy. Porch describes further how COIN doctrine somehow “papered over the 
civil-military crisis of leadership in Washington with empty promises to buy time so that 
Iraqis could reconcile their political and religious divisions.”1051 In the end, Porch would be 
right. 
On the more positive side, the United States Army’s cyclical adaptation, going on parallel 
with its fight against an adaptive insurgency, in process made it perhaps more Full Spectrum 
capable than it had ever been, as Serena contends.1052 But he as well sees an affinity for 
applying familiar yet inappropriate terms to new concepts and operational environments. 
The depiction of cars, trucks, and motorcycles as insurgent platforms or the description of 
populations as human terrain are examples of the persistence of traditional conventional 
war thinking. According to Serena, these things occur because doctrine and weapons 
systems are slow to adapt to new circumstances. The application of old terms to new 
conditions is, in Serena’s eyes, emblematic of an institutional unwillingness or incapability to 
adapt to operational environments and warfare which do not fit into present doctrine.1053 
For the majority of the Army’s history, challenges to traditional war-fighting competencies 
such as MOOTW were seen as challenges to the organization’s raison d’être, and not as 
opportunities to learn and adapt but as irregularities to be dismissed or ignored.1054 In that 
sense, warfare with against peer or near-peer enemies is that much more convenient. To 
fight a peer would only require slight and incremental adaptations to the traditional, legacy 
force. But what is overlooked in this scenario is that, if the United States’ adversaries are 
deterred at the upper end of the spectrum of conflict by high-end strategic air, naval, and 
missile forces, a competent adversary would deny the United States its strategic goals 
through strategies and tactics that employ capabilities stressing the lower end of the 
spectrum of conflict.1055 While EBO parlance with the center of gravity got as well into Army 
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speech and was partially even promoted by Petraeus’ FM 3-24 and its LLOs, Airpower 
seemed to struggle with its role in COIN. “Stability operations” did not warrant 
overwhelming “speed”, but rather persistence; and as well not stealth, which would not be 
mentioned again after the initial successes over Afghanistan. The population-centric 
approach which favored Landpower was nonetheless criticized by Airpower proponents, 
who argued that airmindedness, and not the soldier’s view, would be the solution for 
insurgencies. 
3.3 The Field Manual 3-0 Operations 2008 and the emergence of the hybrid 
threat 
While discussions concerning COIN and the validity of the spectrum of conflict were going 
on, the Army had already drafted a new edition of FM 3-0 which then was published in 
February 2008. This chapter will cover discussions on the new FM and how the Army coped 
with the reality that regular and irregular enemies would not be that easily separable as 
done until recently in its doctrine. 
The FM 3-0 2008 edition 
The new version of FM 3-0 consequently included many of the lessons from the past few 
years in Iraq and Afghanistan, incorporating IW as well as COIN. In the preface, TRADOC 
commander William S. Wallace wrote about the era of “persistent conflict” in which the 
Army was standing at that time. Wallace described in an accompanying article in Military 
Review the approach Unified Action which had been already the cover name in the 2001 
edition: “The current edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex era of persistent 
conflict. The doctrine recognizes that military force alone will not resolve this type of conflict. 
Dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader 
campaign that requires the application of each element of national power.”1056 Landpower 
as a counterweight to Airpower was therefore promoted offensively, described as being the 
paramount instrument for the Full Spectrum. The Manual, or its authors, described the main 
approach as follows: “Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration 
of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to 
achieve unity of effort (JP 1). It involves the application of all instruments of national power, 
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including actions of other government agencies and multinational military and nonmilitary 
organizations.”1057 Unified Action somehow mirrored how the Army leadership indeed 
realized that stabilization and reconstruction, as it took place in Iraq and Afghanistan at that 
time, comprised more than only combat: “The nature of land operations has expanded from 
a nearly exclusive focus on lethal combat with other armies to a complicated mixture of 
lethal and nonlethal actions directed at enemies, adversaries, and the local population, itself 
often a complicated mix.”1058 But the measurement was still the “lethal” aspect of warfare, 
even when divided into “lethal” and “non-lethal actions”. What did not really change from 
the wording comprised in the 2001 edition of the FM 3-0 was how the Army saw its role in 
the Unified Action: 
“Modern conflict occurs in many domains; however, landpower normally solidifies the 
outcome, even when it is not the decisive instrument. Landpower is the ability – by 
threat, force, or occupation – to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, 
and people. Landpower includes the ability to – impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by 
force if necessary.”1059 
While the authors drew on the traditional terms such as the enemy’s “will”, they as well 
once more emphasized that only Landpower could ascertain the outcome – occupying land 
and convincing people to accept the United States’ superiority. Therefore, only the Army 
could “impose the Nation’s will on an enemy”. And what Airpower proponents had accused 
the Army (and Marine Corps) of, was indeed emerging from the new Manual: “Only on land 
do combatants come face-to-face with one another. Thus, the capability to prevail in close 
combat is indispensable and unique to land operations. […] Close combat is required when 
other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions. In that case, Army forces close 
with them and destroy or capture them.”1060 While Airpower supporters had criticized the 
soldier’s role and perspective in COIN, the Army even pointed out that only soldiers on the 
ground in close combat could convince an enemy to give in. Another constant from the 2001 
Manual was Full Spectrum Operations: “The Army’s operational concept is full spectrum 
operations: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations 
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the 
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initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.”1061 But 
while IW did not once occur in 2001, now finally the term had gotten into official language: 
“Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and 
influence over a population. This broad form of conflict has insurgency, counterinsurgency, 
and unconventional warfare as the principal activities.”1062 Therefore the authors stressed 
that “the operational concept addresses more than combat between armed opponents. Army 
forces conduct operations in the midst of populations. This requires Army forces to defeat the 
enemy and simultaneously shape civil conditions.”1063 Indeed, what had been criticized by 
articles in military publications for years did finally happen; the Army somehow managed to 
get away from the perfected RMA type image of war it had constructed together with the Air 
Force in the 1990s. The war reality after Shock and Awe sank in. “In particular, Army 
operations emphasize the importance of peoples’ perceptions, beliefs, and behavior to the 
success or failure of full spectrum operations and in the persistent conflicts the Nation 
continues to face.”1064 People were important, being the human terrain. Similarly, the 
Manual stressed how the opposite side in the conflicts the United States would fight could 
differ from the traditional Way of War as described in earlier Manuals: “Threats are nation-
states, organizations, people, groups, conditions, or natural phenomena able to damage or 
destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. […] Threats may be described through a range of 
four major categories or challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.”1065 
Even as the authors indeed saw these new forms of threats or enemies, they still tended to 
categorize them in a military way. But a glimpse of the coming hybrid problem was 
shimmering through: “By combining traditional, disruptive, catastrophic, and irregular 
capabilities, adversaries will seek to create advantageous conditions by quickly changing the 
nature of the conflict and moving to employ capabilities for which the United States is least 
prepared.”1066 
The Warfighting Functions described different terms necessary for warfare, which earlier 
were called Elements for Combat Power in the 2001 edition of FM 3-0: “The movement and 
maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve 
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a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is 
close combat.”1067 While movement was still understood in a geographical way, “firepower” 
got its place as well: “Fires normally contribute to the overall effect of maneuver but 
commanders may use them separately for the decisive operation and shaping 
operations.”1068 Interestingly, the Manual as well described the center of gravity in a new 
fashion, moving away from an only EBO approach, or relativizing it: 
“Centers of gravity are now part of a more complex perspective of the operational 
environment. Today they are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or 
moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are typically 
easier to identify, assess, and target. They can often be influenced solely by military 
means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and complex.”1069 
COG could now even be “moral”; it seems that again the Army was trying to merge its 
military language and its image of war with a reality and problem that would not be easy to 
grasp. But some of the EBO parlance could still be found, here in respect to “simultaneity” 
and “depth”: “Simultaneity and depth extend operations in time and space. […] Operations 
combining depth and simultaneity achieve a synergy that paralyzes enemy forces. This 
prevents them from reacting appropriately, inducing their early culmination.”1070 “Depth” 
was not only understood in a geographical manner but in time as well. And the talk about 
paralyzing the enemy still strongly resembled Deptula’s wording in regard to EBO. But 
neither the description of “simultaneity” nor the one of “depth” differed substantively from 
the one found in the 2001 FM: “Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and 
resources. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle. These operations 
contribute to protecting the force by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use 
them.”1071 Reading through the Manual, the reader certainly could find even more terms, 
text passages and statements which resembled those in older versions. And in the end, the 
anti-access idea taken from the 2001 QDR as well was spelled out again: 
“The enemy will seek to interdict U.S. forces attempting to enter any area of crisis. If U.S. 
forces successfully gain entry, the enemy will seek engagement in complex terrain and 
urban environments as a way of offsetting U.S. advantages. Methods used by 
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adversaries include dispersing their forces into small mobile combat teams – combined 
only when required to strike a common objective – and becoming invisible by blending in 
with the local population.”1072 
Hereby the Army leadership still got more conventional threats (e.g. the PRC or Iran) in its 
spectrum of conflict. David Fitzgerald then rightly argues that the key development in the 
new edition of FM 3-0 was no more than the elevation of stability operations as coequal with 
more conventional types of conflict.1073 Walter Kretchik describes how the 2008 Manual 
embellished the concept of Full Spectrum Operations form the 2001 version and was 
therefore more evolutionary than both evolutionary and revolutionary as it had been 
announced as. But the Manual placed more emphasis on stability operations and COIN, 
therefore it was deemed to be revolutionary from the service’s perspective, however.1074 
Kretchik notes further, that in the 2008 edition campaigns were differently defined, moving 
beyond more traditional joint service combat operations to include the reestablishment of 
civil authority after combat operations end, even when combat was not required. This 
change reflected, in Kretchik’s eyes, the thinking found in FM 3-24 and indicated how much 
influence that Manual or its authors had.1075 Linn finally argues how the 2008 FM 3-0 
repudiated many of the central ideas of its 1993 predecessor – the resulting transformation 
in the Army’s vision of war went far beyond the counterinsurgency Manual in his eyes.1076 
The new Manual was then positively commented on by Major Glenn A. Henke, a student in 
the Advanced Military Studies Program at the United States Army School of Advanced 
Military Studies: “The Army’s concept of full spectrum operations as outlined in the latest 
version of FM 3-0 is partially intended to advance army doctrine beyond thinking primarily in 
terms of force-on-force engagements, so we must ensure that our planning paradigms are 
truly in line with full spectrum operations.”1077 And Major Paul S. Oh, an assistant professor 
in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy, went further on to 
describe the future operating environment: “To respond to this future strategic environment, 
the United States will most likely be involved in three types of missions: expeditionary 
warfare to manage violence and peace, defense of the command of the commons, and 
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homeland defense. The land forces will spearhead expeditionary missions to ’contested 
zones’ to protect American interests abroad.”1078 But with Jim Pasquarette, a more critical 
voice expressed concerns and accused the Army of still adhering to the conventional image 
of war: “Although FM 3-0 outlines the spectrum of conflict – to include insurgency – a 
majority of the operational concepts apply to general war on the graduated scale due to the 
Army’s cultural bias toward high intensity conflict.”1079 When one accounts for all the terms 
and statements which were taken over from the 2001 edition, Pasquarette’s accusations 
seem to be reasonable. 
The operating environment 
Two different TRADOC pamphlets then in 2009 and 2010, respectively, described the 
operating environment (e.g. the battlefield renamed [!]) as complex and uncertain, here the 
Capstone Concept: “In simple terms, the future operational environment will exhibit 
uncertainty and complexity.”1080 And the Operating Concept similarly pointed out: “The 
future operational environment will be complex and uncertain, marked by rapid change and 
a wide range of threats. Threats to the Nation will originate among diverse populations 
where the advantages of dispersion, concealment, and terrain provide the best chance for 
success.”1081 The pamphlets in their wording followed similar statements from TRADOC head 
General Wallace: “The operational environment is characterized by uncertainty, chaos, and 
friction.”1082 The clausewitzian friction hereby was indeed joined by the chaos as imagined in 
scope of the AirLand Battle. And Wallace as well warned how “this conflict will be waged in 
an environment that is complex, multi-dimensional, and firmly rooted in the human 
dimension.”1083 The human dimension had indeed been established in Army thinking again 
through COIN, as an opposite to the EBO thinking from the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
2009 Capstone Concept, which had the purpose to describe the capabilities the Army would 
need in the future, even criticized the RMA approach which had been taken in this period of 
time: “RMA advocates, however, neglected many of the continuities of armed conflict and 
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did not recognize the limitations of new technologies and emerging military capabilities. In 
particular, concepts that relied mainly on the ability to target enemy forces with long range 
precision munitions separated war from its political, cultural, and psychological contexts.”1084 
The pamphlet’s authors hereby could not relinquish a directly aimed potshot against their 
Air Force colleagues. The Concept as well described how technology had proposed decisive 
victories which then did not take place: 
“Recent and ongoing conflicts have highlighted possibilities as well as limitations 
associated with new and emerging technologies. While surveillance, information, and 
precision strike technologies have improved the joint force’s ability to see its own forces, 
identify visible enemy, share information, and apply joint combat power, it is clear that 
these capabilities cannot deliver rapid or decisive victories when confronting determined, 
adaptive enemies in complex environments.”1085 
But not only would enemies be adaptive, they would also know how to impede the United 
States’ capabilities: “Threat capabilities will also improve. For example, enemy forces will use 
complex and urban terrain to avoid U.S. and allied surveillance capabilities while emerging 
technologies will permit enemy forces to reduce equipment signatures. Future adversaries 
will use commercial off-the-shelf capabilities (to include information technology) to construct 
a well-organized, dispersed force capable of complex operations.”1086 Krepinevich had 
already warned in the early 1990s that the United States themselves would, thanks to its 
technological advances, yield enemies like the Streetfighter State. Scott Stephenson 
concluded in a 2010 edition of Military Review, how the United States had now seen the 
limits of the RMA: “Now, 19 years after Desert Storm, we have been offered a dose of 
humility that might moderate our faith in technology.”1087 Major Irvin Oliver, an instructor of 
international relations at the United States Military Academy similarly argued how the 
technological edge was limited through its diffusion and therefore, through off-the-shelf 
products, available to everyone: “Technology continues to advance and evolve at ever-
increasing rates, resulting in a much more rapid diffusion of its powers to potential enemies. 
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This constant change limits U.S. ability to rely on a technological advantage against 
conventional or irregular forces.”1088 
The 2009 Capstone Concept did evolve the threat accordingly and showed how the 
technology would empower the enemies of the United States: “Potential enemies will 
increase the range, accuracy, and lethality of direct and indirect fire weapons capabilities as 
state and nonstate threats upgrade older systems with new ammunition and readily 
available technology (such as commercially available geographic information system data to 
improve targeting).”1089 Paul S. Oh argued also that “technology’s availability and ease of 
transfer allow broader access to previously unavailable weapons.”1090 And Oh concluded 
how “adversaries will continue to benefit from wide availability of weapons, and they will 
continue to modify what is cheaply available to cause maximum damage on U.S. forces.”1091 
To prevail in this environment and against these technologically-empowered enemies, the 
Capstone Concept emphasized that the Army primarily needed to be able to fight as a 
combined arms team: “The ability to fight as a combined arms team – to integrate fire and 
maneuver and appropriate combinations of infantry, mobile protected firepower, offensive 
and defensive fires, engineers, Army aviation, and joint capabilities – will remain the Army’s 
most fundamental and important competency.”1092 The Operating Concept then featured a 
comprehensive description of how combined arms in an era of persistent conflict would look 
like: “To overcome complex adaptive threats in the future, Army forces apply an expanded 
understanding of combined arms that incorporates the broad range of civil and military 
capabilities necessary to achieve strategic goals and objectives.”1093 Not only did the Concept 
take civil and military capabilities into account, its authors did as well incorporate a range of 
traditional terms in a statement regarding the enemy’s “balance” and his “will”: “Army 
forces conduct combined arms maneuver to throw the enemy off balance, follow up rapidly 
to prevent recovery, and destroy his will to fight.”1094 The fight against the enemy therefore 
still incorporated the boxing-match-like struggle and contest of “wills” as well as “maneuver” 
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in a geographical manner. To be victorious in this battle the Army had still to be able to fight 
the Full Spectrum Operations, as General Wallace had described in 2008: “The Army’s 
operational concept – full-spectrum operations – requires continuous simultaneous offensive, 
defensive, stability or civil-support tasks.”1095 And the Operating Concept in 2010 as well 
demanded the capability to fight simultaneously in different types of operations: “Army 
forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously to 
defeat enemies and secure populations.”1096 This description brings reminiscences of marine 
General Charles C. Krulaks Three Block War in the late 1990s, a concept that described the 
complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In 
Krulaks’ thesis, soldiers would be required to conduct full-scale military action, peacekeeping 
operations, and humanitarian aid within the space of three contiguous city blocks.1097 But 
overall there were also critical voices against the shift which the United States Armed Forces 
did in these years towards COIN. Some authors even argued that there was too much 
emphasis on the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Scott Stephenson wrote in 2010: “The 
United States faces an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Yet the Pentagon will not have the 
luxury of putting an exclusive emphasis on counterinsurgency. There are just too many other, 
different dangers on the horizon.”1098 And in Summer 2011, Major General Michael S. Tucker, 
commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, and Major Jason P. Conroy, chief of Operational 
Assessments at the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, and the author of 
Heavy Metal: a Tank Company’s Battle to Baghdad, wrote in Military Review: “If we have 
learned anything from the current conflicts, it is that our enemies will seek to use a full array 
of threats against us. They will employ a mixture of these threats and transition among them 
over the course of an extended campaign.”1099 Tucker and Conroy then as well mourned the 
degradation of more traditional capabilities: “Maneuvering mounted forces to close with and 
destroy the enemy through direct and indirect fire is quickly becoming a lost art. Today’s 
maneuver organizations are very good at operating at the independent platoon level, but 
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they cannot operate as a maneuver element in an integrated combined arms force.”1100 The 
description shows how these authors indeed feared an ongoing reconstruction of the Army’s 
units towards a more COIN-oriented force, which they criticized and saw as endangering the 
conventional capabilities that the Army had built over two decades. The discourse on war 
and warfare which the Army inherently cultivates hereby holds frontiers that cannot be 
overcome; the Army’s main purpose still is to fight decisively against a peer enemy, a regular 
one fighting with conventional means mainly. 
A Hybrid threat 
While therefore some authors encouraged the Army’s leadership to strengthen conventional 
concepts again, others deemed a blended form of threat or enemy more important. Retired 
Colonel John J. McCuen, an author and consultant on counterinsurgency warfare, argued in a 
Military Review article: “Our enemies’ strategic and tactical objectives are thus not to 
destroy our conventional military forces and seize critical terrain, but to seize, control, and 
defend critical human terrain until we give up the fight.”1101 While McCuen used the human 
terrain coined later by Petraeus, he then wrote further how wars today were fought in a 
hybrid manner: 
“Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought 
not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict 
zone population, the home front population, and the international community 
population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately 
determine success or failure.”1102 
The terminus hybrid wars had already been coined by Lieutenant General James N. Mattis 
and retired Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman in a 2005 Proceedings Magazine article 
(referring to a Four Block War [!], the additional element being the psychological or 
“information” aspect) and even earlier by William J. Nemeth in a study on Chechnya.1103 
McCuen then added a quite comprehensive description of these hybrid wars, which would 
later make its way in official Army parlance: 
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“Thus, hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which 
intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces 
and targets while they must simultaneously – and more decisively – attempt to achieve 
control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them 
(stability operations). Hybrid conflicts therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical 
and conceptual dimensions.”1104 
McCuen would with his definition of “Hybrid conflicts” be even more comprehensive as the 
Army as an institution. He saw “physical and conceptual dimensions”, imagining a war 
without the discoursive constraints that the Army imposed on its own image of war. Michael 
W. Isherwood, a retired USAF colonel, fighter pilot and senior analyst at the Northrop 
Grumman Analysis Center, described the hybrid threat similarly in a 2009 Air Force Magazine 
article: “Hybrid warfare blurs the distinction between pure conventional and pure irregular 
warfare. At present, it is also a term with at least three applications. Hybrid can refer, first, to 
the battlespace environment and conditions; second, to enemy strategy choices; and third, to 
the type of force the US should build and maintain.”1105 But the term hybrid only described 
something that military thinkers had already had in their minds earlier. Indeed, the FM 100-5 
1993 edition had already spoken about a combination of conventional and unconventional 
warfare existing side by side: 
“The components of battle can be joined in a limitless array of complex combinations. 
Army forces maneuver to bring firepower on the enemy, and bring firepower on the 
enemy in order to maneuver. […] Unconventional and conventional warfare can exist 
side by side, the one flowing to the other and back again. […] the commander does 
everything in his power to throw the enemy off balance, to strike the enemy with 
powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions, and to press the fight to the 
end.”1106 
While the TRADOC pamphlets in the years 2009 and 2010 did incorporate some very small 
hints towards the hybrid threat, only a 2011 Change (C1) to the FM 3-0 from 2008 did 
incorporate inserts regarding the new concept or buzzword hybrid. One of them read: “A 
hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, 
criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve 
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mutually benefitting effects.”1107 And while FM 3-0 C1 did describe the range of threats from 
nation-states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life, 
vital resources, or institutions, it categorized them as either “traditional, irregular, 
catastrophic, and disruptive”1108, still in a very military fashion. Future enemies (or now 
called adversaries as well, using a very new wording) would then try to blend these 
categories and make it that more difficult to fight them in process: “Adversaries seek to 
create an advantage over U.S. forces by combining traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and 
disruptive capabilities. These combined threats change the nature of the conflict, enabling 
adversaries to use capabilities for which the United States is least prepared. Adversaries seek 
to interdict U.S. forces attempting to enter any area of crisis.”1109 The whole hybrid concept 
was somehow a merge between the United States’ experiences in Afghanistan as well as a 
hint towards the emerging Chinese capabilities, which will be examined in-depth in the next 
chapter. The anti-access threat was used to show how, even if the United States’ forces got 
into the fight, the enemy would use every mean at his disposal to make it harder for the 
services to fight him: 
“If U.S. forces successfully gain entry, adversaries often engage them in complex terrain 
and urban environments to offset U.S. advantages. Methods used by adversaries include 
dispersing their forces into small, mobile combat teams – combined only when required 
to strike a common objective – and becoming invisible by blending in with the local 
population.”1110 
The authors again described the United States as actor, being on the offensive (“gain entry”). 
While these descriptions indeed showed how the Army’s leadership was ready to accept a 
new image of war, the Army went even further publishing a completely new Manual in 
autumn 2011. The new Manual was named Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified 
Land Operations, and should represent a blending between AirLand Battle and Full Spectrum 
Operations to incorporate both the conventional and COIN environments and the 
experiences the Army had made in the previous years. While the overly small doctrine 
document still retained core definitions of terms such as “depth” as they were in FM 3-0, C1, 
the main focus belonged to the hybrid threat: 
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“The most likely security threats that Army forces will encounter are best described as 
hybrid threats. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, 
irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and 
elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats may involve 
nation-state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy 
forces to coerce and intimidate, or nonstate actors using operational concepts and high-
end capabilities traditionally associated with nation-states.”1111 
The new ADP described the hybrid threat similarly as the FM 3-0 C1 had done (“diverse and 
dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal elements, or 
a combination of these forces”), thereby assuming that all elements would be employed by a 
single steering entity (“all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects”). Seen from the 
outside, it seems problematic that the United States (and many Western scholars) did expect 
the enemy to be a single acting entity. Even if that would make EBO-like actions easier, if it is 
not the case, the United States is mentally not able to cope with a real diverse enemy. Peter 
R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray argue in their 2012 monograph about Hybrid Warfare, 
that the United States Army at the least had acknowledged the “simultaneity” of combat and 
stability operations in its most current doctrine. In their eyes, the doctrine writers did well to 
eliminate the phased approach to combat and post-combat operations, for in the real world, 
they would blur together.1112 But Mansoor and Williamson criticize, on the other hand, that 
to counter hybrid opponents, the United States would have to first understand the 
characteristics of hybrid warfare. Both authors suggested that the intellectual apparatus of 
the American military, especially the Staff and War Colleges, had failed to understand the 
future by reference not only to the distant past but to the immediate past as well.1113 
Because despite its prominence as the latest buzzword, hybrid warfare was, according to 
Mansoor and Williamson, not new: “Its historical pedigree goes back at least as far as the 
Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC.”1114 Mansoor and Williamson then further argue 
that the “U.S. conventional military superiority, at least for the immediate future, will force 
potential opponents to develop alternate means to achieve their goals and oppose American 
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power. Increasingly, those means will include conventional as well as irregular – hybrid – 
forces working in tandem.”1115 
While these two authors saw nothing new in hybrid warfare, others would of course criticize 
how many threats now suddenly seemed to be hybrid. Major Christopher O. Bowers, 
currently a strategic planner at the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), argued 
accordingly: “The pitfall for numerous studies related to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare is 
that they set the aperture too wide in identifying who and what a hybrid threat is. It is only 
natural that every armed force will use any and every means available to it.”1116 Bowers then 
described what really made a threat hybrid: “A fully developed hybrid adversary will be able 
to transition between irregular or guerilla war, and highly conventional warfare in company- 
or larger-sized formations at will.”1117 While in Vietnam, the United States’ enemy had also 
tried to switch to a conventional war (from IW), now today Bowers saw theses enemies 
switch even “at will”. Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., the commander of the CAC, 
wrote similarly: “Combat experience and intelligence assessments often focus on hybrid 
threats that combine in a decentralized manner the characteristics of conventional and 
unconventional forces, terrorists, and criminals.”1118 Bowers even gave an example how a 
hybrid adversary would operate: 
“The Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein attempted to organize and fight against the US-led 
coalition invasion in a manner that many would call hybrid. They included conventional 
formations, tanks, artillery, and missiles. They also included ‘Saddam’s Fedayeen’ and 
foreign irregular fighters, suicide attacks, the use of human shields, information and 
media campaigns, and outreach to American celebrities and Arab populace.”1119 
While Bowers used the Fedayeen as an example how an enemy could resort to hybrid 
tactics, Colonel Leslie F. Brown wrote in a 2011 USAWC paper how “the enemies we face 
today as in the future will combine tactics, techniques, and procedures of both regular and 
irregular warfare to level the battlefield with the United States and its allies.”1120 While 
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Brown described the irregular/regular-mix as postulated by the Army’s doctrine writers, 
retired Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson, an associate professor at the United States 
Army Command and General Staff College, then wrote about what the advantage was to be 
a hybrid adversary: 
“Thus, apparently weaker forces can turn the tables on their enemies. With these 
examples in mind, one imagines that those who resent America’s current dominance in 
military affairs will seek (to resurrect another former ‘hot’ topic) an asymmetric answer 
to U.S. advantages on a modern battlefield. Al-Qaeda has given us a taste of this 
phenomenon, and one wonders what surprises the Chinese are developing. How many 
brigades of technicians in Beijing and Shanghai are at work countering U.S. advantages 
in surveillance technology, command and control systems, and precision munitions?”1121 
Whereas Stephenson’s description as well as ADP 3-0 lets indeed assume that the hybrid 
threat was somehow a conglomerate of the United States’ recent experiences as well as a 
return to the warnings the 2001 QDR had issued with respect to anti-access threats from the 
PRC or Iran, the discussions around the future operating environment and enemy did 
produce COIN critique again as well. 
Critique towards Counterinsurgency 
Colonel Craig A. Collier, the military assistant for Army Land Combat Systems, Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, directly criticized the 
COIN idea for providing security while simultaneously doing reconstruction work: “Just 
because we provided, for example, a micro-power generator to an impoverished community 
and put its grand opening ‘storyboard’ into a local newspaper does not mean the project was 
effective. It just meant that we spent a lot of money, completed a project, and perhaps felt 
good about it.”1122 Collier suggested that “killing or capturing an insurgent consistently and 
quantifiably had a more positive impact than anything else we did.”1123 And the Colonel went 
even further, writing that “the FM [3-24] appealed to liberals because it posited the concept 
of war without blood. Enemies were converted rather than killed. It was the only FM ever 
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accorded a New York Times book review, written by a Harvard professor.”1124 Collier, 
developing Land Systems (e.g. heavy military equipment and weapons such as tanks) hereby 
displayed an inherent critical stance against COIN, resembling the one from Tucker and 
Conroy above. While Collier had already shaken Petraeus’ status as savior for the United 
States in Iraq, Major Irvin Oliver relegated IW and COIN to their place only amongst other 
types of operations: “While irregular warfare is a likely part of the Army’s future, it would be 
unwise to assume that conflicts like counterinsurgencies will be its exclusive bill of fare. The 
Army may want to maintain a significant heavy force within the active component.”1125 
Major Douglas A. Pryer, senior intelligence officer for the British 14th Signal Regiment, as well 
could not depict real success in Iraq and Afghanistan in a 2011 Military Review piece: 
“Although Iraq is far more stable than it was two years ago, it might yet unravel into civil 
war. In Afghanistan, while the hope for an honorable peace has sprung anew with our recent 
troop surge, that conflict is best described at present as a stalemate.”1126 And this 
“stalemate” did not please typical military thinking, obviously. 
Mansoor and Williamson nonetheless write in their monograph Hybrid Warfare how as the 
United States military prepares for the future, it would be a serious mistake to disregard the 
lessons of several thousand years of recorded history. Both authors suggest that the United 
States cannot merely focus on the wars it wants to fight and ignore the rest, for messy small 
wars have a way of challenging the United States despite its conventional superiority.1127 
Mansoor and Williamson therefore argue that future wars would likely entail an increasingly 
vague distinction between the conventional and the irregular, being closely associated with 
the superpower status the United States enjoyed for a rather long period of time. Therefore, 
the forms (and categories the Army writes about) will meld into one, “thereby creating a 
hybrid form of war that takes advantage of the most effective parts of conventional and 
irregular operations.”1128 Thereby the supporters of a more conventional approach towards 
warfare did see their chance to change the course in the discussions on warfare again away 
from unconventional warfare. Indeed, Michael W. Isherwood, retired USAF colonel, saw how 
Airpower would play a role at the center stage in operations against hybrid threats: 
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“In hybrid contests of the future, US forces could confront state and nonstate adversaries 
who employ a range of what could be considered ’conventional‘ weapons – from guided 
mortars to cruise missiles to cyber weapons – in a manner merging lethal and nonlethal 
effects. The adversaries may employ ambush tactics one day while engaging in fixed 
conventional attacks the next. What is clear is that US air and space forces (in simple 
terms, ’airpower’) can provide the foundation for the nation’s response.”1129 
Airpower was not only presented by Isherwood to be a possible solution for hybrid 
threats, it would as well get again into focus as mainstay of the concept AirSea Battle, 
which was then mainly focused on the Pacific and its vast distance, were the Army 
traditionally did not have the same stance simply because there are not any more that 
many Army forces based in the region. 
Hybrid warfare indeed seemed to be the attempt of the Army to relinquish the 
categorization of regular and irregular warfare or enemies by blending them. That 
means that the categories were still there, in doctrine as well as in the minds of the 
soldiers, in the discourse on warfare. The vocabulary using terms such as “firepower” 
or “depth” still persisted. Either the Army could not or did not want to accept an end to 
the categories it used for decades. But the terminus hybrid was useful as it facilitated 
the blending of the war reality with which the Army had to get along with, and the war 
image of war it perhaps wanted to still uphold: the conventional high-tech type of war. 
3.4 The Air Force, Unified Protector and AirSea Battle 
As the Army leadership began (un-)consciously to tend again to a more conventional threat 
with the hybrid concept in 2011, Airpower advocates already wanted to show how masses of 
Landpower were no solution for future problems; not even in the operations that went 
along in Afghanistan or Iraq (where the United States officially ended combat operations in 
2011). This chapter will not only explain how the Air Force did argue against Landpower, it 
will as well cover the emergence of a new more techno-centric concept called AirSea Battle 
originating from a public-private think tank. 
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Airpower versus Landpower again 
Adam J. Hebert, Editor in Chief of the Air Force Magazine, argued in an April 2012 Air Force 
Magazine article against the presence of a large amount of ground forces in-theater: “Large 
US ground forces have worn out their welcome. They present tempting targets for insurgents 
and cede many advantages to the enemy in combat. America’s greatest military advantages 
lie elsewhere, such as in dominant airpower and surveillance and reconnaissance 
systems.”1130 Hebert would rather favor a combination of SOF and Airpower, bringing the 
2001 concept into the discourse again: 
“A much-smaller contingent of special operations forces and intelligence experts, 
backstopped by airpower, is a better long-term mix for Afghanistan. Special operators, 
remotely piloted aircraft, Air Force mobility and strike assets, and good intelligence can 
help Afghanistan’s government keep the Taliban on the run and monitor and kill 
terrorists. For the United States, a large conventional force in Afghanistan has become 
counterproductive.”1131 
As it seems, the ideal Airpower image of war from the beginning of OEF was indeed still 
alive: Airpower, SOF, now even UAVs. But indigenous forces are no more present; possibly 
because the newly formed Afghan Army did not impress that much. Retired Lieutenant 
General Elder, who had served as commander, Eighth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), and as 
Joint Functional Component Commander for global strike, United States Strategic Command, 
drew similar lessons from Afghanistan: “The first lesson for Airmen from these Afghanistan 
operations is the immense value of long-range strike, including bombers and fighters, 
enabled by tankers. The second lesson is the capability of airpower to enable the 
effectiveness of indigenous ground forces against more powerful forces.”1132 With the “long-
range strike” Elder made the new bomber which the United States Air Force wanted to buy 
(dubbed Long-Range Strike Bomber or LRS-B) since 2010 a necessity, putting again the 
“effectiveness” to use. And retired John A. Warden III even claimed that “Ground power, the 
oldest and historically most prevalent tool of conflict, is slow and normally affects only an 
opponent’s fielded”, reiterating his theories from the 1990s and propagating an image of an 
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outdated Landpower in face of modern Airpower.1133 Amy McCullough, Senior Editor of Air 
Force Magazine, wrote therefore in 2012: “The Air Force has been among the most 
adaptable elements of the US military over the last decade-plus of war.”1134 Adaptive being a 
buzzword to describe a modern force as well. Warden would even present Airpower as a 
bloodless Way of War again: “With precision of effect combined with precision of impact, 
bloodless war becomes a reality.”1135 Again, PGMs seemed to be the solution to almost 
everything, ending a war bloodless and therefore being more acceptable. And Adam J. 
Hebert wrote similarly: “This is America’s asymmetric advantage. The Air Force can project 
US power quickly, accurately, and with few casualties. Despite the unending harping by its 
critics, airpower isn’t going anywhere.”1136 Herbert here got again back to the 1990s Air 
Force speech, stating the asymmetric advantages Airpower brought to the United States. But 
other authors then argued against these theories still en vogue and presented, here Dr. J. 
Boone Bartholomees Jr., Professor of Military History in the Department of National Security 
and Strategy at the United States Army War College, critical voices towards the ideas: 
“Examples of the limitations of shock and awe-style strategies of moral annihilation come 
from the two US wars with Iraq.”1137 The limitations were seen in OEF as well as in OIF: while 
Airpower, EBO and NCW had indeed helped to quickly defeat the enemy in the open, they 
had not led to quick conflict termination in both cases as shown above. 
Nonetheless, different authors showed that the United States would have to look beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Cox, the legal adviser to the 603rd Air Operations 
Center in Germany, saw Europe and the Pacific as possible new areas for conflicts and 
operations: “Almost all of the major conventional military scenarios with which the United 
States is concerned these days require air-to-air power on scene as quickly as possible (e.g., 
defense of the Taiwan Strait and the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states 
along the Baltic, where we have only limited immediate capability).”1138 And in the Pacific 
especially, Airpower would be more important than ever, as Richard Halloran argued, 
formerly with the New York Times as a foreign correspondent in Asia and as a military 
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correspondent in Washington, D.C., then a freelance writer based in Honolulu: “Airpower 
plays a key role in overcoming vast Pacific distances because of its ability to swiftly 
concentrate forces and coordinate quick responses to crises.”1139 But Airpower advocates 
would criticize how COIN had deprived Airpower from its resources. John T. Correll, former 
Editor in Chief of the Air Force Magazine lamented in 2012: 
“In any case, the decline of airpower is still in progress, and the Air Force has already 
been cut so much that a bounce-back will be difficult. The land power culture in the 
Pentagon, strong before, has gotten much stronger. How much change it will tolerate 
remains to be seen. The imbalance in strategy and forces could persist. It could get 
worse. But it cannot continue indefinitely without encountering a critical crisis or 
challenge which – for the first time – the United States may not be prepared to meet.”1140 
Indeed, in early 2012 the Air Force decided to retire about 200 older aircraft without 
replacement, representing 5 percent of the overall fleet of 4’000.1141 Airpower proponents 
liked to deplore the degradation of the United States’ conventional capabilities and 
technological edge in an alarmist fashion, in the end even seeing an only Landpower culture 
on the highest military level. Rebecca Grant had as early as in 2009 written, that adversaries 
would catch up while the United States was occupied with COIN operations: 
“The biggest near-term threat to stealth is not in some foreign workshop. It can be found 
right here at home. The clear need for stealth aircraft for air superiority and global strike 
missions has all but dropped out of the national security discussion. […] Potential 
adversaries must be smiling at the prospect of the United States unilaterally giving up on 
one of its greatest military advantages.”1142 
Stealth returns here again as one of the most important means to win every type of war, 
enabling “global strike missions”. About 8 years before, Airpower proponents had argued in 
favor of a similar concept (Global Strike Task Force) in the realm of the opening strikes in 
OEF. But 2009 was also the year when the Obama administration stopped the production of 
the F-22 Air Superiority Fighter. This decision was debated heatedly and surely led to 
comments such as the one above by Rebecca Grant. In the very same year, Michael S. 
Gerson, a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research 
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center, argued that conventional capabilities would still be necessary in the near future: “The 
importance of the credibility of US conventional capabilities remains relevant. Future 
adversaries may discount conventional threats in the mistaken belief that they could 
circumvent US forces via a fait accompli strategy or otherwise withstand, overcome, or 
outmaneuver the United States on the conventional battlefield.”1143 Therefore, deterring 
future opponents would still be important, as then John F. Farrell and Adam B. Lowther 
would argue in a 2012 Air & Space Power Journal article: “Bombers designed for global 
precision attack, for example, send a clear signal to adversaries that the US Air Force can 
strike anywhere on the earth with speed and precision.”1144 Long Range Strike (LRS) was then 
the new conceptual name for the ability to strike globally. Major Wade S. Karren, chief of 
legislative affairs for Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), established at the end of 
2009 to improve the management of the Air Force portion of the United States' nuclear 
arsenal, described then what the United States needed to be capable of: 
“The United States must be able to engage flexibly or hold at risk targets anywhere in 
the world with conventional or nuclear payloads. […] These operations will necessitate 
more responsive space assets and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft 
with penetration capability supported by electronic attack or other standoff weapons 
capable of degrading a modern IADS.”1145 
The most interesting part of this statement seems to be the author and his profession. How 
would flexible strike be possible when a legal advisor was necessary? While technology could 
at one point be ready to strike flexible and fast, would there be time for political and legal 
discussions? In Operation Allied Force, one of the problems politically was the selection of 
targets. 
China and AirSea Battle 
At the same time, a modern Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) would not be found in 
Afghanistan or Iraq, so perhaps these were the wrong countries to fight a “modern war”. 
Marc V. Schanz, wrote in early 2011: “Future threat environments would not be as permissive 
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as what the US sees in Afghanistan, and the Air Force must be prepared to operate in 
them.”1146 Robert S. Dudney, then Editor in Chief of the Air Force Magazine, had as early as 
in 2005 argued that 
“nobody knows the threats we will face in years to come, and it would be a mistake to 
neglect our own development of airpower, given the military buildups under way in 
China and other countries. We’ve been down that road before. […] In a decade in 
Vietnam, the US lost 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft, the result of encounters with surface-to-
air missiles, agile enemy fighters, and dense anti-aircraft artillery.”1147 
Dudney did then elaborate on the PRC and continue, bringing the vast country into the 
discourse on the (future) enemy: “As the China case shows, the danger of big, regional 
clashes of modern conventional forces will be around for a while, and the US needs first-class 
weapon systems to compete effectively.”1148 And the very same author would again reason 
in early 2007: “Today’s major-war scenarios feature huge adversaries such as China, Russia, 
North Korea, and Iran. Against those foes, experts agree, US air, space, naval, and special 
operations forces would dominate, with conventional land forces in a lesser role.”1149 In this 
scenario, Landpower was not that important, as described above at the beginning of this 
chapter. Or even entirely negligible, if one did not count SOF to conventional Landpower. 
Richard Halloran then as well focused on China as the main possible competitor which the 
United States would have to face militarily: “China looms largest in US calculations. The 
uppermost question is whether the communist giant will use its armed power to attempt a 
conquest of Taiwan, the island over which Beijing claims sovereignty.”1150 Dr. Jeffrey Record 
had, as early as in 2001 after the QDR, seen China entering the center stage of planning: 
“The Chinese almost certainly would pursue an asymmetric war against the United States 
involving attempted preemption of US military access to the region; disruption of US sea and 
air lines of communication; and attacks on US command, control, and communications, 
possibly including satellites.”1151 Record already used the anti-access scenario. The anti-
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access concept began to feature high again at the end of the 2000s. Michael S. Gerson wrote 
in a 2009 autumn Parameters article: 
“China, for example, is developing a range of anti-access and area-denial capabilities 
intended to diminish the capacity of extra-regional nations to deploy, operate, and 
sustain forces in its geographical region. The ability, whether real or perceived, to 
prevent or weaken US power projection capability and operational effectiveness can 
undermine deterrence efforts. Consequently, the credibility of conventional deterrence – 
and execution of the threat if deterrence fails – requires convincing potential aggressors 
that the United States can and will rapidly respond to aggression against its global 
interests, and that there is nothing the regime can do to prevent or hinder the 
response.”1152 
Gerson already somehow anticipated that the United States would need a new concept to 
overcome the challenges a peer such as the PRC would pose (in defending itself against the 
United States, of course). It seemed to be a first since the end of the Cold War that the 
United States could itself be “deterred”, “weakened” or “prevented” from any action. The 
perceived “aggression” by the PRC was synonymous to it defending itself. Rebecca Grant 
had similarly argued in a January 2009 piece: 
“China is an avid customer for air dominance technology in every form, from missiles to 
aircraft carriers. Beijing does not much worry about global power projection, stability 
operations, or big land campaigns. China’s battlespace is in and around China itself. 
Chinese doctrine focuses on campaigns – a series of battles for local objectives. Rapid 
defeat of the enemy is the main objective and the preferred method is to inflict strategic 
and operational paralysis or even defeat the enemy with one strike. The air battle is 
absolutely central to China’s campaign plans.”1153 
And Grant therefore, logically, put Airpower already in the forefront of the efforts to 
overcome any threat by the PRC. Again termini such as the paralysis got back into the 
Airpower discourse, better fitting to it than COIN did at the same time. Techno-centric and 
easy-sounding, Airpower would rapidly paralyze the PRC’s Armed Forces, as it had been 
done to Iraq in 1991, by using Stealth and long-range means. 
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In September 2009 the United States Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, 
signed a classified memorandum to initiate an effort to develop a new operational concept 
known as AirSea Battle together with Admiral Gary Roughead, the United States Navy’s Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO).1154 But interestingly, some early thoughts on AirSea Battle would 
come from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an independent, 
non-profit think tank specializing in United States defense policy, force planning, and 
budgets. The majority of CSBA’s income seems to come from research support under 
contract with the Department of Defense. CSBA is still as of 2015 headed by Andrew 
Krepinevich, who had already in the early 1990s spurred the debate on the RMA.1155 
Krepinevich wrote in a 2009 Foreign Affairs article, how the PRC would manage to hinder the 
United States’ military efforts in East Asia: 
“The Chinese approach would entail destroying or disrupting the U.S. military’s 
communications networks and launching preemptive attacks, to the point where such 
attacks, or even the threat of such attacks, would raise the costs of U.S. action to 
prohibitive levels. […] Chinese efforts are focused on developing and fielding what U.S. 
military analysts refer to as ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (a2/ad) capabilities. Generally 
speaking, Chinese anti-access forces seek to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate from 
forward bases, such as Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa, and Andersen Air Force Base, on 
Guam.”1156 
While Krepinevich had already in his 1992 assessment warned that other nations would try 
to not match, but asymmetrically counter the United States RMA capabilities, he described 
in a 2010 CSBA study how the PRC would now indeed try to hinder the United States Armed 
Force’s entry into a battle: 
“China’s ability to disrupt or destroy key elements of the US military’s battle network 
could cripple US power-projection operations. The preponderance of US precision-guided 
weaponry, for instance, is dependent on GPS satellite systems for their targeting 
information. Some US unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Predators, are incapable of 
operating in the absence of satellite data links to their remote controllers.”1157 
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Not only would China jam or disrupt the space-based systems the United States needed to 
communicate, target and surveil, as many had warned before, the PRC would even act 
preemptively, so that the United States would be in the defensive in the first few hours or 
days in a potential conflict: “To defeat US forces, the Chinese military would conduct 
preemptive attacks (including cyber strikes) on US theater ports and airfields, aircraft carriers 
and large surface combatants operating in theater, as well as on logistics, transportation, 
and support forces, and US battle networks.”1158 Only one other country was perceived by 
Krepinevich as being able to test the United States resolve and capabilities in a similar way: 
“Iran, on the other hand, is primarily interested in creating circumstances under which it 
becomes too costly for the United States to project power into a far smaller geographic area: 
the Persian Gulf, which is barely 600 miles long and between 40 and 210 miles wide.”1159 
But while Krepinevich took Iran into account, a more detailed CSBA concept then mainly 
focused on the Pacific (e.g. the PRC) and argued how its name was derived from AirLand 
Battle: “Just as AirLand Battle doctrine development was spurred by the shifting military 
balance in Central Europe, a viable AirSea Battle concept must address the implications of a 
shifting military balance in the Western Pacific.”1160 As authors of this concept figured, 
beneath Andrew Krepinevich, as well Mark Gunzinger, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources, Jim Thomas, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy, and Jan van Tol, a retired Navy Captain and former special adviser in 
the Office of the Vice President. At the beginning of their paper, the authors described what 
the PRC’s intent was: 
“The PLA’s [People's Liberation Army] objective would be to deny US forces the ability to 
generate substantial combat power from its air bases in the Western Pacific; conduct 
major strikes using land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCM) launched from various platforms and submarines against all major US 
Navy and allied warships at sea within 1,500 nm of the Chinese coast, with particular 
emphasis on the maritime areas around the PRC’s littorals. The PLA’s objective would be 
to raise the cost of the US and allied fleet operations within this ‘keep-out’ zone to 
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prohibitive levels; and Interdict US and allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.”1161 
While the concept laid out how the United States’ involvement in a potential scenario in the 
Western Pacific would be impeded by Chinese Forces, the concept also described two 
phases in which AirSea Battle would take place to counter Chinese efforts: 
“The AirSea Battle campaign has two distinct stages. The initial, early stage, 
commencing with the outbreak of actual hostilities, would comprise these four distinct 
lines of operation: Withstanding the initial attack and limiting damage to US and allied 
forces and bases; Executing a blinding campaign against PLA battle networks; Executing 
a suppression campaign against PLA long-range, principally strike systems; Seizing and 
sustaining the initiative in the air, sea, space and cyber domains.”1162 
After wrestling the initiative from Chinese forces, the United States would initiate a second 
phase of AirSea Battle: 
“The follow-on second stage would comprise various subsequent operations and 
measures that would contribute to the larger US strategy creating options to resolve a 
prolonged conventional conflict on favorable terms and reverse any initial military gains 
by the adversary. These would include: Executing a protracted campaign that includes 
sustaining and exploiting the initiative in various domains; Conducting ‘distant blockade’ 
operations; Sustaining operational logistics; and Ramping up industrial production 
(especially precision-guided munitions).”1163 
While the whole scenario could be questioned simply because of the political and economic 
consequences the outbreak of a major war between the United States and the PRC would 
have, it still represented a more or less mature strategy after a phantasy Pearl Harbor-style 
attack on United States Armed Forces poised in the Western Pacific.1164 Nonetheless, the 
concept mostly suggested a technological answer to the imagined threat, mainly in the air 
and on the seas: 
“The Air Force and Navy should jointly develop a long-range precision-strike family of 
systems that consists of ISR, airborne electronic attack, and strike assets. Against potent 
A2/AD battle networks, synergistic employment of such systems would be a prerequisite 
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for degrading an adversary’s IADS, ISR, and C2 networks. In particular, penetrating, 
persistent airborne electronic attack platforms would increase the survivability of stand-
off munitions and penetrating aircraft striking fixed and mobile targets in contested 
airspace.”1165 
The mentioned Long Range Strike featured heavily in the portfolio of technological means to 
counter the anti-access threat: “The Air Force should develop a survivable multi-mission, 
long-range persistent strike platform.”1166 CSBA would then in 2011 support its claim, that 
the PRC could impede the United States’ technological dependencies, with another study 
written by Barry D. Watts who had been head of the Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation in the Department of Defense from 2001 until 2002: 
“U.S. military dependence on relatively unimpeded access to the global commons in both 
space and cyberspace has expanded enormously since 1991. At the heart of this 
dependency is the requirement of current U.S. guided munition – notably the LGBs and 
JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munition]1167 that have been three-quarters of combat 
expenditures – to have precisely located aim points. […] In addition to camouflaging, 
concealing, relocating, hardening, or deeply burying prospective targets […] the PRC, 
among others, has invested in capabilities to attack the space- and cyberspacebased 
information flows on which U.S. target acquisition, battlespace management, and C2 
depend.”1168 
Not only had the Chinese capabilities to disrupt the United States technological advantages 
grown, at the same time the PRC had, according to Watts’ study, developed its own RMA 
capabilities, namely in the area of PGM: 
“The story of conventional precision strike from the early 1990s to the present, then, has 
been largely one of U.S. monopoly and dominance. That happy situation, however, is 
coming to an end. In the years ahead, U.S. forces will be confronted with long-range 
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RUKs1169 such as those the Chinese are developing as part of a broader A2/AD strategy in 
the Western Pacific.”1170 
Taken altogether, the threat scenario and the possible solution provided by AirSea Battle 
were a formidable template to formulate doctrine as well new procurement projects for a 
more conventional image of war again. Whom, when not the Air Force, would that 
prerogative suit more. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Norton A. Schwartz and Chief of 
Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert told their audience: “With Air-Sea Battle, 
we are reinvigorating the historic partnership between our two departments to protect the 
freedom of the commons and ensure operational access for the Joint Force.”1171 Accordingly, 
the two Air Force-related journals analyzed in the scope of this thesis indeed happily took on 
AirSea Battle. Marc V. Schanz, using the statements regarding the withering technological 
edge of the United States, wrote in early 2011: “Potential ‘strategic adversaries’ have taken 
advantage of their own tailored investments and have designed forces and tools to challenge 
the ability of the US to project military power and maneuver.”1172 Schanz hereby reiterated 
the United States’ right to be able to “project military power and maneuver”. In the 
discourse of the United States Armed Forces nobody should be able to elude intervention. 
Richard Halloran argued similarly: 
“China’s military is also assembling a set of capabilities designed to avoid or offset 
traditional US advantages. This is sometimes referred to as a high-end asymmetric 
threat. […] Beijing has fielded an array of advanced jet aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles, 
radar, anti-air and anti-submarine ships, and minelayers intended to deny US air and 
naval forces access to Chinese skies and waters.”1173 
While most of the authors copied statements made by Air Force officials or CSBA studies, 
others even suggested a prominent departure from the COIN-centered conflicts still going on 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Daniel L. Haulman, a historian at the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency, expressed his displeasure for COIN in naming this type of conflict an aberration: 
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“The total absence of aerial combat so far in the 21st century has led some to claim that 
its day is gone forever, that expensive air superiority fighters and highly trained pilots are 
no longer necessary. This view is almost certainly wrong. Why has air combat not played 
a role in the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq? The answer: Those wars were aberrations. War 
in the future probably will once again require the US to fight for air dominance – and not 
enjoy it from the beginning. The first aberration occurred in Afghanistan.”1174 
Haulman then again argued that future opponents would have more conventional 
capabilities than the foes the United States fought in the recent years: “Future wars might 
well involve opponents with much more powerful air forces than those of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Former enemies such as China and Russia, for example, are currently developing fifth 
generation fighter aircraft with stealth technology. Air forces with such technology might 
challenge US control of the skies over battlefields.”1175 Adam J. Hebert wrote then in a similar 
fashion in the Air Force Magazine: “The Pentagon has been preoccupied with manpower-
intensive land wars, but it is time to think about what comes next.”1176 And he as well 
brought up the PRC among two other nations as potential opponents: “Planning for China, 
Iran, North Korea, and such was derided as ‘next-war-it is’ during a decade of land war 
domination. These threats will now get the attention they deserve.”1177 
The CSBA terms and statements were as well brought into the Air Force Magazine by John A. 
Tirpak. First the technological problems posed by PGM and advanced IADS: “Anti-access and 
area-denial technologies and techniques – ranging from advanced air defenses to longer 
ranged, more precise tactical ballistic missiles that can be retargeted in-flight – are having a 
‘disruptive’ effect on the paradigm, and the US will have to adapt.”1178 Then the demise of 
the United States’ edge in space-based systems: “Enemies will not only have more means to 
keep the US at bay, but through cyber warfare and the widespread availability of commercial 
reconnaissance satellites, will deprive the US of much of its ability to act with surprise.”1179 
And then Tirpak as well suggested to train without all the technological gadgets the United 
States relies upon: “Such training now stresses units by jamming their access to Global 
Positioning System information, with reduced input from certain elements of the ISR network, 
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a more vigorous and modern 'enemy', and tougher air defenses.”1180 Richard Halloran would 
also show how the United States would first be on the defensive, subconsciously supporting 
the idea of a new Pearl Harbor: “If the Chinese attack, AirSea Battle would have US forces 
begin an active defense, disperse aircraft and ships, and rely on hardening and resilience to 
ride out and to recover from the assault.”1181 Halloran interestingly, perhaps unconsciously, 
used the Active Defense to describe how the United States should cope with the PRC. But he 
seemed not to use it corresponding to its historical meaning. And he as well wrote about the 
second phase the concept laid out: “Gradually, the US would gain the initiative in the air, on 
the sea’s surface, and in the undersea domain, relying on the better quality of US aircraft, 
ships, and submarines and the superior training of airmen, sailors, and submariners.”1182 The 
scenario with the PRC attacking first and the United States defending as well was a 
departure from the Bush administration’s preemptive doctrine – somehow as well stressing 
the legitimacy of the United States’ efforts in the Pacific. Therefore, it was legitimate to plan 
for a counteroffensive against an attacker, who wanted to lock the United States out of the 
Pacific. As Robert S. Dudney wrote: “The interlocking power of modern fighters, dense air 
defenses, and devastating attacks on air bases, combined with capabilities to strike at US 
cyber and space systems, threatens US land and sea-based airpower with ‘lockout’ from the 
western Pacific.”1183  
Technological edge 
As Marc V. Schanz writes, “potential adversaries, such as China, have made broad 
investments in technology specifically designed to challenge US access in areas such as the 
western Pacific. New tools such as advanced fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, a growing blue 
water Navy, and advanced space capabilities are all designed to thwart traditional American 
military advantages.”1184 Richard Halloran as well touted the PRC’s efforts to prevent the 
United States from intervening: “The Chinese are fielding an array of advanced jet aircraft, 
anti-aircraft missiles, radar, anti-air and anti-submarine ships, and minelayers intended to 
deny US air and naval forces access to Chinese skies and nearby waters.”1185 The PRC and its 
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People’s Liberation Army Air Force’ (PLAAF) intention, respectively, would then be to push 
United States forces’ out of the so-called second island chain, a geographical reference: “The 
PLAAF’s third, and newest, core mission is to acquire the capability to project power into the 
South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean to what the Chinese call the second island chain. This 
island chain runs through Andersen Air Force Base on Guam to Japan, where USAF has bases 
at Kadena, Yokota, and Misawa.”1186 And Wade S. Karren wrote in the Air & Space Power 
Journal: “China continues to add to its stockpiles each year, creating a lethal engagement 
zone for US fighter and bomber crews well outside the first island chain.”1187 With these 
statements the factual basis for procurement of advanced weapons systems such as the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as well as the LRS-B were laid out continuously. Adam B. Lowther, a 
research professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), and John F. Farrell, associate 
professor and chair for Warfare and Profession of Arms at Air University’s Squadron Officer 
College, argued for systems to defeat the anti-access threat: “As China, Iran, and other 
possible adversaries extend the range of their antiaircraft defenses, the Air Force must be 
able to defeat these systems or face a world of highly contested global commons.”1188 Marc 
V. Schanz similarly suggested relying on naval and Air Force systems: “AirSea Battle, in 
whatever form it finally emerges, will rely heavily on warships and long-range airpower. ASB 
is born out of a need for the US military to address perceived threats and strategic concerns 
across the globe, in environments far different from the two largely ‘low intensity’ wars 
fought over the last decade.”1189 And Schanz also suggested access as a key factor: “Since 
there are no permanent bases in Southeast Asia, access will remain a key factor in the 
Pentagon’s future cooperation efforts.”1190 Access thereby seemingly meaning mainly 
Airpower and naval assets. The terminus access had already been brought into the discourse 
on warfare earlier, but only now regarding AirSea Battle it gained much more momentum. 
With it, not the precise destruction of the enemy through “firepower” was in the foreground, 
but more the accessibility of the enemy’s home grounds to be able to strike him at all 
counted. Major Wade S. Karren from AFGSC proposed that the bombers today in service 
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would not suffice to penetrate the Chinese IADS and lamented: “A lack of commitment to 
modernize and sustain these aircraft will impair our ability to bring wars to a quick end, will 
expose US forces to unnecessary risks as they seek to establish air superiority, and could 
threaten our national security objectives.”1191 
But while the general Airpower proponents demanded to invest in more modern aircraft, 
Barry D. Watts’ 2011 RMA study concluded: “The advantages of stealth – understood as 
mission planning and tactics plus low-observable platform signatures – may be eroded by 
advances in sensors and surface-to-air missile systems, especially for manned strike 
platforms operating inside defended airspace.”1192 Nonetheless, Adam B. Lowther and John 
F. Farrell wrote: “Although some individuals have speculated that advances in radar 
detection and tracking will soon compromise the stealth capability of current aircraft, senior 
DOD decision makers appear confident that weapon systems such as the F-35 can continue 
to leverage technological advantages in defeating enemy detection systems.”1193 And John A. 
Tirpak still supported the idea of a Stealth bomber penetrating into modern IADS: “Thus, 
penetrating enemy airspace, for example, might involve a stealthy air vehicle supported by 
separate jamming aircraft, defense suppression aircraft, off-board sensor systems, and the 
like, most of them flexibly autonomous vehicles.”1194 The Airpower discourse therefore still 
relied heavily on the technological possibilities as a solution to the problem described in 
AirSea Battle. New doctrinal ideas would be sparse to find at all. John A. Tirpak was sure that 
AirSea Battle would help the United States prevail: “To deal with adversaries possessing the 
latest anti-access, area-denial measures, concepts like AirSea Battle will be essential to 
prevail against modernized foes.”1195 But in the end, AirSea Battle was nothing more than an 
idea filled with technological means or it was perhaps even only a technological idea at all, 
part of the propaganda machinery the Air Force together with the Navy and the industry 
used to secure funds for overly pricey projects such as the JSF, the LRS-B or the Navy’s 
submarines and aircraft carriers. With AirSea Battle the discourse on the role of technology 
got more in the foreground again compared to the COIN discussions going on in the years 
before, where technology and its “effectiveness” was called into question. 
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Frederick Kagan states in The Transformation of American Military Policy that many of the 
technologies developed in the realm of the RMA (such as NCW) would be very helpful in the 
fight against a near peer or peer state. But other parts of RMA or EBO theories would be 
difficult to achieve. Kagan argued that the United States would not be able to reliably 
destroy Chinese strategic centers of gravity and could not Shock and Awe the PRC into 
submissiveness.1196 There would possibly be too many centers of gravity, or they would be 
difficult to hit at all, or to discern at first. Kagan even suggests that possibly the PRC would 
be better at implementing the lessons learned from “modern wars”: “The U.S. would not be 
the first country to revolutionize warfare initially only to lose ultimately to a state that built 
more effectively on the revolutionary ideas over time.”1197 The PRC has been working for 
years on systems to deny the United States access to Chinese territorial waters and airspace, 
being able to analyze the United States’ successes and problems encountered over the past 
20 years.1198 
While discussions were going on about AirSea Battle, the United States supported its 
European and Arab allies in an intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector (OUP). 
Operation Unified Protector and AFDD 1, 2011 
The United States only committed its forces for initial attacks, including strategic bombers, 
then it did only contribute important niche capabilities such as aerial refueling, Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR) or ISR to the campaign which led to the ousting and death of 
Libyan Dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi. While at the time of writing Libya is amidst turmoil 
and civil war, the Operation was dubbed successful by Air Force proponents in early 2012. 
Erica D. Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, both Ph.D. candidates in Political Science at 
Columbia University wrote in Parameters: “The Libyan intervention exploited the synergy of 
precision airstrikes and local allies fighting on the ground, making the deployment of foreign 
ground forces unnecessary”1199 at least if one does not count SOF. And the authors 
suggested that the United States would in the near future farther intervene by Airpower and 
support others doing the dirty work on the ground: “As the United States tires of fighting 
drawn-out, troop-intensive wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, future interventions are likely 
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to mimic the Libyan experience.”1200 Amitai Etzioni, a professor of international relations at 
George Washington University, on the other side argued in Military Review that, again, 
Landpower in the form of rebel forces was necessary to topple Gaddafi: “Airpower did not 
render ground combat irrelevant; in fact, the war was ultimately won through a rebel ground 
offensive, enabled by the gradual weakening of Qaddafi’s forces through the use of 
airpower.”1201 Etzioni then further wrote how the popular Afghanistan combination of SOF, 
Airpower and indigenous forces had been put to use successfully: “The Libya campaign 
showed that a strategy previously advocated for other countries, particularly Afghanistan, 
could work effectively. The strategy […] entails using airpower, drones, Special Forces, the 
CIA, and, crucially, working with native forces rather than committing American and allied 
conventional ground forces.”1202 
While OUP had again shown that Airpower could lead to conflict termination or a clear 
military victory on the ground in combination with Landpower only, the Air Force in late 
2011 released another new version of its Doctrine Document 1. Officially, OUP was had been 
concluded at this time. But it does not seem as it had any particular influence on the new 
AFDD. The Air Force certainly had to release a new doctrine document after eight years. 
While AFDD 1, 2011 was similarly looking as its predecessor, it sported an entirely new 
chapter on Airpower, referencing as well to the airmindendess. This edition as well for the 
first time included IW, differing it from traditional war. But it referred to the AFDD 3-24, 
Irregular Warfare,1203 and did only devote one page [!] to the discussion on IW. AirSea Battle 
looked for sure like the perfect occasion to promote Airpower again, also internally in the Air 
Force. The document therefore referenced to the anti-access problem: “Adversary anti-
access capabilities will continue to improve, challenging our ability to project power and 
influence. The spread of increasingly effective surface-to-air defenses poses special problems 
for our Air Force.”1204 Still most of the main statements can be found, derived from EBO 
parlance: 
“Airpower can simultaneously strike directly at the adversary’s centers of gravity, vital 
centers, critical vulnerabilities, and strategy. Airpower’s ability to strike the enemy 
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rapidly and unexpectedly across all of these critical points adds a significant impact to an 
enemy’s will in addition to the physical blow. This capability allows airpower to achieve 
effects well beyond the tactical effects of individual actions, at a tempo that disrupts the 
adversary’s decision cycle.”1205 
Boyd’s decision cycle still loomed large in the argumentation of the Air Force. But even as 
centers of gravity and the term “effects” are used, EBO as a whole concept did not resurface 
again. Still, openly referring to the downsides of recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the authors suggest that 
“a surface-centric strategy often seeks its outcome through the destruction of hostile 
land forces and the occupation of territory. However, destruction of hostile land forces 
may be only a tactical or operational objective and may not achieve the desired strategic 
outcome. Further, territorial occupation, with its attendant large cultural footprint, may 
not be feasible or politically acceptable.”1206 
Thus, this 2011 AFDD 1 was wholly in line with earlier suggestions that Landpower would 
alienate an indigenous population, on one side, and cost too much politically and in 
casualties. While not naming AirSea Battle or overly focusing on the anti-access scenario, the 
document focused on the same Airpower specialties as its predecessors had done: 
“When combined with stealth technologies, airpower today can provide shock and 
surprise without unnecessarily exposing friendly forces. To destroy a single target, we no 
longer need the thousand-plane bomber raids of World War II or the hundreds of sorties 
of Vietnam. Today's air forces can provide accurate and assured destruction of vital 
targets with far fewer aircraft, sometimes multiple targets with a single aircraft.”1207 
One of the main capabilities the Air Force touted during the late 1990s got again more 
importance regarding the suggested AirSea Battle scenarios: “Global Precision Attack is the 
ability to hold at risk or strike rapidly and persistently, with a wide range of munitions, any 
target and to create swift, decisive, and precise effects across multiple domains.”1208 
Whereas earlier, the Air Force could just sport Global Attack, now it could even muster 
Global Precision Attack, one of the purported main capabilities necessary to attack the 
military capabilities of a peer or near peer opponent. 
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While AirSea Battle did not make it into the 2011 AFDD 1, several other official documents 
used the concept during the early 2010s. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint 
Force 2020, released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2012, put the whole problem in one 
overarching statement: 
“The diffusion of advanced technology in the global economy means that middleweight 
militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry once available only to 
superpowers. The proliferation of cyber and space weapons, precision munitions, ballistic 
missiles, and anti-access and area denial capabilities will grant more adversaries the 
ability to inflict devastating losses. These threats place our access to the global commons 
at risk, target our forces as they deploy to the operational area, and can even threaten 
forces at their points of origin. Meanwhile, adversaries continue to explore asymmetric 
ways to employ both crude and advanced technology to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. 
Consequently, the capability advantage that U.S. forces have had over many potential 
adversaries may narrow in the future. Adversaries will not only have more advanced 
capabilities in every domain. More of them will have the ability to simultaneously fight 
across multiple domains.”1209 
Obviously, the authors did portray their unconscious and paranoid perception that they 
could lose their advantages, their superiority. While this paragraph displayed as well a short 
synopsis of the anti-access concept, the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), which was 
published by the Department of Defense in January 2012, did then give some guidance on 
how to cope with the threat in a joint fashion. As the United States Forces’ could be attacked 
from far away and even in their garrisons in the Western Pacific in the case of a conflict with 
the PRC, 
“this concept envisions that future joint forces will organize tactically into tailored joint 
formations able to deploy, operate, and survive autonomously. For land forces especially, 
this suggests smaller units and platforms that are rapidly deployable yet lethal. This 
concept sees deployment and combat as a single evolution of parallel actions rather than 
as distinct and sequential phases.”1210 
The parallel aspect focuses substantially more on Airpower and less on Landpower: “The air 
is another domain generally suitable for the early focus of effort, again because air forces 
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tend not to operate in massed formations that make them vulnerable to catastrophic loss 
and because they tend to be broadly effective in bringing power to bear rapidly against other 
domains.”1211 Landpower “masses” were not desired, again. And the concept further 
described why then Landpower would have more a supporting role, going in last: 
“In contrast, large land forces generally will be the last to penetrate within range of an 
enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial weapons because of the potential for catastrophic 
loss. That is not irrevocably true however. Land forces, for example, could be used to 
seize advanced bases on the outskirts of an enemy’s defenses from which to project air 
and naval power into the heart of those defenses.”1212 
The expression “advanced bases” suggests that the concept was almost exclusively thought 
to be applied to a conflict with the PRC. Smaller units on the ground and mainly Airpower 
should battle the anti-access threat: “Rather, by using the asymmetrical advantages and 
cross-domain synergy described above, future joint forces will open limited pockets or 
corridors of superiority in the necessary domains and maintain them long enough to 
accomplish required tasks.”1213 A last in this series of official documents, a summary of the 
AirSea Battle concept released by the now defunct AirSea Battle Office1214, then suggested 
that “the ASB [AirSea Battle] Concept’s solution to the A2/AD challenge in the global 
commons is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, 
destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3 [Networked, Integrated, Attack-in-Depth to 
Disrupt, Destroy, Defeat]).”1215 While here another façon and enlargement of NCW seemed 
to take shape, the Deep Attack somehow as well got back into spelling: 
“The attack-in-depth methodology is based on adversary effects chains, or an 
adversary’s process of finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging and assessing an 
attack on U.S. forces. Attack-in-depth is offensive and defensive fires, maneuver, and 
command and control with the objective of disrupting, destroying, or defeating an 
adversary’s A2/AD capabilities, conducted across domains in time, space, purpose, and 
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resources. Attack-in-depth seeks to apply both kinetic and non-kinetic means to address 
adversary critical vulnerabilities without requiring systematic destruction of the enemy’s 
defenses (e.g., a rollback of an adversary’s integrated air defense system).”1216 
Indeed, the AirLand Battle seemed conceptually to serve as a cornerstone for not only Army 
ideas, but as well joint doctrine. The “depth” now geographically encompassed the distances 
to be overcome in case of a war with the PRC, and on the other side, the whole spectrum of 
means available in this war, including space and cyberspace (e.g. the whole battlespace 
derived in the 1990s). Then as well the Pearl Harbor reference was only the tip of the iceberg 
regarding the threat assessment: The United States would, as it had been together with 
NATO against the Warsaw pact during the Cold War, be at a decisive disadvantage at first 
and would therefore have to cope with the PRC threat by technical means again. Seen from 
the outside, one could conclude that there is a huge difference between the Cold War 
scenario and the one proposed by the AirSea Battle concept: The United States would not be 
the defender, it would be the aggressor. But on closer consideration, AirSea Battle does as 
well see the PRC as the attacker, going after United States bases in allied territory in a similar 
fashion as the Warsaw Pact would have done in late 1980s imagination. 
To conclude this chapter, it seems important to point at how at least the Airpower 
proponents obviously used their discourse to derive arguments to get away from the 
stabilization operations back to the real “modern war”: The war against a peer or near-peer. 
China figured hugely in the discourse beginning with AirSea Battle, replacing the hydra that 
the insurgency in Iraq had been. The battlespace was formed again: on one side 
encompassing all the technological means (to human terrain in Air Force speech!), on the 
other side gaining again “depth”, geographically in the Western Pacific. The threat was again 
clearly outlined, could (possibly) be analyzed and fought with the technological means. The 
involvement of a private and industry-related think tank which propagated a certain 
doctrinal concept (AirSea Battle) that even got into official documents looks alienating, but 
does not surprise considering the interconnectedness of industry, politics and military in the 
United States and the money that can be made of it. And, AirSea Battle clearly favored 
Airpower (beneath Naval power); it is therefore interesting to analyze now in a last chapter 
how Landpower could get back into the discourse on “modern war”. 
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3.5 The Army and Strategic Landpower 
With AirSea Battle occupying a large part of the discussions on future conflicts, the Army 
would after 2012 try to get back into the discourse on warfare after COIN. This chapter will 
show how the Army saw its own role in the scenario described by AirSea Battle, propagating 
Landpower quite obviously in an explicit way as a counterpart to Airpower (and Seapower of 
course). 
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 
While in 2011 the Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 had on a few pages outlined the general 
principles of how the Army saw future warfare, TRADOC in 2012 then published a follow-on 
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0. Comprising more than 70 pages, this 
document illustrated Unified Land Operation more precisely. The ADRP of course followed 
the path laid down by the ADP, suggesting that only Landpower could reach final results 
when battling an enemy: 
“Landpower includes the ability to – Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if 
necessary; Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in an operational 
environment; Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for 
political and economic development; […] Support and provide a base from which joint 
forces can influence and dominate the air and maritime domains of an operational 
environment.”1217 
Whereas the first part of this citation is not that surprising, the second part envisions the 
Army’s role in AirSea Battle: securing bases and infrastructure, without which neither the Air 
Force nor the Navy would be able to fight the AirSea Battle. But the Army still preferred to 
describe its very own special capabilities in defeating an enemy in close combat: “Close 
combat is indispensable and unique to land operations. Only on land do combatants routinely 
and in large numbers come face-to-face with one another. It underlies most Army efforts in 
peace and war. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army 
forces close with and destroy or capture them.”1218 While the Air Force or its supporters had 
argued against “masses” of ground troops, or Landpower, the Army now suggested explicitly 
the opposite. Of course the hybrid threat loomed large in the image of war shown in the 
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ADRP: “A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular 
forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting 
effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law, military 
tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or 
their targets.”1219 “Unregulated” forces can surely be understood as a type of enemy who 
does not fit well into the Army’s perceptions of how an enemy should behave, how it could 
be categorized. On top of that, the ADRP as well differentiated between threats, enemies 
and adversaries: “A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the 
capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the 
homeland. […] When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they 
become enemies.”1220 So the PRC would possibly be a threat in the first line, and only 
become an enemy when being aggressive. Or it could be an adversary in the meantime, 
being potentially hostile to an ally: “An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which 
the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such 
under the law of war. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a 
friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).”1221 
To cope with the enemies as outlined above, the Army should of course again be able to 
rapidly deploy into other parts of the world. Expeditionary operations got more into the 
focus of the capabilities envisioned: 
“Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces 
worldwide into any area of operations and conduct operations upon arrival. 
Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, rapidly 
shape conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on arrival exploiting 
success and consolidating tactical and operational gains. Expeditionary capabilities are 
more than physical attributes; they begin with a mindset that pervades the force.”1222 
While the Army demanded an expeditionary mindset from its leaders, it as well cautioned 
them: “When projecting power into a region, Army leaders may find themselves without one 
or more of the advantages they normally have. U.S. forces encountering new and 
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unanticipated enemy capabilities have to rapidly adapt while engaging in operations.”1223 
The Army hereby indeed quite perfectly adjusted its image of war to the AirSea Battle 
realities as propagated by CSBA or the AirSea Battle concept, suggesting that many of the 
technological systems the United States relied on would be degraded in the theater it would 
deploy its units to. It is quite clear that these statements are fitting to the PRC threat as 
outlined above. But at the same time, the ADRP displayed an Army view, partially 
questioning the technological means the Air Force relies on as well as their functionality in 
case of war. 
Nonetheless, even the description of the operational framework was somehow tied to 
AirSea Battle. Deep Operations would now encompass as well actions “to disrupt the 
movement of operational reserves, for example, or prevent the enemy from employing long-
range cannon, rocket, or missile fires.”1224 But at the same time the Army retained some of 
the lessons it had drawn from COIN: “In an operational environment where the enemy 
recruits insurgents from within a population, deep operations might focus on interfering with 
the recruiting process, disrupting the training of recruits, or eliminating the underlying 
factors that enable the enemy to recruit.”1225 Nonetheless, the ADRP contained no notions of 
COIN, only referring to Joint Publications or FM 3-24, which would be updated in 2014.1226 
The ambivalence of COIN lessons learned was also still visible in the description of combined 
arms. On the one hand, combined arms would be used destructively in a more conventional 
environment: “Used destructively, combined arms integrate different capabilities so that 
counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another.”1227 On the other hand, the 
authors imagined a more modern fashion of combined arms to be applied to IW or COIN 
environments: “Used constructively, combined arms multiply the effectiveness and efficiency 
of Army capabilities used in stability or defense support of civil authorities.”1228 Using 
combined arms “constructively” is sounding interestingly positive. What would that mean? 
But then again applied to the PRC scenario, combined arms would help overcome anti-access 
threats: “Combined arms maneuver causes the enemy to confront dangers faster than the 
enemy can respond to them. For example, in forcible entry operations, effective combined 
                                                            
1223
 ADRP 3-0, 2012, p. 1-3. 
1224
 Ibid. p. 1-11. 
1225
 Ibid. p. 1-11. 
1226
 Headquarters, Department of the Army: Field Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Insurgencies and Countering 
Insurgencies, Washington, DC, May 2014. 
1227
 ADRP 3-0, 2012, p. 1-14f. 
1228




arms maneuver defeats antiaccess and area denial efforts, disrupting the enemy and 
allowing the ground force to transition rapidly to stability tasks.”1229 Being faster than the 
enemy was the key to success, and “maneuver” was again meant more geographically than 
mentally. While the Army did not foresee the same rapid and decisive operations as it had 
imagined in the early 2000s, some of the terms and termini left their traces in the ADRP, 
among them Shock and Awe and EBO: “Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects 
of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires 
close coordination with fires.”1230 Again “maneuver” and “firepower” had to be synchronized 
to be effective, to mass “effects”. And the centers of gravity as well were included, although 
divided between the more tangible, physical ones, and the intangible ones, the moral centers 
of gravity: 
“Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. 
They are part of a dynamic perspective of an operational environment. Physical centers 
of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are typically easier to identify, assess, 
and target. They can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral 
centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a 
charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal influence, or strong-
willed populace. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral 
centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all 
instruments of national power.”1231 
It seems to be a real accomplishment that official Army doctrine confessed how military 
means alone would not suffice to manipulate or affect moral centers of gravity, especially 
compared to the whole Objective Force thinking in the late 1990s, when LIC was rather 
disappointingly discussed in the FM 100-5. But the few comments on the new doctrine 
which could be found mainly in Military Review were rather critical of the new doctrine 
publication. Major Christopher Henry, a former doctrine author for the CADD, criticized 
Army doctrine as lacking (before ADRP, but after ADP 3-0 had been published): “Both Army 
and Marine Corps doctrine production has suffered from a lack of personnel. This shortage 
has been primarily due to the concentration of manpower in the operational force since the 
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advent of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”1232 Henry was surely right, pondering that 
the Army was still mainly focused on its ongoing operations in 2012. And at the same time, 
the Air Force had, together with the Navy, brought a new doctrinal image with AirSea Battle. 
Major J.P. Clark, an Army strategist working in Headquarters, Department of the Army, went 
even further: “The conceptual emptiness of Unified Land Operations suggests that the Army 
still lacks a compelling vision of how to operate in the next several years.”1233 Clark as well 
criticized that the uncertainty which could be found in the 2009 Capstone Concept got away: 
“Indeed, uncertainty was the central theme of the 2009 Capstone Concept, so its absence 
from ADP 3-0 is thus even more disappointing.”1234 But it seems logical that with the focus 
given by AirSea Battle, the Army as well got unto the same bandwagon, adjusting its image 
of war to the Pacific theater as shown above. Nonetheless, Clark went even further to fault 
the neglect of the enemy: “Although the opening review of the strategic context briefly 
identifies the nation’s two most challenging enemies as a nonstate entity able to attack our 
public will and a nuclear-armed state partnering with nonstate actors, after that passage 
there is no further mention of these – or any other – enemies.”1235 Clark was wrong insofar as 
the ADRP 3-0 then was meant to give more in-depth information, complementing ADP 3-0. 
Colonel Bill Benson, commanding the 4th Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, was more 
positive towards the new doctrine: “The authors of Unified Land Operations considered the 
history and evolution of the operational framework in Army doctrine as they developed the 
new operating concept. As a result, Unified Land Operations reintroduces many terms 
rescinded in 2008 and returns the AirLand Battle term supporting effort to the lexicon.”1236 
Benson then went further to identify new elements in the doctrine: 
“The core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security are the only 
truly new constructs within unified land operations. […] They do not represent radical 
departures from earlier doctrine, but rather new cognitive tools that bind existing Army 
operations – offense, defense, and stability – to the purpose of gaining or retaining the 
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initiative. In other words, they link the emphasis on initiative found in AirLand Battle with 
the operating concept described by full spectrum operations.”1237 
Indeed, as openly suggested in ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations did, after Unified Action, 
display kind of a renewed self-confidence of the Army. If this was only a show regarding the 
budget cuts and shrinking in manpower (to between 440’000 and 450’000 by 2017), or if it 
was to position the Army anew among the other services, using new doctrinal ideas, remains 
to be seen. 
While the new doctrine tried to encompass the whole spectrum of operations, other authors 
nevertheless cautioned that the Army should not get to far away from COIN and IW. Paul 
Scharre, a former infantryman who served with the 75th Ranger Regiment in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, suggested in a December 2012 Military review article: “We must revise and 
expand the spectrum of operations or range of military operations to cover these new 
threats, with irregular operations like COIN, counterterrorism, and stability operations on the 
‘low end’ of this spectrum and counter-A2/AD concepts of operation on the ’high end.’”1238 
Despite the primary focus of the Air Force and Navy should be A2/AD threats, Landpower 
would have to be as well dedicated to IW: “Both the Army and Marine Corps must possess 
the ability to conduct population-centric operations to stabilize under-governed regions and 
build the security capacity of partner nations, while still remaining proficient at combined 
arms maneuver to destroy organized military forces in force-on-force conflict.”1239 Major Phil 
W. Reynolds, a civil affairs officer, wrote similarly : “The most dangerous threats to the 
United States are the ones for which we cannot prepare conventional responses, so it is 
essential that the United States develop and use irregular warfare (IW) as a deterrent that 
creates strategic depth.”1240 Reynolds in fact even told the reader that the United States 
should itself be able to wage IW, suggesting “offensive IW” conducted by the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). G. Scott Taylor, serving on the Army Staff at the 
Pentagon in G3/5/7 in the Current Operations Division argued in a similar way that 
“unconventional warfare in the form of counterinsurgencies, terrorism, and guerilla warfare 
is here to stay and nostalgia for simpler forms of conventional war will not place the Army in 
                                                            
1237
 Benson, Unified Land Operations, p. 11. 
1238
 Scharre, Paul: Spectrum of What?, in: Military Review, November-December 2012, p. 73-79, here p. 73. 
1239
 Scharre, Spectrum of What?, p. 78. 
1240
 Reynolds, Phil W.: What Comes Next? An Argument for Irregular War in National Defense, in: Military 




the best position for what will most likely be the next conflict.”1241 Taylor contended that the 
Army’s core competencies in fighting conventional wars had surely eroded over the last 
decade. But in his eyes nonetheless “merely focusing on conventional fights and wishing 
away the types of wars the Army does not want to fight – the messy and protracted 
counterinsurgency fights – is potentially naïve and irresponsible.”1242 Paul Scharre on the 
other side laid more weight into the anti-access threat: “Conventional maneuver warfare, 
often labeled major combat operations, is now only a relatively small slice of the spectrum of 
operations. Conventional war is also not at the highest end of this spectrum of conflict, but 
rather in the middle. The high end features sophisticated A2/AD threats that require new U.S. 
capabilities and concepts of operation to counter.”1243 Scharre therefore even wanted to 
have a higher intensity than conventional high-intensity war. And he further took on some of 
the arguments AirSea Battle proponents had brought into the discussion, seeing the United 
States even partially disadvantaged: “The United States has historically been strong in the 
middle part of the conflict spectrum, in conventional warfare. The high end of the spectrum, 
counter-A2/AD operations, is new and has developed as adversaries have modernized their 
militaries and designed clever approaches to counter U.S. forces.”1244 To counter hybrid 
threats, Scharre even envisioned a hybrid ground force, able to fight over the whole 
spectrum: “A hybrid-focused ground force that could both destroy enemy forces and 
influence populations might be able to fight both up and down on the spectrum of conflict by 
performing both conventional and COIN operations.”1245 What Scharre described therefore 
seemed to be a task force with a mix of heavier and lighter units, air and ground, as well as 
psychological, “information”, SOF, even cyber units. Reynolds on the other side cautioned 
that the United States would have to manage this kind of force sensitively: “The U.S. military 
will have to walk a fine line, paying for a conventional force robust enough to deter 
unfriendly state actions, and yet maintaining a force that can deploy and resolve a myriad of 
problems posed by nonstate actors engaging in irregular warfare.”1246 And Scott used the 
example of Iraq to show, that future adversaries would much more fight in an asymmetrical 
way: “The nature of the hybrid threat and the fact that U.S. power could be challenged for so 
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long in Iraq, very narrowly avoiding defeat, all but guarantees that future enemies will 
challenge us asymmetrically seeking protracted conflict over decisive battles and insurgent 
strategies over conventional ones.”1247 
The U.S. Army Capstone Concept 
After the ADP and ADRP had been published, TRADOC followed up with a comprehensive 
Capstone Concept in winter 2012. The uncertainty lacking in the doctrine according to Major 
Clarke was mentioned early in the Capstone Concept: “The future Army will continue to 
operate in a complex and uncertain environment.”1248 But the environment at home was also 
described: “In an environment of decreasing resources, the Army must plan for a shift in 
strategic focus while preparing to confront these threats.”1249 Budget cuts looming at the 
horizon already visible were as well incorporated into Army thinking. The authors then made 
as well a step away from the old category thinking regarding the type of enemy to be 
encountered in the near future: “Furthermore, the distinctions between threats will blur in 
the future due to the complexity of adversaries, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the 
ability of threats to adapt rapidly.”1250 The hybrid threat got to the center stage, again 
encompassing irregular and regular facets: “Likely adversaries will employ a combination of 
regular and irregular tactics and seek technologies that enable them to overcome or avoid 
U.S. military strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses.”1251 And the anti-access threat as 
well got a foothold in the Capstone Concept: 
“Some adversaries are investing in anti-access and area denial capabilities to counter the 
U.S. ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of 
action to accomplish assigned missions. Adversary commanders will position forces and 
capabilities to support rapid precision attack against air and seaports of debarkation and 
interrupt the flow of logistics or follow-on forces.”1252 
In comparison to the AirSea Battle concept, the Capstone Concept did not emphasize that 
much how the United States Armed Forces would be on the defensive. Army thinking saw 
the United States getting into the fight against a hybrid threat which defended itself using 
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asymmetric tactics and technologies to deny access, combining capabilities of a peer or near 
peer enemy as well as other elements. A March 2012 Army-Marine Corps Concept dubbed 
Gaining and Maintaining Access, accordingly contended, that the defeat of anti-access 
capabilities would primarily be accomplished through air, maritime, space and cyberspace 
operations. But at the same time the authors argued that “U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
forces can control terrain and the associated population. They ensure that access can be 
maintained by making persistent or extending in duration the effects created by other 
elements of the joint force.”1253 But Landpower would not only secure bases for air and naval 
assets. It would as well act offensively: “Multiple dispersed maneuver elements will use 
strategic and operational maneuver via air and sea to deploy and employ from the global 
system of main operating bases, forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and 
amphibious and other sea-based platforms to conduct operations in the objective area.”1254 
Dispersed units would make it more difficult for the enemy to defend itself: “By requiring the 
adversary to defend a vast area against our mobility and deep power projection capabilities, 
maneuver is expected to render some of the adversary force irrelevant while exploiting the 
seams and gaps created in his defensive disposition.”1255 Interestingly, the authors used the 
very same image of exploiting units that the authors of AirLand Battle had used to depict 
Soviet OMGs attacking NATO lines in Germany at that time. And now “maneuver” got its 
own part, being an instrument itself without “firepower”. But different from AirLand Battle, 
the United States Army and Marine Corps would be on the offensive, obviously attacking 
into areas held by peer or near peer nations. And the concept even proposed different roles 
for Army as well as Marine Corps units: 
“Although they are employed in an integrated fashion, entry forces may be conceptually 
divided into two broad categories: assault forces and follow-on forces. Assault forces 
take three complementary forms: Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) operating 
from ships at sea; Army airborne forces delivered by intertheater or intratheater airlift; 
and Army air assault forces operating from intermediate staging bases (ISBs) within the 
theater. Follow-on forces, when required, may arrive via airlift, sealift, or various 
combinations thereof. Traditionally, follow-on forces have included heavier units whose 
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offload is dependent upon infrastructure that has been seized intact/quickly repaired, or 
expeditionary facilities that have been established.”1256 
Thereby the authors killed two birds with one stone; they secured the fielding of heavy Army 
units as well as the Marine Corps capabilities, displaying their thorough techno-centric 
operational thinking. Getting far away from COIN and back to conventional war, both the 
Army and the Marine Corps showed off how they were still prisoners of their very own 
discourse on Landpower. As a follow-up, Marine Corps Commandant James F. Amos, 
USSOCOM commanding officer, Admiral William H. McRaven and Army Chief of Staff 
Raymond Odierno published a joint paper called Strategic Landpower – Winning the Clash of 
Wills in May 2013, defending their respective services’ idea of future conflict. The title says it 
all: conflict is still about “wills”, forcing the enemy to surrender. Therefore, the paper stated 
that even as technology seemed to be the solution to the anti-access problem, the human 
terrain or domain was indispensable, and Landpower was there to win in this sphere of 
operations: 
“Land operations have a uniquely significant role in both peacetime and conflict, in 
addressing human factors. This assertion rises from the recognition that: 1) the Army, 
Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces significantly contribute to the activities 
central to influencing the ‘human domain’ short of war, such as peacekeeping, 
comprehensive military engagement, security force assistance, building partner capacity, 
and stability operations; 2) in conflict, the same forces are those most intimately and 
closely involved with the human networks – friendly, enemy, and neutral – that comprise 
the ‘human domain’; and 3) strategic success or failure most often occurs within the land 
domain, especially in the shared space between humans and the cyberspace domain.”1257 
Not only can the human terrain be found again in this statement, part of COIN speech; but 
most importantly, the land domain was the place where success could only be obtained. The 
paper as well contained statements regarding the challenges allegedly presented by the PRC. 
When tensions would mount, many of the nations threatened by the PRC’s behavior would 
be looking to the United States to balance the growing Chinese military power in the region: 
“The Air Force and Navy obviously have a crucial role in this arena, both as a deterrent to 
aggression and in military engagement. Still, those efforts must be complemented by 
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forward engaged and creatively employed soldiers, Marines, and Special Operations Forces, 
as it signals a high level of American commitment to its partners and allies.”1258 Indeed the 
United States would rather quickly begin to rotate its Army units trough exercises all over 
the Western Pacific. And the efforts of the Army and Marine Corps seemed to bear fruit 
when the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 2014 published its Joint Concept for Entry operations. 
Entry was the new counter-buzzword versus the anti-access threat, representing the 
obviously aggressive stance the United States displays again and again against anyone trying 
to prevent it from intervening: “Entry forces will envelop, infiltrate and penetrate in and/or 
across multiple domains at select points of entry to place the enemy at an operational 
disadvantage.”1259 Now not only air and naval forces would fight AirSea Battle, but the joint 
force would: “By exploiting the sea and the air as maneuver spaces, the Joint Force will be 
able to threaten a greater number of the adversary’s critical assets as well as increase the 
unpredictability of the force.”1260 To facilitate entry into the PRC’s reach (what seems 
obvious), “forces must be able to disperse to seize key terrain or for self-preservation, and to 
concentrate rapidly to exploit opportunity.”1261 Reading through these statements the image 
forms of United States forces in the Western pacific huddled on their small bases in the 
second island chain, sitting out massive ballistic missile barrages as described in the AirSea 
Battle concept papers. Chief of Staff of the Army, Raymond T. Odierno, had already in late 
2012 at an AUSA meeting told his audience that rapidly massing dispersed small units would 
be the key in future warfare: 
“In total, our modernization efforts will prepare the entire Force for the complex and 
uncertain battlefield by putting Squads with precise information and overmatch 
capability at the decisive time and place to achieve dominance of the operational 
environment. At the same time, we must preserve the ability to reassemble our Forces 
rapidly, building the mass necessary to decisively defeat a determined enemy. In 
pursuing these goals, we ensure that we remain an Army capable of many missions, at 
many speeds, under many conditions.”1262 
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The experienced reader will remember where similar statements were already part of the 
Army’s doctrine: in the early 1950s, when all services prepared to fight on a Massive 
Retaliation’s atomic battlefield, the Army would as well want to have its dispersed units 
massing quickly, but after nuclear strikes: “Plans provide for immediate movement through 
or around the target area. Exploiting units remain dispersed until the critical moment, then 
concentrate rapidly, and move to the decisive point to take maximum advantage of surprise 
and the enemy’s disorganization.”1263 And then in the late 1980s in the scope of AirLand 
Battle Future the Army as well imagined smaller units massing from dispersed fighting 
positions on the geographically larger battlefield, as R. Roger Wolf described in a 1990 
memo to TRADOC commanders and key staff officers: “Available forces must be dispersed 
[…] and then when required, quickly mass and move forward.”1264 Another example came 
from a 1988 CAC pamphlet: “Battlefield of the 21st century – Non-linear – Poorly defined 
FEBAs and rear areas – Units at risk throughout battlefield – Numerous, small, independent 
but coordinated battles throughout theater.”1265 The similarity of the images of war as 
displayed by documents having been written 30 and 60 years ago, respectively, is showing 
how doctrine thinking in the United States Army is somewhat cyclical. To conclude this study 
and get back to the immediate present, one can take a look at the United States Army 
Operating Concept published in 2014. Not only would Army forces achieve surprise through 
maneuver across strategic distances and arrival at unexpected locations – to strike the 
enemy from unexpected directions. They would as well disperse and concentrate rapidly: “In 
high anti-access and area denial environments, dispersion allows future Army forces to evade 
enemy attacks, deceive the enemy, and achieve surprise. Even when operating dispersed, 
mobile combined arms teams are able to concentrate rapidly to isolate the enemy, attack 
critical enemy assets, and seize upon fleeting opportunities.”1266 The Operating Concept as 
well referenced to the most recent conflicts: 
“Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional and 
unconventional land forces in Ukraine suggest that Russia is determined to expand its 
territory and assert its power on the Eurasian landmass. Russia deployed and integrated 
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a range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic means to conduct what some 
analysts have described as “non-linear” operations. […] Russia’s actions highlight the 
value of land forces to deter conflict as well as special operations and conventional force 
capability to project national power and exert influence in political contests.”1267 
While the non-linear operations can be traced back to AirLand Battle, it seems unclear to the 
reader how exactly Landpower would have prevented Russia from taking Crimea. There had 
been Ukrainian ground forces on the peninsula, but they were taken out of the fight early 
on, losing communications and being surprised by unconventional tactics and irregular 
forces: by a hybrid threat according to Army doctrine. While ISIL would be mentioned as 
well, Chinese capabilities still took to the center stage: 
“China works to negate U.S. advantages in space and cyberspace. China is developing 
significant anti-satellite capabilities, integrating cyber into all aspects of military 
operations, and developing sophisticated missiles and air defenses as part of an effort to 
challenge United States’ ability to project power. Chinese doctrine calls for combining 
conventional and unconventional actions.”1268 
This last statement again reiterates all the arguments brought by the AirSea Battle 
proponents: The A2/AD as a whole, deployed by the PRC. Additionally, the hybrid nature of 
the PRC’s answer to the United States’ Way of War was represented by the 
conventional/unconventional mix. 
3.6 Interim conclusion: back to the roots all over again? 
While these last papers analyzed lead this thesis into the immediate present, they show as 
well how again an image of war, or, of an enemy, respectively, had been constructed and 
used to justify doctrine and procurement. While some would have argued, a few years 
before, that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had indeed generated a radical Transformation 
in military thought, a paradigm shift from idealized, techno-centric, scientific formulas – such 
as NCW and EBO – to more complex, ambiguous, and human-centered visions of war, which 
were then represented by the COIN FM 3-241269, it seems appropriate to remark how again 
another, more technological image of war was induced into Army and especially Air Force 
thinking by the Pacific Pivot and AirSea Battle. 
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In the discourse on warfare, the EBO/NCW proponents had been, especially in hindsight, 
very unimaginative in forecasting the consequences of their theories and visions regarding 
future warfare. The central problem of the EBO/NCW idea of war – that the United States’ 
war objectives would be restricted to destroying the armed forces of a centralized nation-
state – was already apparent from the very beginning. The Transformation advocates only 
considered “effects” in the most immediate military and therefore mostly kinetic meaning. 
They did not imagine the long-term impacts of the loss of control produced by Shock and 
Awe in states that were coercive dictatorships (Iraq) or fragile tribal alliances (Afghanistan), 
the failed states the national security strategy consistently identified as the most likely areas 
of conflict. Neither did the Transformation enthusiasts foresee the consequence of creating 
Armed Forces that were organized, equipped, and trained exclusively for rapid, decisive 
operations. In this respect the Transformation proponents have to be blamed for not 
considering that if EBO/NCW did not lead to success as promised, “the most likely result 
would be the very long, bloody, frustrating attritional struggles they claimed their approach 
would avoid” as Linn writes.1270 The Transformation enthusiasts seem to have divorced their 
theories both from history and from reality at the time. Their main theories – based on neo-
Marxist views of history – would be proven wrong in Afghanistan and Iraq; especially the 
system idea. And in their attempts to rescue their programs from absolute irrelevance after 
the 9/11 attacks, “they have so diluted the meaning of transformation as to render the 
concept useless. They may even succeed unintentionally in discrediting the notion of 
transformation completely”, as the idea of transforming the United States Armed Forces to 
adapt them to changing environments and challenges does not seem to be that absurd at 
all.1271 
As the Army changed their image of war, their vision of Landpower, from the 
Transformation’s rapid and decisive, technological style of warfare to a more realistic vision, 
letting the Objective Force behind, the Air Force vision of war has been rather less changed 
by Iraq and Afghanistan. Though Airpower proponents repeatedly pointed to their 
contributions to COIN, they remained committed to the concepts they formulated in the 
1990s, maintaining the central tenets that the discourse on Airpower comprised. Some 
voices even used the word aberration to describe the sort of conflict which did not fit that 
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well into their image of war, or into their discourse on war. Central to the Air Force was the 
same assumption held in the 1990s; that is, if it gets the most modern means (capabilities), 
then the ends (strategy) will sort themselves out. From this assumption, the Air Force as an 
institution seemed always to look first to technology, then to concepts that would allow its 
application, the last of which was AirSea Battle.1272 At the same time, Airpower enthusiasts 
brought back again and again the notion that their perspective was “elevated“ and that their 
airmen, flying above the battlefield, were less under stress than the soldiers on the ground 
and therefore better able to fight the complicated COIN war. 
But the realization that, because of the United States’ success in embracing the RMA, it was 
in fact losing its military edge, led to some kind of panicking, at least in the Air Force and 
Navy. In the discourse on the enemy, adversaries were now themselves acquiring PGMs, as 
well as the vital supporting capabilities needed to wage “precision“ warfare, including 
commercial sources of imagery, “precision“ navigation and timing. And that vision was then 
translated into a modern version of Pearl Harbor, justifying NCW and RMA technologies 
once more.1273 But on the other side, reality was as well more uncomfortable: future 
adversaries would seek to deny the United States the ability to operate in the skies and 
(cyber)space with impunity, either by shooting down aircraft and UAVs or jamming 
communications, GPS or surveillance means. The Airpower-centered New American Way of 
War would not be that easy to apply to the PRC – as it was indeed neither applicable to Al-
Qaida.1274 The PRC indeed took on the role that the Warsaw Pact once had: somehow 
menacing, but on the defensive in reality. By putting the Pearl Harbor scenario to good use, 
the AirSea Battle proponents nonetheless argued that the United States would be on the 
defensive, as it had been with AirLand Battle before. 
Finally, the Army began to explicitly state how Landpower as an opposite to Airpower and 
would enable the United States to overcome the most “modern” enemy in “modern war”. 
While the Air Force in scope of COIN had doubted that the Army's soldiers (and Marines) 
could fight and win against an enemy conducting IW, the Army would then resort again to 
the contest of “wills” after the Air Force stepped in with AirSea Battle. The discourse on 
Landpower described how only marines and soldiers could hold ground and win against a 
determined enemy in the close fight. Not only did the Air Force, the Army as well displayed a 
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cyclical doctrine and image of war development, getting back to terms and even termini 
from AirLand Battle. “Depth” got back with the geographical vastness of the Western Pacific, 
being put to use by the Air Force to justify its long range and Stealth assets. “Firepower” 
again supported “maneuver”, at first. Then “maneuver” would, still in a geographical 
meaning, help Landpower to fight as well against the enemy which was at least modeled 
after the PRC. 
While COIN brought, finally, IW and LIC into Army and Air Force doctrine, now at the end the 
anti-access threat again got the United States Armed Forces back on its technologically 
centered American Way of War. The Army and Marine Corps did stress the importance of 
the human dimension of war (human terrain). But honestly, to overcome the threat as 
displayed and described in AirSea Battle does stress the need for high-tech weapons again, 
as was the case with AirLand Battle. Access not only means the physical and geographical 
dimension, but as well the United States’ capability to hurt its enemies at all. The United 
States image of war or American Way of War does depend on the possibility that the United 






Lewis argues that technology only makes killing more efficient, but this would never deter a 
determined enemy.1275 Perhaps this would be a fitting concluding statement for this thesis, 
looking from the perspective of a reality check: while the study at hand analyzed the 
thinking, the image of war, it did as well show when the vision and therefore discourse on 
warfare differed from how the wars and operations fought in the real world environment 
were experienced. But even as there were dissenting voices in the discourses analyzed, still 
the United States Armed Forces fight the American Way of War. This circumstance is 
especially evident regarding the language use describing the image of war: since the Gulf 
War in 1991 the United States Air Force points out increasingly how airstrikes are more 
efficient, and even, less bloody, compared to the deployment of ground forces. But looking 
closely, at the same time the idea of killing by itself seemed only to have been made more 
agreeable by concepts such as EBO – “effect” instead of destruction or annihilation – 
because all those terms carry the same meaning, actually. The thesis at hand was able to 
show how the tendency towards a post-heroic American culture of strategy imagined a war 
fought through wide distances with minimal casualties.1276 In some extreme cases then COIN 
operations and persistent conflict were dubbed aberrations, not fitting into the discourse on 
warfare. The terminus operations other than war does indeed show that fact in an 
exemplary way. 
When AirLand Battle in the 1980s unmistakably was conceived to be the gigantic symphony 
of destruction of the Warsaw Pacts “masses”, the technology discourse played an important 
role as it was the means for the defense against a seemingly superior enemy, even though 
factors such as initiative or morale were postulated at the same time. “Mass” or also 
“speed” stood representative for the gigantism which was propagated. AirLand Battle would 
then be as well one last occasion when the Air Force leadership agreed with Army doctrine 
because it suited its interest, having a say in doctrine development in the 1970s and 1980s, 
as Kretchik argues as well.1277 After the dissolution of the USSR the United States became the 
sole remaining superpower and showed its conventional superiority in 1991. Operation 
Desert Storm displayed the “effectiveness” of PGM and Stealth; moreover, the Army could 
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have beaten its opposite possibly even using fewer troops, what the Air Force liked to point 
out repeatedly. On one side this victory strengthened the self-confidence of the military and 
its political influence; on the other side it enlarged the already enormous belief into 
technology.1278 The introduction of new Airpower technologies and the development of new 
doctrines such as NCW created the illusion that wars could be fought and won quickly and 
cheaply (decisive, “shock”). The Airpower paradigm that emerged during World War II was 
still influencing decisions in Washington, even though Airpower alone has until today never 
proven decisive.1279 Landpower advocates would then as well persistently argue that only 
soldiers on the ground could beat an enemy close and personal, forcing him to surrender 
and letting the United States imposing its “will” on him. 
Nonetheless, the sanitized, didactic, almost mythological EBO/RMA or Transformation 
narrative has been interjected into virtually every military reform debate in the last four 
decades, from discussions on Army and Marine Corps doctrine to which fighters the Air 
Force should purchase – the most modern in the last case, for sure. RMA thinking has caused 
a lot of unanticipated consequences, not least the fact that it may have led some senior 
commanders and administration officials to repeat what historians have identified as a 
major mistake in the German Way of War: concentrating on tactics and operations while 
failing to consider how individually successful battles and campaigns will achieve the nation’s 
war aims.1280 But Desert Storm had as well shown to possible future adversaries what the 
preferred American Way of War was. Not only the PRC, but as well enemies who would not 
as well fit to the United States Armed Forces’ image of war were encouraged to find other 
ways to beat the United States. 
Operation Desert Storm also provided the illusion that higher command levels could control 
the battlefield. Even though it became clear later on, that Powell as well as Schwarzkopf had 
misread the situation and ended the war too quickly, the ideal of the controlled battlefield 
remained. The battlefield was translated into the Non-linear Battlefield in the scope of the 
AirLand Battle, then into battlespace when discussing the RMA and should then incorporate 
the space, too (as well as the Cyberspace). In the end, the discourse on the battlefield 
brought the teminus operating environment for AirSea Battle. The multi-dimensional 
information age as a military concept featured then as well termini such as Full Spectrum 
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Dominance or Information Dominance, somehow trying to encompass the ramifications of 
the application of information age technologies. The RMA eventually culminated in the 
Transformation concept which, thanks to new technologies, planned for smaller, more 
mobile, networked and deadlier units. Every soldier should have access to the same 
situational image simultaneously to outclass potential enemies on the enlarged battlefield in 
the area of decision-making as well as regarding the weapons “effects”. 
“Mass” and “speed” are dominating terms in the language of both branches; “speed” was 
enforced by the information age, “mass” was reinterpreted. Especially the Air Force tried to 
bring forward masses of “effects” and to distance itself from the solely physical destruction 
of the enemy in scope of the discourse on warfare; but in reality, killing by “firepower” 
remained the core competence Airpower would be best at. Furthermore the Air Force liked 
to look at the enemy as a system with a “brain“, backbone or eyes. Lewis correctly criticizes 
this vision as being too focused on little confined (and conventional) wars against states; 
then (voluntary) nations in his eyes cannot be beaten only through precise attacks into their 
“brain“.1281 And indeed, both OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan would not result in an 
enemy surrendering to precise blows to its system. The “will” of the insurgents and terrorists 
could not be altered by PGM. As Lawrence Freedman points out, underdogs who know that 
they have little chance against superior conventional forces favor irregular forms of 
warfare.1282 But still, Airpower proponents retained their EBO thinking throughout these 
years of persistent conflict and COIN. 
The Army used the image of a boxing match in the scope of the AirLand Battle, using terms 
such as “balance”, “will” or “blows” against the numerical superior enemy Warsaw Pact. On 
the other side, the Air Force in the enemy discourse coined the idea of the surgical strike and 
paralysis of the enemy in the scope of the Effects-based Operations. Hereby a language was 
discernible which used words such as “brain“, “heart“, backbone or nervous system. Despite 
that the enemy was dehumanized alone through the propagated distance from within it was 
fought and downgraded to a defenseless entity being treated with the scalpel on the 
dissecting table. With COIN the Army then emphasized the human terrain, bringing the 
human element into thinking, but from another perspective. Seemingly, the Army as well 
used the human element as part of it justifying its mere existence, or at least, the existence 
                                                            
1281
 Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 393f. 
1282




of its heavy units which were capable of shaping the human terrain in contrast to the Air 
Forces PGMs. The Air Force or its proponents themselves brought their air mindedness into 
the game in COIN, arguing, that ground forces would be to mentally touched by their 
fighting close on the ground, becoming less effective because of that. 
On the part of the Army the tendency of dehumanization is more ambivalent: the “balance” 
of the enemy dominates. “Maneuver” and “firepower” coin the discourse at (least) until 
2001 and are interpreted in a specific American way, the former mostly geographical (so the 
accusation of AirLand Battle by its critics), the latter more technical. Yet even the wars in the 
Balkans and the intervention in Somalia were harbingers of a war reality, which did not fit as 
well to ideas such as Dominant Maneuver or Effects-Based Operations. Krepinevich writes 
about how the Army tries to fit the war to its own ideas. What began on the onset of the 21st 
century was a decade-long battle which seemed to be more similar to the Vietnam War than 
to all that which was propagated until then. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense under 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, once told Army cadets at West Point that: “any future 
defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into 
Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur 
so delicately put it.”1283 
But despite of the legacy from Vietnam and the experiences gained in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the American-scientific approach to war dominates the discussion heavily in the whole 
period analyzed. The admonishments made towards the Soviets about them thinking too 
rigid and scientific seem to be contradictory. Then what could be more scientific than to 
simulate a battle hundred or even thousand fold with alternating parameters using a 
computer to determine the best circumstances for a fight? The scientification further gained 
steam after the 1991 Gulf War; analysis was predominant (Systems Analysis) and was further 
developed by Warden. “Efficiency” coined the discourse especially in the scope of EBO and 
appears as the return of the managers, but this time in the Air Force’s language. Moreover, 
the “efficiency” thought reflects as well the perceived financial state of the armed forces in 
the 1990s. 
In parallel to the discussions surrounding the key termini and buzzwords of the discourses, 
others can be found which are recurring despite of the technological advances and new 
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concepts: for example, the “will” of the enemy which can be found in most of the Air Force 
Manuals. Other termini change or are changed, such as the center of gravity, whereas the 
former seems to be a modern recourse to Clausewitz‘ point of main effort or the United 
States Armed Forces’ interpretation of it, respectively. The Army utilized it in the scope of its 
occupation with German concepts regarding AirLand Battle. The culminating point as well is 
recurring, first with the Army (Active Defense), then the Air Force (Halt Phase) and the 
strategic attack remains in the discourse, has little significance in the AirLand Battle concept, 
but in return much in EBO. In this context the term “depth” plays a big part. At the beginning 
understood as an only geographical element and viewed in the scope of the AirLand Battle 
as an enlargement of the battlefield, it was steadily enlarged by the Air Force. As, at the 
outset of the 1990s, the Air Force dominated the “depth”, the Army reacted with its own 
interpretation, the projection of military power on a global scale – and “depth” would as well 
feature as a human element later-on in COIN doctrine. 
The question is: Will the Army and the Air Force begin a new cycle of doctrinal thinking after 
COIN, or with AirSea Battle, respectively? American military thought tends to be cyclical, 
with concepts, which often are little more than buzzwords, being heralded as revolutionary 
or transformational and preparing the future, then quickly going out of fashion, only to 
reemerge under a new rubric a decade or so later, as Linn describes.1284 Surely the CSBA’s 
conceptual thought and image of war found its way into official Army and Air Force 
statements and doctrine documents. Reading through some of the excerpts presented in the 
third and last part of this thesis, one could conclude that the PRC presented another 
fatalistic Fulda Gap scenario – or in this case, a new Pearl Harbor envisioned in the Western 
Pacific. Lewis concludes that “for half a century, the United States has planned and equipped 
itself to fight the type of war it wants to fight, not the type of war it is most likely to 
fight.”1285 The rebalancing in the United States grand strategy to the Pacific may also be a 
rebalancing in that it sees a return of the United States Armed Forces back to its comfort 
zone preparing only for proper wars against other great powers, the peers.1286 
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4GW      Fourth Generation Warfare 
A2/AD      Anti-access and Area denial 
A-AF CLIC     Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict 
AAN      Army After Next 
ADP      Army Doctrine Publication 
ADPA      American Defense Preparedness Association 
ADRP      Army Doctrine Reference Publication 
AEF      Expeditionary Air Force 
AFA       Air Force Association 
AFDD      Air Force Doctrine Document 
AFGSC      Air Force Global Strike Command 
AFHRA      Air Force Historical Research Agency 
AFM      Air Force Manual 
AHEC      Army Heritage and Education Center 
AI      Air Interdiction 
ALB-F (or ALBF)    AirLand Battle Future 
ALFA      Airland Forces Application Agency 
AMRAAM     Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
AO      Area of Operations 
APC      Armored Personnel Carrier 
APDA       Army Physical Disability Agency 
ARPA      Advanced Research Projects Agency 
ASCM      Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASAT      Anti-satellite [Weapon] 
ASB      AirSea Battle 
ASM      Air-to-Surface-Missile 
ATACMS     Army Tactical Missile System 
ATF      Advanced Tactical Fighter 




AU      Air University 
AUSA       Association of the United States Army 
AWACS     Airborne Early Warning and Control System 
BAI      Battlefield Air Interdiction 
BDA      Battle Damage Assessment 
BRD      Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
C2  Command and Control 
C4ISR  Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
CAC      United States Army Combined Arms Center 
CADD      Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate 
CARL       Combined Arms Research Library 
CAS      Close Air Support 
CENTAF     Central Command Air Forces 
CENTCOM     United States Central Command 
CIA      Central Intelligence Agency 
CINC      Commander-in-Chief 
CINCUSAREUR  Commander in Chief of United States Army 
Europe 
CINCPAC     Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command 
CINCREDCOM     Commander-in-Chief, Readiness Command 
CJCS      Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CG      Commanding General 
CO      Commanding Officer 
CoG      Center of Gravity 
COIN      Counterinsurgency 
CONUS     CONtinental United States  
CNA      Computer Network Attack 
CNO      Chief of Naval Operations 
CRS      Congressional Research Service 




CSAF      Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
CSAR      Combat Search and Rescue 
DARPA      Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DDR      Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
DE      Directed Energy 
DSB      Defense Science Board 
EBO      Effects-Based Operations 
ESM      Electronic support measures 
EW      Electronic Warfare 
FAC      Forward Air Controller 
FCS      Future Combat System 
FEBA      Forward Edge of the Battle Area 
FID      Foreign Internal Defense 
FLIR      Forward Looking Infrared 
FLOT      Forward Line of Troops 
FM      Field Manual 
FOC      Full Operational Capability 
FOFA      Follow-on Forces Attack 
FOIA      Freedom of Information Act Request 
FRY      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
FSCL      Fire Support Coordination Line 
GAO      Government Accountability Office 
GMTI      Ground Moving Target Indicator 
GPS      Global Positioning System 
HERO      Historical Evaluation and Research Organization 
HQ      Headquarters 
HUD      Head-up Display 
IADS      Integrated Air Defense System 
IO      Information Operations 
IRBM      Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile 
ISB      Intermediate Staging Bases 




ISR      Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
ISTA      Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition 
IW      Information Warfare 
JCS      Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JDAM      Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JFC      Joint Force Commander or Joint Force Command 
JOAC      Joint Operational Access Concept 
J-SAK       Joint Second Echelon Attack 
J-SEAD      Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
JSF      Joint Strike Fighter 
JSTARS      Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
LAV      Light Armored Vehicle 
LCS      Littoral Combat Ship 
LGB      Laser Guided Bomb 
LLO      Logical Line of Operations 
LRS-B      Long Range Strike Bomber 
MACV      Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
MAGTF     Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MBT      Main Battle Tank 
MIRV  Multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicle 
MLRS      Multiple-launch Rocket System 
MNF-I      Multi- National Force-Iraq 
MOOTW     Military Operations other than War 
MRC      Major Regional Conflict 
MTR      Military-Technological Revolution 
MTW      Major Theater War 
NATO      North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCA       National Command Authority 
NCW      Network-Centric Warfare 




NIA/D3 Networked, Integrated, Attack-in-Depth to 
Disrupt, Destroy, Defeat 
NTC      National Training Center 
OAS      Offensive Air Support 
ODCSDOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army 
[Doctrine] 
OEF      Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF      Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OMG      Operational Maneuver Group 
OPFOR      Opposition Force 
OUP      Operation Unified Protector 
PCC      Pre-Command Course 
PGM      Precision Guided Munition 
PLA      People’s Liberation Army 
PLAAF      People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PMA      Precision Munition Attack 
PRC      People’s Republic of China 
QDR      Quadrennial Defense Review 
RAND      Research and Development 
RCS      Radar Cross Section 
RDO      Rapid Decisive Operations 
REFORGER     Return of Forces to Germany 
RMA      Revolution in Military Affairs 
RUSI      Royal United Services Institute 
SAM      Surface-to-Air Missile 
SBCT      Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
SEAD      Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SLBM      Ship-launched Ballistic Missile 
SLOC      Sea Line of Communication 
SOF      Special Operations Forces 
SOTAS      Stand-off Target Acquisition System 




TAC      Tactical Air Command 
TACAIR     Tactical Air 
TACFIRE     Tactical Fire Direction 
TOW      Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided 
TRADOC     Training and Doctrine Command 
UDSSR      Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken 
USAF      United States Air Force 
USAAF      United States Army Air Force 
USAWC     United States Army War College 
USSOCOM     United States Special Operations Command 
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